競爭法(雙語)課程03-antimonopoly-law1-基本框架課件

1Part2AntimonopolyLaw:

ChinesePerspective1Part22Introduction“TheShermanActwasdesignedtobeacomprehensivecharterofeconomiclibertyaimedatpreservingfreeandunfetteredcompetitionastheruleoftrade.”——NorthernPacificRailwayCo.v.UnitedStates,356U.S.1,4-5(1958)2Introduction“TheShermanActLearningObjectives(1)Depictthedefinition,theobjectivesandtheframeworkofAML(2)Expound3differenttypesofmonopolisticconducts(3)Explainhowtoapplyjudicialdoctrinesaboutantimonopolybehaviors(4)Differreasonablecompetitionfrommonopolisticconducts(5)DiscusstheobjectivesofAML(6)Activity:Howtobriefacase?LearningObjectives(1)Depict4Content1.Thedefinition,theobjectivesandtheframeworkofAML2.MonopolyAgreements3.AbuseofDominantMarketPosition4.ConcentrationofBusinessOperators5.Howtoinvestigatesuspiciousmonopolisticconducts?6.LegalLiabilities4Content1.Thedefinition,the5Chapter3TheDefinition,theObjectivesandtheFrameworkofAML5Chapter31.ThedefinitionofAML1.1Itislawthatpromotesorseekstomaintainmarketcompetitionbyregulatinganti-competitiveconductbycompanies.1.2ItisknownasantitrustlawintheUnitedStatesfairtradingactinKorea,Japan,Taiwananti-monopolylawinChinaandRussia,inpreviousyearsithasbeenknownastradepracticeslawintheUnitedKingdomandAustralia.61.ThedefinitionofAML1.1I1.3ChinaCompetitionlawInthebroadsense，Chinacompetitionlawincludes4parts,whereascompetitionlawoftenbeusedinanarrowsense,whichonlyincludesAntimonopolyLawandLawAgainstUnfairCompetition.71.3ChinaCompetitionlawInth1.3ChinaCompetitionlawCompetitionlawAnti-monopolyLawLawAgainstUnfairCompetition

ConsumerProtectionActProductQualityLaw1.3ChinaCompetitionlawCompe1.4HistoryofChinaLegislation

(1)Itiscommonlyrecognizedthatthelegislationoftheanti-monopolylawinChinainitiatedsinceAugust1987.But(2)30August2007,the10thNPC(NationalPeople'sCongress)StandingCommitteepassedandpromulgatedtheAML.(3)1August2008,theAMLwasputintoenforcement.91.4HistoryofChinaLegislatiQuestionAMLpost-termbirth:Whatarethemainobstacles?10QuestionAMLpost-termbirth:W2.TheobjectivesofAMLArticle1ThisLawisenactedforthepurposeofpreventingandcurbingmonopolisticconducts,protectingfairmarketcompetition,enhancingeconomicefficiency,maintainingtheconsumerinterestsandthepublicinterests,andpromotingthehealthydevelopmentofsocialistmarketeconomy.112.TheobjectivesofAMLArtiClassDiscussionWhatistheobjectiveofEC?WhatistheobjectiveofUS.A?consumerinterestsCompetitionorder12ClassDiscussionWhatistheobActivity:CaseStudyActivity:CaseStudyVirginAtlanticAirwaysCasesVirginagainstBritishAirways'loyaltyrebateschemeswhicheffectivelytietravelagentstoBritishAirways,discouragingthetravelagentsfromsellingticketsforotherairlines.VirginAtlanticAirwaysCasesTheCommissiondecision

VirginWins.TheCommissionfoundthatbothBAperformancebonusschemesamountedtoanabuseofitsdominantpositionbyrewardingloyaltyfromtravelagentsandbydiscriminatingbetweentravelagentswiththeobjectandeffectofexcludingBA’scompetitorsfromtheUKmarketforairtransport.Inconsequence,theCommissionimposedafineof￡6.8millionin1999.TheCommissiondecision

VirgiCf.InEU:VirginWins.EU:theCommissionconcernwithprotectingcompetition,notcompetitors.U.S.:Virginlost.US:theCourtconcernswithprotectingconsumerwelfare,notcompetitors.

Cf.InEU:VirginWins.3.ThesourcesandframeworkofAML3.1Anti-monopolystatutescanbeunclear,therebyrequiringtheauthoritiesandthecourtstodeterminewhatreallyconstitutesantitrustlaw.Question:CanulistthesourcesofChinaAML?173.Thesourcesandframework3.ThesourcesandframeworkofAML3.2ThesourcesofChinaAML“AML”referstoantitruststatutes,enforcementguidelinesbytheauthorities,andtheinterpretationofthesestatutesbythecourts.GuidelinesonRelevantMarketDefinitionbyStateCouncilNDRCMOFCOME183.Thesourcesandframework3.3TheframeworkofAMLChapterIGeneralProvisionsChapterIIMonopolyAgreementsChapterIIIAbuseofDominantMarketPositionChapterIVConcentrationofBusinessOperatorsChapterVAbuseofAdministrativePowertoEliminateorRestrictCompetitionChapterVIInvestigationintoSuspiciousMonopolisticConductsChapterVIILegalLiabilitiesChapterVIIISupplementaryProvisions193.3TheframeworkofAMLChap20AboutChapterIGeneralProvisions20AboutChapterIGeneralProQuestions1.Howmany“monopolisticconducts”arelistedinAML?Monopolyagreementsreachedbetweenbusinessoperators;Abuseofdominantmarketpositionbybusinessoperators;andConcentrationofbusinessoperatorsthatmayhavetheeffectofeliminatingorrestrictingcompetition.AbuseofAdministrativePowertoEliminateorRestrictCompetition21Questions1.Howmany“monopoliQuestions1.Howmany“monopolisticconducts”arelistedinAML?Monopolyagreementsreachedbetweenbusinessoperators;Abuseofdominantmarketpositionbybusinessoperators;andConcentrationofbusinessoperatorsthatmayhavetheeffectofeliminatingorrestrictingcompetition.AbuseofAdministrativePowertoEliminateorRestrictCompetition22Questions1.Howmany“monopoliQuestions2.HowtointerpretArt.5andArt.6?Article5Businessoperatorsmay,throughfaircompetitionandvoluntaryassociation,gettogetheraccordingtolaw,toexpandthescaleoftheirbusinessoperationsandenhancetheirmarketcompetitiveness.Article6Nobusinessoperatorwithdominantmarketpositionmayabuseitsdominantpositiontoeliminateorrestrictcompetition.23Questions2.HowtointerpretAMonopolyMonopolyisamarketstructure.Monopoliescanbeestablishedbyagovernment,formnaturally,orformbyintegration.Monopolyisakindofmonopolisticconductswhichmayeliminateorrestrictcompetition.AMLaimsto……24MonopolyMonopolyisamarketQuestions3.PleaselisttheAMLenforcementauthoritiesinChina?1+3+XAnti-monopolyCommission(StateCouncil)NDRC(NationalDevelopmentandReformCommission)PriceMonopolyagreementsMOFCOMEConcentrationofbusinessoperatorsSAIC（StateAdministrationforIndustryandCommerce）OtherkindsofMonopolyagreementsAbuseofdominantmarketposition25Questions3.PleaselisttheAMChina:“1+3+X”EnforcementModel26ChinaEAAMC1AMEA3MOFCOMConcentrationreviewNDRCPriceMAsSAICMAsAbusingmarketpowerSectorRegulatorsXChina:“1+3+X”EnforcementMod27AboutChapterVIIISupplementaryProvisions27AboutChapterVIIISupplemeQuestions1.PleasereadArticle55andArticle56.“Thislawshallnotapplytotheconduct……”DoyouthinkwhatisthedifferencesbetweenArticle55andArticle15?Exception:適用除外，“表面上符合也不適用”Exemption：豁免“符合免責條件，網(wǎng)開一面”28Questions1.PleasereadArticlQuestions2.HowtointerpretIPisakindofmonopoly?Intellectualproperty(IP)rightsarelegallyrecognizedexclusiverightstocreationsofthemind。Article55Thislawshallnotapplytotheconductofbusinessoperatorstoexercisetheirintellectualpropertyrightsaccordingtothelawsandrelevantadministrativeregulationsonintellectualpropertyrights;however,thisLawshallapplytotheconductofbusinessoperatorstoeliminateorrestrictmarketcompetitionbyabusingtheirintellectualpropertyrights.29Questions2.HowtointerpretIActivity:CaseStudyActivity:CaseStudyInstructions1)Searchthecaseabout“Qualcomminanti-monopolyprobe”(US,Korea,China)fromwebsite.2)AnalyzewhatisQualcomm’s“hotpotato”.Qualcommistheworld'slargestmanufacturerofwirelesstelecommunicationproducts,holding40percentofthemarketinChinaand30percentintheworld.In2013,Qualcomm'srevenuereaches$24.3billion,withnearlyhalfcomingfromChinaand$7.88billionfrompatents.Instructions1)SearchthecaQualcomm’s“hotpotato”Itisaccusedofunfairanddiscriminatorypriceswithunreasonableconditions,accordingtotheNDRC.Normally,royaltypaymentsarenomorethan10percentofaproduct'ssellingprice.ButmanufacturersusingQualcommchipshavebeenaskedtopayexorbitantpatentfees.Qualcomm’s“hotpotato”ItisKFTCchallengeQualcommforexclusionaryconductandabuseofdominanceTheKFTCannouncedon23July2009,itsdecisiontoimposeafineof$208milliononQualcommforabusingits“near-monopolyposition”ontheKoreanCDMAchipmarket(in2008,itheld99.4percentofthemarket).AccordingtotheKFTC,whichhadbeeninvestigatingthecaseformorethanthreeyears,Qualcommabuseditsdominantpositionbyimposinghigherroyaltiesonmobilephonemanufacturerswhouseitsrivals’productsandbyofferingrebatestoKoreanmobilephonemakerswhoagreedtopurchaseamajorityoftheirchipsfromQualcomm.KFTCchallengeQualcommforeJTFCchallengeQualcommforexclusionaryconductandabuseofdominanceOn27July2009,theJapanFairTradeCommission(JFTC)sentadraftrulingtoQualcommallegingthatthecompany'slicensingpolicywasabusivetowardsmanufacturersofsemiconductorintegratedcircuitsusedinthirdgenerationmobilephones.TheJFTCsentaformalceaseanddesistordertoQualcommon2October.JTFCchallengeQualcommforex35AboutJudicialdoctrinesofmonopolisticconducts35AboutJudicialdoctrinesof36

Illegalperseviolationsvs.theRuleofReasonReadAMLArt.13,14,15,17.(1)illegalperseWhichmeansthattheactisinherentlyillegal.blatantandsubstantiallyanticompetitiveThus,anactisillegalwithoutextrinsicproofofanysurroundingcircumstancessuchaslackofscienter(knowledge)orotherdefenses.Actsaremadeillegalpersebystatute,constitutionorcaselaw.36IllegalperseviolationsvCourtsandagenciesseekingtoapplytheperserulemust:

1.show"thepracticefaciallyappearstobeonethatwouldalwaysoralmostalwaystendtorestrictcompetitionanddecreaseoutput";2.showthatthepracticeisnot"onedesignedto'increaseeconomicefficiencyandrendermarketsmore,ratherthanless,competitive'";3.carefullyexaminemarketconditions;and4.absentgoodevidenceofcompetitivenessbehavior,avoidbroadeningpersetreatmenttoneworinnovativebusinessrelationships.37Courtsandagenciesseekingto38(2)theRuleofReasonWhilesomeactionslikeprice-fixingareconsideredillegalperse,otheractions,suchaspossessionofamonopoly,mustbeanalyzedundertheruleofreasonandareonlyconsideredillegalwhentheireffectistounreasonablyrestraintrade.

38(2)theRuleofReasonWhileActivity:writingpracticesActivity:writingpractices40Cases(1)ReportChristmastreepricefixingscandalinDenmark(2007)(2)BrieftocaseContinentalTVInc.v.GTESylvania,Inc.(1977).LeeginCreativeLeatherProducts,Inc.v.PSKS,Inc.,551U.S.877(2007).40Cases(1)ReportYouwillbedividedinto2groups.OnegroupisrequiredtowriteareportaboutChristmastreepricefixingscandalinDenmark(2007).TheothergroupisrequiredtowriteabrieftocaseaboutContinentalcaseandLeegincase.Everyoneshouldturnonawritingpaperbeforenextclass.YourcontentmustfocusonIssues

ofthiscaseWhichjudicialdoctrineshouldbeapplied?Howtoprovemonopolyconducts?ExpectedOutcomeYouwillbedividedinto2gro42Part2AntimonopolyLaw:

ChinesePerspective1Part243Introduction“TheShermanActwasdesignedtobeacomprehensivecharterofeconomiclibertyaimedatpreservingfreeandunfetteredcompetitionastheruleoftrade.”——NorthernPacificRailwayCo.v.UnitedStates,356U.S.1,4-5(1958)2Introduction“TheShermanActLearningObjectives(1)Depictthedefinition,theobjectivesandtheframeworkofAML(2)Expound3differenttypesofmonopolisticconducts(3)Explainhowtoapplyjudicialdoctrinesaboutantimonopolybehaviors(4)Differreasonablecompetitionfrommonopolisticconducts(5)DiscusstheobjectivesofAML(6)Activity:Howtobriefacase?LearningObjectives(1)Depict45Content1.Thedefinition,theobjectivesandtheframeworkofAML2.MonopolyAgreements3.AbuseofDominantMarketPosition4.ConcentrationofBusinessOperators5.Howtoinvestigatesuspiciousmonopolisticconducts?6.LegalLiabilities4Content1.Thedefinition,the46Chapter3TheDefinition,theObjectivesandtheFrameworkofAML5Chapter31.ThedefinitionofAML1.1Itislawthatpromotesorseekstomaintainmarketcompetitionbyregulatinganti-competitiveconductbycompanies.1.2ItisknownasantitrustlawintheUnitedStatesfairtradingactinKorea,Japan,Taiwananti-monopolylawinChinaandRussia,inpreviousyearsithasbeenknownastradepracticeslawintheUnitedKingdomandAustralia.471.ThedefinitionofAML1.1I1.3ChinaCompetitionlawInthebroadsense，Chinacompetitionlawincludes4parts,whereascompetitionlawoftenbeusedinanarrowsense,whichonlyincludesAntimonopolyLawandLawAgainstUnfairCompetition.481.3ChinaCompetitionlawInth1.3ChinaCompetitionlawCompetitionlawAnti-monopolyLawLawAgainstUnfairCompetition

ConsumerProtectionActProductQualityLaw1.3ChinaCompetitionlawCompe1.4HistoryofChinaLegislation

(1)Itiscommonlyrecognizedthatthelegislationoftheanti-monopolylawinChinainitiatedsinceAugust1987.But(2)30August2007,the10thNPC(NationalPeople'sCongress)StandingCommitteepassedandpromulgatedtheAML.(3)1August2008,theAMLwasputintoenforcement.501.4HistoryofChinaLegislatiQuestionAMLpost-termbirth:Whatarethemainobstacles?51QuestionAMLpost-termbirth:W2.TheobjectivesofAMLArticle1ThisLawisenactedforthepurposeofpreventingandcurbingmonopolisticconducts,protectingfairmarketcompetition,enhancingeconomicefficiency,maintainingtheconsumerinterestsandthepublicinterests,andpromotingthehealthydevelopmentofsocialistmarketeconomy.522.TheobjectivesofAMLArtiClassDiscussionWhatistheobjectiveofEC?WhatistheobjectiveofUS.A?consumerinterestsCompetitionorder53ClassDiscussionWhatistheobActivity:CaseStudyActivity:CaseStudyVirginAtlanticAirwaysCasesVirginagainstBritishAirways'loyaltyrebateschemeswhicheffectivelytietravelagentstoBritishAirways,discouragingthetravelagentsfromsellingticketsforotherairlines.VirginAtlanticAirwaysCasesTheCommissiondecision

VirginWins.TheCommissionfoundthatbothBAperformancebonusschemesamountedtoanabuseofitsdominantpositionbyrewardingloyaltyfromtravelagentsandbydiscriminatingbetweentravelagentswiththeobjectandeffectofexcludingBA’scompetitorsfromtheUKmarketforairtransport.Inconsequence,theCommissionimposedafineof￡6.8millionin1999.TheCommissiondecision

VirgiCf.InEU:VirginWins.EU:theCommissionconcernwithprotectingcompetition,notcompetitors.U.S.:Virginlost.US:theCourtconcernswithprotectingconsumerwelfare,notcompetitors.

Cf.InEU:VirginWins.3.ThesourcesandframeworkofAML3.1Anti-monopolystatutescanbeunclear,therebyrequiringtheauthoritiesandthecourtstodeterminewhatreallyconstitutesantitrustlaw.Question:CanulistthesourcesofChinaAML?583.Thesourcesandframework3.ThesourcesandframeworkofAML3.2ThesourcesofChinaAML“AML”referstoantitruststatutes,enforcementguidelinesbytheauthorities,andtheinterpretationofthesestatutesbythecourts.GuidelinesonRelevantMarketDefinitionbyStateCouncilNDRCMOFCOME593.Thesourcesandframework3.3TheframeworkofAMLChapterIGeneralProvisionsChapterIIMonopolyAgreementsChapterIIIAbuseofDominantMarketPositionChapterIVConcentrationofBusinessOperatorsChapterVAbuseofAdministrativePowertoEliminateorRestrictCompetitionChapterVIInvestigationintoSuspiciousMonopolisticConductsChapterVIILegalLiabilitiesChapterVIIISupplementaryProvisions603.3TheframeworkofAMLChap61AboutChapterIGeneralProvisions20AboutChapterIGeneralProQuestions1.Howmany“monopolisticconducts”arelistedinAML?Monopolyagreementsreachedbetweenbusinessoperators;Abuseofdominantmarketpositionbybusinessoperators;andConcentrationofbusinessoperatorsthatmayhavetheeffectofeliminatingorrestrictingcompetition.AbuseofAdministrativePowertoEliminateorRestrictCompetition62Questions1.Howmany“monopoliQuestions1.Howmany“monopolisticconducts”arelistedinAML?Monopolyagreementsreachedbetweenbusinessoperators;Abuseofdominantmarketpositionbybusinessoperators;andConcentrationofbusinessoperatorsthatmayhavetheeffectofeliminatingorrestrictingcompetition.AbuseofAdministrativePowertoEliminateorRestrictCompetition63Questions1.Howmany“monopoliQuestions2.HowtointerpretArt.5andArt.6?Article5Businessoperatorsmay,throughfaircompetitionandvoluntaryassociation,gettogetheraccordingtolaw,toexpandthescaleoftheirbusinessoperationsandenhancetheirmarketcompetitiveness.Article6Nobusinessoperatorwithdominantmarketpositionmayabuseitsdominantpositiontoeliminateorrestrictcompetition.64Questions2.HowtointerpretAMonopolyMonopolyisamarketstructure.Monopoliescanbeestablishedbyagovernment,formnaturally,orformbyintegration.Monopolyisakindofmonopolisticconductswhichmayeliminateorrestrictcompetition.AMLaimsto……65MonopolyMonopolyisamarketQuestions3.PleaselisttheAMLenforcementauthoritiesinChina?1+3+XAnti-monopolyCommission(StateCouncil)NDRC(NationalDevelopmentandReformCommission)PriceMonopolyagreementsMOFCOMEConcentrationofbusinessoperatorsSAIC（StateAdministrationforIndustryandCommerce）OtherkindsofMonopolyagreementsAbuseofdominantmarketposition66Questions3.PleaselisttheAMChina:“1+3+X”EnforcementModel67ChinaEAAMC1AMEA3MOFCOMConcentrationreviewNDRCPriceMAsSAICMAsAbusingmarketpowerSectorRegulatorsXChina:“1+3+X”EnforcementMod68AboutChapterVIIISupplementaryProvisions27AboutChapterVIIISupplemeQuestions1.PleasereadArticle55andArticle56.“Thislawshallnotapplytotheconduct……”DoyouthinkwhatisthedifferencesbetweenArticle55andArticle15?Exception:適用除外，“表面上符合也不適用”Exemption：豁免“符合免責條件，網(wǎng)開一面”69Questions1.PleasereadArticlQuestions2.HowtointerpretIPisakindofmonopoly?Intellectualproperty(IP)rightsarelegallyrecognizedexclusiverightstocreationsofthemind。Article55Thislawshallnotapplytotheconductofbusinessoperatorstoexercisetheirintellectualpropertyrightsaccordingtothelawsandrelevantadministrativeregulationsonintellectualpropertyrights;however,thisLawshallapplytotheconductofbusinessoperatorstoeliminateorrestrictmarketcompetitionbyabusingtheirintellectualpropertyrights.70Questions2.HowtointerpretIActivity:CaseStudyActivity:CaseStudyInstructions1)Searchthecaseabout“Qualcomminanti-monopolyprobe”(US,Korea,China)fromwebsite.2)AnalyzewhatisQualcomm’s“hotpotato”.Qualcommistheworld'slargestmanufacturerofwirelesstelecommunicationproducts,holding40percentofthemarketinChinaand30percentintheworld.In2013,Qualcomm'srevenuereaches$24.3billion,withnearlyhalfcomingfromChinaand$7.88billionfrompatents.Instructions1)SearchthecaQualcomm’s“hotpotato”Itisaccusedofunfairanddiscriminatorypriceswithunreasonableconditions,accordingtotheNDRC.Normally,royaltypaymentsarenomorethan10percentofaproduct'ssellingprice.ButmanufacturersusingQualcommchipshavebeenaskedtopayexorbitantpatentfees.Qualcomm’s“hotpotato”ItisKFTCchallengeQualcommforexclusionaryconductandabuseofdominanceTheKFTCannouncedon23July2009,itsdecisiontoimposeafineof$208milliononQualcommforabusingits“near-monopolyposition”ontheKoreanCDMAchipmarket(in2008,itheld99.4percentofthemarket).AccordingtotheKFTC,whichhadbeeninvestigatingthecaseformorethanthreeyears,Qualcommabuseditsdominantpositionbyimposinghigherroyaltiesonmobilephonemanufacturerswhouseitsrivals’productsandbyofferingrebatestoKoreanmobilephonemakerswhoagreedtopurchaseamajorityoftheirchipsfromQualcomm.KFTCchallengeQualcommforeJTFCchallengeQualcommforexclusionaryconductandabuseofdominanceOn27July2009,theJapanFairTradeCommission(JFTC)sentadraftrulingtoQualcommallegin