解釋合同之+默示條文

1、默示條文1 序言解釋合約的大精神還是要從合約文件本身去尋找、確定當(dāng)事人的訂約意愿。法官/仲裁員在解釋合約時(shí)不能隨意增刪或修改合約的內(nèi)容，他的職能只是解釋而不是重寫（rewrite）合約。但由于知識(shí)水平、訂約能力、行業(yè)慣例等種種原因，經(jīng)?？梢姾霞s條文并不完整但合約雙方卻已經(jīng)開始或完成了合約的履行，反正雙方都承認(rèn)有一個(gè)有效合約的存在，在這種情況下一旦雙方對合約沒有寫明的內(nèi)容有了爭議，法官/仲裁員該怎么辦呢？所以鑒于解釋合約的最終目標(biāo)是為了客觀地尋找合約雙方當(dāng)事人的意愿，法律出于必須性的考慮，因?yàn)楹霞s中所遺留的一個(gè)不完整之處必須有一個(gè)說法才能去補(bǔ)這個(gè)漏洞，還是允許法官/仲裁員給合約增加一些其原本沒有

2、明示的內(nèi)容，這就是我們通常所指的默示條文（implied terms）了。所謂默示條文，就是訂約時(shí)雙方從來沒有寫明或提到，而由法官/仲裁員依據(jù)有關(guān)事實(shí)或法律而引入合約的條文，在很大程度上就把此當(dāng)作是訂約雙方假設(shè)/假定的訂約意圖（presumed intention）。相對來說合約中的明示條文顯然是雙方的真正訂約意圖（actual intention）。 由于這類條文無需寫進(jìn)合約也構(gòu)成合約的內(nèi)容，從而對合約方構(gòu)成約束，因此出于商業(yè)穩(wěn)定性的要求，法律對其限定的條件也是較為嚴(yán)格的?？傮w而言，默示條文可分為事實(shí)的默示與法律的默示，而要想成功默示條文進(jìn)合約，此條文也必須滿足一些先決條件如：（i）必須合理

3、與公平；（ii）必須是合約的商業(yè)效力所必要，如果缺少此條文合約仍能運(yùn)作則不會(huì)默示；（iii）必須在訂約時(shí)可以去假設(shè)雙方會(huì)理所當(dāng)然或異口同聲地同意這個(gè)說法；（iv）必須可以被清楚地表達(dá)；（v）不能與合約明示條文起沖突。法官/仲裁員在決定是否默示一條條文進(jìn)合約時(shí)，會(huì)采用“商業(yè)效力”或“好事第三者”的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，以上一些大精神/大原則后詳。2 默示條文的性質(zhì)與分類：默示條文取決于訂約雙方假定的訂約意圖，有些情況下默示條文從個(gè)別合約內(nèi)的明示條文和訂約語境來確定，另有情況是根據(jù)訂約雙方的法定關(guān)系本質(zhì)來確定。這兩種情況表示了默示條文可分為兩種，前一種是法律的默示（implied by law），后一種是事實(shí)的默

4、示（implied in fact）。 Wright勛爵在Luxor (Eastbourne) Ltd v. Cooper (1941) A.C. 108是這樣說：“The expression implied term is used in different senses. Sometimes it denotes some term which does not depend on the actual intention of the parties but on a rule of law, such as the terms, warranties or conditions wh

5、ich, if not a rule of law, such as the terms, warranties or conditions which, if not expressly excluded, the law imports, as for instance under the Sale of Goods Act and the Marine Insurance Act. But a case like the present is different because what it is sought to imply is based on an intention imp

6、uted to the parties from their actual circumstances.”。在后期的案件，Wright勛爵的這個(gè)分類開始引人注意，Simonds子爵與Tucker勛爵在Lister v. Romford Ice and Cold Storage Co Ltd (1957) A.C. 555也有提到。但這個(gè)兩分法真正發(fā)展起來是在Liverpool City Council v. Irwin (1977) A.C. 239，在這個(gè)先例中，貴族院的Cross勛爵對這兩種默示有區(qū)分如下：“When it implies a term in a contract the

7、court is sometimes laying down a general rule that in all contracts of a certain typesale of goods, master and servant, landlord and tenant, and so onsome provision is to be implied unless the parties have expressly exclude it. In deciding whether or not to lay down such a prima facie rule the court

8、 will naturally ask itself whether in the general run of such cases the term in question would be one which it would be reasonable to insert. Sometimes, however, there is no defined type but what the court is being in effect asked to do is to rectify a particularoften a very detailedcontract by inse

9、rting in it a term which the parties have not expressed. Here it is not enough for the court to say that the suggested term is one the presence of which would make the contract a better or fairer one; it must be able to say that the insertion of the term is necessary to giveas it is putbusiness effi

10、cacy to the contract and that if its absence had been pointed out at the time both partiesassuming them to have been reasonable menwould have agreed without hesitation to its insertion.”。2.1 默示類別之一：法律的默示這里可去舉一些簡單的例子讓讀者更好地理解這兩種不同的默示條文。首先是舉法律的默示，這默示可來自商業(yè)習(xí)慣作法/慣例（請看本章第10段）、立法或普通法/案例法。上述Wright勛爵的判詞中就提到了兩

11、個(gè)立法，一是貨物銷售法（Sale of Goods Act），另是海上保險(xiǎn)法（Marine Insurance Act）。在1979年英國貨物銷售法，它內(nèi)中有許多的默示條文，其中最重要的例子是賣方對出售的貨物有一個(gè)默示條文，即他有權(quán)出售該有關(guān)貨物，貨物也沒有債務(wù)與押記，及買方可寧靜地占有該貨物，等。這是在第12條文，可去部分節(jié)錄如下：“12. Implied terms about title, etc.(1) In a contract of sale, other than one to which subsection (3) below applies, there is an imp

12、lied (term) on the part of the seller that in the case4 of a sale he has a right to sell the goods, and in the case of an agreement to sell he will have such a right at the time when the property is to pass.(2) In a contract of sale, other than one to which subsection (3) below applies, there is als

13、o an implied (term) that (a) the goods are free, and will remain free until the time when the property is to pass, from any charge or encumbrance not disclosed or known to the buyer before the contract is made, and (b) the buyer will enjoy quiet possession of the goods except so far as it may be dis

14、turbed by the owner or other person entitled to the benefit of any charge or encumbrance so disclosed or know”。另是針對將來的貨物，貨物銷售法之第14條文有各種不同的針對。一是默示有關(guān)貨物是滿意的質(zhì)量（satisfactory quality）。這是第14 (2)條文，如下：“14. Implied terms about quality or fitness(2) Where the seller sells goods in the course of a business, th

15、ere is an implied term that the goods supplied under the contract are of satisfactory quality.(2A) For the purposes of this Act, goods are of satisfactory quality if they meet the standard that a reasonable person would regard as satisfactory, taking account of any description of the goods, the pric

16、e (if relevant) and all the other relevant circumstances.(2B) For the purposes of this Act, the quality of goods includes their state and condition and the following (among others) are in appropriate cases aspects of the quality of goods(a) fitness for all the purposes for which goods of the kind in

17、 question are commonly supplied,(b) appearance and finish,(c) freedom from minor defects,(d) safety, and(e) durability.(2C) The term implied by subsection (2) above does not extend to any matter making the quality of goods unsatisfactory(a) which is specifically dra2wn to the buyers attention before

18、 the contract is made,(b) where the buyer examines the goods before the contract is made, which that examination ought to reveal, or(c) in the case of contract for sale by sample, which would have been apparent on a reasonable examination of the sample.”。筆者無意再多去介紹有關(guān)貨物銷售法，反而想去介紹這些立法的默示條文是如何操作。舉例說，在一個(gè)

19、船舶買賣，買方在接受船舶的時(shí)候才發(fā)覺船舶以前留下了大量的債務(wù)，導(dǎo)致船舶在一些港口不斷被扣押。這一來，買方的損失顯然應(yīng)該可以向賣方索賠。但要成功索賠首先在責(zé)任方面要證明賣方違反買賣合約的條文。如果雙方的買賣合約是以一些草擬得嚴(yán)謹(jǐn)?shù)臉?biāo)準(zhǔn)格式合約，例如1993年挪威格式，它是有一條明示條文去針對賣方不能遺留債務(wù)，這是第9條文如下：“9. EncumbrancesThe sellers warrant that the Vessel, at the time of delivery, is free from all charters, encumbrances, mortgages and mari

20、time liens or any other debts whatsoever. The sellers hereby undertake to indemnify the Buyers against all consequences of claims made against the Vessel which have been incurred prior to the time of delivery.”。在這個(gè)情況下，買方很容易就能證明賣方違反了買賣合約的第9條明示條文，接下去只是去計(jì)算賠償損失的金額。但不難想到有一些訂約沒有這么正規(guī)的情況，例如是游艇或內(nèi)河船舶的買賣，買賣雙方根

21、本不知道也不會(huì)去使用挪威格式。這一來，訂約雙方?jīng)]有去想到也自然去漏掉如上述的挪威格式第9條文可能性就很大了，這正是Steyn勛爵在近期的Equitable Life Assurance Society v. Hyman (2002) 1 A.C. 408, CA, HL所說的“general default”的情況。這一來，難道無辜的買方買下了一艘留有許多債務(wù)的船舶難道就沒有救濟(jì)了嗎？顯然，這并不公道。加上，這種情況會(huì)是很普遍，因?yàn)樨浳镤N售法適用在所有種類貨物的買賣包括船舶。所以，為了公平、公共政策或法治的需要，有了這一個(gè)立法去強(qiáng)加這些默示條文。這一來，買方向賣方索賠損失，如果賣方扯皮說：“我

22、從來沒有對你作出任何承諾說該船舶沒有債務(wù)?！保I方就可以回答說：“就算是沒有明示條文去作出這種承諾，但貨物銷售法有默示條文要求該船舶沒有債務(wù)與可以讓我作為買方享有寧靜的占有，但你做不到，所以違反了默示條文?！薄．?dāng)然，即使是立法的默示條文，如果不是像1924年海牙規(guī)則這樣規(guī)定不能以明示條文改變的話，也不影響雙方的訂約自由。所以默示條文是應(yīng)該屈服于明示條文，例如上述船舶的賣方以明示條文說明該船舶有一筆債務(wù)，而買方也接受了，這一來貨物銷售法的有關(guān)默示條文就在此方面不適用了。Wright勛爵提到的另一個(gè)立法就是1906年海上保險(xiǎn)法，這里面也是有大量的默示條文。最為人所知的是第17條文說明保險(xiǎn)合約是要“

23、絕對善意”（utmost goodfaith），再多舉一個(gè)例子是立法的第39條文針對航次保險(xiǎn)，受保人的船東有一個(gè)在航次開始前使船舶必須絕對/嚴(yán)格適航的默示保證。這些默示條文的操作如上述例子，筆者不去多介紹。至于以保險(xiǎn)合約明示條文去否定或更改立法的默示條文，針對“絕對善意”就很少會(huì)出現(xiàn)，但針對航次保險(xiǎn)對必須適航的默示保證，就比較多見到有明示條文去作出改變以減輕或避免對船東的絕對適航責(zé)任。例如在貨物保險(xiǎn)，由于這種保險(xiǎn)也是受1906年海上保險(xiǎn)法的管轄，就有一條標(biāo)準(zhǔn)條文可簡稱為“Seaworthiness Admitted Clause”去放棄這一個(gè)默示責(zé)任，因?yàn)榻裉斓呢浄礁竟懿涣舜笆欠襁m航。例如

24、在1982年的“學(xué)會(huì)貨物條文(A)”（Institute Cargo Clauses A），就有第5.2條文說：“The underwriters waive any breach of the implied warranties of seaworthiness of the ship and fitness pf the ship to carry the subject-matter insured to destination, unless the Assured or their servants are privy to such unseaworthiness or unfi

25、tness.”。除了立法外，普通法也會(huì)去增加默示條文。例如Mahmud v. Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA (1998) AC 20, HL，貴族院在雇傭合約確認(rèn)了有一個(gè)默示條文就是雙方有一個(gè)相互信任的關(guān)系（trust of confidence）。例如雇主不應(yīng)做一些不誠實(shí)與腐敗的事情，而這些事情會(huì)導(dǎo)致雇員的前途受損。在Lister v. Romford Ice and Cold Storage Co Ltd (1957) A.C. 555，案情也是涉及一份雇傭合約中，爭議是是否在雇主疏忽情況下雇主要負(fù)責(zé)賠償其雇員。Simonds子爵

26、說這不是個(gè)別合約的問題，他說：“with a general question, which if not correctly described as a question of status, yet can only be answered by considering the relation in which the drivers of motor-vehicles and their employers generally stand to each other. If I were to try to apply the familiar tests where the que

27、stion is whether a term should be implied in a particular contract in order to give it what is called business efficacy, I should lose myself in the attempt to formulate it with the necessary precision. But this is not conclusive, for as I have said, the solution of the problem does not rest on the

28、implication of a term in a particular contract but upon more general considerations.”。讀者可以注意到上述舉的例子是普遍性地默示在每一不同類別的合約，而不是個(gè)別情況。法律默示也不理會(huì)每一個(gè)案件不同的事實(shí)， 唯一只屈服于明示條文，因?yàn)榇笤瓌t還是訂約自由。這種默示也不追究訂約雙方的真正或假設(shè)訂約意圖， 甚至是默示最重要的一個(gè)要求是它是否必要（necessary）才可讓有關(guān)的合約有商業(yè)效力（business efficacy）并可以運(yùn)行（workable）也會(huì)較寬松，因?yàn)橛幸恍┓傻哪臼浅鲇诟鼜V泛的考慮，例如是公共

29、政策與整體的合理性。唯一能去否定這種法律默示條文就是以清楚無誤的明示條文去加以否定， 換言之訂約自由與雙方的訂約意愿仍是至高無上的大原則。這里可去節(jié)錄Chitty on Contracts一書第29版第一冊13-003段如下：“Terms implied by law. The implication of a term is a matter of law for the court, and whether or not a term is implied is usually said to depend upon the intention of the parties as coll

30、ected from the words of the agreement and the surrounding circumstances. In many classes of contract, however, implied terms have become standardized, and it is somewhat artificial to attribute such terms to the unexpressed intention of the parties. The court is, in fact, laying down a general rule

31、of law that in all contracts of a defined typefor example, sale of goods, landlord and tenant, employment, the carriage of goods by land or seacertain terms will be implied, unless the implication of such a term would be contrary to the express words of the agreement. Such implications do not depend

32、 on the intentions of the parties, actual or presumed, but on more general considerations.”。另可節(jié)錄Diplock勛爵在Photo Productions Ltd v. Securicor Transport Ltd (1980) A.C. 827, HL中強(qiáng)調(diào)了“法律默示”對商業(yè)合約的重要性，他說：“A basic principle of the common law of contract, to which there are no exceptions that are relevant in

33、 the instant case, is that parties to a contract are free to determine for themselves what primary obligations they will accept. They may state these in express words in the contract itself and, where they do, the statement is determinative; but in practice a commercial contract never states all the

34、 primary obligations of the parties in full; many are left to be incorporated by implication of law from the legal nature of the contract into which the parties are entering. But if the parties wish to reject or modify primary obligations which would otherwise be so incorporated, they are fully at l

35、iberty to do so by express terms.”。（一個(gè)有關(guān)普通法下合約法的基本精神是雙方當(dāng)事人有訂約自由可去決定他們愿意接受哪一些主要合約責(zé)任/承諾。做法上是以明示的文字寫在合約內(nèi)，這一來這些明示的責(zé)任/承諾就是決定性的。但在現(xiàn)實(shí)中，商業(yè)合約永遠(yuǎn)不會(huì)把所有的主要責(zé)任/承諾去寫出來，導(dǎo)致剩下了不少是根據(jù)不同性質(zhì)的商業(yè)合約去靠法律作出默示。如果訂約雙方想去拒絕或改變這些會(huì)被默示合并進(jìn)來的主要責(zé)任/承諾，他們完全有自由去以明示條文排除或修改。）在Ashmore v. Lloyds (1992) 2 Lloyds Rep. 620，高院的Gatehouse大法官也有針對法律的默示

36、，把它稱為“第三類默示條文”，說：“The third, described as a term implied in law does not depend on the presumed joint intention of the parties, but upon the principle derived, as the plaintiffs say, from Liverpool City Council v. Irwin 1977 A.C. 239. Strictly, I think the principle emerged much earlier and Liverpoo

37、l v. Irwin is merely an example of its application. It was recognized by Lord Wight in Luxor (Eastbourne) Ltd. v. Cooper 1941 A.C. 108 at p. 137, and again, in rather more detail, by Viscount Simonds and Lord Tucker in Lister v. Romford sup., at pp. 516 and 524; pp. 576 and where the relationship be

38、tween the parties is one of a particular type or category but is incomplete in that the parties have failed to express a term which the law will then imply as a necessary term of all contracts within the category; unless, of course, the parties have expressly excluded it or it is otherwise inconsist

39、ent with the express terms of their contract.”。這就帶來了下一個(gè)問題，即如何去把有爭議的合約去分類，因?yàn)樗鼈冇胁煌姆赡緱l文。這里會(huì)有十分容易分類的合約，例如FOB或CIF買賣就肯定是受貨物銷售法的管轄并會(huì)引進(jìn)該立法下的法律默示條文。確定合約的定性/分類是解釋合約的工作：Wong Mee Wan v. Kwan Kin Travel Service Ltd (1996) 1 W.L.R. 38, 42, PC。在確定合約分類時(shí)，可考慮雙方之前的交易，合約的訂約的環(huán)境等事實(shí)。但看來還是有困難，例如目前在英國法律下電腦軟件的買賣是否歸1979年貨物

40、銷售法管轄或歸1982年貨物與服務(wù)提供法管轄還不明朗：St Albans City and District Council v. International Computers Ltd (1996) 4 All E.R. 481, CA。同樣的不明朗也出現(xiàn)在造船合約，雖然已經(jīng)有一連串先例判其是屬于買賣將來貨物（future goods）的合約。Diplock大法官在McDougall v. Aeromarine of Emsworth Ltd (1958) 2 Lloyds Rep. 345說：“ it seems well settled by authority that, althou

41、gh a shipbuilding contract is, in form, a contract for the construction of the vessel, it is in law a contract for the sale of goods ”。要知道一個(gè)貨物買賣合約與提供建造服務(wù)合約有各自不同的默示條文，所以必須能夠去分類。2.2 默示類別之二：事實(shí)的默示在近期的Equitable Life Assurance Society v. Hyman (2002) 1 A.C. 408, CA, HL，Steyn勛爵把把事實(shí)的默示稱為“ad hoc gap fillers”

42、，從“隨意”（ad hoc）一詞我們也可看出事實(shí)的默示的特點(diǎn)。它是針對個(gè)別合約，往往也沒有任何直接的先例或立法針對，而判了之后也不會(huì)可去適用在將來的類似合約。這是因?yàn)槊恳粋€(gè)合約在訂約自由下都會(huì)有不大相同的寫法，也往往有它不同的語境/環(huán)境，導(dǎo)致了很容易去作出區(qū)分并給與不同的解釋。 由于解釋合約條文是一個(gè)法律問題：The “Nema” (1982) A.C. 724，而法律問題在倫敦仲裁是可以去上訴，但由于在“Nema Guideline”有所收緊，上訴是要先去取得上訴批文，而在“一次過”（one-off）的案件，可以說是不會(huì)有成功的希望去取得上訴批文。這就可以得出一個(gè)結(jié)論就是大部分的“ad ho

43、c gap fillers”，特別只是影響個(gè)別的合約與相關(guān)的當(dāng)事人，都會(huì)是一次過的案件。相反，在上一小段的法律的默示就會(huì)是影響面廣，上訴就會(huì)是機(jī)會(huì)大得多了。先去舉一個(gè)簡單的例子有關(guān)事實(shí)的默示，就是訂約雙方同意在一條明示條文去支付一筆錢（或做一件事）。如果雙方的合約完整，就應(yīng)想到也應(yīng)去明示付錢的期限。這一來，如果有明示約定付錢必須準(zhǔn)時(shí)在某一天，或馬上（immediately）/立即（forthwith）等措辭，這去解釋起來就十分容易了。但如果雙方的合約根本沒有提到，加上雙方有了爭議，例如收款人說是在訂約后的第二天就應(yīng)該支付，但付款人說是訂約后50年才需要支付，就存在怎樣在雙方的兩個(gè)極端之間去認(rèn)定

44、付款的時(shí)間了。注意是由于沒有明示條文，所以剩下了只有靠默示條文。而且，必須要有一個(gè)說法，否則該合約就有了一個(gè)大漏洞，不去填補(bǔ)的話訂約雙方根本無法去走這付款的一步。這一來，法官/仲裁員就會(huì)去作出一個(gè)合理時(shí)間必須付錢的默示條文。合理是因?yàn)槟緱l文本質(zhì)上必須是合理，因?yàn)檫@是去假設(shè)雙方的訂約意圖，而肯定雙方在訂約時(shí)都不會(huì)提出異議的當(dāng)然就只能是對大家都合理。這合理就要去看該合約的其他明示條文，例如該筆錢是人民幣，另是付款人所在地是中國大陸，但收款人是在外國。這一來，考慮到中國大陸有外匯管制，再加上收款人所在地會(huì)是不方便與有關(guān)的時(shí)間碰巧又是長假期，法官/仲裁員在這種環(huán)境下取得有關(guān)的匯款證據(jù)/事實(shí)后會(huì)認(rèn)定付

45、款的合理時(shí)間是在訂約后的兩個(gè)星期內(nèi)，既不是收款人所說的第二天，更不是付款人所說的50年。從上述的例子也可以去看到在另一個(gè)合約，有類似的情況出現(xiàn)，但事實(shí)上有一點(diǎn)改變例如有關(guān)的一筆錢是美元，而付款人與收款人都是在香港的公司，這一來默示的合理時(shí)間可能只有一/兩天的銀行工作日，而不再是兩個(gè)星期了。在此可去簡單介紹英國在這方面的第一個(gè)案例The “Moorcock” (1889) 14 P.D. 64，案情是被告擁有泰晤士河畔的一個(gè)碼頭，他將此碼頭租用給原告“Moorcock”輪的船東，當(dāng)時(shí)雙方都知道船舶在低潮期間是肯定要擱淺來作業(yè)的，結(jié)果因?yàn)楹哟舶纪共黄蕉鴮?dǎo)致船舶損壞。但船東與碼頭所有人之間的租用合約

46、沒有明示條文保證卸貨碼頭是安全，所以要去依賴默示條文，就是碼頭所有人保證船東卸貨碼頭安全。而上訴庭也是去這樣做，即把原來不在合約存在的去加上一條默示條文，其中Bowen大法官說：“Now, an implied warranty, or, as it is called, a covenant in law, as distinguished from an express contract or express warranty, really is in all cases founded upon the presumed intention of the parties, and up

47、on reason. The implication which the law draws from what must obviously have been the intention of the parties, the law draws with the object of giving efficacy to the transaction and preventing such a failure of consideration as cannot have been within the contemplation of either sides; and I belie

48、ve if one were to take all the cases, and there are many, of implied warranties or covenants in law, it will be found that in all of them the law is raising an implication from the presumed intention of the parties with the object of giving to the transaction such efficacy as both parties must have

49、intended that at all events it should have.”。另一個(gè)可去簡單介紹的重要先例是Shirlaw v. Southern Foundries (1926) Ltd (1939) 2 K.B. 206。此先例是一個(gè)公司與其常務(wù)董事之間的一個(gè)10年雇傭合約，簽約三年后公司被收購，新的母公司重寫了其公司章程，使其有權(quán)解雇任何董事。上訴庭多數(shù)判是這一個(gè)10年的雇傭合約內(nèi)有默示條文該公司是不能事后去改變公司章程以影響或改變該合約。去簡單地總結(jié)說，事實(shí)的默示經(jīng)常發(fā)生，也是法官/仲裁員經(jīng)常要面對的問題，這顯示了一般訂約當(dāng)事人水平會(huì)有問題，導(dǎo)致合約不完整或有缺陷，非要填補(bǔ)

50、這個(gè)漏洞。而法官/仲裁員是否要去默示就是根據(jù)一些主要先例規(guī)定下來的先決條件，而這些先決條件與上一小段的法律的默示也不盡相同，例如事實(shí)的默示十分重視雙方訂約時(shí)能否肯定去假設(shè)他們是有這種意圖，所以有Shirlaw v. Southern Foundries先例所說的“好事第三者”（officious bystander）的考驗(yàn)，這是法律的默示不要求的。這些方面在接下去的段節(jié)會(huì)比較詳細(xì)介紹。2.3 其他有關(guān)默示條文分類的說法以上介紹了主要兩種的默示條文，但要指出它們之間的區(qū)分也不是那么嚴(yán)格與明確的，可能法院默示只是“一個(gè)連續(xù)光譜上的圖案”（shades on a continuous spectru

51、m），即有重疊模糊地帶，并不是黑白分明那么簡單。例如在The “Moorcock” (1889) 14 PD 64, 68, CA先例，Treitel教授在The Law of Contract一書中就指出了該先例并不明確是否是事實(shí)或是法律的默示，雖然一般的說法是該先例是第一個(gè)有關(guān)事實(shí)的默示。這兩者之間最主要的一個(gè)分別就是事實(shí)的默示必須在訂約的時(shí)候要通過一個(gè)“好事第三者”的考驗(yàn)，就是如果有一位第三者去問訂約雙方：“如果河道淺會(huì)有危險(xiǎn)導(dǎo)致船舶擱淺時(shí)受損，碼頭所有人是否保證這一方面的安全？”（undertaken to see that the bottom of the river is rea

52、sonably fit, or at all events that they have taken reasonable care to find out that the bottom of the river is reasonably fit for the purpose.），Treitel教授相信訂約雙方不會(huì)是異口同聲說“是”，至少碼頭所有人就不大可能這樣說。這就表示雙方并沒有這一個(gè)意圖的訂約意愿，也就不能算是事實(shí)的默示了，而只能是一個(gè)法律的默示。當(dāng)然，在該先例是否是重要也不見得，反正法律肯去默示就已經(jīng)有這個(gè)默示條文的存在。但會(huì)有情況這個(gè)區(qū)分是重要，因?yàn)榉傻哪静⒉皇请S便就能成立

53、，而一去成立了它的適用面也會(huì)是廣泛，所以去成立前必須要深思熟慮。有關(guān)默示條文的分類也有其他的說法， 例如Glanville Williams教授在“Language and the Law”(1945) 61 L.Q.R. 71第401頁將默示條文分為三種：(1) 雙方訂約時(shí)可能想到但沒有費(fèi)力去寫明的；(2) 不管訂約雙方當(dāng)時(shí)有沒有想到，如果有人提出，他們會(huì)寫明的；(3) 不管訂約雙方當(dāng)時(shí)有沒有想到，也不管他們?nèi)绻A(yù)見到困難會(huì)不會(huì)寫明，只要法院為了公平或政策或法治的需要（consequence of rules of law），就可以默示。他指出(1)是為了努力找出雙方的真實(shí)意圖；(2)是努力

54、通過假設(shè)來找出雙方的假定或有條件的意圖，即如果雙方預(yù)見到會(huì)有此困難就會(huì)有的意圖；(3)不關(guān)心訂約雙方的訂約意圖也要去默示，除非雙方可以用明示來排除這種默示的情況。在實(shí)際操作中，法院并不拘泥于對默示條文分類的嚴(yán)格區(qū)分而是把它們當(dāng)作“連續(xù)光譜上的圖案”（shades on a continuous spectrum），也即是兩者有中間難以區(qū)分乃至重疊的模糊地帶，這是Liverpool City Council v. Irwin (1977) A.C. 239之253頁Wilberforce勛爵的話。他將默示條文分為四大類（但其實(shí)只同意有三類），其中第一類是商業(yè)慣例的默示，第二類是事實(shí)的默示，第三類

55、是被他以不合傳統(tǒng)而否定的由Denning勛爵倡導(dǎo)的合理性的默示，第四類就是法律的默示，而它們之間就是一個(gè)“連續(xù)光譜上的圖案”的關(guān)系：“To say that the construction of a complete contract out of these elements involves a process of implication may be correct; it would be so if implication means the supplying of what is not expressed. But there are varieties of implic

56、ations which the courts think fit to make and they do not necessarily involve the same process.1 Where there is, on the face of it, a complete, bilateral contract, the courts are sometimes willing to add terms to it, as implied terms: this is very common in mercantile contracts where there is an est

57、ablished usage: in that case the courts are spelling out what both parties know and would, if asked, unhesitatingly agree to be part of the bargain.2 In other cases, where there is an apparently complete bargain, the courts are willing to add a term on the ground that without it the contract will no

58、t workthis is the case, if not of The Moorcock it self on its facts, at least the doctrine of the Court of Appeal, a strict testthough the degree of strictness seems to vary with the current judicial trendand I think that they were right not to accept it as applicable here.3 There is a third variety of implication, that which I think Lord Denning MR favours, or at least did devour in this case, and that is the implication of reasonable terms. But although I agree with many of his instances, which in fact fall under one or other of the preceding heads, I cannot go so far