內(nèi)部控制l論文相關(guān) 外文翻譯

1、.審計(jì)委員會(huì)、董事會(huì)和內(nèi)部控制重大缺陷的整治Audit Committees, Boards of Directors, and Remediation of Material Weaknesses in Internal Control譯文：本研究探討審核委員會(huì)和董事會(huì)的有效性是否與公司的內(nèi)部控制的重大缺陷修復(fù)的及時(shí)性有關(guān)。選取的樣本包括從2003年7月至2004年12月編報(bào)公司根據(jù)的“薩班斯 - 奧克斯利法案”第302節(jié)披露的至少一種重大弱點(diǎn)。采用Logistic回歸分析發(fā)現(xiàn)，較大的審計(jì)委員會(huì)，審計(jì)委員會(huì)，更大的非會(huì)計(jì)財(cái)務(wù)專業(yè)知識(shí)，以及更多的獨(dú)立委員會(huì)的企業(yè)更容易及時(shí)地修復(fù)重大缺陷。這些結(jié)

2、果表明，審計(jì)委員會(huì)及董事會(huì)對(duì)監(jiān)督整治重大缺陷發(fā)揮了重要作用?？偟膩碚f，這項(xiàng)研究有助于我們了解審計(jì)委員會(huì)和董事會(huì)根據(jù)薩班斯 - 奧克斯利法案“的制度的有效性。這項(xiàng)研究還確定了整治重大缺陷及時(shí)性的重要決定因素，這是提高財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告質(zhì)量和恢復(fù)投資者信心的關(guān)鍵。研究表明，審核委員會(huì)的質(zhì)量與該公司的內(nèi)部控制的質(zhì)量呈正相關(guān)?？死锵Ｄ希?005）使用的樣本公司，改變了審計(jì)師在1994-2000年期間發(fā)現(xiàn)，獨(dú)立審計(jì)委員會(huì)和審計(jì)委員會(huì)的財(cái)務(wù)專業(yè)知識(shí)是不太可能與內(nèi)部控制的問題有相關(guān)性。 Zhang等人（2007）使用在“薩班斯 - 奧克斯利法”頒布后披露內(nèi)部控制缺陷的樣本公司，發(fā)現(xiàn)這些企業(yè)更可能有財(cái)務(wù)專業(yè)知識(shí)少的審計(jì)

3、委員會(huì)。如果審計(jì)委員會(huì)的質(zhì)量與內(nèi)部控制的質(zhì)量有關(guān)，似乎有理由相信，一個(gè)更有效的審計(jì)委員會(huì)將確保及時(shí)修復(fù)重大缺陷，以保持內(nèi)部控制的有效性。一個(gè)有效的審計(jì)委員會(huì)可以直接進(jìn)行，通過審查財(cái)務(wù)和會(huì)計(jì)人員的會(huì)計(jì)程序和控制來監(jiān)督公司的控制。當(dāng)發(fā)現(xiàn)重大弱點(diǎn)，有效的審計(jì)委員會(huì)，更可能采取實(shí)用的方法，并和審計(jì)師討論如何整治重大缺陷。通過努力跟進(jìn)有關(guān)建議，以改善內(nèi)部控制和監(jiān)測(cè)整治力度的進(jìn)展，一個(gè)更有效的審計(jì)委員會(huì)可能導(dǎo)致重大缺陷的及時(shí)整治。雖然審計(jì)委員會(huì)在監(jiān)督整治重大缺陷中發(fā)揮了重要作用，但在整治過程中，董事會(huì)可以提供增量的監(jiān)督。在大型企業(yè)中，機(jī)構(gòu)發(fā)生沖突通常是由于所有權(quán)和控制權(quán)的分離。為了處理這些沖突和保障股東的

4、利益，董事會(huì)要發(fā)揮其監(jiān)督作用，監(jiān)督高層管理人員，監(jiān)督內(nèi)部控制系統(tǒng)，確保財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告的質(zhì)量。由于重大缺陷給了管理一個(gè)從事不一致行為的機(jī)會(huì)，董事會(huì)能夠履行其受托責(zé)任的監(jiān)督管理，確保管理層迅速采取行動(dòng)，修復(fù)重大缺陷和維護(hù)內(nèi)部控制質(zhì)量。有研究表明，董事會(huì)可以通過激進(jìn)的會(huì)計(jì)（德賽等，2006）推翻該公司的高層管理人員。如果董事會(huì)對(duì)類似的高層管理人員因內(nèi)部控制失敗進(jìn)行紀(jì)律處分，這可能對(duì)高層管理人員造成了強(qiáng)大的壓力來及時(shí)整治重大缺陷。一個(gè)更有效的董事會(huì)很可能在管理和監(jiān)督管理的行為方面有更強(qiáng)的影響力的。例如，有研究表明，一個(gè)更有效的板可以阻止管理行為導(dǎo)致的欺詐行為以及SEC的執(zhí)法行動(dòng)（1996年邁克爾 - 比斯利

5、.德肖等。1996年）。魏斯巴赫（1998）也認(rèn)為，一個(gè)更有效的董事會(huì)可以減少CEO財(cái)務(wù)表現(xiàn)不佳的可能性。因此，我期望一個(gè)更有效的董事會(huì)對(duì)重大缺陷進(jìn)行及時(shí)整治。 “薩班斯 - 奧克斯利法”的兩個(gè)重要方面是與財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告相關(guān)的內(nèi)部控制的質(zhì)量和公司治理機(jī)制的有效性。本研究發(fā)現(xiàn)，較大的非會(huì)計(jì)財(cái)務(wù)專業(yè)知識(shí)的審計(jì)委員會(huì)，以及更多的獨(dú)立委員會(huì)的企業(yè)更容易及時(shí)整治重大缺陷。結(jié)果有一定的影響。首先，雖然各大交易所要求審計(jì)委員會(huì)有至少3名董事，本研究的結(jié)果表明，公司可以擴(kuò)大其審計(jì)委員會(huì)，加強(qiáng)內(nèi)部控制的監(jiān)測(cè)。關(guān)于金融知識(shí)的定義，根據(jù)薩班斯 - 奧克斯利法案“407的爭議，這項(xiàng)研究表明，無財(cái)務(wù)專業(yè)知識(shí)的審核委員會(huì)成員，

6、提高了監(jiān)測(cè)的重大缺陷的整治。因此，非會(huì)計(jì)財(cái)務(wù)專業(yè)知識(shí)對(duì)于審計(jì)委員會(huì)成員的專業(yè)的治理知識(shí)是一種寶貴的組成部分。這一發(fā)現(xiàn)到最后得到“薩班斯 - 奧克斯利法”的支持，規(guī)定擴(kuò)大定義的財(cái)務(wù)專業(yè)知識(shí)，包括非會(huì)計(jì)知識(shí)。本研究具有一定的局限性。首先，現(xiàn)有的研究表明，有效的審計(jì)委員會(huì)的公司不太可能有內(nèi)部控制問題（克里希南2005年，張等人，2007年）。在本研究的樣本包括有重大缺陷的公司，從而可能偏向于贊成相對(duì)無效的審計(jì)委員會(huì)的公司。缺乏足夠的審計(jì)委員會(huì)特征的變化也可以對(duì)這些特性的發(fā)現(xiàn)顯著成效。此外，公司披露的重大缺陷，這是加速編報(bào)公司限制本研究的結(jié)果的普遍性。然而，以前的研究也限制設(shè)置測(cè)試審計(jì)委員會(huì)的影響，例

7、如，審計(jì)師變更的的公司（克里希南2005年）和強(qiáng)調(diào)財(cái)政上的公司（Car cello和Neal2000）。第二，公司終止其證券登記或延遲提交的10-K報(bào)告被排除在樣本。此外，這些公司將如何影響本研究的結(jié)果目前尚不清楚。第三，進(jìn)行的各種測(cè)試的統(tǒng)計(jì)力量可能是由于小樣本的大小。當(dāng)這加強(qiáng)了發(fā)現(xiàn)重要變量的統(tǒng)計(jì)力量時(shí)，它的工作原理為他人反對(duì)發(fā)現(xiàn)統(tǒng)計(jì)學(xué)上的顯著成效。最后，這是一個(gè)研究的關(guān)聯(lián)，而不是因果關(guān)系。這可能是與內(nèi)部控制質(zhì)量和治理特征的不可觀測(cè)的因素推動(dòng)的結(jié)果。這個(gè)問題通過增加在“薩班斯 - 奧克斯利法案期間（阿什博斯凱夫等人2007b; Doyle等人，2007年b）被發(fā)現(xiàn)的影響內(nèi)部控制質(zhì)量的各種控制變

8、量后緩解了。 原文：Audit Committees, Boards of Directors, and Remediation of Material Weaknesses in Internal Control Audit Committees, Boards of Directors, and Remediation of Material Weaknesses in Internal Control This study examines whether the effectiveness of the audit committee and the board of director

9、s is associated with firms timeliness in the remediation of material weaknesses in internal control. The sample comprises accelerated filers that disclosed at least one material weakness from July 2003 to December 2004 under Section 302 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act . Using logistic regression analyses,

10、 I find that firms with larger audit committees, audit committees with greater non-accounting financial expertise, and more independent boards are more likely to remediate material weaknesses in a timely manner. These results show that the audit committee and the board play an important role in moni

11、toring the remediation of material weaknesses. Overall, the study contributes to our understanding of the effectiveness of the audit committee and the board under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act regime. The study also identifies important determinants of firms timeliness in the remediation of material weakne

12、sses, which is key to improving financial reporting quality and restoring investor confidence. Studies have shown that the quality of the audit committee is positively associated with the quality of the firms internal controls. Krishnan (2005) uses a sample of firms that changed auditors over the pe

13、riod 1994-2000 and finds that independent audit committees and audit committees with financial expertise are significantly less likely to be associated with internal control problems. Zhang et al. (2007) use a sample of firms that disclosed internal control deficiencies after the enactment of Sarban

14、es-Oxley Act and find that these firms are more likely to have audit committees that have less financial expertise. If audit committee quality is associated with the quality of internal controls, it seems reasonable to believe that a more effective audit committee will ensure timelier remediation of

15、 material weaknesses in order to maintain the effectiveness of internal controls. An effective audit committee can directly engage in overseeing the firms controls by reviewing ternal accounting procedures and controls with the financial and accounting staff. When material weaknesses are detected, a

16、n effective audit committee is more likely to take a hands-on approach and discuss with the internal and external auditors on how to remediate material weaknesses . By diligently following up on recommendations to improve internal controls and monitoring the progress of the remediation efforts close

17、ly, a more effective audit committee is likely to result in timelier remediation of material weaknesses . Although the audit committee plays an important role in monitoring the remediation of material weaknesses , the board of directors can provide incremental oversight on the remediation process. W

18、ithin large corporations, agency conflicts arise due to the separation of ownership and control (Fama and Jensen 1983). To deal with these conflicts and to protect shareholders interests, the board assumes an oversight role that involves monitoring top management, approving the corporations strategy

19、, monitoring the internal control system, and ensuring the quality of financial reports. Because material weaknesses open a window of opportunity for management to engage in incongruent behaviors, the board can discharge its fiduciary duties in monitoring management by ensuring that management take

20、prompt actions to remediate material weaknesses and maintain internal control quality. Studies have shown that the board can oust top management from the firm for aggressive accounting (Desai et al. 2006). If the board imposes similar disciplinary actions on top management for internal control failu

21、res, this can create a strong pressure for top management to remediate material weaknesses promptly. A more effective board is likely to have a stronger influence on management and monitor the actions of management. For instance, studies have shown that a more effective board can deter managerial ac

22、tions leading to frauds and SEC enforcement actions (Beasley 1996; Dechow et al. 1996). Weisbach (1998) also finds that a more effective board increases the likelihood of CEO turnover due to poor financial performance. Hence, I expect a more effective board to result in timelier remediation of mater

23、ial weaknesses. Two important aspects of Sarbanes-Oxley Act are the quality of internal control over financial reporting and the effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms. This study finds that firms with larger audit committees, audit committees with greater non-accounting financial expertis

24、e, and more independent boards are more likely to remediate material weaknesses in a timely manner. The results have some implications. First, although the major exchanges require audit committees to have at least three directors, the results of this study suggest that firms can enhance the monitori

25、ng of internal controls by expanding their audit committees. With regard to the controversies over the definition of financial expertise under Sarbanes-Oxley Act 407, this study shows that the non-accounting financial expertise of the audit committee members enhances the monitoring of material weakn

26、esses remediation. Hence, non-accounting financial expertise is a valuable component of the governance expertise of the audit committee members. This finding lends support to the final provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which expand the definition of financial expertise to include non-accounting expe

27、rtise. This study has certain limitations. First, prior studies show that firms with effective audit committees are less likely to have internal controls problems (Krishnan 2005; Zhang et al. 2007). The sample in this study comprises firms with material weaknesses and may thus be biased in favor of

28、firms with relatively ineffective audit committees. The lack of sufficient variation in audit committee characteristics can also work against finding significant results for these characteristics.Furthermore, using firms that disclose material weaknesses and that are accelerated filers limit the generalizability of the results of this study. However, prior studies have also used restricted settings to test the effect of audit committeesfor example, auditor change firms (K