員工獎金制度中英文對照外文翻譯文獻

1、文獻信息：文獻標題：Effects of staff bonus systems on safety behaviors（員工獎金制度對安全行為的影響）國外作者：M.Mattson，I.Torbirn，J.Hellgren文獻出處：Human Resource Management Review,2013,24(1):17-30字數(shù)統(tǒng)計：英文 2461 單詞，13345 字符；中文 4221 漢字外文文獻：Effects of staff bonus systems on safety behaviorsAbstract Bonus systems are a common means in

2、trying to motivate employees to perform well. However, there is still disagreement regarding the effects of bonus systems. Some theories even suggest that such systems could cause an increase in risk-behavior. This makes further research regarding bonus systems warranted, especially when applied in

3、high-risk organizations. This study aims to explore potential effects on safety-related behavior associated with bonus systems currently used at Swedish nuclear power plants. Fifteen semi-structured interviews with employees were performed based on an eclectically composed framework from motivationa

4、l and organizational theories. Results do not indicate any negative effects on safety-related behaviors, but rather that safety behaviors may be promoted insofar as bonus rewards are linked to performance goals concerning safety. Differences in bonus system design appeared to affect behavioral outco

5、mes. The comparative and qualitative approach of this study contributes valuable information by highlighting the types of factors that may serve to stimulate greater incentive for employees to engage in safe behavior.Keywords: Bonus; Pay system; Incentive; Motivation; Nuclear power plant;Safety1.Int

6、roductionA large proportion of companies around the world are presently making use of monetary incentives in the form of so-called bonus systems in order to motivate employees to perform better (Patton, 1972). However, there are still disagreements regarding the real effect of bonuses on motivation

7、and performance (Pfeffer, 1997). While a few studies have found indications of increased motivation and improved performance due to monetary incentives such as bonuses under some conditions (e.g. Engellandt & Riphahn, 2011; Kahn & Sherer, 1990), there are also studies showing no or even negative eff

8、ects of incentive systems.Workplace accidents are increasingly common and one of the biggest issues facing employers today is the safety of their employees. Organizational practices that promote safety are vital for organizations in general and high-risk organizations in particular. As a consequence

9、, many high-risk organizations use bonus systems that are more or less directed towards achieving safety through improved safety-related performance among its employees. However, empirical research is scant regarding the effects of these systems and the results from the little research that has been

10、 conducted are mixed as well. Some evidence suggests that bonus systems that reward safety behavior could result in a decreased accident frequency (Goodrum & Gangwar, 2004). However, other research suggests that bonus systems designed to reward employees for working injury-free over a set period of

11、time could be detrimental due to underreporting of accidents as a result of fear among the workforce of losing their bonus. This could result in continuing problems and risks that may otherwise have been attended to (Cooper, 2001; Miozza & Wyld, 2002).Given the ambiguous empirical evidence of the ef

12、fects of bonus systems,organizations making use of these kinds of systems take an imminent risk of obtaining unintended, and even undesirable, effects. This could be especially harmful to certain kinds of organizations, such as those dealing with operations involving high risks. Several reviews indi

13、cate that bonuses could be particularly detrimental to performance when the task is intrinsically interesting enough and when the task is complex enough that flexible thinking is needed (e.g. McGraw, 1978). Consideringthe complexity and high technology characterizing the environment in many high rel

14、iability organizations (HROs), these findings implicate that bonus systems could potentially pose a threat to safety. This may be especially relevant when confronted with an accident situation where complexity and ambiguity are particularly evident. More research is therefore warranted regarding whi

15、ch factors involved in bonus systems that are perceived as motivating by the employees and in extension, that promote safety-related behaviors.The aim of the present field study was to find out whether bonus systems could compromise safety in nuclear power plants and other high-risk organizations. T

16、he main question concerned the potential effects on motivation and safety-related behavior that could be associated with the use of bonus systems by identifying factors that could possibly affect safety via changes in behavior. The data used in the study comes from in-depth interviews with employees

17、 at three Swedish nuclear power plants where employee bonus systems are currently applied. The systems applied at the three plants have considerable differences in design, which enabled a tentative comparative analysis of the perceived motivational effects due to these differences.The study also inn

18、ovates by adopting a qualitative approach using a theoretical analysis and in-depth interviews in investigating potential behavioral effects. To date, qualitative approaches such as in the present study are unusual when it comes to examination of monetary rewards and safety. The more frequently used

19、 quantitative studies in the field offer valuable information about relations between different factors, such as between the application of bonus systems and particular safety outcomes, but they do not provide us with any deeper understanding of the underlying causes of those relations. The qualitat

20、ive and comparative nature of this study could contribute by reducing the gap between research and practice in the application of bonus systems in high-risk organizations. This could be achieved through the offering of valuable information in this regard by highlighting the types of factors and goal

21、s that may serve to stimulate greater incentive for employees to avoid risk and engage in safe behavior.2.Methods2.1.Elaboration of a theoretical frameworkAs part of the design of our study, one aim was to first establish which role monetary rewards in general might play according to a broader spect

22、rum of theories. Hence, an elaboration of theories on motivation, organizational perspectives and previous research regarding safety-related bonus systems was performed. The intent with such an eclectic approach was to produce a theoretical frame of reference through the generation of different them

23、es that were considered to be relevant for the functioning of bonus systems and, more specifically, safety behaviors. The theoretical models selected to provide the themes for the study were those that could in some way be related to the effects from monetary rewards, and none of them were therefore

24、 given overall precedence. The emerging themes were then used as a platform, both for the interviews with the employees at the power plants and for the subsequent interpretation of the data obtained from the interviews and from the mapping of the bonus systems (see Fig. 1).2.2.An eclectic framework

25、for exploring potential effects of bonus systemsVarious types of theories on the assumed effects of rewards on motivation, performance and safety have been brought together with the purpose of forming a broad and eclectic theoretical framework for the present study. Table 1 shows a variety of aspect

26、s of possible relevance for the effects of bonus systems as such aspects are derived from theories or empirical evidence. As the various motivational and organizational theories referred to in the table are basic and well known they are not described in the text but samples of general references are

27、 given in Table 1. Based on the aspects listed in Table 1, seven major key themes were identified and used as a platform and guide for both the interviews and the analysis of data. Table 2 shows the overriding themes and the types of theories from which they were extracted.2.3.SettingThe study was c

28、arried out at all three presently active Swedish nuclear power plants. All three plants had approximately 10001500 employees each and wereabout the same physical size (34 reactors each). They had similar hierarchical structures in which the service and support staffs worked directly under the CEOs.

29、Each reactor encompassed a discrete production unit that was comprised of several subgroups (e.g., operator shift teams, maintenance teams). Today, the plants are all incorporated companies.Table 3 shows the percentages of maximum bonus for plants AC contingent upon economic vs. quality goals, corpo

30、rate vs. plant goals, and group vs. individual goals. Bonus goals related to production and economic results varied between 25 and 50% among the plants. The remaining portions of maximum bonuses were based on quality goals. The nature of these goals differed to some extent among the three systems bu

31、t mainly focused on competence and process development as well as safety-related issues. All of the three bonus systems applied to all permanently employed staff members (except the plant managing director and vice president). Anybonus was paid retrospectively on a yearly basis. At plants A and B, t

32、he potential bonus was limited to a maximum amount of 20,000 Swedish crowns (SEK) annually per person. At plant C, the quality goals also included certain individual goals. These goals were separate from those concerning regular work tasks and often focused on behaviors regarding safety awareness. T

33、he maximum potential bonus at plant C was limited to a certain percentage (1030%) of the individuals yearly salary, which differed among staff categories (with higher percentages applying to higher positions). The goals to be used in the systems were decided by the managing director after consultati

34、on with executives and operational managers. Generally, other employees were not able to influence the selection of goals, except possibly through the unions. However, at plant C, individual goals were set, and even evaluated, through a collaboration of the individual and his or her immediate superv

35、isor. In this case, the individual part of the bonus was based on the managers final evaluation of whether the criteria were fulfilled, on a scale between 0110%. Otherwise, the goals, criteria, and estimated rewards of the bonus system were communicated continuously, for example, through the interna

36、l website. In some cases a method using balanced scorecards was used in the system. Scorecards of this kind generally apply to strategic and measurable goals that can be either of a financial or of a qualitative (e.g. learning in the organization) character. The bonus system had had these designs fo

37、r about two to four years at the time of the present investigation. The specific goals of the systems are, however, revised yearly and the size of the bonuses often varies from one year to another. Employees usually end up earning some bonus, but they rarely receive theirfull potential bonus.As can

38、be seen in Table 3, the three systems differed in the extent to which they emphasized goal achievement at the corporate, plant, and individual levels. At plant A, all of the goals were set at the corporate and plant levels and were thus the same for all employees. The system at plant B holds, beside

39、s a major share of bonuses related to plant level results, also a share (15%) set at a lower, group level. At plant C, as much as 40% of the maximum bonus was related to individual goals, but nothing to goals defined at group level.In Table 3, each bonus system has been given a denotation or keyword

40、 indicating to what degree they emphasize collective or individual goals. The keyword does not mention the systems design on the economic-quality goal dimension, but is only intended to facilitate the further reading by offering a short denotation of one of the main characteristics of each system.2.

41、4.SampleFive employees from each of the three nuclear power plants (A, B, and C) were selected to participate in the study. To obtain this sample, one of the interviewees at each plant was first selected as a contact person for the study, based on advice from the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority,

42、the public authority in charge of controlling the nuclear plants. The contact persons in turn proposed four additional employees at their plant for participation. The contact persons had been prompted to select employees who could have varied views and experiences of the systems and who represented

43、different functions and positions in the organization. Four of the participants were middle level managers, four were lower level managers (operational) and seven were workers. Of the workers, five worked in production shift teams (e.g. control room personnel) and two worked with maintenance. None o

44、f the participants were top-level managers, such as CEO or vice president. The final sample consisted of two women and thirteen men, which corresponds fairly well to the general proportion within the plants. The age range of the participants was 3263 years.3.ConclusionsDrawing on general theories of

45、 motivation, our study presents a useful framework for examining the possible effects that bonus systems may have on employee motivation and safety behavior. Applying this approach as reflected in ourinterview guide and in the data obtained, nothing was found to indicate that the systems under study

46、 should negatively affect safety behaviors, for example, in terms of increased risk taking or underreporting. All three systems seemed to have problems achieving any significant effects on behaviors. They all lacked in incentive intensity and motivational effects due to different problems within the

47、ir design. To the degree that the systems at all influenced safety behaviors, the effects appear to be positive and directly mediated by the bonus goals being related to safety issues and also indirectly mediated by the pronounced safety concerns framing the systems. All three systems also appeared

48、to have some positive effects on the respondents general work motivation, due to the systems role in clarifying priorities, creating a sense of participation, and bringing about appreciation and recognition for those involved. The results indicate that group or team based goals seem to be a good mid

49、dle way of avoiding unsafe competition and feelings of unfairness but still creating a clear link between behavior and reward. However, in order to achieve positive effects, the results imply that it is essential to set goals aimed at realistic quality improvements (such as safety issues) instead of

50、 economic achievements and to create feelings of participation among the employees. Clear information and feedback, a design that is perceived as fair and the avoidance of goal conflicts also seems to be of great importance in order to create incentives for safe behaviors.The results of the present

51、study can have practical implications in a number ofways. Bonus systems of different kinds are today a popular means of trying to achieve corporate goals. The possible negative impact that a badly designed system could have on factors such as safety should be of critical interest not only for power

52、plants, but also for HROs in general. Although the results from the present study do not indicate that the systems posed any significant risks to safety, it cannot be presumed that such bonus systems may not do so in other HROs. Such a risk could arise even if many of the bonus goals were to relate

53、directly to safety concerns, as was the case at the studied plants. Still, the results indicating that the three systems and their motivational effects were perceived in clearly distinct ways by the employees at the three nuclear power plants due to their differences, underline the importance ofsyst

54、em design in preventing negative effects on safety.中文譯文：員工獎金制度對安全行為的影響摘要獎金制度是一個試圖激勵員工來更好地完成工作的常見的手段。然而，在獎金制度的激勵作用的問題上仍然存有一些分歧。甚至一些理論表明， 這樣的制度可能導致不安全行為的增加。這就需要對獎金制度做進一步的研究， 特別是在高危行業(yè)。本研究旨在探討目前在瑞典核電站使用獎金制度對安全行 為的潛在影響。通過與十五名員工進行的半結構化訪談，并根據(jù)激勵與組織理 論得出了一個折衷的理論框架。結果并沒有顯示獎金制度對安全行為有任何負 面影響,相反地，在獎金獎勵與安全績效的促進范圍

55、內，安全行為可能會被大大提高。獎金制度設計的差異似乎對安全行為也存在影響。本研究通過比較和定 性的方法，通過突出那些能夠更好地激勵員工參與到安全行為中去的各類影響 因素，從而得出有價值的信息。關鍵詞：獎金、薪酬制度、獎勵、動機、核電站、安全1.介紹全世界大部分的公司為了激勵員工表現(xiàn)得更好，目前正在使用的一種以金錢鼓勵（即所謂獎金制度）為主的形式(Patton，1972)。然而,就獎金激勵機制的實際效果與績效而言仍然然存在著分歧(Pfeffer，1997)。然而一些研究己經有跡象表明，在一定條件下的貨幣激勵機制諸如獎金等可以提供動力和改善行為行動(例如，Engellandt 和 Riphahn，

56、2011；Kahn 和 Sherer，1990)，也有研究顯示，激勵系統(tǒng)甚至連負面影響都沒有。工作場所發(fā)生的事故越來越普遍，其中雇主如今面臨的最大問題之一是員工的安全。組織在提高工作安全上的做法對一般組織，尤其對高風險組織都顯得至關重要。因此，許多高風險組織使用獎金制度，或多或少地朝著實現(xiàn)提高員工安全工作的目標而努力。然而，探究這些制度影響的研究少之甚少，甚至于其研究結果也與別的研究發(fā)生了混合。一些證據(jù)表明，獎勵安全行為的獎金制度可能會降低事故頻率(Goodrnm 和 Gangwar，2004 )。然而，其他研究表明， 起初旨在獎勵員工在規(guī)定的時間內無傷病記錄的獎金制度有可能會因為擔心失去獎金

57、的員工而發(fā)生瞞報事故。這可能導致持續(xù)的問題和風險，還有可能已經發(fā)生了（Cooper，2001；Miozza 和 Wyld，2002 )?？紤]到獎金制度的影響存在模糊的經驗證據(jù)，積極利用這些制度的組織承擔意想不到，甚至是不良影響的風險。這對某些類型的組織極其不利，比如處理涉及高風險業(yè)務的組織。一些評論表明，當任務在本質上是有趣并復雜時，獎金可能對工作表現(xiàn)尤其不利，這時候就需要靈活的思維(例如，McGraw，1978)?？紤]到許多高可靠性組織的環(huán)境有復雜性和高技術的特性(HROs)，這些發(fā)現(xiàn)暗示獎金制度對安全可能構成潛在威脅。當面對及其復雜和模糊的意外情況時， 獎金制度就顯得及其相關。因此凡是涉及

58、獎金制度中能激勵員工更能促進安全行為的因素，更多的研究可以得到保證。當前本領域研究的目的是找出獎金制度能否在核電站和其他高風險組織之間妥協(xié)安全保證。主要問題都關注對動機和使用獎勵制度的安全行為產生的潛在影響，同時通過識別從行為上的改變可能影響安全性的因素來確定相聯(lián)系的安全行為。這項研究中使用的數(shù)據(jù)來自于瑞典員工的深度訪談，這些員工來自于目前應用獎金制度的三個核電站。三家工廠的制度應用在設計中有很大的差異，正是激勵效果的差異形成一個初步的比較分析。這項研究創(chuàng)新調査方法，采用定性的方法，使用理論分析和深度訪談來調查行為的潛在影響。到目前為止，當面臨定貨幣獎勵和安全行為的檢査時，定性的方法，如應用在

59、目前研究中的方法就顯得不尋常。在提供不同因素間關系的有效信息的領域中，定量研究被不斷的頻繁使用，比如在獎金制度的應用及其帶來的特定安全結果之間，但定量研究不能給我們提供隊這些關系根本原因的任何更深的理解。本研究的定量性和比較性能夠減少高風險組織在研究和實踐應用獎金制度之間的差距。這點可以通過提供有效信息來實現(xiàn)，強調因素和目標的類型可能會提供員工避免風險和從事安全行為的更大激勵機制。2.方法2.1.細化的理論框架作為我們研究設計的一部分，首先要根據(jù)廣泛的理論來確立金錢獎勵在安 全管理中的作用。因此，需要研究一些細化的理論（關于安全動機、組織機構，以及早期的關于獎金制度的研究）。這種折衷的方法的目的是通過生成與獎金制度、更確切的是安全行為相關的不同的話題來構建一個可供參考的理論框架。用來提供此次研究話題的理論模型從某種程