英國(guó)未來的發(fā)展結(jié)構(gòu)會(huì)是什么樣？What Could the UKs Future Development Structure Look Like

WhatCouldtheUK’sFuture

DevelopmentStructureLookLike?

RANILDISSANAYAKE·RACHAELCALLEJA

Abstract

HowcantheUK(re)organiseitsdevelopmentworktooptimallyaddressthechallenges

ofavastlychangeddevelopmentandgeopoliticallandscape?Notingthatthe(defacto)

objectivesofdevelopmentpolicyultimatelydeterminehowandwhyalternative

arrangementsareadopted,weassessthestrengthsandweaknessesoffourmain

organisationalmodelsandexaminetheirtrade-offsintheUKcontext.Wediscusshow

thechoiceofobjectivesinformsthechoiceofinstitutionalform,andhowtheUK’sown

arrangementshaveevolvedwithitsobjectives;andconsiderhowpolicycoherence,

expertise,theexperienceofpartnercountriesandaccountabilityvarywithdifferent

models.Sincethereisnoinherentlysuperioroption,thechoiceofinstitutional

structuredependsonspecifictrade-offsthataremostpalatabletoUKpolicymakers.

Weconcludebyoutliningfivekeydesignfeaturesforanynewarrangements:theclarity

ofitsobjectives;thepredictabilityandstabilityofitsfunding;thestrategiccoherenceit

achievesacrossgovernment;itsabilitytoretainanddevelopawiderangeofcapabilities

(bothinpersonnelandmodesofaction)anditsadministrativeandlegalbasis.

POLICYPAPER319?JANUARY2024

WhatCouldtheUK’sFutureDevelopmentStructureLookLike?

RanilDissanayakeandRachaelCalleja

CenterforGlobalDevelopment

Theauthorsaregratefultotwoanonymouspeerreviewers,anumberofcolleagueswhokindlycommented

onadraft,andparticipantsofaprivateroundtableinDecember2023.Anyerrors,omissionsandthelikeremain

oursalone.

RanilDissanayakeandRachaelCalleja.2024.“WhatCouldtheUK’sFutureDevelopmentStructureLookLike?”CGD

PolicyPaper319.Washington,DC:CenterforGlobalDevelopment.

/publication/

what-could-

uks-future-development-structure-look

CENTERFORGLOBALDEVELOPMENT

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Washington,DC20036

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CenterforGlobalDevelopment.2024.

fundersoftheCenterforGlobalDevelopment,ortheauthors’respectiveorganizations.

Contents

Introduction 1

Thechanginginternationalcontext 3

The(evolving?)objectivesofinternationaldevelopmentcooperation

andpolicy 4

Atypologyofmodelsformanagingdevelopmentcooperation 5

Keystrengthsandweaknessesoffourmodelsformanaging

developmentco-operation 7

Model1:AnintegratedMinistryofForeignAffairs 8

Model2:Developmentco-operationdirectorateordivision

withinMinistryofForeignAffairs 9

Model3:Apolicyministrywithseparateimplementingagency 10

Model4:Autonomousdevelopmentagencyorministry 12

Keytake-away 13

TheUK’sarrangements,nowandinthepast 13

AssessingtheUKcontext 15

Assessingtheoptionsforfuturearrangements 17

Fitwiththecurrentdevelopmentandgeopoliticalclimate 18

Policysettingandcoherence 19

Capabilityandretention 20

Experienceofpartnercountries 21

Accountabilityforresourcesandimpact 22

DesignprinciplesfornewUKarrangements 24

Clarityofobjectives 24

Predictabilityandaccountabilityofresources

andresourcemanagement 24

Acentralmechanismforstrategiccoherence 25

Capabilitydevelopmentandretention 26

Administrative,financialandlegalbasis 26

Conclusion 27

References 29

ListofFigure

1.Typologyofinstitutionalformsfordevelopment 6

ListofTables

1.Summaryofsuitabilitytoaddressingnewchallenges,bymodel 19

2.Summaryofinternalandcross-governmentcoherencecapacity,

bymodel 20

3.Summaryofcapacitiesandretention,bymodel 21

4.Summaryofpartnercountryexperience,bymodel 22

5.Summaryofaccountabilityandimpact,bymodel 24

Introduction

AgeneralelectionloomsintheUK.Roughlyoneyearaway,thissuggeststhatnowisthetimethat

seriousconsiderationoffinalpolicypositionswillbegin,thoughtheywillbefinalisedonlywhentherespectivepartyManifestosarepublished.Thetenmonthsremainingforseriouspolicydevelopmentisrathershort.TheConservativesfiredthestartinggunonthiswiththerecentpublicationofaWhitePaperonInternationalDevelopment,1onewhichtheoppositionhaverespondedtopositively(atleastintermsofitscontents).2

ButtheWhitePaperissilentononeofthekeyconsiderationsthenextGovernmentwillneed

todecideon:whethertheexisting,merged,arrangementsforforeignpolicyandinternational

developmentarefitforpurpose.Thoughtheshiphasbeguntosteadysomewhat,itremainsbatteredandinseriousdangerofcapsizeafterthreeyearsofnearconstantstormsandattacksfromallsides.Covidforcedbothcuts(duetoeconomiccontractionandhenceadeclineinthelevelofaidthat

constituted0.7percentofGNI)andreorganisationofthethen-DFIDportfolio.Amergerwiththe

FCOannouncedbyBorisJohnsonwasrapidlyconceivedandpoorlyexecuted.3AnyopportunitytofixmatterswhileatseawaslostwhentheGovernmentimposeddeepandrapidcutsonthedepartment,4forcingittotrimaroundone-thirdofitsspending.Justasthesecutsworkedtheirwaythroughthe

system,theHomeOfficeandTreasurystrippedafurtherthirdorsoofthebudgetawaytopayforthecostsofrefugeeandasylumseekersintheUK.5

Evenasteady,well-functioningorganisationwouldhavestruggledtonavigatethesestorms.Itis

striking,then,thatseniordecision-makersfromallthemajorpartieshaveexplicitlyacknowledgedthattheUK’sdevelopmentstructuresarefailingandnotfitforpurpose,toagreaterorlesserextent:

“IregardthedecisiontodismantleDFIDasaquiteextraordinarymistake.First,

itwilldestroyoneofthemosteffectiveandrespectedenginesofinternational

developmentintheworld…itiscompletelyunnecessary…BoththeForeign

OfficeandDFIDworkceaselesslyinBritain’snationalinterest,butforeign

affairsanddevelopment,whiletotallycomplementary,arenotthesamething.”

—AndrewMitchell,nowConservativeministerofstateforinternationaldevelopment6

1ForeignCommonwealthandDevelopmentOffice,InternationalDevelopmentinaContestedWorld:EndingExtremePovertyandTacklingClimateChange,AWhitePaperonInternationalDevelopment(London:FCDO,2023).

2SeethisrecordinHansard,ofLisaNandy(thecurrentShadowCabinetMinisterforInternationalDevelopment),

https://hansard.parliament.uk/commons/2023-11-21/debates/17FFF91C-74DB-43CE-8944-63A2C996C5AC/Internatio

nalDevelopmentWhitePaper#contribution-ADDA47C1-71E1-410E-B1B4-FB2B94C9AFB6

.

3See,forexampleRanilDissanayake(@scepticalranil),“Extraordinary”,Twitter,Nov8.2023,

/

scepticalranil/status/1722295471417274716

.

4CGD’sanalysisofthisiscollectedhere:

/impacts-and-influence/shaping-uk-aid-cuts-debate

.

5SamHughesandIanMitchell,“ProjectionsofUK-HostedRefugees,andtheImplicationsfortheUK’sAidBudgetandSpend,”CGDNote,(London:CGD,2022),

/publication/projections-uk-hosted-refugees

-

and-implications-uks-aid-budget-and-spend

.

6Mitchellhas,sincethistime(hewasspeakingwhenthemergerwasfirstannounced),enteredGovernmentwithresponsibilityforthedevelopmentportfoliointhemergeddepartment,andhasbegunrestructuringittobetterimplementitsdevelopmentresponsibilities.

WHATCOULDTHEUK’SFUTUREDEVELOPMENTSTRUCTURELOOKLIKE?1

“The…mismanagedmergeroftheFCOandDFIDiscausingchaos.Wecan’t

affordthisincompetenceatamomentofacuteinternationalcrisis.”

—DavidLammyonX(formerlyTwitter),Feb202022

“We’vewatchedwithinterestwhatAndrewMitchellhasbeendoingtorepair

someofthedamagethatwasdone…Itremainstobeseenwhetherthe

structuralchangesthathe’smadearesufficienttoreallydeliver.”

—LisaNandy,quotedinDevex9Oct2022

“[Wewouldestablish]anindependentdevelopmentdepartment—notsimplya

recreationofDFIDinitspreviousform,butanindependentdepartmentwith

asecretaryofstateandfullyfunctioning…withanabsolutelaserfocusonthe

transitiontowardszeropovertyandzerocarbon.”

—LordPurvis,LiberalDemocratspokespersononForeignandCommonwealthAffairsintheHouseofLordsataCGDevent

Thecommonthreadacrosstheseinterventions(andmanymorelikethem)isthattheyallsuggest

thattheUK’soptimalstructuretoaddressdevelopmentchallengesisnotwhatwasputinplacebythemergerasoriginallyconceivedandimplementedin2020.Yetnoneofthemofferawhollyconcrete

visionofwhatshouldreplaceit(LordPurviscomesclosest,butevenheleavesthequestionofhowthenewdepartmentwouldbedifferenttoDFIDunresolved).

Inlargepart,thisreflectsthefactthatthereisnoclearconsensusoneitherwhattheUKshould

achievewithitsdevelopmentpolicy,nor,consequently,thestructurethatisbestpositionedto

supporttheseaims.Allpartiesagreethattheworldisratherdifferenttohowitlookedin1997,whenDFIDwasfirstestablished:extremepovertyisnolongeraswidespreadasitoncewas,thougheveninplaceswhereithasbeenall-but-eradicated,acutematerialdeprivationisstillcommon;theplacesinwhichitremainsendemicareoftenconflict-affectedorcapturedbytoxicpoliticalbargains;

developmentitselfislesscompartmentalisedandthereisagrowingrealisationthatdomesticpolicyinrichcountriesaffectsthedevelopmentpathofthepoorerones,especiallythroughillicitfinancialflows,migration,climatepolicyandthelike;andinmoreandmoreplaces,aidhasbecomeasmallerandlessimportanttoolinthefightforbetterlivingconditions.

HowcantheUKorganiseitsdevelopmentworkandpolicytooptimallyaddresstheworldof2024?

Throughoutthisnotewetakedevelopmentpolicytomeannotjusttheuseofforeignaid,butthe

fullsetofspendingandpolicydecisionsthathaveadirectimpactoneconomicandsocialwelfare

outcomesindevelopingcountries.Inthisnote,weassesstheinternationalcontextinwhichthe

choiceisbeingmade,contrastittoprevious‘eras’ofdevelopmentcooperation,andconsiderhowtheUK’sowninstitutionalformsfordevelopmenthaveevolved.Wethensetoutfourbroadoptionsfor

theUK’sfuturedevelopmentarchitecture,notingthatcompromisesbetweenthemarealsopossible,andlookattheexperienceofothercountriesinimplementingeach.Wegoontoassessthestrengths

WHATCOULDTHEUK’SFUTUREDEVELOPMENTSTRUCTURELOOKLIKE?2

andweaknessesofalternativeoptionsintheUKcontextonthefollowinggroundsofpolicyrelevancetoanyforthcomingGovernment:

.Fitwiththecurrentdevelopmentandgeopoliticalcontext

.Policysettingandcoherenceondevelopment

.Capacitytoattractandretaindevelopmentexpertise

.Experienceofpartnergovernmentsandeffectonpartnerships

.Accountabilityforresourcesandimpact

Wemakefourprimaryconclusions:firstly,thatthemodeladoptedbytheUKmustbedrivenbytheUK’spolicyobjectivesandstatecapacity,ratherthantheexperienceofothercountries:eachmodelcanfunctionwellorpoorly,dependingonitsfitwithdomesticpolitics,policies,andcapabilities.

Second,intheUKcontext,decisionsshouldbetakentomaximisetheirlong-termimpact;assuch,wemakerecommendationsforhowtoimplementdifferentmodelsifchosen,tomaximisefitand

function.Thirdly,differentmodelshavedifferentstrengthsandweaknesses:thechoiceofwhich

capabilitiesandfunctionstheUKwishestomaximiseshoulddrivethechoiceofinstitutionalform.Finally,itisnotsimplywithinthedevelopmentfunctionthatreformisrequiredtoimprovethe

effectivenessandimpactofUKdevelopmentpolicy,butacrossWhitehall.Thoughmoredifficult,weneverthelessoutlinesomeofthekeychangesthatmayhelp.

Ultimately,somereformisnecessarytorestoretheeffectivenessoftheUK’sdevelopmentfunction.Howreformsareimplementedwilldeterminetheirsuccess.

Thechanginginternationalcontext

In1997,whentheUKcreatedDFID,whichwouldgoontobecomeahighlyrespecteddevelopment

agency,theworldfacedwhatMasoodAhmeddescribedas“theunipolarmomentwhentheWestwasfeelingconfidentandgenerousafterthecollapseoftheSovietUnionandtherewasapeacedividendtobedeployed.Developmentprovidedthenewglobalprojectandthetechniciansofdevelopment

assertedthattheyhadthetechnologytodeliverresults.Thatattractedthesupportoftheleadersofgovernment.”7

Thiswasanexceptionallyconduciveperiodforinternationaldevelopment.Conflicts(bothwithindevelopingcountriesandbetweencompetingglobalpowers)wereindeclineordormant;economicconditionswerelargelybenignformuchofthe2000s,withgrowthreasonablyfastandwidespread.

Conditionscouldnotbemoredifferentnow:amultipolarworldcharacterisedbydirectandovertcompetitionbyglobalpowers,includingthroughdiplomacyandforeignaid.Growthhasslowed

7Quotedhere:

/publication/setting-compass-eliminating-world-poverty-department

-

international-development-1997

.

WHATCOULDTHEUK’SFUTUREDEVELOPMENTSTRUCTURELOOKLIKE?3

inmuchoftheworldandeconomicconditionsworsenedmorebroadly.Thechallengeshavealsobecomemoreglobalised,withglobalpublicgoodsandbadsoccupyinganincreasingamountofpolicyspacebothdomesticallyinsidedonorcountriesandininternationalfora.Considerationoftheoptimalmodeltoadoptmustaccountforthechanginginternationalcontext—andindeed,theobjectivesofinternationaldevelopmentaction.

The(evolving?)objectivesofinternational

developmentcooperationandpolicy

Itisnotjusttheinternationalcontextthatevolvesovertime;sotoodotheobjectivesofdevelopmentcooperation,thoughofteninresponsetodomesticconsiderations.Broadly,wecanthinkofthree

categoriesofobjective,whicharenotmutuallyexclusive.

Thefirstisthewellbeingandwelfareofdevelopingcountries.Thismaytaketheformofpoverty

reduction,improvementsinsocialdevelopmentoreconomicdevelopment,andneednotbepursuedsolelyfor(orevenprimarily)altruisticmotivations.IntheUK,thiswasoftenthestated(anddefacto)aimofdevelopmentpolicyinthe1997–2015period(seebelow).

Thesecondistheachievementofdomesticpoliticalandeconomicobjectives,betheygeostrategic,diplomatic,oreconomic(includingmercantilist).These,equally,neednotbeanti-developmentalorevensolelyselfish:suchaimsmayalsobenefitdevelopingcountries(byboostingtradeorstability).

Thethirdistheachievementofspecificallyglobalobjectives,typicallytheprovisionof

whatarecommonlytermed‘globalpublicgoods’,thoughthetermisusuallyusedtoreferto

activitiesorprojectswhichhaveglobalbenefits,eventhoughtheyareundertakeninaspecificlocality.Increasingly,GPGprovisionanddevelopmentactionhavebeenfundedfromthesamepotsandincorporatedintothesamestrategies.Thisobjectiveistypicallyjustifiedasbeing

betweendevelopingcountrywellbeingandproviderdomesticinterest,astheglobalpositivespilloverenvisionedthroughGPGprovisioncansupportbothaimssimultaneously,thoughtherearealmostcertainlysubstantialtrade-offsbetweentheobjectivesinthepresenceofabindingresourceconstraint.8

Nodevelopmentactoriscompletelyinnocentofanyofthesethreeobjectives.Eventhemost

mercantilistundertakeprojectswithlocalbenefitstopartnercountries,andeventhemostaltruisticundertakeprojectswithdomesticbenefitsforprovidergovernments.Thequestionthatmattersmost

8Forafullerdescriptionofthespectrumofprovidermotivationsforcooperation,seeNilimaGulrajaniandRachael

Calleja,“UnderstandingDonorMotivations:DevelopingthePrincipledAidIndex”(London:ODI,2019);foradiscussionoftrade-offs,seeRanilDissanayake.2023.“GPGsandWheretoFundThem:TheStartlingImplicationsofFinancingGlobalPublicGoodProvisionfortheMultilateralDevelopmentBanks.”CGDPolicyPaper303.Washington,DC:CenterforGlobalDevelopment.

/publication/gpgs-and-where-fund-them-startling-implications

-

financing-global-public-good-provision

.

WHATCOULDTHEUK’SFUTUREDEVELOPMENTSTRUCTURELOOKLIKE?4

fordeterminingoptimalinstitutionalarrangementsiswhatthebalanceofobjectivesis,whichinturndetermineswhichcapabilitiesaremostrequiredandwhichtrade-offsaremostpalatable.

Atypologyofmodelsformanaging

developmentcooperation

Historically,bilateralmembersoftheOrganisationforEconomicCooperationandDevelopment

(OECD)DevelopmentAssistanceCommittee(DAC)haveusedfourorganizationalmodels,9whichcanlooselybeconceivedaspointsalongaspectrumofinstitutionalautonomy,fromleastautonomous

tomostautonomous(seeFigure1).Thistypology,whichwasdevelopedbytheOECD,differentiatesstructuralmodelsbasedonthelocationofdevelopmentpolicyandimplementationfunctions.10

Asaresult,whilethesemodelsprovideabroadoverviewofprimarydevelopmentstructures,theydonotprovideinsightintobroadaccountabilityorcross-governmentstructuresthatnecessarily

informhow—andhowwell—thesestructuresfunctionineachcountrycontext.Despitesuchlimitations,weadheretotheirdefinitionsforconsistency,thoughrecognisingthat,likealltypologies,theyimperfectlycapturethecomplexityofreal-worldarrangements.

ThefourmainmodelsidentifiedbytheOECD-DAC,andusedbyitsmembers,are:

.Model1:AnintegratedMinistryofForeignAffairs—fullyintegratesthedevelopment

functionwithinaforeignministry,whichisresponsibleforbothdevelopmentpolicyandimplementation.Inthismodel,developmentisintegratedalongsideotherforeignpolicyprioritiesatmostlevels,providingtheleastautonomyforthedevelopmentfunction.

.Model2:Developmentco-operationdirectorateordivisionwithinMinistryofForeign

Affairs—inthismodel,responsibilityfordevelopmentpolicyandimplementationislocatedinadedicateddirectoratewithinaforeignministry.Thisprovidessomeautonomyfor

development,thoughthefunctionremainsintegratedwithintheforeignministry.

.Model3:Apolicyministrywithseparateimplementingagency—thismodelseparatesthepolicyandimplementationfunctions,wheredevelopmentpolicyissetbyaresponsible

ministry(oftenaforeignordevelopmentministry),whileoneormoreseparateagenciesareresponsibleforimplementation.

.Model4:Autonomousdevelopmentagencyorministry—isafullyindependentgovernmentministryresponsibleforinternationaldevelopmentpolicyandimplementation.Thiswas

themodelusedbytheUKbetween1997and2020,whentheDepartmentforInternationalDevelopmentwasinoperation.Atpresent,noDACmemberscurrentlyusethismodel.

9AsdefinedinOECD,“ManagingAid—PracticesofDACMemberCountries”(Paris:OECD,2009);OECD,“AComparisonof

ManagementSystemsforDevelopmentCo-operationinOECD/DACMembers”(Paris:OECD,1999).

10SeeOECD,“ManagingAid—PracticesofDACMemberCountries.”

WHATCOULDTHEUK’SFUTUREDEVELOPMENTSTRUCTURELOOKLIKE?5

DEVELOPMENTAGENCYOR

MINISTRY

IMPLEMENTINGAGENCY

FOREIGN

MINISTRY

FOREIGNMINISTRY

RESPONSIBLEMINISTRY

Dev.

FIGURE1.Typologyofinstitutionalformsfordevelopment

MODEL1

MODEL2

MODEL3

MODEL4

Responsibilityfor

A‘directorate’withinthe

Separateagency

Fullyautonomous

developmentpolicyand

foreignministryleadson

implementscooperation

ministryoragencyis

implementationis

developmentpolicyand

andresponsibleministry

responsiblefor

integratedwithinthe

implementation

setsdevelopmentpolicy

developmentpolicy

foreignministry

andimplementation

FOREIGNMINISTRY

Dev.

INTEGRATION

INDEPENDENCE

Source:AdaptedfromOECD,“ManagingAid—PracticesofDACMemberCountries”(Paris:OECD,2009).

Inaddition,manyDACprovidersusedafifthmodelduringtheearlystagesoftheirengagementasproviders.Termedthe“multipleministry”model,thisapproachsawresponsibilityfordevelopmentcooperationdisbursedacrossarangeoflineministries,eachofwhichimplementedprojectsbasedontheirthematicexpertise,yetoftenlackedaninstitutionalcenterorfocalpointforsettingcross-governmentdevelopmentpolicy.11Asaresult,thismodeltendedtobeusedattheearliestphasesofadonor’sinstitutional“path”,whengovernmentsseektoengageincooperativeaction,yetareoftenunclearaboutthevalueofinvestinginadedicatedstructureformanagingdevelopmentaction.

Morerecentlyhowever,anadaptedformofthisstructure,whichincludesaninstitutionalfocal

pointforstrategicmanagementofcooperationthatisimplementedbycross-governmentactors,

hasbeenadoptedbyseveralnon-DACproviders.InChina,forinstance,theChineseInternational

DevelopmentCooperationAgency(CIDCA)functionsasapolicysetterandcoordinationagency,

withresponsibilityfor“coordinatingandselectingforeignaidprojects”aswellasdraftingstrategicpolicies,plansandguidance,andevaluatingChina’scooperationengagements.Inthissystem,

implementationremainstheresponsibilityoftheMinistryofCommerce(primarily),aswellas

severalotherlineministriesandsubordinateagencies,12whileChina’sforeignministryservesasthepointofcontactinpartnercountries(viaembassies)13andisresponsibleforensuringdevelopmentobjectivesarealignedwithotherforeignpolicyareas.14Similarcoordinatingresponsibilitiesare

alsofoundinTürkiye,withtheTurkishInternationalCooperationandCoordinationAgency(TIKA)

11Hyun-SikChang,ArthurM.Fell,andMichaelLaird,“AComparisonofManagementSystemsforDevelopment

Co-operationinOECD/DACMembers”InternationalAreaStudiesReview3,no.1(2000).

12OECD.“OtherOfficialProvidersnotReportingtotheOECD—China(People’sRepublicof),”inDevelopmentCooperationProfiles2023(Paris:OECD,2023),availableat:

/sites/18b00a44-en/index.html?itemId=/

content/component/18b00a44-en

.

13WhilethisfunctionwaspreviouslyconductedbyMOFCOM’sEconomicandCommercialCouncilorsOffice(ECCO)stafflocatedinembassies,MarinaRudyaknotesthat“supervisionbyembassiesismentionedintheMFAparagraphand

notintheMOFCOMparagraph”ofChina’sMeasuresfortheAdministrationofForeignAid,suggestingthatthefunctionhaseithershiftedtotheMFAorthatECCOs“arebecomingmoreintegratedintotheembassystructure”.SeeMarinaRudyak,“NewMeasuresfortheAdministrationofForeignAidbyCIDCI,MFA,andMOFCOM,”(2021).

http://china-aid

-

/2021/09/01/407/

.

14MarinaRudyak,“NewMeasuresfortheAdministrationofForeignAidbyCIDCI,MFA,andMOFCOM,”(2021).

/2021/09/01/407/

.

WHATCOULDTHEUK’SFUTUREDEVELOPMENTSTRUCTURELOOKLIKE?6

responsibleforbothimplementingtechnicalcooperationandcoordinatingcooperation,15while

inColombiaandMexico—whichbothreceiveandprovidecooperation—agencieslocatedunder

thePresidencyorforeignministry(respectively)actascoordinatorsofbothinwardandoutward

cooperationflowsthatareadministeredbyotherpartsofthegovernmentsystem.16Whilethis

canhardlybeconsidereda“non-DACmodel”,withthe54non-DACcountries17withinstitutions

fordevelopmentcooperationadoptingarangeofformsincludingresemblingthemodelsnoted

above—UnitedArabEmirates(Model1),India(Model2),andBrazilandIndonesia(Model3)18—theuseofcoordinatingstructuresallowactorstoleveragecross-governmentexpertisefordevelopment

withoutnecessitatingalargescaleinvestmentindevelopment-focusedcapacity.

Overtime,theorganisationalmodelsusedbyprovidersarepronetochange,eitherthrough

substantiveshiftsincludingmergersorseparations,whicharedesignedtocreateoreliminatean

agency,orthroughmoreincrementalchangestotherolesorresponsibilitiesofvariousactorsinthedevelopmentsystem.

Keystrengthsandweaknessesoffourmodels

formanagingdevelopmentco-operation

Eachoftheorganisationalmodelsusedformanagingdevelopmentcooperationcomewiththeir

ownuniquestrengthsandweaknessesbasedonthebroaddivisionoflabourbetweentheforeignministryanddevelopmentactors,particularlyintermsofhowandwherepolicyformationand

implementationfunctionsarelocated.Whiletheexperienceofcountriesadoptingthesamemodelmaydifferbasedondomesticpoliticalandbureaucraticenvironments,constraints,andcultures,manyactorsutilisingthesamemodelexperiencesimilarchallengesorperceivesimilarbenefitsfromtheirorganisationalchoices.

Threepointsshouldbemadeattheoutset.First,thefourmodelsdefinedaboveshouldbeconsideredillustrative,withmostcountriesadoptinghybridstructuresthatcanresemblespecificmodels

togreaterorlesserdegrees.Inmostcountries,therearesomedevelopment-relatedfunctionsthatareheldoutsideofeithertheforeignaffairsordevelopmentministry.Forexampleinthe

UKandUS,theTreasuryatleastsharestheresponsibilityformanagingrelationshipswiththe

WorldBankandIMF,bothclearlyofcentraldevelopmentimportance.Inmanycountries,thehealthministriesmaintaincontroloverpolicyonhealth-relatedglobalgoods.Aswereturntobelow,howsuch‘a(chǎn)dd-ons’tothecentraldevelopmentinstitutionsaremanaged,andhowaccountability