產(chǎn)業(yè)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)（雙語(yǔ)）知到章節(jié)答案智慧樹(shù)2023年山東財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)

產(chǎn)業(yè)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)（雙語(yǔ)）知到章節(jié)測(cè)試答案智慧樹(shù)2023年最新山東財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)第一章測(cè)試()referstheproductionofaneconomicgoodorservicewithinaneconomy.

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Industry()refersthewayandstructureinwhichthefirmsinonesectorarearranged.

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Industrialorganization()denotesanation’sdeclared,official,totalstrategicefforttoinfluencesectoraldevelopment

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IndustrialPolicyThecoreissuesofindustrialorganizationare(

)and(

).

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monopoly;competitionDemandconditionsareaffectedby().

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Priceelasticity;Substitutes;Marketgrowth;TypeofgoodProductioninonesectorhaslowsubstitutability.

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錯(cuò)Allfirmsseekhighermarketsharesinordertogainhigherprofits.

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對(duì)Ifoneorseveralfirmshavemarketpowerandcometodominate,competitionisusuallyeffective

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錯(cuò)ChicagoSchooleconomistsarguedthatincreasedefficiencyledtoincreasedmarketpowerandincreasedprofits.

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對(duì)TheSCPparadigmwasdevelopedbyEdwardMasonandJoeBaininthe1940sand1950s.

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對(duì)ChicagoSchooleconomistsquestionedmanyofthemajorempiricalconclusionsreachedbyfollowersoftheSCPapproach.

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對(duì)HarvardSchooleconomistsarguedthatincreasedefficiencyledtoincreasedmarketpowerandincreasedprofits.

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錯(cuò)TheSCPparadigmarguesthatbasicmarketconditionsdeterminemarketstructure;marketstructuredeterminesconduct;andconductdeterminesperformance.

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對(duì)thereisagrowingconsensusinrecentdevelopmenttheorythatstateinterventionsareoftenunnecessarywhenmarketfailuresprevail.

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錯(cuò)Thefieldofindustrialorganizationdevelopedasanoffshootofmicroeconomictheory.

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對(duì)第二章測(cè)試Assetspecificityreferstothedegreetowhichsomeassetsareofvalueprimarilytoonefirm.（）

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對(duì)Animportantadvantageofacorporationisthatitsownershaveunlimitedliability（）.

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錯(cuò)Intheshortrunsomeinputsarefixed;thefirmhastodothebestitcanwithagivencapitalstockandplantsize.（）

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對(duì)MESshowsthebestsizeforproduction().

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對(duì)BelowtheMESlevel,theremaybediseconomiesofscale.（）

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錯(cuò)Specializationletsworkerslearntodotheirspecifictasksmuchmorerapidlyandprecisely.（）

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對(duì)Learningcurvesshowadeclineinthecurrentaveragecostofproductionastotalproductionmounts.（）

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對(duì)Animportanttypeofsharedinputisanintangibleassetsuchasresearchknowledgeorbusinessknow-howaboutproduction.（）

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對(duì)Eachfirmisassumedtomaximize（）.

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profitsThecostsofusingthemarkettoconductbusinessarecalled.（）。

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transactioncostsThecostsavingsthatresultfromproducingjointproductsiscalledas(

)

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economiesofscopeWilliamsonpointsoutthreeproductioncostadvantagesofusingthemarket,theyare（）。

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economiesofscale;economiesofscope;productioncostsThereareseveralpossiblebenefits(orso-calledsynergies)fromdiversification.（）。

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Reducingrisk;Allocatingcapital;TransferoftechnologyThemorefrequentafirm’sneedforaninput,themorethefirmcansaveontransactioncostsbyinternalproduction.()

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對(duì)thehigherthedegreeofuncertainty,thehigherarethetransactioncosts.（）

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對(duì)第三章測(cè)試Theelasticityofdemand,isameasureofhowsensitivequantitydemandedistoachangein().

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price（）isthedifferencebetweenthemaximumamountconsumersarewillingtopayforagoodandtheamounttheyactuallypay。

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consumersurplusIfafirmcouldhavetheabilitytosetpriceabove(),thenwecansayithasmarketpower.

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marginalcostInaperfectlycompetitivemarket,transactioncostsarezerofor(

)

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sellers;buyersInaperfectlycompetitivemarket,transactioncostsarezeroforbothbuyersandsellers.

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對(duì)Theprofit-maximizingruletellsafirmtoproducethatquantityofoutputforwhichmarginalrevenueequalsmarginalcost.

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對(duì)Economistsoftenevaluatethewelfareeffectsofchangesinmarketstructureorofgovernmentpoliciesbylookingatchangesinconsumersurplus.

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錯(cuò)Amonopolyisthesoleproducerofagoodforwhichtherearenoclosesubstitutes

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對(duì)TheLernerIndexindicatesthatamonopolisthasunlimitedcontroloverprice.

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錯(cuò)Iftheelasticityequals-10,theLernerIndexequals0.01

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錯(cuò)Ifmonopolizationofanindustryraisescosts,thedeadweightlossislarger

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對(duì)Thecompetitivemarketequilibriumisallocativelyefficient:Itmaximizesthesumofconsumerandproducersurplus.

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對(duì)Thedeadweightlosstriangleisameasureofthemisallocationofresourcesresultingfrommonopoly.

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對(duì)Thesimplecomparisonofcompetitionandmonopolyhighlightstheresourcemisallocationassociatedwithmarketpower.

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對(duì)Producersurplusisthedifferencebetweenthe(

)theproducerreceivesforsellingaunitofoutputanditsreservation(

）

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marketprice,supplyprice第四章測(cè)試Marketshareisthefirm’spercentageshareofthemarket’stotalsalesrevenue.Itrangesfromzeroupto()percent.

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100TheHHInumbercanrangefrom(

)to（）。

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0,10000Verticalmergerinvolvesfirmsthatproduceat()ofproductioninthesameindustry.

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differentstagesThemotivesformergerare（）。

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marketpower;riskreduction;reduceentrybarriers;financialmotivesStaticorstructuralbarrierstoentryinclude（）。

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absolutecostadvantages;capitalcosts;productdifferentiation;economiesofscaleAtoo-broaddefinitionincludestoomanyfirms,withtheresultthatreportedmeasuresofmarketpowertendtobebiaseddownward.

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對(duì)Entryandexitconditionsareimportantdeterminantsofexistingfirms’marketpower.

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對(duì)Firmswithintheindustryhavecontroloverstructuralbarrierstoentry

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錯(cuò)Behavioralorstrategicbarrierstoentryarethoseexistingfirmsmightdeliberatelybehaveinwaysthatdecreasedtheprobabilityofentrybyotherfirms

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對(duì)Establishedfirmshasabsolutecostadvantagesoverpotentialentrants.

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對(duì)Productdifferentiationcreatesanadvantageforestablishedfirmsrelativetonewcomers.

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錯(cuò)Expectingprofitabilityisanincentivestoenter

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對(duì)Anycostthatafirmmustincurtoleaveanindustryisanexitbarrier,whichisgenerallythoughtofassometypeofmarginalcost.

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錯(cuò)Industrieswithhighratesofentrytendtohavehighratesofexit

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對(duì)Eachsourceofentrybarrierscanalsoerectabarriertoexitbygoingfirms.

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對(duì)第五章測(cè)試

Inamarketwithadominantfirm,itmakessensetoassumethat(

)

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thedominantfirmwillsettheindustrypriceandthefringefirmswilltakethatpriceasgiven.InUSSteelmodel,wecanfindthedominantfirm’sresidualdemandcurvebysubtractingthefringesupplycurvefromthetotaldemandcurveateverypricegreaterthanP=$25.

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對(duì)Accordingtotheassumptionof“Entryisfree”inthetheoryofcontestablemarket,(

)

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Entrantscouldbeoncompletelyequalfootingwithestablishedfirms,evenwithanestablishedmonopolist.Accordingtocontestablemarketassumption,absoluteentryimpliesthattheentrylagismorethanthepriceadjustmentlag:anewfirmcanenteramarketandsellitsproductbeforetheestablishedfirmscanreactandchangetheirprices.

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錯(cuò)Accordingtotheoryofcontestablemarketassumption,

theassumptionofnosunkcostsimpliesthatafirmcouldsellitsproductionfacilitiesfortheirpresentvalueinaresalemarketorcouldusetheminanothermarketwithoutanylosses.

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對(duì)Ifaconsumerfeelsmuchbetterasmoreconsumersuse“wechat”,thenetworkexternalityis(

)

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positiveNegativeExternalityexistswhenconsumersarebetteroffasthenumberofusersofthesamebrandincreases

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錯(cuò)DirectNetworkExternalityreferstothebenefittoanindividualconsumerdependsdirectlyonthenumberofotherusersoftheproduct.

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對(duì)IndirectNetworkExternalityarisesbecauseofcomplementarity.

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對(duì)Inemail’sapplication,itshowsnetworkexternalityanditshouldbenegative.

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錯(cuò)第六章測(cè)試LetX1standforameasureofmarketstructureandYforameasureofeconomicprofits,wecanexpressthehypothesisabouttherelationshipbetweenmarketstructureandprofitsusingasimplelinearequationas:,isanerrorterm.

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對(duì)Infigure1(a),hypotheticalscatterdiagramofdataonY(economicprofits)andX1(marketstructure),theverticaldistancebetweeneachdatapointandastraightlinefittedthroughtheobservationsiscalledthe()

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residualTheLernerIndexisdifficulttoestimatebecausedataarelackingonfirms’marginalcosts.

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對(duì)Excessreturnonsalesistheratioofeconomicprofitstosalescost.

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錯(cuò)Economicprofitsaredifficulttocalculate.

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對(duì)Tobin’sqhasseveraladvantagesoverrateofreturnmeasures().

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Themarketvalueofafirmdependspartlyonrisk,soqincorporatesanadjustmentforrisk.;Thenumeratorofq,marketvalue,reflectsexpectedfutureprofits,whereasaccountingdatareflectonlypastprofits.;qismuchlesssensitivetoerrorsinmeasuringitscomponentsthanareprofits.Inthemeasuringofcapitalrequirements,typicallymeasuredbytheestimatedamountofcapitalrequiredbyamidpointplant.

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對(duì)Manyeconomistshaveusedproxiesforentrybarriersasindependentvariablesintheirregressionequations.Commonlyusedmeasuresofbarrierstoentryincludethefollowing():

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Economiesofscale;Capitalrequirements;Productdifferentiation;ResearchintensityAdvertisingandotherformsofproductdifferentiationareexpectedtohavelesseffectonconcentrationandprofitabilityinproducergoodsindustriesthaninconsumergoodsindustries,()

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becausebuyersinproducergoodsindustriestendtobelargeandwellinformed.Inthemeasuringofeconomiesofscale,oftenapproximatedbytheratioofmidpointplantsales(thesalesoftheplantinthemiddleofthesizedistributionofplants)tototalindustrysales.

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對(duì)第七章測(cè)試TheWaldmanmodelisagameofperfectinformationbecausebothtrucksmovesimultaneouslytopickalocation.

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錯(cuò)InWaldmanmodel,ifbothlocateatthesamepoint,thetruckssplitsales50-50.

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對(duì)Adominantstrategyisastrategythatoutperformsanyotherstrategynomatterwhatstrategyanopponentselects.

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對(duì)AlthoughalldominantsolutionsareNashequilibria,somegameswithoutadominantsolutioncanhave()Nashequilibrium.

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morethanoneIfWaldmanplaysastrategythatminimizesthemaximumpossibleoutcomeforOtherTruck,Waldmanwillbeplayinghisdominatedstrategy.

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錯(cuò)GeneralElectric(GE)andWestinghousegameisofimperfectinformationbecauseGEandWestinghousesimultaneouslyselectprices.

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對(duì)Adominatedstrategyisastrategythatcanalwaysbebeatenbysomeotherstrategy.

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對(duì)Insequentialgames,theplayerstaketurnsmovinginsteadofmovingsimultaneously.

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對(duì)oneofthecharacteristicsofallmixedstrategyequilibriaisthatoncetheequilibriumisobtained,bothplayersareindifferentbetweenplayingtheirequilibriumstrategyandanyotherstrategy.

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對(duì)AmixedstrategyNashequilibriumisinherentlystablebecauseprofitsarethesameregardlessofthestrategyadoptedbythefirms,andtherefore,bothfirmshavelittleincentivetomaintaintheequilibrium.

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錯(cuò)第八章測(cè)試IntheStackelbergModel,onefirmmakechoicefirst,thenanotheronewillselectoutputlevel.

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對(duì)InBertrandModel,twofirmsselectoutputoftheproductsinordertomaximizeprofit.

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錯(cuò)Cournot’sduopolymodelisusedtodescribeanindustrystructureinwhichcompaniescompeteonthepriceofproducttheywillproduce,whichtheydecideonindependentlyofeachotherandatthesametime.

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錯(cuò)InCournot’sduopolymodel,twofirmsfaceidenticalcosts.

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對(duì)Cournot’sduopolymodelassumptionincludes():

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thereisnocollusion;twofirmsfaceidenticalcosts;eachfirmbelievesthatitscompetitorwillalwaysmaintainitscurrentoutput.Inequilibrium,amongCournotoutput,jointprofit-maximizingoutputandtheperfectlycompetitiveoutput,ifweweretosortbytheoutputlevelfromthelargesttothesmallest,itshouldbe():

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theperfectlycompetitiveoutput,Cournotoutput,jointprofit-maximizingoutputCournotequilibriumisnotaNashequilibrium

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錯(cuò)TheCournot–Nashgameisasequentialgame.

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錯(cuò)TheStackelbergequilibriumyieldsagreatertotalindustryoutputandhigherpricethantheCournot–Nashequilibrium.

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錯(cuò)IntheSouthwest-U.S.Airways’farecompetinggame,anyfarelessthanMC=$70willresultinoneairlinereducingfares,whichinturnwillresultinafarereductionbytheother,andsoon.

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錯(cuò)第九章測(cè)試Inordertoachievethejointprofit-maximizingresult,thefirmsmustestablishanenvironmentinwhicheachbelievestheotherwillsticktothecollusivehigh-pricepolicy.Anysolutiontothedilemmahastobecharacterizedby():

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anabilitytodetectcheating;anabilitytopunishcheatersThecharacteristicsofatit-for-tatstrategyincludes(

)

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Ineverysubsequentround,adoptthestrategyplayedbyyouropponentinthepreviousround.;theniceness;Startingbycooperatinginthefirstround.Tacitcollusionresultswhenagroupofcompetitorssitsdowntodiscussandsetprice.

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錯(cuò)Inperfectcollusion,thefirmsareproducingthejointprofit-maximizingoutput.

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對(duì)Themostimportantadvantageoftit-for-tatstrategyisthenicenesscharacteristic.

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對(duì)InJensen–WaldmanMiniTournament,whereJensenplaystit-for-tatandWaldmanplaysthedominantstrategy,Jensenmustwinthehead-to-headcompetition.

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錯(cuò)Tit-for-tatisforgivinginthatitrewardsdefectorswhoreverttocooperationbyalsorevertingtocooperation.

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對(duì)Oligopolistsshouldsimplyadoptthetit-for-tatstrategyinallcircumstances.

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錯(cuò)Inatriggerpricestrategy,evenasingledeviationfromcooperationwillcausetheendsofcooperationforever.

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對(duì)tit-for-tatstrategyisalsooftencalledthegrimstrategy.

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錯(cuò)Acartelisaformal(explicit)agreementamongcompetingfirms.

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對(duì)InWal-Mart-Searsmodel,todeterminethejointprofit-maximizingprice,theindustryaveragecostcurvemustbeequatedtotheindustrymarginalrevenuecurve.

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錯(cuò)Whichofthefollowingfactorcouldhindereffectivecollusion

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slowrateofdemandgrowthordecliningdemand;differingcostsbetweenfirms;lowentrybarriersThemoreelasticthedemand,therefore,thegreaterthecartel’spotentialmarketpowerandthegreatertheincentivetocolludebecauseitiseasiertoraisepricewithouthavingtosignificantlyreduceindustryoutput.

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錯(cuò)Slowratesofdemandgrowthmaybeassociatedwithhigherlevelsofcollusion.

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對(duì)第十章測(cè)試Thetheoryoflimitpricingsuggeststhatfirmsmaychargehighershort-runpricestorestrictfutureentry.

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錯(cuò)Intheoriginallimitpricingmodels,onecriticalassumptionwastheCournotassumptionthatthemonopolistwouldmaintainitsoutputevenafterentryoccurred.

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對(duì)Inlimitpricingmodel,todeterentry,themonopolistmust()itspricesufficientlytoensurethatthepotentialentrant’sresidualdemandcurvelieseverywhere()thepotentialentrant’saveragecostcurve.

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lower,belowThelowestpossiblepricethemonopolistcanchargeandstillprevententryiscalledthelimitprice

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錯(cuò)Evenifeconomiesofscaleexist,alimitpricingpolicystillmaynotworkintheabsenceofacostadvantageforthemonopolist.

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錯(cuò)Predatorypricingassumesthatamonopolistmaximizesprofituntilentryoccurs,andthatafterentry,themonopolistexpandsoutputaggressivelyandcutsprice.

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對(duì)Accordingtochainstoreparadoxtheory,evenwithhundredsorthousandsofroundsinapredatorypricinggame,entrywillbeaccommodatedonlyinthefirstround.

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錯(cuò)Aweakmonopolistenjoysbeingpredatoryandisalwayspredatory.

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錯(cuò)Aweakmonopolistispredatoryinonemarketonlyifitbelievesitwillincreaseitsfutureprofitinothermarketstoatleastcompensateforitslowercurrentprofit.

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對(duì)Inpredatorypricinggamewithinformationisimperfect,certain,incomplete,andasymmetric,themonopolistandthepotentialentrantallknowwhetherthemonopolistisstrongorweak.

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錯(cuò)第十一章測(cè)試Fromaneconomicstandpoint,nonpricingstrategiesaremorelikelytobemisinterpretedbycompetitorsasaggressiveacts.

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錯(cuò)Inexcesscapacitymodel,thepotentialentrantmovesfirstandselectsalevelofcapacity,thenthemonopolistdecideswhethertoenter,thenthemonopolistselectsacapacitylevelandanoutput.Thepotentialentrantproducesaquantityofzeroifitstaysout.

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錯(cuò)Inexcesscapacitymodel,themonopolistinvestsinexcesscapacityinperiod1inorderto()itscostsinperiod2;moreimportantly,thisinvestment()themonopolist’scostsinrelationtoapotentialentrant’scostsinperiod2.Asaresult,themonopolistdetersentryandearnslargerprofitsoverthetwoperiods.

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lower,lowersInexcesscapacitymodel,themonopolistcanthreatentobuildtheextracapacityafterthepotentialentranthasalreadyentered,butsuchathreatisnotcredible.

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對(duì)Inexcesscapacitymodel,themonopolistcannotbuildtheextracapacityinadvanceofthepotentialentrant’sdecisionofwhethertoenter.Themonopolist’searlyexpansionofcapacitywouldonlyaffecttheprofitpayoffsofitself.

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錯(cuò)Whenlearningbydoingisimportant,earlyentrantsintothemarketmaybeabletomaintainalargemarketshareandincreasethepresentvalueoftheirprofitsbystrategicallyproducingsignificantlylargeroutputsearlyonthanwouldbejustifiedbyshort-runprofit-maximizingbehavior.

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對(duì)AccordingtoSmiley’sresultsaboutthefrequencyuseofdifferentstrategies,themoststrikingfindingwasthatthestrategicuseofadvertisingandproductproliferationwascommoninbothnewandexistingproductmarkets.

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對(duì)Inexcesscapacitymodel,themonopolistinvestsinexcesscapacityin()inordertoloweritscostsin();moreimportantly,thisinvestmentlowersthemonopolist’scostsinrelationtoapotentialentrant’scostsinperiod2.Asaresult,themonopolistdetersentryandearnslargerprofitsover().

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period1,period2,thetwoperiods.Facedwithathreatofentry,themonopolistcaninvestinresearchanddevelopmentinperiod1andearnasmallerprofitin(

);however,ifthemonopolist’slowercostsinperiod2deterentry,themonopolist’sprofitswillbesignificantlyincreasedin(

)

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period2,period2.Whichofthefollowingmethodscouldbeusedforamonopolisttoraiseitsrivals’costs?

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lobbyingthegovernmenttoerectbarrierstoentry;sabotagingcorporatecompetitors;providingcomplementarygoodsandservicestoforceentrantstoalsoprovidecomplementaryproducts;increasingadvertisingexpenditurestoforceentrantstoincreasetheiradvertisingexpenditures第十二章測(cè)試Productdifferentiationisassociatedwithpossibleadvantagesforincumbentfirms.Theseadvantagesinclude():

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alloftheabove;anincreaseinthecapitalbarriertoentry;possiblecostadvantagesforincumbents;increasedeconomiesofscaleSmartphonesellersattempttodifferentiatetheirproductsinmanyways,suchas(

):

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batterylife;

internalstorage;appearance;chipbrandInHotelling’sspatialmodel,ifthereisonly1store,themainstreet’slengthis1mile,sothemonopolistshouldlocatethestoreon(

)milefromoneendofthemainstreet.

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1/2Inthespatialmodelofproductdifferentiation,theTotalSocialSurplus(TSS)equalsthetotalvalueoftheNunitssoldtoconsumersincaseswhereallNconsumerspurchaseexactlyoneunitofthegoodfromoneofnstores(NR)minus():

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thefixedcostsofbuildingnstores(nF);totaltransportationcosts;thetotalvariablecostsofproduction(Nc)Inthespatialmodelofproductdifferentiation,totaltransportationcostsdependon():

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thetransportationcostsperunitofdistancet.;thenumberofstoresnThetwoimportantcharacteristicsofmonopolisticcompetitionare()

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productdifferentiation;easyentryandexitVerticaldifferentiationreferstodifferencesbetweenbrandsbasedondifferentproductcharacteristicsbutnotondifferentoverallquality.

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錯(cuò)AMcDonald’sQuarterPounderissomewhatdifferentfromaBurgerKingWhopperoraWendy’sSingle,buttheoverallqualityofthethreeburgersissimilar.Thisishorizontaldifferentiation.

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對(duì)Inthespatialmodelofproductdifferentiation,thesociallyoptimalnumberofstoresisthesamenumberofstoresthatmaximizesthemonopolist’sprofit.

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錯(cuò)Accordingtofirstmovermodelintheproductdifferentiationadvantagestheory,iftherepeatpurchasesfrequenceissmall,therisk-costfactor

issmall.

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錯(cuò)第十三章測(cè)試Advertisinginbusinessisaformofmarketingcommunicationusedtoencourage,orpersuadeanaudiencetotakeorcontinuetotakesomeactions.（）

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對(duì)Informativeadvertisingimprovescompetitionandconsumerchoiceandissociallybeneficial.（）

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對(duì)Persuasiveadvertisingmerelytriestochangeconsumerreferencesortodivertattentionfromfactstoimages.（）

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對(duì)Advertisingintensityshouldbehighestincompetitivemarkets.（）

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錯(cuò)Advertisingintensityshouldbelowestinoligopolymarkets.（）

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錯(cuò)Firmshopetoraisetheirmarketsharesandprofitsbyadvertising.Theresultiswidelybelievedtobestandoffadvertising.（）

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對(duì)Advertisingmakesitmoreexpensivetoenteramarket.（）

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對(duì)Anincumbentfirmhasnothresholdlevelofadvertisingbecausethecumulativeeffectofpreviousadvertisingcampaignsensuresthatcurrentadvertisinghasanimmediateimpactonsales.（）

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對(duì)Advertisingcanbeapowerfuldevicebywhichneworsmallfirmssucceed.（）

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對(duì)Theresearchconsensussofaristhatadvertisingdoestendtoraisemarketpowerandmonopolyprofits,especiallypersuasiveadvertising.（）

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對(duì)第十四章測(cè)試Creativedestructioncanbedescribedasthedismantlingoflong-standingpracticesinordertomakewayforinnovation.（）

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對(duì)Thetheoryofcreativedestructionassumesthatlong-standingarrangementsandassumptionsmustbedestroyedtofreeupresourcesandenergytobedeployedforinnovation.（）

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對(duì)ForSchumpeter,perfectcompetitionwasnottheidealmarketstructure.（）

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對(duì)ForSchumpeter,perfectcompetitionwasthesuperiormarketstructure.（）

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錯(cuò)LargeeconomiesofscalemaybeassociatedwithR&D.()

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對(duì)Apatentisanintellectualpropertyrightfora

technicalinvention.Itallowsyoutopreventothersfromusingyourinventionforcommercialpurposesforever.（）

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錯(cuò)patentsmayallowgreaterexclusivityandmoremonopolypower.（）

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對(duì)Yourinventioncanbeprotectedbypatentwithoutanyrequirment.()

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錯(cuò)Onceapatentexpires,aninventionbecomescommonpropertyandcanthenbefreelyusedbyanyone.（）

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對(duì)Copyrightisalegaltermdescribingrightsgiventocreatorsovertheirliteraryandartisticcreations,whiletheterm‘industrialpropertyrights’referstocertainexclusiverightsregardinginnovativeideasordistinguishingsignsintheindustrialorcommercialfield.（）

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對(duì)第十五章測(cè)試Asingle-pricemonopolyisafirmthatmustselleachunitofitsoutputforthesamepricetoallitscustomers.()

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對(duì)Buyerswithmoreelasticdemandarechargedmore.（）

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錯(cuò)Buyerswithlesselasticdemandarechargedless.（）

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錯(cuò)Pricediscriminationexistswhensalesofidenticalgoodsorservicesaretransactedatdifferentpricesfromdifferentprovider.（）

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錯(cuò)Oligopolydividesbuyersintotwoormoregroupsandchargeslowerpricestothebuyerswithlesselasticdemand.（）

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錯(cuò)Inthirddegreepricediscrimination,pricevariesaccordingtoquantitysold.Largerquantitiesareavailableatalowerunitprice.（）

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錯(cuò)Inseconddegreepricediscrimination,pricevariesbyattributessuchaslocationorbycustomersegment,orinthemostextremecase,bytheindividualcustomer’sidentity.（）

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錯(cuò)Thesellerdividesthebuyersintotwoormoregroupsandchargeshigherpricestothebuyerswithlesselasticdemand.

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對(duì)Pricediscriminationcanocc