2021年英語演講稿相關(guān)主題介紹

1、英語演講稿相關(guān)主題介紹 Good Evening, my fellow Americans. Tonight I want to talk to you on a subject of deep con _rn to all Americans and to _ny people in all parts of the world, the war in Vietnam. I believe that one of the reasons for the deep division about Vietnam is that _ny Americans have lost confiden _

2、 in what their Gover _ent has told them about our policy. The American people cannot and should not be asked to support a policy which involves the overriding issues of war and pea _ unless they know the truth about that policy. Tonight, therefore, I would like to answer some of the questions that I

3、 know are on the minds of _ny of you listening to me. How and why did America get involved in Vietnam in the first pla _? How has this administration changed the policy of the previous Administration? What has really happened in the negotiations in Paris and the battlefront in Vietnam? What choi _s

4、do we have if we are to end the war? What are the prospects for pea _? Now let me begin by describing the situation I found when I was inaugurated on Jan. 20th: The war had been going on for four years. Thirty-one thousand Americans had been killed in action. The training program for the South Vietn

5、amese was behind schedule. Five hundred forty-thousand Americans were in Vietnam with no plans to redu _ the number. No progress had been _de at the negotiations in Paris and the United States had not put forth a prehensive pea _ proposal. The war was causing deep division at home and critici _ from

6、 _ny of our friend, as well as our enemies, abroad. In view of these circumstan _s, there were some who urged withdrawal of all American for _s. From a political standpoint, this would have been a popular and easy course to follow. After all, we became involved in the war while my prede _ssor was in

7、 offi _. I could blame the defeat, which would be the result of my action, on him - and e out as the pea _ _ker. Some put it to me quite bluntly: this was the only way to avoid allowing Johnsons war to bee Nixons war. But I had a greater obligation than to think only of the years of my Administratio

8、n, and of the next election. I had to think of the effect of my decision on the next generation, and on the future of pea _ and _ in America, and in the world. Let us all understand that the question before us is not whether some Americans are for pea _ and some Americans are against pea _. The ques

9、tion at issue is not whether Johnsons war bees Nixons war. The great question is: How can we win Americas pea _? Well, let us turn now to the fundamental issue: why and how did the United States bee involved in Vietnam in the first pla _? Fifteen years ago North Vietnam, with the logistical support

10、of Communist China and the Soviet union , launched a campaign to impose a Communist gover _ent on South Vietnam by instigating and supporting a revolution. In response to the request of the Gover _ent of South Vietnam, President Eisenhower sent economic aid and military equipment to assist the peopl

11、e of South Vietnam in their efforts of prevent a Communist takeover. Seven years ago, President Kennedy sent 16,000 military personnel to Vietnam as bat advisers. Four years ago, President Johnson sent American bat for _s to South Vietnam. Now _ny believe that President Johnsons decision to send Ame

12、rican bat for _s to South Vietnam was wrong. And _ny others, I among them, have been strongly critical of the way the war has been conducted. But the question facing us today is - now that we are in the war, what is the best way to end it? In January I could only conclude that the precipitate withdr

13、awal of all American for _s from Vietnam would be a disaster not only for South Vietnam but for the United States and for the cause of pea _. For the South Vietnamese, our precipitate withdrawal would inevitably allow the Communists to repeat the _ssacres which followed their takeover in the North 1

14、5 years before. They then murdered more than 50,000 people and hundreds of thousands more _d in slave labor camps. We saw a prelude of what would happen in South Vietnam when the Communists entered the city of Hue last year. During their brief rule there, there was a bloody reign of terror in which

15、3,000 civilians were clubbed, shot to death, and buried in _ss graves. With the sudden collapse of our support, these atrocities at Hue would bee the night _re of the entire nation and particularly for the million-and-a half Catholic refugees who fled to South Vietnam when the Communists took over i

16、n the North. For the United States this first defeat in our nations history would result in a collapse of confiden _ in American leadership not only in Asia but throughout the world. Three American Presidents have recognized the great stakes involved in Vietnam and understood what had to be done. In

17、 1963 President Kennedy with his characteristic eloquen _ and clarity said we want to see a stable Gover _ent there, carrying on the struggle to _intain its national independen _. We believe strongly in that. We are not going to withdraw from that effort. In my opinion, for us to withdraw from that

18、effort would mean a collapse not only of South Vietnam but Southeast Asia. So were going to stay there. President Eisenhower and President Johnson expressed the same conclusion during their terms of offi _. For the future of pea _, precipitate withdrawal would be a disaster of immense _gnitude. A na

19、tion cannot re _in great if it betrays its allies and lets down its friends. Our defeat and humiliation in South Vietnam without question would promote recklessness in the councils of those great powers who have not yet abandoned their goals of world conquest. This would spark violen _ wherever our

20、mitments help _intain the pea _ - in the Middle East, in Berlin, eventually even in the Western Hemisphere. Ulti _tely, this would cost more lives. It would not bring pea _. It would bring more war. For these reasons I rejected the remendation I should end the war by immediately withdrawing all of o

21、ur for _s. I chose instead to change American policy on both the negotiating front and the battle front in order to end the war on _ny fronts. I initiated a pursuit for pea _ on _ny fronts. In a television speech on May 14, in a speech before the United Nations, on a number of other oasions, I set f

22、orth our pea _ proposals in great detail. We have offered the plete withdrawal of all outside for _s within one year. We have proposed to _ase fire under international supervision. We have offered free elections under international supervision with the Communists participating in the organization an

23、d conduct of the elections as an organized political for _. And the Saigon gover _ent has pledged to aept the result of the election. We have not put forth our proposals on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. We have indicated that were willing to discuss the proposals that have been put forth by the other

24、 side. We have declared that anything is negotiable, ex _pt the right of the people of South Vietnam to determine their own future. At the Paris pea _ conferen _ Ambassador Lodge has demonstrated our flexibility and good faith in 40 public meetings. Hanoi has refused even to discuss our proposals. T

25、hey de _nd our unconditional aeptan _ of their terms which are that we withdraw all American for _s immediately and unconditionally and that we overthrow the gover _ent of South Vietnam as we leave. We have not limited our pea _ initiatives to public forums and public statements. I recognized in Jan

26、uary that a long and bitter war like this usually cannot be settled in a public forum. That is why in addition to the public statements and negotiations, I have explored every possible private avenue that might lead to a settlement. Tonight, I am taking the unpre _dented step of disclosing to you so

27、me of our other initiatives for pea _, initiatives we undertook privately and secretly because we thought we thereby might open a door which publicly would be closed. I did not wait for my inauguration to begin my quest for pea _. Soon after my election, through an individual who was directly in con

28、tact on a personal basis with the leaders of North Vietnam, I _de two private offers for a rapid, prehensive settlement. Hanois replies called in effect for our surrender before negotiations. Sin _ the Soviet union furnishes most of the military equipment for North Vietnam, Secretary of Stare Rogers

29、, my assistant for national security affairs, Dr. Kissinger; Ambassador Lodge and I personally have met on a number of oasions with representatives of the Soviet Gover _ent to enlist their assistan _ in getting meaningful negotiations started. In addition, we have had extended discussions directed t

30、oward that same end with representatives of other gover _ents which have diplo _tic relations with North Vietnam. None of these initiatives have to date produ _d results. In mid-July I became convin _d that it was ne _ssary to _ke a _jor move to break the deadlock in the Paris talks. I spoke directl

31、y in this offi _, where Im now sitting, with an individual who had known Ho Chi Minh on a personal basis for 25 years. Through him I sent a letter to Ho Chi Minh. I did this outside the usual diplo _tic channels with the hope that with the ne _ssity of _ statements for propaganda removed, there migh

32、t be constructive progress toward bringing the war to an end. “Dear Mr. President: “I realize that it is difficult to municate meaningfully across the gulf of four years of war. But precisely because of this gulf I wanted to take this opportunity to reaffirm in all solemnity my desire to work for a

33、just pea _. I deeply believe that the war in Vietnam has gone on too long and delay in bringing it to an end can benefit no one, least of all the people of Vietnam. The time has e to move forward at the conferen _ table toward an early resolution of this tragic war. You will find us forthing and ope

34、n-minded in a mon effort to bring the blessings of pea _ to the brave people of Vietnam. Let history record that at this critical juncture both sides turned their fa _ towards pea _ rather than toward conflict and war. death. It simply reiterated the public position North Vietnam had taken at Paris

35、and flatly rejected my initiative. The full text of both letters is being released to the press. In addition to the public meetings that Ive referred to, Ambassador Lodge has met with Vietnams chief negotiator in Paris in 11 private sessions. And we have taken other significant initiatives which mus

36、t re _in secret to keep open some channels of munications which _y still prove to be productive. But the effect of all the public, private and secret negotiations which have been undertaken sin _ the bombing halt a year ago, and sin _ this Administration came into offi _ on Jan. 20, can be summed up

37、 in one senten _: No progress whatever has been _de ex _pt agreement on the shape of the bargaining table. Well, now, whos at fault? Its being clear that the obstacle in negotiating an end to the war is not the President of the United States. It is not the South Vietnamese Gover _ent. The obstacle i

38、s the other sides absolute refusal to show the least willingness to join us in seeking a just pea _. And it will not do so while it is convin _d that all it has to do is to wait for our next con _ssion, and our next con _ssion after that one, until it gets everything it wants. There can now be no lo

39、nger any question that progress in negotiation depends only on Hanoi s deciding to negotiate - to negotiate seriously. I realize that this report on our efforts on the diplo _tic front is discouraging to the American people, but the American people are entitled to know the truth - the bad news as we

40、ll as the good news - where the lives of our young men are involved. Now let me turn, however, to a more encouraging report on another front. At the time we launched our search for pea _, I recognized we might not sueed in bringing an end to the war through negotiations. I therefore put into effect

41、another plan to bring pea _ - a plan which will bring the war to an end regardless of what happens on the negotiating front. It is in line with the _jor shift in U. S. foreign policy which I described in my press conferen _ at Guam on July 25. Let me briefly explain what has been described as the Ni

42、xon Doctrine - a policy which not only will help end the war in Vietnam but which is an essential element of our program to prevent future Vietnams. We Americans are a do-it-yourself people - were an impatient people. Instead of teaching someone else to do a job, we like to do it ourselves. And this trait has been carried over into our