第九屆華政杯全國法律翻譯大賽初賽試題

1、第九屆“華政杯”全國法律翻譯大賽初賽試題試題一：( 598 words )Commerce sp rimary argument is that the plain statutory language mandating that a countervailing duty“ shall be imposed” requires it to impose countervailing duties when it isable to identify a subsidy, even in an NME country. See Commerce Br. 19-23; Commerce Rep

2、ly Br. 2. We disagree. The text of the relevant statute states that if “thea dministering authority determines that the government of a country . . . is providing, directly or indirectly, a countervailable su bsidy, ” and if the domestic injury requirement is met,“then there shall beimposed upon suc

3、h merchandise a countervailing duty, in addition to any other duty imposed, equal to the amount of the net countervailable subsidy. 1”9 1671. Contrary to Commerce s argument we do not find the statute to be clear on its face. The statute does not explicitly require the imposition of countervailing d

4、uties on goods from NME countries. The question is whether government payments in an NME economy constituteu“ntecrovailablesubsidies ” within the meaning of the statute. We have indeed previously held that the statute does not compel the imposition of countervailing duties to goods from NME countrie

5、s because the government payments with respect to such goods are not “ bounties or grants,” or“ countervailable subsidies” in the current termGienorloggeyto. wn Stee,l 801 F.2d at 1314.Section 303 of the Tariff Act of 1930, the predecessor to the current countervailing duty law, stated that“ wheneve

6、r any count rsyh .a .l l. pay or bestow, directly or indirectly, any bountyor grant, ” then “ there shall be levied . . . in addition to any duties otherwise imposed, a duty equal to the net amount of such bounty or grant.” 19 1303 (1988) (repealed 1994)Georgetown Steel we found that the “ economic

7、incentives and benefits ”pr ovided by governments in NME countries “do not constitute bounties or grants under section 303,” 801F.2d at 1314, that is, “ countervailables ubsidies in” the language of the current statute.Georgetown Steel found “no indication . . . that Congress intended” this law to a

8、pply to NMEexports, noting that the purpose of countervailing duty law is “to offset the unfair competitive advantage that foreign producers would otherwise enjoy from export subsidies, ” and that “in exports from a nonmarket economy . . . this kind of unfair competition cannot exist.F.2d at 1315-16

9、 (quoting Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 437 U.S. 443, 456 (1978). We stated that“ even if one were to lab ienlc tehnetives provided by NMEs to exporting entitiesas a subsidy,. . . the governments of those nonmarket economies would in effect be subsidizing themselves. Id”. at 1316. We thus uph

10、eld Commerce sd ecision not to impose countervailing duties on goods from NME countries.The “ bounty or grant” language of Section 303 invoGlveeodr gine town Steel was replaced bythe current“ countervailable subsidylanguage in the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub.L. No. 103- 465, 108 Stat. 4809 (19

11、94) (URAA” ),n bgurte Csso made clear that this changewas not intended to substantively affect the countervailing duty law. The URAA Statement ofAdministrative Action (“SAA”), which “ shall be regarded as an authoritative expression bythe United States concerning the interp retation and application

12、of the URAA,” 19 3512(d), stated that “the definition of subsidy will have the same meaning that administrative practice and courts have ascribed to the term bounty or grant andunder prior versions of the statute ” and that “ practices countervailable under the current law will be countervailable un

13、der the revised statute, H”.R . Doc. No. 103-316, at 925 (1994).Thus, Georgetown Steel is equally applicable to the revised statute.試題二：( 499 words)When a statute s constitutionality is in doubt, we havaen obligation to interpret the law, if possible, to avoid the constitutional problem. See, e.g.,

14、Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Building & Constr. Trades Council , 485 U. S. 568, 575 (1988). As one treatise puts it,“a statute should be interpreted in a way that avoids placing its constitutionality indoubt. ” A. Scalia & B. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts3

15、8, p(2012). This canon applies fully when considering vagueness challenges. In cases like this one, “our task is not to destroy the Act if we can, but to construe it, if consistent with the will of Congress, so as to comport with constitutional limitations. Civil Service Comm ” n ev.r Lett Carriers

16、, 413 U. S. 548, 571 (1973); see also Skilling v. United States , 561 U. S. 358, 403 (2010). Indeed,“ the elementary rule is that every reasonable construction must be resortedto, in order to save a statute from unconstitutionality. Id., a”t 406 (quoting Hooper v.California , 155 U. S. 648, 657 (189

17、5); emphasis deleted); see also Ex parte Randolph, 20 F.Cas. 242, 254 (No. 11,558) (CC Va. 1833) (Marshall, C. J.).The Court all but concedes that the residual clause would be constitutional if it applied to “ rea-wl orld con duct. ” Whether that is the best interpretation of the residual clause is

18、beside the point. What matters is whether it is a reasonable interpretation of the statute. And it surely is that.First, this interpretation heeds the pointed distinction that the Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984 (ACCA) draws between the “ elements of” a n offense and “ conduct. U”nd er 924(e)(2)(B

19、)(i), a crime qualifies as a “ violenfte lony ”if one of its “ elements inv”olv es “the use, attempted useo,r threatened use of physical force against the person of another.”the residual clause, which appears in the very next subsection, 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), focuses on “ conduct ” specifically,“ conduc

20、t that presents a serious potential risk of phyys itcoa l injuranother. ” The use of these two different termisn 924(e) indicates that“ conduct ” refers tothings done during the commission of an offense that are not part of the elements needed for conviction. Because those extra actions vary from case to case, it is natural to interpret “ conduct ” to mean- wreoarld conduct, not the conduct involved in some Platonic ideal of the offense.Second,