英文文獻(xiàn)翻譯、主觀幸福感

Subjectwell-beingSubjectivewell-being1Subjectivewell-beingandwell-beingsimpliciterInthissection,Iexploretherelationshipbetweensubjectivewell-beingandwell-beingsimpliciterinthewritingsonsubjectivemeasures.Iwillarguethatproponentsofsubjectivemeasuresofwell-beingdisagreeabouttherelationshipbetweensubjectivewell-beingandwell-beingsimpliciter:aboutwhethersubjectivewell-beingconstituteswell-beingsimpliciterormerelyisacomponentofit.Asmystartingpoint,Itaketheconceptofwell-being,thatis,whatIhavesofarcalledwell-beingsimpliciter:“whatwehavewhenourlivesaregoingwellforus,whenwearelivinglivesthatarenotnecessarilymorallygood,butgoodforus”(Tiberius,2006,p.493,italicsinoriginal).Letuscallthisthe“core”conceptofwell-being.Therearemanyothertermsthatareusedinthesamesense,including“aperson’sgood,benefit,advantage,interest,prudentialvalue,welfare,happiness,flourishing,eudaimonia,andutility”(Moore&Crisp,1996,p.599).Becausetheconceptofwell-beingisintendedtocapturewhatisultimately–andnotjustinstrumentally–goodfortheindividual,itisalsosupposedtocapturethatwhichwehavereasontopromote–asanendandnotjustasameans–bothinourownlivesandinthelivesofothers.AsThomasScanlonputsit:Itiscommonlysupposedthatthereisasimplenotionofindividualwell-beingthatplaysthefollowingthreeroles.First,itservesasanimportantbasisforthedecisionsofasinglerationalindividual,atleastforthosedecisionsinwhichheorshealoneisconcerned(thatistosay,inwhichmoralobligationsandconcernsforotherscanbeleftaside).Second,itiswhataconcernedbenefactor,suchasafriendorparent,hasreasontopromote.Third,itisthebasisonwhichanindividual’sinterestsaretakenintoaccountinmoralargument(Scanlon,1998,p.93).3Inparticular,itisfrequentlyassumedthatwell-beingisoneconsiderationorassomepeoplewouldargue,theonlyconsiderationthatshouldserveasanend,andnotjustameansforpublicpolicy.HereIwilltakeitforgrantedthatwhenproponentsofsubjectivemeasurestalkaboutsuchmeasuresasrepresentingwell-being,theyusetheterminthecoresense(Angner,2009a,inpress).First,asindicatedabove,subjectivemeasuresareoftenpresentedasalternativestoothermeasuresofwelfareorwell-being;thiswouldmakelittlesenseif,infact,subjectivemeasureswerenotintendedtorepresentthatwhichtheothermeasuresweredesignedtorepresentviz.welfareorwell-being.Second,theproponents’conceptofwell-beingplaystheverysameroleasthatplayedbythecoreconcept:thosewhodefendtheuseofsubjectivemeasuresofwellbeingoftenemphasizethattheythinkofwell-beingasthatwhichisultimatelygoodfortheindividual,asthatwhichisworthpromotinginthelifeofothers,andasacentral(sometimestheonly)ultimategoalforpublicpolicy(cf.Diener&Seligman,2004,quotedabove).Third,anumberofproponentsexplicitlyciteclassicalphilosophicalliteratureinenthusiasticagreementwhilesignalingthattheyuse“well-being”and/or“happiness”inthesamesenseasphilosophersdo(Kahneman,Wakker,&Sarin,1997;Layard,2005;Watson,1930).Overtheyears,philosophershavetriedtoshedlightontheconceptofwell-beingbydevelopinganddefendingvariousaccounts,orconceptionsofwell-being.Here,IfollowParfit(1984,pp.493–502)individingsuchaccountsintothreemainclasses:mentalstateaccounts,preference-satisfactionordesire-fulfillmentaccounts,andobjective-listaccounts.4Accordingtomental-stateaccounts,well-beingisa“mentalstate”ora“stateofmind.”Becausetheseaccountsallseewelfare“ashavingtoenterourexperience,”theyaresaidtosatisfytheexperiencerequirement(Griffin,1986,p.13).Scanlonwrites:“Experientialtheoriesholdthatthequalityoflife‘forthepersonwholivesit’iscompletelydeterminedbyitsexperientialquality,”where“experientialquality”refersto“whatitwouldbeliketoliveit”(Scanlon,1998,pp.97,99).Onthisview,then,subjectivelyfeltexperienceisbothnecessaryandsufficientforaperson’swell-being.Accordingtodesire-fulfillmentorpreference-satisfactionaccounts,bycontrast,apersoniswellofftotheextentthatherdesiresarefulfilledand/orherpreferencesaresatisfied.Scanlonputsitthisway:Desiretheoriesrejecttheexperiencerequirementandallowthataperson’slifecanbemadebetterandworsenotonlybychangesinthatperson’sstatesofconsciousnessbutalsobychangeselsewhereintheworldwhichfulfillthatperson’spreferences(Scanlon,1993,p.186).Suchaccountsdonotrequirethatapersonwhoiswelloffexperienceanyfeelingsofhappinessorsatisfaction.Whattheydorequireisthatherdesiresarefulfilled(orthatherpreferencesaresatisfied),whichdoesnotcomedowntothesamething.Thetwokindsofaccountdescribedsofararefrequentlyreferredtoassubjectiveaccounts,becausetheydescribeaperson’swell-beingas(atleastpartly)afunctionofhisorherfeelings,experiences,desires,andsoon.Accordingtoso-calledobjectiveaccounts,bycontrast,aperson’swell-beingdoesnotdependonsuchsubjectivefactors.Onsuchaccounts,“certainthingsaregoodorbadforbeings,independentlyinatleastsomecasesofwhethertheyaredesiredorwhethertheygiverisetopleasurableexperiences”(Chappell&Crisp,1998,p.553).Identifyingthelistofthingsthataregoodforpeopleregardlessofwhattheywantisnotoriouslydifficult,butoneprovisionallistofsuchthingsincludes“moralgoodness,rationalactivity,thedevelopmentofone’sabilities,havingchildrenandbeingagoodparent,knowledge,andtheawarenessoftruebeauty”(Parfit,1984,p.499).Obviously,therearemanyversionsofaccountsofeachkind.Thetri-partitedivisionpermitsustocaptureamajordifferencebetweensubjectivemeasuresofwell-being,traditionaleconomicwelfaremeasures,andwelfareindicatorsinspiredbythecapabilityapproach.Ithasbeennotedelsewherethattraditionaleconomicwelfaremeasuresarebasedonpreference-satisfactionaccountsofwell-being(Angner,2009a,b,inpress;Harsanyi,1982;Hausman&McPherson,2006).Thisisevident,amongotherthings,fromthefactthatwelfareeconomiststraditionallyhavedefendedtheirmeasuresbyshowingthattheyareutilityfunctions,thatis,thattheyareindicesofpreferencesatisfaction.Ithasalsobeennotedthatmeasuresinspiredbythecapabilityapproacharebasedonobjective-listaccountsofwell-being(Nussbaum,2008;Sen,1987).Thisisclear,amongotherthings,fromtheassumptionthatcertainthings–inparticular,havingalargecapabilityset–arethoughttobegoodforapersonregardlessofwhetherthosethingswouldmakethepersonhappier,andofwhetherthepersondesiresthem.5Meanwhile,itisfairlyobviousthatmanyproponentsofsubjectivemeasuresthinkofwell-beingasamentalstate.Thereisabundantevidence,foronething,thattheyadheretotheexperiencerequirement.Intheliteratureonsubjectivemeasures,well-beingisoftendescribedasamatterexclusivelyofindividualsubjective,hedonic,oraffectiveexperience.Forexample,DavidG.MyersquotesMadamedelaFayetteassaying:“Ifonethinksthatoneishappy,thatisenoughtobehappy,”andaddsthat“l(fā)ikeMadamedeLaFayette,socialscientistsviewwell-beingasastateofmind.Well-being,sometimescalled‘subjectivewell-being’toemphasizethepoint,isapervasivesensethatlifeisgood”(Myers,1992,pp.23,27).Myersevidentlytakeswell-beingtobesomethingthoroughlysubjective;note,inparticular,theuseoftheterm“subjectivewell-being”assynonymouswith“well-being.”Theexplicitreferencetostatesofmindstronglysuggeststhatwhathehasinmindissometypeofmental-stateaccount.Similarly,EdDienerwrites:“Theareaofsubjectivewell-beingissubjective.[It]resideswithintheexperienceoftheindividual”(Diener,1984,p.543).DienerandEunkookSuhreinforcethepoint:Subjectivewell-beingresearchisconcernedwithindividuals’subjectiveexperiencesoftheirlives.Theunderlyingassumptionisthatwell-beingcanbedefinedbypeople’sconsciousexperiences—intermsofhedonicfeelingsorcognitivesatisfactions.Thefieldisbuiltonthepresumptionthattounderstandtheindividuals’experientialqualityofwell-being,itisappropriatetodirectlyexaminehowapersonfeelsaboutlifeinthecontextofhisorherownstandards(Diener&Suh,1997,p.191).DienerandSuh,likeMyersandtheauthorstowhomherefers,apparentlyusetheterm“well-being”interchangeablywith“subjectivewell-being.”ThefactthatDienerandSuharguethatwell-beingisnotonlyconcernedwiththeindividual’ssubjectiveexperiences,butdefinedbythem,stronglysuggeststhattheyadheretotheexperiencerequirement.Severalauthorsemphasizethesubjectivecharacterofwell-being,astheyusetheterm,bycontrastingsubjectivemeasureswith“objective”ones,includingsocialandeconomicindicators.Dienermakesthispointinthefollowingway:NotablyabsentfromdefinitionsofSWB[subjectivewell-being]arenecessaryobjectiveconditionssuchashealth,comfort,virtue,orwealth.AlthoughsuchconditionsareseenaspotentialinfluencesonSWB,theyarenotseenasaninherentandnecessarypartofit(Diener,1984,p.543).6Thisquoteconfirmsthat,inDiener’swork,anindividual’swell-beingisdefinednotbytheobjectivecircumstancesinwhichshefindsherself,butbyhersubjectiveexperiences,thoughheallowstheformertobecausallyresponsibleforthelatter.DanielKahneman,whoidentifieswell-beingwithhappiness,addsthathappiness“isnottobeconfusedwithgoodfortune,whichisanassessmentofthecircumstancesofsomeone’slife”(Kahneman,1999,p.5).InKahneman’sview,itispossibletoenjoygoodfortune–presumablyincome,health,andsoon–withoutbeinghappy.AngusCampbell(1976),quotedinDiener(1984,p.543),expandsonthispoint.Campbellmaintains:“Thegrossnationalproduct,importantasitundoubtedlyis,isclearlynottheultimatetouchstoneagainstwhichthequantumofhappinessinthiscountrycanbeassessed”(Campbell,1976,p.117).Hecontinues:Ifweareprimarilyconcernedwithdescribingthequalityoflifeexperienceofthepopulation,wewillneedmeasuresdifferentfromthosethatareusedtodescribetheobjectivecircumstancesinwhichpeoplelive.Wewillhavetodevelopmeasuresthatgodirectlytotheexperienceitself.Thesesubjectivemeasureswillsurelynothavetheprecisionofindicatorsthatareexpressedinnumberofdollars,unitsoftime,ornumbersofsquarefeet,buttheywillhavethegreatadvantageofdealingdirectlywithwhatitiswewanttoknow,theindividual’ssenseofwell-being(Campbell,1976,p.118,italicsinoriginal).6Qualityoflife,onCampbell’sview,isafunctionofindividuals’senseofwell-being.Ifwewanttostudythequalityoflife,then,weneedtostudytheindividuals’experienceoftheirlives,nottheobjectivecharacteristicsoftheirexistence.Thesewritingsclearlygiveprideofplacetosubjectivelyexperiencedmentalstates.Indeed,theevidencesuggeststhattheseauthorsadopttheexperiencerequirementandthinkofwell-beingasconstitutedbysomesubjectivelyexperiencedmentalstate.Theyarebestunderstoodasusingtheterm“subjectivewell-being”todenotethesubjectivelyexperiencedmentalstate,sothatwell-beingcanbesaidtobeconstitutedbysubjectivewell-being.Thenotionthatwell-beingisconstitutedbysubjectivewell-being,bytheway,explainstheidentificationof“subjectivemeasuresofwell-being”and“measuresofsubjectivewell-being.”O(jiān)thers,however,appeartoresisttheviewthatwell-beingisconstitutedbysubjectivewell-beingalone(cf.Angner,inpress).Increasinglyfrequently,itissuggestedthatsubjectivelyexperiencedmentalstatesconstitutebutonecomponentofwell-being.Forexample,Kahnemanwrites:Objectivehappinessisnotproposedasacomprehensiveconceptofhumanwell-being,butonlyasasignificantconstituentofit.Maximizingthetimespentontherightsideoftheaffectgridisnotthemostsignificantvalueinlife,andadoptingthiscriterionasaguidetolifemaybemorallywrongandperhapsself-defeatingaswell.However,thepropositionthattherightsideofthegridisamoredesirableplacetobeisnotparticularlycontroversial.Objectivehappinessisacommonelementofmanyconceptionsofwell-being(Kahneman,2000,p.691).Thepointisclearenough:well-beinghasmultiplecomponents,ofwhich“objectivehappiness”isonlyone(albeitanimportantone).AsimilarpositionisdefendedbyDiener,JeffreyJ.Sapyta,andSuh,whousetheterm“subjectivewell-being”todenotethesubjectivelyexperiencedcomponentofwell-beingandwhoarguethatalthoughsubjectivewell-beingisnotsufficient,itis“essentialtowell-being”(Diener,Sapyta,&Suh,1998,p.33;cf.Kesebir&Diener,2008,p.69).Seligmantoocanbeattributedthisview:Iusehappinessandwell-beinginterchangeablyembracingbothpositivefeelings(suchasecstasyandcomfort)andpositiveactivitiesthathavenofeelingcomponentatall(suchasabsorptionandengagement).Itisimportanttorecognizethat“happiness”and“well-being”sometimesrefertofeelings,butsometimesrefertoactivitiesinwhichnothingatallisfelt(Seligman,2002,p.261).Insum,thesepassagesallseemtoexpressthenotionthatwell-beinghasmultiplecomponentsandthatsomesubjectivelyexperiencedmentalstateconstitutesoneofthesecomponents.Itisunfortunatethattheseauthorsdonotsaymoreaboutthenumberandnatureoftheremainingcomponents,butitisquiteclearthattheyneednotbesubjectivelyexperiencedmentalstates.Theideathatwell-beinghasmultiplecomponents,thoughitdoesnotfitneatlyintoParfit’staxonomy,hasbeendefendedbyseveralmodernphilosophers.Bytheendofhisdiscussion,Parfithimselfindicatesthatitmightbepossibletoformamoreplausibleaccountofwell-beingbytakingeachofthethreekindsofaccountasdescribinganecessary(butnotindividuallysufficient)conditionforwell-being(Parfit,1984,p.501;cf.Haybron,2008,p.18).Parfit’ssuggestionappearstohavebeenpickedupbySimonKeller(2004),whowritesthatwelfare–likephysicalfitness–ismulti-dimensional.Hebelievesthatyoucanbebetteroff(orfitter)simpliciterthanIamwithoutscoringhigheralongalltherelevantdimensions;yet,therearecasesinwhichwecannotsaythateitheroneofusisbetteroff(fitter)becausethereisnofactofthematter.InKeller’sview,onecomponentofwell-beingistheachievementofone’sgoals,nomatterwhatthosegoalsare(Keller,2004,p.36).Onmyreading,authorslikeKahnemancanbeunderstoodasagreeingwithKelleraboutthemulti-dimensionalityofwell-being,althoughhemaynotbeproposingthesamecomponents.Notice,however,thatthetwoproposalsarenotincompatible.Inanycase,theseproponentsofsubjectivemeasuresstillgiveprideofplacetosubjectivelyexperiencedmentalstates.Theauthorsdonot,however,treatwell-beingasconstitutedbyasubjectivelyexperiencedmentalstatealone.Instead,theytreatsomesubjectivelyexperiencedmentalstateasconstitutingamerecomponent–albeitanimportantone–ofwell-being.Thesewritersarebestunderstoodasusingtheterm“subjectivewell-being”todenotethatsubjectivelyexperiencedmentalstate,sothatsubjectivewell-beingcanbesaidtoconstitute,notwell-being,butacomponentofwell-being.Thediscussioninthissectionhasshownthatproponentsofsubjectivemeasuresofwell-beingappeartodisagreeabouttherelationshipbetweensubjectivewell-beingandwell-beingsimpliciter.Somethinkofwell-beingasconstitutedbysomesubjectivelyexperiencedmentalstate;theyarebestunderstoodasusingtheterm“subjectivewell-being”todenotethesubjectivelyexperiencedmentalstate,sothatwell-beingcanbesaidtobeconstitutedbysubjectivewell-being.Othersthinkofsomesubjectivelyexperiencedmentalstateasconstitutingamerecomponent–albeitanimportantone–ofwell-being;theyarebestunderstoodasusingtheterm“subjectivewell-being”todenotethatsubjectivelyexperiencedmentalstate,sothatsubjectivewell-beingcanbesaidtoconstituteacomponentofwell-being.Hence,proponentsofsubjectivemeasuresofwell-beingarenotahomogeneousgroup:theydisagreewitheachotherabouttherelationshipbetweensubjectivewell-beingandwell-beingsimpliciter.

主觀幸福感1主觀幸福感和絕對(duì)幸福在這個(gè)部分，我將就著作中的主觀測(cè)量來(lái)探討主觀幸福感和絕對(duì)幸福之間的關(guān)系。我會(huì)爭(zhēng)辯說(shuō)，主觀幸福感的測(cè)量的支持者在主觀幸福感和絕對(duì)幸福之間的關(guān)系上持不同意見(jiàn)：主觀幸福感是否構(gòu)成絕對(duì)幸?；騼H僅是它的一個(gè)組成部分。如同我一開(kāi)始的觀點(diǎn)一樣，我認(rèn)為幸福的概念，也就是所謂的迄今我都成為絕對(duì)幸福：“我們擁有什么，我們的生活什么時(shí)候會(huì)變得好，什么時(shí)候我們的生活不是一定道義上的好，但是有利于我們”（提比略，2006年）。讓我們稱其為幸福的核心概念吧。還有許多其他的名詞，在同一意義上使用，包括“一個(gè)人的好，利益，優(yōu)點(diǎn)，興趣，審慎的價(jià)值，福利，幸福，繁榮，幸福和實(shí)用”（摩爾，1996年）。因?yàn)樾腋Ｊ菫榱俗非笞罱K的，而不僅僅是幫助性地有利于個(gè)人，幸福也應(yīng)該是我們有理由鼓勵(lì)追求的，是作為目的，而不僅僅是作為一種手段，無(wú)論是在我們自己的生命里以及他人的生命里。正如托馬斯斯坎倫指出：大家普遍認(rèn)為個(gè)體幸福有一個(gè)簡(jiǎn)單的含義，它起著以下三個(gè)作用。首先，它作為一個(gè)單個(gè)人的理性決策的重要依據(jù)，至少對(duì)那些在他或她獨(dú)自關(guān)注時(shí)（也就是說(shuō)，在這種道義上的義務(wù)和對(duì)他人的關(guān)切上能夠予以擱置）的決定。第二，它關(guān)注恩人如朋友或父母，有理由推廣。第三，它是以將其個(gè)人的利益考慮到道德觀點(diǎn)里為基礎(chǔ)的（斯坎倫，1998年）。特別是，人們經(jīng)常認(rèn)為幸福是一個(gè)因素，或者像有些人會(huì)認(rèn)為，唯一的因素應(yīng)作為結(jié)果，而不僅僅是為公共政策的一個(gè)手段。當(dāng)主觀測(cè)量支持者談到用這種測(cè)量代表幸福感時(shí)我會(huì)認(rèn)為這是理所當(dāng)然的，他們?cè)诤诵母拍钌鲜褂眠@個(gè)術(shù)語(yǔ)（安格納，2009年）。首先，如上所述，如果主觀測(cè)量經(jīng)常被作為福利或幸福的其他測(cè)量的替代方案；事實(shí)上，如果主觀測(cè)量并不旨在代表其他那些準(zhǔn)備用來(lái)表示福利或幸福的測(cè)量的話，那這將毫無(wú)意義。其次，支持者們的幸福感概念起著相同的作用就如同核心概念所起的作用：那些為主觀幸福感測(cè)量的作用辯護(hù)的人們往往強(qiáng)調(diào)他們認(rèn)為幸福感是最終有利于個(gè)人的，也是值得在別人的生活中所提倡的，并且能作為公共政策的一個(gè)主要（有時(shí)甚至是唯一）的最終的目標(biāo)（上面引述的參見(jiàn)迪納與塞利格曼，2004年）。第三，許多支持者明確地列舉了和哲學(xué)家所認(rèn)為的一樣，古典哲學(xué)文學(xué)也意見(jiàn)相當(dāng)一致地表示他們用意思相同的“幸?！焙?或“幸福感”（卡內(nèi)曼，沃克爾，沙林，1997；萊亞德，2000；華生，1930）。多年來(lái)，哲學(xué)家們?cè)噲D通過(guò)完善各種報(bào)告或者幸福感的概念來(lái)闡明幸福感的思想。在這里，我跟隨帕菲特（1984，第493-502）將這個(gè)報(bào)告分為三個(gè)主要類別：心理狀態(tài)報(bào)告，偏好滿足或愿望實(shí)現(xiàn)的報(bào)告，客觀名單報(bào)告。根據(jù)精神狀態(tài)報(bào)告，幸福感是一種“精神狀態(tài)”或“心靈的狀態(tài)?！庇捎谶@些報(bào)告都把福利“當(dāng)做不得不出現(xiàn)在我們的經(jīng)驗(yàn)中，”據(jù)說(shuō)他們對(duì)經(jīng)驗(yàn)要求很滿意（格里芬，1986年，第13頁(yè)）。斯坎倫寫(xiě)道：“經(jīng)驗(yàn)論認(rèn)為，生命的質(zhì)量‘就是這個(gè)人所過(guò)得生活’完全是由它的經(jīng)驗(yàn)的質(zhì)量所決定的，”“這里的經(jīng)驗(yàn)質(zhì)量”是指“它會(huì)想過(guò)怎樣的生活”（斯坎倫，1998年，第97，99）。從這個(gè)角度來(lái)看，那么，主觀感覺(jué)的經(jīng)驗(yàn)對(duì)于一個(gè)人的幸福感來(lái)說(shuō)是必要的也是足夠的。根據(jù)愿望實(shí)現(xiàn)或偏好滿足報(bào)告，相比較而言，如果一個(gè)人的愿望得到滿足和/或她的喜好得到滿足，那么她就是富裕的。斯坎倫這樣指出：欲望理論拒絕經(jīng)驗(yàn)要求，卻允許不只通過(guò)人意識(shí)狀態(tài)里的變化，也通過(guò)在一個(gè)能夠滿足個(gè)人喜好的世界的其他地方的變化讓一個(gè)人的生命變得好與壞。（斯坎倫，1993年，第186頁(yè)）。這些報(bào)告不要求一個(gè)富裕的人體驗(yàn)過(guò)任何幸福或滿足的感覺(jué)。他們確實(shí)需要的是她的愿望得到滿足（或她的喜好得到滿足），它沒(méi)有歸結(jié)為同樣的事情。這兩類報(bào)告迄今為止經(jīng)常被稱為主觀報(bào)告，因?yàn)樗麄冃稳菀粋€(gè)人的幸福感（至少部分）是他或她的感情、經(jīng)驗(yàn)、欲望等等的功能。根據(jù)所謂的客觀報(bào)告，與此相比，一個(gè)人的幸福并不取決于這種主觀因素。在這種報(bào)告里，“有些事情對(duì)于一個(gè)人是好還是壞，至少單獨(dú)地在一些他們是否得到滿足或它們是否會(huì)引起愉快的經(jīng)驗(yàn)的案例中”（察佩爾＆酥，1998年，第553）。鑒別那些有利于人們的事物清單，而不管他們想要的是什么是非常困難的，但是這樣的事情臨時(shí)名單包括“道德上的善，理性活動(dòng)，一個(gè)人能力的發(fā)展，生孩子并成為一個(gè)好家長(zhǎng)，知識(shí)，和真實(shí)之美意識(shí)”（帕菲特，1984年，第499頁(yè)）。顯然，各類報(bào)告有許多種版本。三方分工使我們能夠找到主觀幸福感測(cè)量，傳統(tǒng)的經(jīng)濟(jì)福利測(cè)量以及受到能力方法啟發(fā)的福利指標(biāo)三者之間的主要區(qū)別。人們注意到在其他地方，傳統(tǒng)的經(jīng)濟(jì)福利測(cè)量是以幸福感的偏好滿足報(bào)告為基礎(chǔ)的（安格納，2009；海薩尼，1982年；奧斯曼和麥克弗森，2006年）。除其他外，從傳統(tǒng)上，福利經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家通過(guò)顯示它們是有實(shí)用功能（那就是，他們是偏好滿足的指標(biāo)）的來(lái)為他們的測(cè)量辯護(hù)這個(gè)事實(shí)來(lái)看，這是顯而易見(jiàn)的。也有人指出，受能力方法啟發(fā)的測(cè)量是建立在幸福報(bào)告的客觀名單上的（努斯鮑姆，2008年；森，1987年）。除其他外，從某些事情尤其是有大的能力集的事情，不管這些事情是否會(huì)使人更快樂(lè)也不管這個(gè)人是否能取悅他們就被認(rèn)為是有利于個(gè)人的這個(gè)假設(shè)來(lái)看，這是明確的。同時(shí)，許多主觀測(cè)量的支持者都認(rèn)為幸福感是一種心理狀態(tài)，這是相當(dāng)明顯的。一方面，有大量證據(jù)表明他們遵守經(jīng)驗(yàn)要求。在有關(guān)主觀測(cè)量的文獻(xiàn)資料中，幸福感經(jīng)常被描述為一個(gè)完全是個(gè)人主觀，享樂(lè)，或情感經(jīng)驗(yàn)的問(wèn)題。例如，大衛(wèi)邁爾斯引述克拉法葉夫人的話說(shuō)：“如果一個(gè)人認(rèn)為他是快樂(lè)的，這一點(diǎn)就足以快樂(lè)”，并補(bǔ)充說(shuō)，“和拉法葉夫人一樣，社會(huì)科學(xué)家也把幸福感看作是一種心理狀態(tài)。幸福感，有時(shí)被稱為‘主觀幸?！瘡?qiáng)調(diào)這一點(diǎn)，它是一個(gè)普遍意義上的生活是美好的”（邁爾斯，1992年）。邁爾斯明確地認(rèn)為幸福感是完全主觀的東西，要指出的是，尤其是使用“主觀幸福感”這個(gè)術(shù)語(yǔ)等同于“幸福?！毙睦頎顟B(tài)的明確提出強(qiáng)烈地表明，人的頭腦中所想的東西就是心理狀態(tài)報(bào)告的某一類型。同樣，埃德迪納寫(xiě)道：“主觀幸福感方面是主觀的，它屬于個(gè)人經(jīng)驗(yàn)”（迪納，1984年）。迪納和亞科卡強(qiáng)調(diào)了這一點(diǎn)：主觀幸福感的研究與個(gè)人生活的主觀經(jīng)驗(yàn)有關(guān)。潛在的假設(shè)是幸?？梢酝ㄟ^(guò)人的意識(shí)經(jīng)驗(yàn)來(lái)定義，是就享樂(lè)感受或認(rèn)知滿意度而言的。該領(lǐng)域是建立在了解個(gè)人幸福經(jīng)驗(yàn)質(zhì)量的假設(shè)上的，在他或她自己生活的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)背景下直接研究一個(gè)人如何感受生活是適當(dāng)?shù)模ǖ霞{，1997年，第191）。迪納，像邁爾斯和作者們提到的人一樣，明確把“幸福”和“主觀幸福感這兩個(gè)術(shù)語(yǔ)互換使用?！笔聦?shí)是迪納認(rèn)為幸福不僅與個(gè)人主觀經(jīng)驗(yàn)有關(guān)，也是由它們來(lái)定義的，有力地表明他們遵守經(jīng)驗(yàn)要求。由于他們使用這個(gè)術(shù)語(yǔ)，一些作者通過(guò)比較主觀測(cè)量與客觀測(cè)量，包括社會(huì)和經(jīng)濟(jì)指標(biāo)強(qiáng)調(diào)主觀幸福感的特征。迪納以下列方式說(shuō)明這點(diǎn)：主觀幸福感的定義特別是由于如健康，舒