國(guó)際商法雷奧古斯特CHAPTER 1

Chapter1INTRODUCTIONTOINTERNATIONALANDCOMPARATIVELAW1-1CHAPTER1

INTRODUCTIONTOINTERNATIONALANDCOMPARATIVELAWTopicsforthischapter:DefiningInternationalLawMakingInternationalLawSourcesofInternationallawScopeofInternationalLawinPracticeInternationalPersonsIndividualRightsUnderInternationalLawComparisonofMunicipalLegalSystems1-2WhatisInternationalLaw?Historically,dealtwiththerulesandnormsregulatingtherelationshipsbetweenstates(countries)ThislawbetweennationsiscalledpublicinternationallawWithgrowthofrelationshipsbetweenpersonsandcorporationsindifferentstates,privateinternationallawdevelopedtogoverntheirconduct1-3SchoolsofThoughtDefiningTheBasisofInternationalLaw(IL)CosmopolitansarguethatILisbaseduponuniversalhumanrights.PositivistssaythatILisbasedonthesovereignequalityofallstatesandstateconsenttoILthroughtreatiesorcustom.HobbesiansclaimthatstateswillmakeagreementsandabidebyILonlywhenitsuitstheirself-interests.1-4ExamplesofPublicand

PrivateInternationalLaw1-5GoodwillandCivility

BetweenStates:ComityRepublicofthePhilippinesv.WestinghouseElec.Corp.

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F3d65(3rdCir,1994)U.S.trialcourtorderedthePhilippinegovernmenttonotharasswitnessesinvolvedinthecase.CourtofAppealsoverturnedtheorder.Heldthatacourtcouldrequestcompliancebyaforeignsovereignasamatterofcomity,butcouldnotordercompliance.Comityrequiresthatwerespectothercountries’sovereigntyandlawsothattheywillrespectours.1-6Case1-1

IgnacioSequihuav.TexacoInc.Comityappliedtoprivatedispute.CourtinTexasdeclinedtoexercisejurisdictionoveractivityandharmthatoccurredinEcuador.TakingjurisdictioninU.S.wouldhaveinterferedwithEcuador’ssovereignrighttocontrolitsownenvironment.Casedismissedunderthedoctrineofcomityofnations.1-7U.S.CourtsApplyComityandRefusetoTakeJurisdictionWhen:ThedefendantisasovereignstateDefendanthasinsufficientcontactswiththeU.S.AnotherjudicialforumismoreconvenientCongressdidnotintendU.S.statutetoapplyextraterritoriallyCaseconcernsactofsovereignstateonitsownterritory

1-8TheMakingofInternationalLawGenerally,ILcomesintoeffectonlywhenstatesconsenttoit.Generalconsentfoundinstatepractice–theconductandpracticesofstatesintheirdealingswitheachother.Evidenceofgeneralconsent:DecisionsoftheInternationalCourtofJusticeResolutionspassedbytheUNGeneralAssemblyMultilateraltreaties,conclusionsofinternationalconferences,andprovisionsrepeatedoverandoveragaininbilateraltreaties

1-9SourcesofInternationalLawTreatiesorconventionsInternationalcustomGeneralprinciplesoflawrecognizedbycivilizednationsJudicialdecisionsandteachingsofhighlyqualifiedlegalwriters

Thislist,ascontainedinArticle38(1)oftheStatuteoftheInternationalCourtofJustice,impliesahierarchy,ororder,inwhichthesesourcesaretobereliedon.1-10TreatiesandConventionsEquivalentsoflegislationinILare:Treaties–legallybindingagreementbetweentwoormorestates.Conventions–legallybindingagreementbetweenstatessponsoredbyaninternationalorganization.CustomaryrulesthatgoverntreatiesarecontainedintheViennaConventionontheLawofTreaties,ratifiedby108countries.1-11CustomAsSourceofInternationalLawCustom–along-establishedtraditionorusagethatbecomescustomarylawifitis:Consistentlyandregularlyobserved,and(Evidenceofthisfoundinofficialstatementsofgovernments,opinionsoflegaladvisors,executivedecrees,orderstomilitaryforces,andcourtdecisions.)Recognizedbythosestatesobservingitasapracticethattheymustobligatorilyfollow.

1-12GeneralPrinciplesofLawandJusCogensCourtswilloftenrelyupongeneralprinciplesoflawthatarecommontothelegalsystemsoftheworldtosolveinternationaldisputes.Juscogensisaperemptorynormofgeneralinternationallaw,recognizedbytheinternationalcommunityasanormfromwhichnoderogationispermitted.Juscogens-statesmustrespectcertainfundamentalprinciples.Treatiesarevoidiftheyconflictwithjuscogens.Ex:Treatybytwonationstouseviolenceagainstathirdnationviolateshigherstandardofjuscogens.

1-13ScopeofInternationalLawinActualPracticeInternationaltribunalsregardmunicipallawassubservienttointernationallaw.Stateshaveobligationtobringtheirmunicipallawintocompliancewithinternationalnorms.Municipalcourtsoftenbalkatthisobligationbaseduponstrongfeelingsofnationalismandbeliefinpriorityforthesovereignstate’sownlaw.1-14PracticeinMunicipalCourtsInmunicipalcourts,internationallawgenerallytreatedascorrelative.Iftheinternationallawisbasedoncustomarypractice,itisreceivedinaccordancewiththedoctrineofincorporation.CustomaryILispartofdomesticlawtotheextentthatitisnotinconsistent.Minorityofcourts-doctrineoftransformationCustomaryILisapplicabledomesticallyonlyafteradoptedbylegislation,courtdecision,orlocalusage.

1-15MunicipalCourtReceptionRulesFoundinTreaties–TwoFactorsNatureofthetreaty:Self-executing–containsaprovisionstatingthatthetreatywillapplytothepartieswithouthavingtoadoptdomesticenablinglegislation.Non-Self-Executing–requiresenablinglegislationbeforeeffectivedomestically.Constitutionalstructureoftheratifyingstate:InU.S.,PresidentnegotiatesconstitutionaltreatiesthatarethenratifiedbytheSenate.

Executiveagreements-treatiesenteredintobythePresident,notratified,noteffectivedomestically.1-16Case1-2

SeiFujiiv.StateExamineswhetherprovisionsofUNCharterpromotingfundamentalfreedomswithoutdistinctionastoraceareself-executingornot.CaliforniaappellatecourtruledthatlandpurchasedbyFujii,aJapanesealien,violatedalienlandlawandescheatedtostate.CASupremeCourtaffirmedthatUNCharterwasnotself-executingbecauselanguagewasnotmandatoryandrequiredadditionalimplementinglegislation.However,lawviolated14thAmend.,Fujii’smoneyreturned.1-17InternationalPersonsStatesIndependentstatesDependentstatesInchoatestatesInternationalOrganizationsIntergovernmentalorganizations(IGO)Nongovernmentalorganizations(NGO)1-18InternationalPersons-StatesState-politicalentitycomprisingaterritory,apopulation,agovernmentcapableofenteringintointernationalrelations,andagovernmentcapableofcontrollingitsterritoryandpeoples.Anindependentstateissovereignandoperatesindependentlyinternationally.Adependentstate(PuertoRico)hasformallysurrenderedsomeaspectoftheirpoliticalandgovernmentalfunctionstoanotherstate.Aninchoatestatelacksattributesofindependentstate,suchasterritoryorpopulation.1-19Case1-3

MatimakTradingCo.v.KhalilyandD.A.Y.KidsSportswearInc.Matimak,aHongKongcorporation,suedinfederalcourtinNYunderdiversityjurisdictionasacitizenofforeignstate.Thoughnotformallyrecognizedbyexecutivebranch,MatimakargueddefactorecognitionofHongKong.Ruling:HongKongnotanindependentstate.MatimaknotacitizenorsubjectofUnitedKingdomoranyforeignstate.Suitdismissedforlackofjurisdiction.

1-20Case1-4

TheTrailSmelterArbitrationStatewithterritorialsovereigntystillsubjecttonegativeservitudes,preventingitfromcausinginjurytoasecondstate.SmeltingplantinCanadawaspollutingairandwaterinStateofWashington.“Astateowesatalltimesadutytoprotectotherstatesagainstinjuriousactsbyindividualsfromwithinitsjurisdiction.”1-21TerritorialSovereigntyAfterTheRiodeJaneiroConference-1992Modernly,stateshaveadoptednegativeservitudeasformalpartofinternationallaw.1-22ChangesinTerritorialSovereigntyWithachangeinsovereigntyoverterritory,severallegalconsequencesariseandweapplythefollowingrules:Successorstatesareboundbydispositivetreaties–treatiesconcernedwithrightsoverterritory(boundaries&servitudes.)MergerRule–treatiesineffectinaformerstateremainineffectinitsterritorywhenitbecomespartofanewstate.Ex:TreatiesofbothEgyptandSyriaremainedineffectwhentheymergedintotheUnitedArabRepublicMovingBoundariesRule–treatiesofstateabsorbingnewterritorybecomeeffectivewithinabsorbedterritory.1-23ChangesinTerritorialSovereignty(continued)Ex:France’streatiesdisplacedGermantreatiesinannexedterritoryofAlsace-LorraineatendofWWI.CleanSlateDoctrine–newstatecreatedfromcolonynotboundbytreatiesofitsformercolonialpower.SuccessionofStates–whentwostatesagreetojoinandformsinglestateorwhenastatedissolvesintotwoormorestates,thenewstatesareboundbythepredecessor’streaties.Ex:WhentheSovietUnionsplitin1991,the12republicswereboundbytheexistingtreatiesoftheSovietUnion.1-24InternationalPersons

-InternationalOrganizationsAccordingtotheUnitedNationsCharter,therearetwokindsofinternationalorganizations:Intergovernmentalorganizations(IGO)Privateornongovernmentalorganizations(NGO)IGOisapermanentorganizationsetupbytwoormorestatestocarryonactivitiesofcommoninterest.NGOisaninternationalorganizationmadeupoforganizationsotherthanstates.MaybenonprofitNGOorfor-profitmultinationalenterprise(MNE).

1-25InternationalPersons

-IGOsIGOcharter(Ex:UNCharter)setsoutitsAimsObjectivesInternalstructureResourcesExpresspowersIGOmustberecognizedtohavelegalcapacity–thequalificationorauthoritytodealwithotherinternationalpersons1-26InternationalPersons

-IGOs

-TheUnitedNationsMostimportantIGOItscharterisamultilateraltreatyOperatesthoughitsorgans-anagencythatcarriesonspecificfunctionswithinalargerorganizations.UNorgansaretheGeneralAssembly,theSecurityCouncil,theInternationalcourtofJustice,theTrusteeshipCouncil,andtheEconomicandSocialCouncil.1-27UnitedNationsSystemNamegiventovariousautonomousorganizations(alsoIGOs)thathaveenteredintoagreementswiththeUNtobeUNagencies.1-28InternationalPersons

-IGOs

-TheEuropeanUnionTheEuropeanUnionisa25-memberIGOcreatedbythefoundingstatesinordertointegratetheireconomiesandpoliticalinstitutions.TheEuropeanTreatyin1992establisheda:politicalunioncommoncitizenshipfornationalsofmemberstatesSocialChartermonetaryunionCentralBank,andcommoncurrency(theeuro).

1-29EUPowersEUhassupranationalpowers.SupranationalpowersarepowerssurrenderedbymemberstatestoanIGO.EUlawissuperiortothelawsofmemberstates.Thismeans:ThememberstatesarerequiredtobringtheirinternallawsintocompliancewithEUlaw,andEx:Commissionv.BelgiumheldthatBelgiummustchangeitslawstopreventdiscriminationagainstlumberproducedinotherstatesTheEUlawisdirectlyeffectivewithinmemberstates

Ex:Costav.ENELheldthatindividualisentitledtoinvoketheEUTreatyinthecourtsofEUmemberstates.1-30Case1-5

CommissionoftheEuropeanCommunitiesv.Fed.Rep.ofGermanyGermanyprohibitedtheimportationandmarketingofmeatproductsfromothermemberstatesthatdidnotcomplywithitsMeatRegulationlaw.NationalrulesrestrictingimportsarecompatiblewiththeEECTreatyonlyasnecessaryfortheeffectiveprotectionofhumanlifeandhealthandemploytheleastrestrictivemeanstoaccomplishthis.Theimportedmeatwasnotinjurioustohealth.Held:GermanymustconformtoEUlawandtheprincipleoffreemovementofgoodsbetweenmemberstates.1-31InstitutionsoftheEU

-TheEuropeanCommissionThemaininstitutionsoftheEUarethe:EuropeanCommission–EU’sexecutivebranchwithsomelegislativefunctioncomprised27individualsappointedbyParliament.Dutiesareto:EnsurethatEUrulesarerespectedProposemeasurestotheEuropeanCouncilImplementEUpoliciesManagethefundsthatmakeuptheEUbudgetSeehttp://ec.europa.eu/index_en.htm

1-32InstitutionsoftheEU

-CounciloftheEuropeanUnionMaindecision-makingbodyoftheEU.Exercisesco-decisionswithParliament.Roleisto:Adoptlegislation(withParliament)Adoptannualbudget(withParliament)AdoptinternationalagreementsCoordinatetheeconomicpoliciesofthememberstatesSeehttp://www.consilium.europa.eu

1-33InstitutionsoftheEU

-EuropeanParliamentCo-legislativebodyandmainsupervisoryinstitutionoftheEU.786memberselectedeveryfiveyears.Arrangedbypoliticalparties,notbynationality.Threemainroles:OversightauthorityoverallEUinstitutionsShareslegislativepowerwithCounciloftheEUDeterminestheEU’sannualbudgetwithCouncil1-34InstitutionsoftheEU

-EuropeanCourtofJusticeIsthesupremetribunaloftheEU.Comprisedof27judgesand8advocatesgeneral.Advocategeneralbriefscaseforjudgesandsuggesthowcaseshouldbedecided.Sitsinchambersofthreetofivejudges.Hearsfourkindsofcases:appealsfromtheCourtofFirstInstancecomplaintsbroughtbythecommissionorbyonememberagainstanothermembercomplaintsbroughtbymemberagainstEUinstitutioncomplaintstoannulEUlegalmeasure1-35InternationalPersons

-otherIGOsGeneralIGOsthataredevotedtopoliticalcooperation,security,&promotionofeconomic,social,andculturaldevelopmentinclude:CouncilofEurope,AfricanUnion,ArabLeague,OrganizationofAmericanStates,CommonwealthofIndependentStates(formerrepublicsoftheSovietUnion).SpecializedIGOsdealwithissuesofmutualinterestsuchasEuropeanSpaceAgencyandInternationalCriminalPoliceAgency(INTERPOL).FreeTradeAreasarecooperativeeconomicIGOs.TheseincludetheNorthAmericanFTA(NAFTA).1-36InternationalPersons

-NongovernmentalOrganizations(NGOs)NonprofitNGOsserveascoordinatingagenciesforprivatenationalgroups.IncludeInternationalBarAssoc.,AmnestyInternational,andtheInternationalCommitteeoftheRedCross.For-profitNGOs,knownastransnationalcorporationsormultinationalenterprises(MNEs),arebusinessesoperatingjointventuresinmultiplecountries.Thesejointventuresbystateshaveincludedspaceandoilexploration.

1-37RightsofIndividualsUnderInternationalLawIndividualshavenodirectrightsundertraditionalviewofIL.Stateallowedtoseekcompensationforinjurytoitsnationalsunderthelawofstateresponsibility.Individualmayassertclaimforviolationofbasichumanrightsintendedtoprotectallpeoplefromcruelandinhumantreatment,threatstotheirlives,andpersecution.1-38Case1-6

DeSanchezv.BancoCentralDeNicaraguaIndividualsuedBancoCentralinU.S.courtforbreachofcontractfornothonoringacheck.Held:Anindividualwhoisanationalofaforeignstatemaynotsueanagencyofthatforeignstateinanotherstate’scourtsforbreachofcontract.1-39ComparisonofMunicipal

LegalSystemsStudyofdifferentmunicipallawsystemsisknownascomparativelaw.Threemajorlegalsystemtypesare:Romano-GermaniccivillawAnglo-AmericancommonlawIslamiclaw1-40Romano-GermanicCivilLawCivillawsetoutinnationallawcodes.Civillawdealsonlywithrightsofprivatecitizensasopposedtopubliclawthatdealswithconstitutionalandadministrativeissues.Guidancefordecisionscomesonlyfromthecivilcode,notcour