外文文獻(xiàn)及翻譯企業(yè)人力資源管理模式

洛陽理工學(xué)院畢業(yè)設(shè)計(jì)（論文）外文翻譯資料系 部： 經(jīng)濟(jì)與工商管理系 專 業(yè)： 工商管理 學(xué)生姓名： 鄭雷震 班級(jí)學(xué)號(hào)： B09090634 指導(dǎo)教師姓名： 鄧 輝 指導(dǎo)教師職稱： 副教授 Human Resource ManagementJapanese business management personnel of the supervision and restraint mainly from two aspects: first, the holding company from the cross-shareholdings, if a poor performance or business operators can not afford, the major shareholder of the business operators will be for criticism, and urge them to improve their work, until the removal of the operator; Another important oversight from the main bank. Main bank monitoring the way of business management under specific circumstances: in the good performance of the company, the enterprise is operating normally, the main banks do not intervene, but when the poor performance of the company to display and control power. Main bank can be major shareholders, the Board replace the managers. Cross-shareholdings in the company and the main bank holding system, the holding sole purpose is to make shareholders stabilization, mutual support and control, rather than to get a higher dividend and bonus. Therefore, the stock is not easily shot, turnover rate is low, the stock market and therefore have little effect on managers. Mergers on the stock market, Japan is also rare, making the market mechanism of the business management of the effectiveness of the external constraint is not.In Japan, due to external market is relatively underdeveloped in terms of British and American, plus the influence by Confucian culture, corporate family characteristics significantly, and management talent is also a longer period of employment, the general practice of lifelong employment system, the relative mobility between enterprises much less. Enterprise managers are mainly promoted from within the enterprise (in addition to the lowest level of job outside), so good management is more willing to risk is low, more opportunities for advancement in the pursuit of individual M-enterprise development, enterprises in Japan, M often gathered many of the more outstanding middle-level management personnel. In the promotion and remuneration, the implementation of power series in wages, promotion system, with employees working years of age and growth of enterprises to increase wages and improve employee job level. For this system there is no increase in wages and promotion by giving employees the ability or strength difference, so for those who like the same age and length of service of employees, wages there would be no difference. Japanese companies attach great importance to the development of enterprise training management personnel, many companies have their own training centers and training are. However, different from Japanese companies and the United States, more emphasis on generalist training.In Germany, the dual track development of human resources training model (that is, young people in schools and businesses at the same time education and training), Germany on human resources development, a major feature. German training system and mode of this study with the same highlights and a combination of theory and practice characteristics, the more successful resolution of the training system and employment system interface. In addition, German companies attach great importance to the service personnel (including managers at all levels) for continuing education and retraining. Germanys business community and flexible training methods for employees, diversity, efficiency, the kind of training on the use of which benefit. Content from the training point of view, a new adaptive training of workers, have jobs diverted to training, job training, promotion, professional training and corporate training managers at all levels. The training of professionals so that they are often taken to study problems with organizing seminars, exchanges, organizing short courses, the purpose, direction, practical, very strong. Training for enterprise management approach often taken at different levels. Senior management of enterprises rely mainly on the self, organize them into a condition of good environmental sites, conduct discussions and exchange; of middle managers, most of the way to full-time training, to the training center to learn; on line managers, often type of education and training to promotion mode, with the incentive mechanism is also easy to find talent from which companies, because this layer of workers who directly organize production and business activities, the status of important and irreplaceable role. Ownership structure is the formation of the determinants of different management modelsDifferent ownership structure is the formation of the company management talent management company the deciding factor. Differences in the ownership structure of the company, thus the formation of different companies and management talent management.Widely dispersed ownership of U.S. companies, the lack of strong corporate governance by shareholders in the supervisory board of business by the board of directors and the supervisory board often a mere formality, the actual control easily transferred to the hands of managers. To this end the United States established a well-developed capital markets and sound corporate laws and regulations, effectively inhibited from outside the opportunistic behavior of managers. Meanwhile, the dispersed ownership of the companys acquisition of the stock market provides a convenient, making the market supervision as the most important external oversight mechanisms. Corporate cross-shareholdings by Japanese companies as the main features of the concentration of ownership, or the relative concentration of the internal control management will play an important role, and supervision of enterprises through the acquisition of the stock market operators more difficult. So, the company is how differences in ownership structure formed? The latest research shows that ownership structure is not entirely the formation of a competitive market outcome, the U.S. and Japanese companies of different ownership structure is due to different national laws, economic practices and other historical path caused by the difference. For example, the United States banned the use of deposits held by commercial banks, stocks, mutual antitrust laws strictly limit the holding company. Japanese companies allow commercial banks to hold less than 5% of the companys stock, the association of the mutual holding company looser trading restrictions and so on.Therefore, we select the operation and management talent management mode, to consider the overall system environment, consider the situation resulting from the history, consider the ownership concentration. Therefore, in the market system is not perfect, not perfect laws and regulations under construction, the companys external market-based management model is likely to result poor; for the relatively high concentration of large state-owned enterprises, strengthen internal control and governance is very important. The effects of two management The effect of Anglo-American model Anglo-American model of the internal management of its rationality. Board of Directors and managers do their job, is conducive to the operator to concentrate, improve management, use of the work of the operators to maintain enthusiasm and innovation, prompted the company to develop. However, at the same time, Anglo American also obvious internal management problems. British external market-based management need to address the question of how the operators work to keep the passion in the same time, the lack of adequate monitoring mechanisms and of a great dereliction of duty and senior managers to control the issue for personal gain. Beginning of the 20th century, 80 years, this issue may become increasingly prominent in the Anglo-American performance. In particular, in 2002 Enron, WorldCom, Xerox and other corporate scandals have exposed the credibility with the market mechanism to ensure the authenticity of financial information and the independence of independent directors was suspect in the supervision of Anglo-American model more apparent defects . Therefore, in the Anglo-American, on board the improvement, the introduction of independent directors and outside directors on how to play a substantive role has become a focus of attention. External market-oriented Anglo-American management talent management model is built on a more sound market mechanism and legal system based on its management of the company and operate better supervision and restraint. But it also has the following shortcomings: the highly fragmented ownership structure resulted in the operators short-term, long-term damage to business interests and development; the high mobility of the companys equity capital structure so that the stability of Anglo-American difference, managers replaced too frequently; acquisition in many cases not conducive to the managers of their initiative.Anglo-American management model, manager market development, business management personnel remuneration are closely linked with the contributions and the market, pay way more diverse, which makes under American management incentive compensation system better able to fully mobilize the management staff initiative. However, the U.S. corporate high-promoted, high-reward, high-stimulated management to some extent also be adversely affected. Very serious short-term phenomenon, many young people to work less than a year to replace the five or six times the work, this phenomenon is upset the companys long-term training programs of the companys development strategy. And with the increasing income gap, the general staff turnover rate is also climbing, the companys operating efficiency will certainly be different degrees. Also, any number of staff employment policies also brought serious insecurity, lowered their loyalty to the enterprise; labor confrontation, the excessive concentration of decision-making power also showed a larger ills. Effect of German and Japanese models German-Japanese model is better internal management. In this mode, the banks in general is the companys largest shareholder, the bank has access to the company in control of information production and management of natural advantages, making the monitoring role of shareholders to better play, supervision and management of the business was better than bound good. In addition, because the companys core shareholders - the shareholders of Bank is a stable, long-term investment focus, which can be subject to long-term incentive management is conducive to better achieve the companys long-term development. German-Japanese management model, in promotion and compensation in general, the implementation of power series in wages, promotion system, with employees working years of age and growth of enterprises to increase wages and improve employee job level. Labor relations and comprehensive cooperation have strengthened the staffs sense of security and sense of belonging, improve staff-to-business loyalty. In general, little change in the Japanese model in the technical industries such as manufacturing, while a relatively strong advantage. However, this system also led many Japanese companies are overstaffed and inefficient; addition, because this system there is no increase in wages and promotion by giving employees the ability or strength difference, for those who like the same age and length of service of staff , there is no difference in wages, but also makes difficult to stand out talents, was repressed and wasted a common phenomenon. In addition, the incentives of a single, particularly serious impact on narrowing income gap and the suppression of the enterprise managers enthusiasm and creativity classes. Both business management personnel management development trend From the development of management talent management trends, with the development of economic globalization, countries in corporate governance of mutual learning, mutual learning, a variety of management talent management is also evolving, and the main show the following main Features: United States and Britain began to learn German and Japanese management model management, attention to internal control and long-term incentive. German-Japanese model shown has the advantage, banks and Enterprise Group Holdings in ways that favor long-term development to encourage enterprises to focus on; and Anglo-American capital markets to stock-based operators can easily lead to more inclined to take short-term, in order to obtain short-term return on investment lost the long-term business opportunities. To this end, Britain and the United States companies starting to focus on long-term incentive to change business in the short term behavior and short-term employment means employees pay more attention to mobilizing the enthusiasm of employees.80 years since the 20th century, the gradual relaxation of British and American control of the financial system. In particular the United States through 1999, Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999, the end of the commercial banks, securities and insurance sub-sector management and separate supervision of the situation. In 1986, the implementation of the London Stock Exchange, the first major reform to allow non-members can obtain 100% ownership of membership, which is equal to allow commercial banks to participate directly in the securities business. Deregulation will allow the banks role in monitoring the company increased. Under British management approach continues to pay rich Traditional pay system in order to avoid all the disadvantages brought to skills-based pay system has become a U.S. corporate trend of pay reform. This salary system is based on the skills of employees are paid according to master, rather than the specific time they are engaged in paid work and reward. This kind of investment (including knowledge, skills and abilities) for the measurement based pay system will help encourage employees to consciously acquire new work skills and knowledge for enterprise innovation. In addition, the variable pay system and the non-monetary compensation system is constantly being used and developed. The gradual weakening of German and Japanese management model within the direct control of the external market began to strengthen monitoringFrom the 80s, along with the development of securities markets and enterprise self-accumulation capabilities, direct financing business in Japan, Germany, the increase in funding to enable enterprises to reduced dependence on bank loans, corporate debt rate decreased to weakening the banks control of the business, Japan, Germany, the trend of concentration of share ownership structure began to weaken, the market external monitor role is being strengthened.Germany and Japan the traditional management mode of employment, selection methods are changing In Japan, the annual salary system, variable pay increases and other human resources management system for Performance feature has become increasingly evident, the flow of employment, the expansion of contract employees, the tendency to further strengthen the cost-impact on the business operations of the welfare system pension reform, the general direction of development can not be questioned. In Japan, staff work with the values of diversity, employee self-conscious high, and dismissal of the phenomenon of increase in the employment relationship and other adjustments, employees and business sense of the common sense and progressive loss of one. Coupled with the increased mobility of the labor market to the premise of lifetime employment means employment is constantly loosening and changes. From the current actual situation, many Japanese companies have canceled the lifetime employment system, on Merits gradually being broken. The original step by step, the internal promotion, the rules have changed. So someone said, Japanese companies and personnel system three pillars of the two slowly fall.企業(yè)人力資源管理模式日本企業(yè)經(jīng)營管理人才的監(jiān)督和約束主要來自兩個(gè)方面：首先是來自交叉持股的持股公司，如果一個(gè)企業(yè)經(jīng)營績效差或者經(jīng)營者沒有能力，大股東就會(huì)對(duì)該企業(yè)的經(jīng)營者提出批評(píng)意見，督促其改進(jìn)工作，直至罷免經(jīng)營者；另一重要監(jiān)督來自主銀行。主銀行監(jiān)督企業(yè)經(jīng)營管理層的方式根據(jù)具體情況而定：在公司業(yè)績較好、企業(yè)運(yùn)轉(zhuǎn)正常時(shí)，主銀行不進(jìn)行干預(yù)，但在公司業(yè)績很差時(shí)，就顯示控制權(quán)力。主銀行可以通過大股東會(huì)、董事會(huì)更換經(jīng)理人員。在公司交叉持股和主銀行持股體制中，持股目的只在于使股東穩(wěn)定化，相互支持和相互控制，而不是為了得到較高的股息和紅利。所以，股票不輕易出手，周轉(zhuǎn)率低，股票市場(chǎng)因此對(duì)經(jīng)理層影響甚微。就股票市場(chǎng)上的兼并而言，日本也很少發(fā)生，這就使得市場(chǎng)機(jī)制對(duì)企業(yè)經(jīng)營管理層的外部約束效力不大。在日本，由于外部市場(chǎng)相對(duì)英美來講不夠發(fā)達(dá)，再加上深受儒家文化的影響，企業(yè)家族特色明顯，經(jīng)營管理人才的雇傭期也較長，一般實(shí)行終身雇傭制，企業(yè)間的人員流動(dòng)相對(duì)少得多。企業(yè)的管理人員則主要是從企業(yè)內(nèi)部提拔（除了最低層的職位以外），因此優(yōu)秀的管理人員更愿意在風(fēng)險(xiǎn)低、升遷機(jī)會(huì)較多的M型企業(yè)里追求個(gè)人發(fā)展，日本的M型企業(yè)里往往能聚集許多比較優(yōu)秀的中層經(jīng)營管理人才。在晉升與報(bào)酬方面，實(shí)行年功序列工資、晉升制度，伴隨員工年齡和工作年限的增長，企業(yè)為員工增加工資和提高職位等級(jí)。由于這個(gè)制度在增加工資和晉級(jí)上沒有按照員工的能力或?qū)嵙o予差別，因此對(duì)于那些同等年齡和工作年限一樣的員工，工資就沒有差別。日本公司也十分重視企業(yè)經(jīng)營管理人才的開發(fā)培訓(xùn)，許多公司都有自己的培訓(xùn)中心和研修所。但是，日本企業(yè)與美國不同，更重視通才的培養(yǎng)。在德國，“雙軌制”的人才開發(fā)培訓(xùn)模式（即青年在學(xué)校和企業(yè)同時(shí)接受教育和培訓(xùn)），是德國人力資源開發(fā)上的一大特色。德國的這種培訓(xùn)體制和模式突出了學(xué)用一致和理論與實(shí)際相結(jié)合的特點(diǎn)，較為成功地解決了培訓(xùn)制度與就業(yè)制度的銜接。另外，德國企業(yè)十分重視對(duì)在職人員（包括各級(jí)管理人員）進(jìn)行繼續(xù)教育和再培訓(xùn)。德國的企業(yè)界對(duì)職工的培訓(xùn)方法靈活，形式多樣，講究實(shí)效，哪種培訓(xùn)有利就采用哪種。從培訓(xùn)的內(nèi)容上看，有新工人適應(yīng)性培訓(xùn)、有轉(zhuǎn)業(yè)改行培訓(xùn)、職務(wù)晉升培訓(xùn)、專業(yè)人員培訓(xùn)和企業(yè)各級(jí)管理人員培訓(xùn)等。對(duì)專業(yè)人員培訓(xùn)往往采取讓他們帶著要研究解決的問題，舉辦講座，開展交流，組織短訓(xùn)班，其目的性、針對(duì)性、實(shí)用性非常強(qiáng)。對(duì)企業(yè)管理人員培訓(xùn)往往采取分層次的辦法。企業(yè)的高級(jí)管理人員，主要依靠自學(xué)，組織他們到一個(gè)條件好的環(huán)境場(chǎng)所，開展討論交流；對(duì)中級(jí)管理人員，大多數(shù)采取脫產(chǎn)培訓(xùn)的方法，送到培訓(xùn)中心去學(xué)習(xí)；對(duì)基層管理人員，往往采取晉升式的教育培訓(xùn)模式，十分具有激勵(lì)機(jī)制，也便于企業(yè)從中物色人才，因?yàn)檫@一層人員直接組織工人進(jìn)行生產(chǎn)經(jīng)營活動(dòng)，地位重要，作用不可取代。 所有權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)是形成不同管理模式的決定因素 公司所有權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)是形成不同公司經(jīng)營管理人才管理模式的決定因素。由于公司所有權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)存在差異，進(jìn)而形成不同的公司管理人才管理模式。 美國公司所有權(quán)極為分散，法人治理中缺乏強(qiáng)有力的股東通過董事會(huì)監(jiān)督企業(yè)經(jīng)營者，董事會(huì)和監(jiān)事會(huì)往往流于形式、實(shí)際控制權(quán)容易轉(zhuǎn)移到經(jīng)理人手中。為此美國建立了發(fā)達(dá)的資本市場(chǎng)和完善的公司法律法規(guī)，從外部有效地抑制了經(jīng)營者的機(jī)會(huì)主義行為。同時(shí)，分散的公司所有權(quán)為股票市場(chǎng)的并購提供了方便，使得市場(chǎng)的監(jiān)督成為最主要的外部監(jiān)督機(jī)制。日本公司以法人相互持股為主要特征，所有權(quán)集中或者相對(duì)集中，內(nèi)部監(jiān)控管理將發(fā)揮重要的作用，而通過股票市場(chǎng)并購監(jiān)督企業(yè)經(jīng)營者的難度加大。 那么，公司所有權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)的差異是如何形成的呢？最新的研究表明，公司所有權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)不完全是競(jìng)爭(zhēng)性市場(chǎng)所形成的結(jié)果，美國和日本公司所有權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)的差異是由于各國不同的法律規(guī)定，經(jīng)濟(jì)慣例等歷史路徑差異所造成的。例如，美國禁止商業(yè)銀行利用存款持有股票，反壟斷法律嚴(yán)格限制公司相互持股。日