企業(yè)倫理學(xué)（原書第5版） 課件 第10章　公司治理與會計實務(wù)中的倫理決策

ChapterTen:EthicalDecisionMaking:CorporateGovernance,Accounting,andFinanceCopyright?2021McGraw-HillEducation.Allrightsreserved.NoreproductionordistributionwithoutthepriorwrittenconsentofMcGraw-HillEducation.ChapterObjectives1Afterreadingthischapter,youwillbeableto:Explaintheroleofaccountantsandotherprofessionalsas"gatekeepers."Describehowconflictsofinterestcanariseforbusinessprofessionals.OutlinetherequirementsoftheSarbanes-OxleyAct.DescribetheCOSOframework.Definethe"controlenvironment"andthemeansbywhichethicsandculturecanimpactthatenvironment.Discussthelegalobligationsofamemberofaboardofdirectors.ChapterObjectives2Explaintheethicalobligationsofamemberofaboardofdirectors.Highlightconflictsofinterestinfinancialmarketsanddiscussthewaysinwhichtheymaybealleviated.Describeconflictsofinterestingovernancecreatedbyexcessiveexecutivecompensation.Defineinsidertradingandevaluateitspotentialforunethicalbehavior.EthicalDecisionMaking1Itastoundsmehowlittleseniormanagementgetsabasictruth:Ifclientsdon’ttrustyou,theywilleventuallystopdoingbusinesswithyou.Itdoesn’tmatterhowsmartyouare. GregSmith,“WhyIamLeavingGoldmanSachs,”TheNewYorkTimes,March14,2012Introduction1Thescandalsoftheearly2000sinvolvedfundamentalquestionsofcorporategovernanceandresponsibility.Therewerearashofproblemsassociatedwiththefinancialmeltdownin2007to2008.Ethicsinthegovernanceandfinancialarenasisnowthemostvisibleissueinbusinessethics.Introduction2Analystscontendthatcorruptionisevidenceofacompletefailureincorporategovernancestructures.Corporategovernance:Thestructurebywhichcorporationsaremanaged,directed,andcontrolledtowardtheobjectivesoffairness,accountability,andtransparency.Thestructuresgenerallywilldeterminetherelationshipbetweentheboardofdirectors,theshareholdersorownersofthefirm,andthefirm’sexecutivesormanagement.ProfessionalDutiesandConflictsofInterest1ThecollapseofEnronCorporationbroughttheethicsoffinancetoprominenceatthestartofthe21stcentury.Severalimportantcategoriesofbusinessprofessionals—forexample,lawyers,auditors,accountants,andfinancialanalysts—functionbasedontheinternalcontrolsthatexistwithinmarket-basedeconomicsystem.Roleidentitiesdetermineethicaldutiesandprovideasourceforruleswhichdeterminehowprofessionalsoughttoact.Gatekeepers:

Actas"watchdogs"toensurethoseinthemarketplaceplaybytherulesandconformtothemarketfunctionsasitshould.ProfessionalDutiesandConflictsofInterest2Themostbasicethicalbusinessissuefacinggatekeepersinvolvesaconflictofinterest.Thisexistswhenapersonholdsapositionoftrustthatrequiresthatheorsheexercisejudgmentonbehalfofothers,butwherehisorherpersonalinterestand/orobligationsconflictwiththeproperexerciseofthatjudgment.Conflictscanarisewhenaperson’sethicalobligationsintheirprofessionaldutiesclashwithpersonalinterests.Suchprofessionalsaresaidtohavefiduciaryduties—alegalduty,groundedintrust,toactonbehalfoforintheinterestsofanother—totheirclients.Figure10.1:ConflictsofInterestinPublicCPAActivityAccessthetextalternativeforslideimage.ProfessionalDutiesandConflictsofInterest3Becauseprofessionalgatekeeperdutiesarenecessaryconditionsforthefairandeffectivefunctioningofeconomicmarkets,theyshouldtrumpotherresponsibilitiestoone'semployer.Butknowingone’sdutiesandfulfillingthosedutiesaretwoseparateissues.ProfessionalDutiesandConflictsofInterest4Thegatekeeperfunctionisnecessary,butself-interestcanmakeitdifficulttofulfillgatekeeperduties.Societyhasaresponsibilitytocreateinstitutionsandstructuresthatwillminimizetheseconflicts.Criticssaygovernmentregulatoryrulesalonewillnotavertfinancialcrises.Extraordinaryexecutivecompensationandconflictsofinterestwithintheaccountingandfinancialindustrieshavecreatedanenvironmentwherewatchdogshavelittleabilitytopreventharm.TheSarbanes-OxleyActof2002Astringofcorporatescandalsshookinvestorconfidence.TheU.S.CongresspassedthePublicAccountingReformandInvestorProtectionActof2002,commonlyknownastheSarbanes-OxleyAct.TheactisenforcedbytheSecuritiesandExchangeCommission(SEC)andappliestomorethan15,000publiclyheldcompaniesintheU.S.andsomeforeignissuers.TheEuropeanUnion8thDirectivecoversmanyofthesameissues.Somestatesissuessimilarlegislationthatapplytoprivatefirms.TheSarbanes-OxleyActof20022Noregulatory"fix"isperfect.Theactisintendedtoprovideprotectionwhereoversightdidnotexist.Oversightintermsofaccountabilityandresponsibility.Thefollowingsectionsimpactcorporategovernanceandboards.Section201.Servicesoutsidethescopeofauditors—noconsultingratherthanauditing.Section301.Publiccompanyauditcommittees,mandatingmajorityofindependentsonanyboardandtotalabsenceofcurrentorpriorbusinessrelationships.Section307.Rulesofprofessionalresponsibilityforattorneys.TheSarbanes-OxleyActof20023Section404.Managementassessmentofinternalcontrols.Section406.Requiredcodesofethicsforseniorfinancialofficers.Section407.DisclosureofauditcommitteefinancialexpertRequiresthattheyactuallyhaveanexpert.TheInternalControlEnvironment1Internalcontrolmechanismsareestablishedinternallytocomplywithfinancialreportinglawsandregulations.OnewaytoensurecontrolsistoutilizeaframeworkadvocatedbytheCommitteeofSponsoringOrganizations(COSO).COSO:AvoluntarygroupofauditandaccountingorganizationsseekingtoimprovereportingthroughacombinationofcontrolsandgovernancestandardscalledtheInternalControl-IntegratedFramework.TheInternalControlEnvironment2Theelementscomprisingcontrolstructureare:Controlenvironment.Controlenvironment:Culturalissuessuchasintegrity,ethicalvalues,competence,philosophy,andoperatingstyle.Riskassessment.Controlactivities.Informationandcommunications.Ongoingmonitoring.TheInternalControlEnvironment3COSOstandardsforinternalcontrolsmovedaudit,compliance,andgovernancefromanumbersorientationtoconcernfortheorganizationalenvironment.BothinternalfactorssuchastheCOSOcontrolsandexternalfactorssuchastheSarbanes-Oxleyrequirementsmustbesupportedbyacultureofaccountability.TheInternalControlEnvironment4COSOdevelopedanewsystem,EnterpriseRiskManagement-IntegratedFrameworkin2004.Servesasaframeworkformanagementtoevaluateandimprovetheirfirms’prevention,detection,andmanagementofrisk.Expandsonthepriorframeworktoinclude"objectivesetting."Assistsanorganizationinresolvingethicaldilemmasbasedonafirm’smission,itsculture,andtoleranceforrisk.EthicalDecisionMaking2Wheneveraninstitutionmalfunctionsasconsistentlyasboardsofdirectorshaveinnearlyeverymajorfiascoofthelastfortyorfiftyyears,itisfutiletoblamemen.Itistheinstitutionthatmalfunctions. PeterDruckerGoingBeyondtheLaw:EthicalBoardMembersThecorporatefailuresofrecentyearswouldsuggest:Afailureonthepartofcorporateboards.Afailureofgovernmenttoimposehighexpectationsofaccountabilityonboardsofdirectors.Inmanycases,boardsandexecutivesoperatedwithinthelaw.Someactionsmaynothavebeenethicalorinthebestinterestsofstakeholders,buttheywerelegal.Thelawofferssomeguidanceonminimumstandardsforboardmemberbehavior,butisthelawenough?LegalDutiesofBoardMembersU.S.lawimposesthreecleardutiesonboardmembers.Thedutyofcareistheexerciseofreasonablecarebyensuringthatexecutivescarryoutresponsibilitiesandcomplywiththelaw.Thedutyofgoodfaithisoneofobedience,requiringfaithfulnesstotheorganization’smission.Thedutyofloyaltyrequiresfaithfulnessfromboardmembersbygivingundividedallegiancewhenmakingdecisionsaffectingtheorganization.Conflictsofinterestarealwaystoberesolvedinfavoroftheorganization.TheFederalSentencingGuidelinessuggesttheboardexercise"reasonableoversight"withrespecttotheimplementationandeffectivenessoftheethics/complianceprogram.Theprogramshouldhaveadequateresources,levelsofauthority,anddirectaccesstotheboard.BeyondtheLaw,ThereisEthics1Questionsthatweexpectthelawtoanswerbutremainsunclear.Whomdoestheboardrepresent?Whoareitsprimarystakeholders,ethicallyspeaking?Iftheboardisawareofanunethical,butlegal,practice—onwhatbasiscantheboardrequirethepracticetocease?BeyondtheLaw,ThereisEthics2Somesuggestboardshavearesponsibilitybeyondthelawtoexploreandinvestigatetheorganizationsthattheyrepresent.Whatcoulddragthefirmdownandwhatcouldcompetitorsdotohelpitalongthatpath?Itistheboardmembers’ultimatedutytoprovideoversight,whichisimpossiblewithoutknowingtheanswerstothesequestions.EthicalDecisionMaking3Itisessentialthattheactivitiesofcorporateexecutivesareunderconstant,vigorousandpublicscrutiny,becausethoseactivitiesarecrucialtotheeconomicwell-beingofsociety.AnnCrottyConflictsofInterestinAccountingandtheFinancialMarkets1Conflictsofinterestextendbeyondtheboardroomtothefinancialarena—trustandstructuresthatpromoteitareintegralissuesforallinvolvedinthefinanceindustry.Realorperceived, conflictscanerodetrustandoftenexistasaresultofvaryinginterestsofstakeholders.Accounting,byitsverynature,isasystemofprinciplesappliedtopresentthefinancialpositionofabusinessandtheresultsofitsoperationsandcashflows.Itishopedthatadherencetotheseprincipleswillresultinfairandaccuratereportingofthisinformationinaformatthatcanreadilybeinterpretedbyothers.Whetheranaccountantisconsideredawatchdogoragreyhounddependsonwhetherheishiredinternallyorexternally.ConflictsofInterestinAccountingandtheFinancialMarkets2TheAmericanInstituteofCertifiedPublicAccountants(AICPA)publishesprofessionalrulestopreventaccountantsfrombeingputintoconflicts.GAAP,orgenerallyacceptedaccountingprinciples,establishedbytheFinancialAccountingStandardsBoardstipulatesmethodsofgatheringandreportinginformation.AccountantsarealsogovernedbytheAICPA'sCodeofProfessionalConduct.Canthesestandardskeeppacewithreadilychangingaccountingandfinancingactivitiesinnewlyemergingfirms?ExecutiveCompensation1Fewareasofcorporategovernanceandfinancehavereceivedasmuchpublicscrutinyasexecutivecompensation.In1965,theaverageCEOpaywas20timesasmuchastheaverageworkerpay.By2000,CEOpayhadrisento376timesasmuchastheaverageworker’spay.Evenafteradeclinetheratioremainedhigh—in2016—271times.Skyrocketingexecutivecompensationpackagesraisenumerousethicalquestions.Greedandavaricearethemostaptdescriptivetermsforthemoralcharacterofsuchpeoplefromavirtueethicsperspective.Giverisetofundamentalquestionsofdistributivejusticeandfairness.ExecutiveCompensation2Seriousethicalchallengesariseagainstthesepracticesevenfromwithinthebusinessperspective.Beyondissuesofpersonalmoralityandeconomicfairness,excessivecompensationraisesethicalissuesofcorporategovernanceandfinance.ExecutiveCompensation3Intheory,compensationpackagesserveinterestsintwoways:Theyprovideanincentiveforexecutiveperformance.Theyserveasrewardsforaccomplishments.Inpractice,reasonabledoubtsexistforbothrationales.Inmanycasesthereisnocorrelationbetweencompensationandperformance.Thereisadiminishingrateofreturnonincentivesbeyondacertainlevel.ExecutiveCompensation4Anothercrucialgovernanceissueisthedisincentivesthatcompensationpackagesandrelianceonstockoptionsprovide.Executiveshaveincentivetofocusonshort-termstockpriceratherthanlong-termcorporateinterests.Acasecanbemadethatstockoptionsmaybetoblameforthecorruptioninvolvingmanagedearnings.Excessivecompensationcanalsoinvolveavarietyofconflictsofinterestsandcronyism.Anotherlargeconcernisthecross-fertilizationofboards.Figure10.2:DutiesoftheBoardandSeniorExecutivesThatMayGiveRisetoConflictsofInterestAccessthetextalternativeforslideimage.InsiderTrading1Tradingofsecuritiesbythosewhoholdprivateinsideinformationthatwouldmateriallyimpactthevalueofthestockandthatallowsthemtobenefitfrombuyingorsellingstock.Illegalinsidertradingoccursthencorporateinsidersprovide"tips"tofamilymembers,friends,orotherstobuyorsellthecompany'sstockbasedonthatinformation."PrivateInformation"includesprivilegedinformationthathasnotyetbeenreleasedtothepublic.TheSecuritiesandExchangeCommissionhastreatedthedetectionandprosecutionofinsidertradingviolationsasoneofitsenforcementpriorities.InsiderTrading2Insidertradingmayalsobebasedonaclaimofunethicalmisappropriationofproprietaryknowledge.Proprietaryknowledgereferstotheknowledgeonlythoseinthefirmshouldhave,knowledgeownedbythefirmandnottobeusedbyabusingone’sfiduciaryresp