一個(gè)國(guó)際歷史性的比較2007美國(guó)次貸金融危機(jī)是否不同

1、一、 外文原文Is the 2007 U.S. Sub-Prime Financial Crisis So Different? An International Historical ComparisonCarmen M. Reinhart University of Maryland and the NBER and Kenneth S. Rogoff Harvard University and the NBERThe first major financial crisis of the 21st century involves esoteric instruments, unawa

2、re regulators, and skittish investors. It also follows a well-trodden path laid down by centuries of financial folly. This time is a problem of sub-prime mortgages, but this time is not different. In fact, there are stunning quantitative parallels across a number of major crisis indicators from the

3、standard literature on international financial crises. For example, the run-up in U.S. equity and housing prices, which Graciela L. Kaminsky and Carmen M. Reinhart (1999) find to the be best leading indicators of crisis in countries experiencing large capital inflows, closely tracks the average of t

4、he nineteen major post World War II banking crises in industrial countries. So, too, is the inverted v-shape of real growth in the years prior to the crisis. Despite widespread concern about the effects on national debt of the early 2000s tax cuts, the run-up in U.S. public debt is actually somewhat

5、 below the average of other crisis episodes. In contrast, the pattern of United States current account deficits is markedly worse. The book is still open on the how the current dislocations in the United States will play out, but some precedent can be found in the aftermath of other bank-centered fi

6、nancial crises in industrial economies. Depending on the degree of trauma to the banking system, they can be quite severe. A severe banking crisis typically has a far deeper and more protracted effect on growth than does a severe currency crisis, if the latter occurs in isolation. The average drop i

7、n (real per capita) output growth is over two percent, and it typically takes two years to return to trend. For the five most catastrophic cases (which include episodes in Finland, Japan, Norway, Spain and Sweden), the drop in annual output growth from peak to trough is over five percent, and growth

8、 remained well below pre-crisis trend even after three years. It is, of course, the more catastrophic casesthat policymakers particularly want to steer clear of.1. Post War Bank-Centered Financial Crises: The DataOur main purpose here is to make simple and straightforward comparisons of theUnited St

9、ates 2007 crisis with other post-war crises, employing a small piece of a much larger and longer historical data set we have constructed (see Reinhart and Kenneth S. Rogoff, 2008.) The extended data set catalogues banking and financial crises around the entire world dating back to 1800 (in some case

10、s earlier). In order to focus here on data most relevant to present U.S. situation, we do not consider the plethora of emerging market crises, nor industrialized country financial crises from the Great Depression or the 1800s. Nevertheless, it is striking how much the “this time is different” syndro

11、me has already been repeated.First came the rationalizations. This time, many analysts argued, the huge run-upin U.S. housing prices was not at all a bubble, but rather justified by financial innovation (including to sub-prime mortgages, as well as by the steady inflow of capital from Asia and petro

12、leum exporters. The huge run-up in equity prices was similarly argued to be sustainable thanks to a surge in U.S. productivity growth a fall in risk that accompanied the “Great Moderation” in macroeconomic volatility. As for the extraordinary string of outsized U.S. current account deficits, which n

13、ow soak up roughly two-thirds of all the worlds current account surpluses, many analysts argued that these, too, could be justified by new elements of the global economy. Thanks to a combination of a flexible economy and the innovation of the tech boom, the United States could be expected to enjoy s

14、uperior productivity growth for decades, while superior American know-how meant higher returns on physical and financial investment than foreigners could expect in the United States.Next came the reality. In the past few month, we have seen a striking contractionin wealth, increases in risk spreads,

15、 and deterioration in market functioning. The 2007United States sub-prime crisis, of course, has it roots in falling U.S. housing prices,which have in turn led to higher default levels particularly among less credit worthyborrowers. The impact of these defaults on the financial sector has been great

16、ly magnified due to complex bundling techniques that were thought to spread risk efficiently, but in fact have made the resulting instruments extremely nontransparent and illiquid in the face of falling house prices.As a benchmark for the 2007 U.S. sub-prime crisis, we draw on data from nineteen ban

17、k-centered financial crises from the post-War period. We have included postwar episodes in which an important financial institution or segment of financial sector collapsed in a manner similar to that described by Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999). For further discussion and documentation, see Reinhart a

18、nd Rogoff (2008).These crisis episodes include:The Five Big Five Crises: Spain (1977), Norway (1987), Finland (1991), Sweden (1991) and Japan (1992), where the starting year is in parenthesis. Other Banking and Financial Crises: Australia (1989), Canada (1983), Denmark (1987), France (1994), Germany

19、 (1977), Greece (1991), Iceland (1985), and Italy (1990), and New Zealand (1987), United Kingdom (1974, 1991, 1995), and United States (1984, 2007).The “Big Five” crises are all protracted large scale financial crises that are associated with major declines in economic performance for a protracted p

20、eriod. Japan (1992), of course, is the start of the “l(fā)ost decade,” although the Nordic Crises and the Spanish crisis of 1977 all left deep marks on their economies as well.The remaining rich country financial crises represent a broad range of lesser events. The 1984 U.S. crisis is the savings and lo

21、an crisis and, of course, the 2007 crisis is the sub-prime crisis, which we have represented as a U.S. crisis though of course it has had a severe impact on banks from Europe to Central Asia.While generally all the crises centrally involved the banking system, we have included the 1995 UK crisis tha

22、t resulted from the bankruptcy of Barings, which was essentially an investment bank. We note that one crisis episode not encompassed by our selection criteria is the period of severe bank stress in the U.S. and Europe, especially, caused by the developing country debt crisis that began in 1982. We o

23、mit it because the bank crisis was not clearly at the epi-center of problem (which had it roots in U.S. disinflation and a drop in world commodity prices). Moreover, it overlaps somewhat with our dating of the thrift crisis. However, including it would not weaken our results.2. ComparisonsWe now pro

24、ceed to a variety of simple comparisons between the 2007 U.S. crisis and previous episodes. Drawing on the standard literature on financial crises, we look at asset prices, growth and public debt. We begin in Figure 1 by comparing the run-up in housing prices. Period T represents the year of the ons

25、et of the financial crisis. So period T-4 is four years prior to the crisis, and the graph in each case continues to T+3, except of course in the case of the U.S. 2007 crisis.1 The chart confirms the case study literature, showing the significant run-up in housing prices prior to a financial crisis,

26、 with the affect being particularly pronounced for the “Big five” severe cases. Housing prices in the United States, however, have risen even further.Figure 2 looks at real rates of growth in equity market price indices. (For the United States, the index is the S&P 500; Reinhart and Reinhart, 20

27、08 provide the complete listing for foreign markets.)The U.S. again looks like the archetypical crisis country, only more so. Here, however, the big five crisis countries tended to experience equity price falls earlier on. Of course, each of these crises occurred at different points in the global pr

28、oductivity cycle, which may explain some of the difference. Then, too, the monetary responses differed across these episodes, with the Federal Reserve pumping in an extraordinary amount of stimulus in the early part of the most recent episode.Figure 3 looks at the current account as a share of GDP,

29、again starting four years before the crisis. Again, the United States looks like the typical pre-crisis country, in the capital inflows accelerate going into the crisis. However, the U.S. deficits are more severe, reaching over six percent of GDP. As already mentioned, there is a large and growing l

30、iterature that attempts to rationalize why it might be beneficial for the United States to a sustained current deficit. The simplest argument is that increasing global trade and financial globalization supports larger current account imbalances (Obstfeld and Rogoff, 2001). The various rationales for

31、 the massive U.S. current account deficit would be more reassuring if the U.S. deficit were not almost twice the average of the earlier precrisis episodes.Real per capita GDP growth in the run-up to debt crises is illustrated in Figure 4. The United States 2007 crisis follows the same inverted V sha

32、pe that characterizes the earlier episodes. Growth momentum falls going into the typical crisis, and remains low for two years after. In the more severe “Big Five” cases, however, the growth shock is ever larger and more prolonged. Not encouraging for the U.S. economic outlook, the aftermath of a ba

33、nking crisis tends to have a protracted effect on real growth.Figure 5 looks at public debt as a share of GDP. Rising public debt is a near universal precursor of other post-war crises, not least the 1984 U.S. crisis. Nevertheless, although public debt is rising prior to the 2007 U.S. crisis, it is

34、rising notably more slowly than in the average of the other 18 episodes, and much more slowly than the Big Five. This shallow path of U.S. public debt also makes it clear that the large current account deficits shown earlier owe to factors other than just government excess.The correlations in these

35、graphs are not necessarily causal, but in combination nevertheless suggest that if the United States does not experience a significant and protracted growth slowdown, it should either be considered very lucky or even more “special” that most optimistic theories suggest. Indeed, given the severity of

36、 most crisis indicators in the run-up to its 2007 financial crisis, the United States should consider itself fortunate if it can have post-crisis trajectory parallel to the milder banking crises in the comparison set, as opposed to the much larger growth pauses experiences by Spain, Japan, Sweden, N

37、orway and Finland during their severe financial crises.3. ConclusionsTolstoy famously begins his classic novel Anna Karenina with the line “Every happy family is alike, but every unhappy family is unhappy in their own way.” While each financial crisis no doubt has its own distinctions, there are als

38、o striking similarities, in the run-up of asset prices, in debt accumulation, in growth patterns, and in current account deficits. The majority of historical crises are preceded by financial liberalization, as documented in Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999). While in the case of the United States, there

39、has been no striking de jure liberalization, there certainly has been a de facto liberalization. New unregulated, or lightly regulated, financial entities have come to play a much larger role in the financial system, undoubtedly enhancing stability against some kinds of shocks, but possibly increasi

40、ng vulnerabilities against others.Perhaps the United States will prove a different kind of happy family. Despitemany superficial similarities to a typical crisis country, it may yet suffer a growth lapse comparable only to the mildest cases. Perhaps this time will be different as so many argue. What

41、ever the long-term outcome, the quantitative parallels to earlier post-war industrialized-country financial crises, at least in the pre-crisis period, is worthy of note. Of course, inflation is lower and better anchored today worldwide, and this may prove an important mitigating factor.One last para

42、llel deserves mention. During the 1970s, the U.S. banking system stood as an intermediary between oil-exporter surpluses and emerging market borrowers in Latin America and elsewhere. While much praised at the time, 1970s petro-dollar recycling ultimately led to the 1980s debt crisis, which in turn p

43、laced enormous strain on money center banks.3 It is true that this time, a great deal of petro-dollars are again flowing into the United States, but many emerging markets have been running current account surpluses, lending rather than borrowing. Instead, a large chunk of money has effectively been

44、recycled to a developing economy that exists within the United States own borders. Over a trillion dollars was channeled into the sub-prime mortgage market, which is comprised of the poorest and least credit worth borrowers within the United States. The final claimant is different, but in many ways,

45、 the mechanism is the same.二、 翻譯文章一個(gè)國(guó)際歷史性的比較：2007美國(guó)次貸金融危機(jī)是否不同卡門萊因哈特米馬里蘭大學(xué)和國(guó)家經(jīng)濟(jì)研究局和哈佛大學(xué)肯尼斯羅格夫?qū)W和國(guó)家經(jīng)濟(jì)研究局21世紀(jì)的第一次重大金融危機(jī)涉及深?yuàn)W的手段，不易察覺(jué)的調(diào)整機(jī)構(gòu)和活躍的投資者。它也良好地遵循了百年來(lái)金融危機(jī)的鬧劇規(guī)律。這一次我們將面臨抵押貸款的問(wèn)題,但與之前相比，也并無(wú)什么差異。事實(shí)上，在定量指標(biāo)上，很大一批危機(jī)指標(biāo)都和國(guó)際金融危機(jī)的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)文獻(xiàn)相吻合。例如，卡明斯基和卡門萊因哈特米（1999年）通過(guò)密切跟蹤二戰(zhàn)后十九次主要工業(yè)國(guó)家的銀行危機(jī)研究，發(fā)現(xiàn)美國(guó)股票上漲和住房?jī)r(jià)格,是引起經(jīng)濟(jì)危機(jī)中國(guó)家

46、大量資本流入的最好指標(biāo)。因此，也就是倒V形實(shí)際增長(zhǎng)在未來(lái)數(shù)年之前的危機(jī)。盡管2000年代初期，人們廣泛關(guān)注減稅國(guó)家的債務(wù)情況，但美國(guó)的公共債務(wù)卻低于其他經(jīng)濟(jì)危機(jī)波及的國(guó)家。與此相反，美國(guó)的赤字格局是明顯惡化。 該書還對(duì)如何改變美國(guó)目前混亂的情況做深入的研究，但一些先例可在其他銀行的善后事宜中找到。根據(jù)銀行系統(tǒng)不同程度的損傷，工業(yè)經(jīng)濟(jì)體的金融危機(jī)的相當(dāng)嚴(yán)重。較之發(fā)生在隔離狀態(tài)下的貨幣危機(jī)，一次嚴(yán)重的銀行危機(jī)通常具有更深遠(yuǎn)，更持久影響。平均降低產(chǎn)出的增長(zhǎng)（人均）超過(guò)百分之二時(shí)通常需要2年時(shí)間才能恢復(fù)到原有趨勢(shì)。五個(gè)最災(zāi)難性的案例（其中包括發(fā)作在瑞典，芬蘭，日本，挪威，西班牙）， 年產(chǎn)量從高峰下降到

47、低谷，但三年后，其增長(zhǎng)率超過(guò)百分之五，并保持良好的勢(shì)頭。1.戰(zhàn)后銀行經(jīng)濟(jì)危機(jī)數(shù)據(jù)：我們的主要目的是將美國(guó)2007年危機(jī)與其他戰(zhàn)后危機(jī)做簡(jiǎn)單的比較，使用一小塊更大和較長(zhǎng)遠(yuǎn)的歷史數(shù)據(jù)集延長(zhǎng)數(shù)據(jù)，我們已經(jīng)構(gòu)建（見(jiàn)萊因哈特和肯尼斯學(xué) 羅格夫，2008。）危機(jī)圍繞設(shè)定的目錄銀行和金融擴(kuò)展數(shù)據(jù)，整個(gè)世界可以追溯到1800年（在某些情況下更早）。為了集中這些數(shù)據(jù)，目前在美國(guó)的相關(guān)情況下，我們不過(guò)多地考慮新興市場(chǎng)危機(jī)，也不涉及十九世紀(jì)的工業(yè)化國(guó)家或金融危機(jī)大蕭條。 不過(guò)，驚人的是“這一次是不同的”綜合癥已經(jīng)被重復(fù)。 首先是合理化。這一次，許多分析師認(rèn)為，不是所有的美國(guó)房?jī)r(jià)的龐大升值都是泡沫經(jīng)濟(jì)，而是金融創(chuàng)新的

48、理由（包括次級(jí)抵押貸款，以及來(lái)自亞洲的穩(wěn)定資金流入 和石油出口國(guó)。股票價(jià)格的巨大運(yùn)行也同樣被認(rèn)為伴隨持續(xù)激增得益于美國(guó)生產(chǎn)率增長(zhǎng)下降的風(fēng)險(xiǎn) 下“大穩(wěn)定”的宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)波動(dòng)。至于非凡串聯(lián)的美國(guó)項(xiàng)目赤字過(guò)于龐大，目前大約吸收世界上所有賬戶盈余的三分之二。受到全球經(jīng)濟(jì)的新元素的影響，許多分析家認(rèn)為，這些也可能是合理的。由于經(jīng)濟(jì)與科技創(chuàng)新熱潮的靈活結(jié)合，美國(guó)可望在未來(lái)的幾十年里享受卓越生產(chǎn)力的不斷增長(zhǎng)，而與外國(guó)人相比，優(yōu)越的美國(guó)人更能發(fā)現(xiàn)物理和經(jīng)濟(jì)投資所能帶來(lái)的高回報(bào)。接下來(lái)是現(xiàn)實(shí)。在過(guò)去數(shù)月，我們已經(jīng)看到了顯著的財(cái)富收縮和增加的傳播風(fēng)險(xiǎn)還有市場(chǎng)運(yùn)作的惡化。2007年，美國(guó)次貸危機(jī)，當(dāng)然受美國(guó)房?jī)r(jià)下跌的影

49、響， 這反過(guò)來(lái)又導(dǎo)致較高水平信貸違約，特別是信譽(yù)不高的借款人。這些機(jī)構(gòu)的影響金融領(lǐng)域的拖欠率已經(jīng)大大放大捆綁技術(shù)，被認(rèn)為分散風(fēng)險(xiǎn)有效投資,但實(shí)際上其取得的結(jié)果非常不透明，技術(shù)流動(dòng)性不足，且不易面對(duì)下跌的房產(chǎn)價(jià)格。 作為2007年美國(guó)次貸危機(jī)的基準(zhǔn)，我們繪制了一戰(zhàn)后十九家銀行危機(jī)的數(shù)據(jù)圖。我們已經(jīng)涉及戰(zhàn)后波及點(diǎn)，其中一些重要的金融機(jī)構(gòu)或金融部門的倒塌類似于卡明斯基和萊因哈特在1999年進(jìn)一步討論的文件（見(jiàn)Reinhart和Rogoff，2008）。這些危機(jī)事件包括：“五大”的危機(jī)：西班牙（1977），挪威（1987年），芬蘭（1991），瑞典（1991年）和日本（1992年），其中今年開始在括號(hào)

50、。其他銀行和金融危機(jī)：澳大利亞（1989年），加拿大（1983年），丹麥（1987年），法國(guó)（1994年），德國(guó)（1977年），希臘（1991年），冰島（1985年），意大利（1990年）和新西蘭（1987年），英國(guó)（1974年，1991年，1995年），美國(guó)（1984年，2007年）?！拔宕蟆钡奈C(jī)，都是大規(guī)模的曠日持久的金融危機(jī)，表現(xiàn)在在較長(zhǎng)的一段時(shí)間內(nèi)經(jīng)濟(jì)大幅下降。雖然北歐和西班牙1977年的經(jīng)濟(jì)危機(jī)也留下了深刻的印記，但日本1992年的經(jīng)濟(jì)危機(jī)才是“失去的十年”的開始。其余的富裕國(guó)家的金融危機(jī)代表了廣泛范圍內(nèi)的小事件。1984年美國(guó)的危機(jī)是儲(chǔ)蓄和貸款危機(jī)，當(dāng)然，2007年危機(jī)是次貸危機(jī)

51、，一開始我們錯(cuò)誤地只把它當(dāng)成美國(guó)的危機(jī)，但它卻波及了整個(gè)歐洲還有中亞。雖然一般危機(jī)都集中在銀行系統(tǒng)，1995年英國(guó)的危機(jī)是導(dǎo)致巴林銀行（本質(zhì)上是一個(gè)投資銀行）的破產(chǎn)的主要原因。 我們注意到，危機(jī)事件的選擇標(biāo)準(zhǔn)不涵蓋美國(guó)和歐洲的銀行壓力，特別是1982年發(fā)展中國(guó)家造成的國(guó)家的債務(wù)危機(jī)年。我們忽略它，因?yàn)殂y行危機(jī)并不是問(wèn)題的中心，它植根于通貨緊縮和世界商品價(jià)格下降。此外,它有點(diǎn)重疊于我們所說(shuō)的節(jié)儉危機(jī)。2.比較我們現(xiàn)在進(jìn)行的2007年美國(guó)的金融危機(jī)和以往的各種事件的簡(jiǎn)單比較。在金融危機(jī)的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)文獻(xiàn)繪圖中，我們來(lái)看看資產(chǎn)和公共債務(wù)的價(jià)格增長(zhǎng)。我們開始通過(guò)比較圖1進(jìn)行房屋價(jià)格上漲的比較。T期間代表了金融

52、危機(jī)爆發(fā)的一年。所以周期T - 4是前四年的危機(jī)，并在每一種情況下繼續(xù)為T +3期間，在美國(guó)2007年crisis.1圖表案件個(gè)案研究文獻(xiàn)證實(shí)，顯示了金融危機(jī)時(shí)期的房?jī)r(jià)，特別是在 “五大”危機(jī)的嚴(yán)重影響的情況下極為明顯。在美國(guó)住房?jī)r(jià)格中甚至有進(jìn)一步上升的情形。圖2著眼于市場(chǎng)的股票價(jià)格指數(shù)增長(zhǎng)的實(shí)際利率。 （對(duì)于美國(guó)來(lái)說(shuō)，該指數(shù)是標(biāo)準(zhǔn)普爾500;萊因哈特和Reinhart，2008年國(guó)外市場(chǎng)提供完整的清單。）美國(guó)又看起來(lái)更加像如此原型危機(jī)的國(guó)家。在這里，從五個(gè)發(fā)生危機(jī)的國(guó)家的經(jīng)驗(yàn)來(lái)看，跟之前相比股票價(jià)格趨于下跌。當(dāng)然，這些危機(jī)發(fā)生在每一個(gè)全球生產(chǎn)力的周期，這也許可以解釋一些共同點(diǎn)。然后，這也是有

53、差異的，在這些事件與美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)在最近的事件的初期，貨幣的反應(yīng)就說(shuō)明了這一切。三、 朗讀四、 Miguó yòu kàn qlái xiàng yuánxíng wéij de guóji, zhyu gèng rúc. Zài zhèl,Ránér, cóng dà w gè fshng wéij de guóji de jngyàn gpiào jiàgé q

54、 yú xiàdié jiào zo qián. Dngrán, zhèxi wéij fshng zài mi ygè zài quánqiú shngchnlì de zhuqí, zhè yx ky jishì yxi bùtóng de chyì din. Ránhòu, yyu chyì, zài zhèxi shìji

55、4;n y miliánch zài cìj fifán de chushu liàng zài zuìjìn de shìjiàn chqí, huòbì de fnyìng.五、 字典 - 查看字典詳細(xì)內(nèi)容六、 Tú 2 zhuóyn yú shìchng de gpiào jiàgé zhshù zngzhng de shíjì lìl. (

56、Duìyú miguó lái shu, gi zhshù shì biozhn pr 500; lái yn h tè hé Reinhart,2008 nián guówài shìchng tígng wánzhng de qngdn.)七、 字典 - 查看字典詳細(xì)內(nèi)容八、 朗讀九、 Wmen xiànzài jìnxíng de 2007 nián miguó zh jin de

57、 wéij hé ywng de gè zhng shìjiàn de jindn bjiào. Zài jnróng wéij de biozhn wénxiàn huìtú, wmen lái kàn kàn zchn jiàgé, zngzhng hé gnggòng zhàiwù. Wmen kish tngguò bjiào tú 1 y

58、ùnxíng zài fángw jiàgé shàngzhng. Qíjin T dàibio le jnróng wéij bàof de y nián. Suy zhuqí T - 4 shì qián sì nián de wéij, bìng zài mi y zhng qíngkuàng xià jìxù wèi T +3 tú chú dngrán, zài miguó 2007 nián crisis.1 Túbio ànjiàn gèàn yánj