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TRADEANDDEVELOPMENTREPORTUPDATE
GlobalTrendsandProspects
APRIL2023
?2023,UnitedNationsConferenceonTradeandDevelopment
Thefindings,interpretationsandconclusionsexpressedhereinarethoseoftheauthorsanddonotnecessarilyreflecttheviewsoftheUnitedNationsoritsofficialsorMemberStates.
ThedesignationsemployedandthepresentationofmaterialonanymapinthisworkdonotimplytheexpressionofanyopinionwhatsoeveronthepartoftheUnitedNationsconcerningthelegalstatusofanycountry,territory,cityorareaorofitsauthorities,orconcerningthedelimitationofitsfrontiersorboundaries.
Thispublicationhasnotbeenformallyedited.
UNCTAD/GDS/INF/2023/1
iii
Tableofcontents
A.INTRODUCTION 1
B.WEAKENINGGROWTHOUTLOOKAGAINSTMOUNTINGFINANCIALSTRAINS 2
1.Bailingoutbetter? 2
2.Globalgrowthandtrade 5
3.Regionalprospects 10
C.INFLATIONWOES:THELIMITSOFMONETARYTIGHTENING 14
1.Hungryforprofits:foodpricesandthecost-of-livingcrisis 20
D.CHRONICLEOFADISASTERFORETOLD:DEBTANDDEVELOPMENTDISTRESS
IN2023ANDBEYOND 24
1.Developingcountrydebtdynamicsunderunfavourablemonetary
conditions 24
2.Fromdebtdistresstodevelopmentcrisis 27
3.Towardsanewdebtarchitecture 30
E.LOSSANDDAMAGEINATIMEOFPOLYCRISIS 31
1.Pakistan:intheeyeofthepolycrisis 31
2.Theroleoflossanddamagefinancing 32
3.Existingfinancingforlossanddamage 33
REFERENCES 34
iv
TRADEANDDEVELOPMENTREPORTUPDATE
April2023
Listoffigures
1.
Worldmerchandisetrade,January2010–January2023
8
2.
Globalsupplychainpressureindex(GSCPI),January1998–February2023
9
3.
Consumerpriceindex,selectedeconomies,January2020–January2023
16
4.
DeflatorsforGermany,ItalyandtheUnitedKingdom,firstquarterof2019–fourth
quarterof2022 18
5.
DeflatorsforIndonesiaandPoland,firstquarterof2019–fourthquarterof2022
20
6.
Internationalpriceindicesoffertilizerandfood,January2018–January2023
21
7.
Medianfoodtraders’profitsandrevenues,2018–2022
22
8.
Totalglobalcommoditytradinggrossmargin,2018–2022
23
9.
Bondandequityemergingmarketfundflows,2017–2023
25
10.
Sovereignbondmarketindicators,1January2019–17March2023
26
11.
Netresourcetransfersonexternalpublicdebtinlow-andmiddle-income
countries,2012–2021 28
12.
Changeinpublicexternaldebtserviceandotherkeypublicspending,
2012–2014and2019–2021 29
13.
EconomyofPakistan,selectedindicators,2015–2022
31
Listoftables
1.
Worldoutputgrowth,1991–2023
6
2.
CPIinflationratesandcontributions,selecteddevelopedcountries,2018–2023
17
3.
CPIinflationratesandcontributions,selecteddevelopingcountries,2018–2023
19
Listofboxes
1.
Inflationtargetingandtheprimacyoffinancialstability.....................................................4
Listofchartsinboxes
B1.
Effectivefederalfundsrate,June1976–February2023......................................................5
GlobalTrendsandProspects
1
A.INTRODUCTION
Accordingtomostrecentdata,theworldeconomygrewby3.1percentin2022.Tomany,thereboundsuggestedthatasoftlandingwaspossiblein2023,andthatthekeyproblemsoftheyear2022–risingprices,supply-chaindisruptionsandrecessionrisks–havebeenaddressed.Asaresult,theveryfirstmonthsof2023wereviewedwithoptimismbydecision-makers,asitappearedthattheanti-inflationarystanceofthecentralbankshadsetapathtopricestabilizationwithoutcausingamajordisruptiontogrowth.
TradeandDevelopmentReport2022
cautionedagainstsuchoptimismbecauseitwasbasedonshort-termdynamics.Long-termissueswhichhademergedaftertheglobalfinancialcrisis(GFC)of2007–09andgainedgreatervisibilityduringthepandemic–weakinvestment,slowproductivitygrowth,supplychainvulnerabilities,highlevelsofindebtedness–remaininplace.TheongoingwarinUkrainecontinuestoimpactinternationalmarketsforenergy,foodandcommodities.Moreover,inflationisprovingastubbornadversaryduetopersistentsupply-sidefactorsandexcessivemarkupsbylargecorporations,particularlyinfoodandenergymarkets.
Withglobalgrowthdeceleratingduringthefourthquarterof2022,theworldeconomyhasbegun2023inamorefragilestatethantheoptimisticaccountsweresuggesting.WiththeconflictinUkrainecontinuinginto2023,majorfinancial,investmentandstrategicdecisionsarecloudedbygeopoliticaluncertaintyandrisksofeconomicinsecurity.ThecollapseofthecryptoexchangeFTXinNovember2022andastringofbankfailuresinEuropeandtheUnitedStatesinMarch2023,raisethespectreoffinancialcontagioninanalreadyslowingeconomy.
Howdeepthesefinancialstressesreachandhowlongtheypersistwilldeterminewhetheradvancedeconomiesslipbackintorecessionin2023.Withlong-termchallengesremainingunaddressed,growthisexpectedtodecelerateto2.1percentin2023.Thiscouldsettheworldontoarecessionarytrack.Concertedactionsbygovernmentsinearly2023andtheinitialreactionfrommarketssuggestthisisstillavoidable.However,theroomformanoeuvremaybeconstrainedgiventheheightenedsovereigndebtlevelsnotseensincetheglobalfinancialcrisis,theexpansionofcentralbankbalancesheetsandthegrowthofthelargeandunregulatedshadowbankingsystem.Withtheeraofcheapcreditcomingtoanendatatimeof“polycrisis”andgrowinggeopoliticaltensions,theriskofsystemiccalamitiescannotberuledout.
Thedamagetodevelopingcountriesfromunforeseenshocks,particularlywhereindebtednessisalreadyasourceofdistress,willbeheavyandlasting.Withoutthekindoffinancialsafetynetenjoyedbyprivateactorsinadvancedeconomies,theyearaheadwillbeachallengingoneevenforthosedevelopingcountriesnotinimmediatedistress.Inthissense,inequalities,bothwithinandacrosscountries,thatemergedwiththelop-sidedrecoveryfromthepandemic,arelikelytoincrease.Financialsupportandrescuepackagestofailinglendersandenhancedswaplinesinadvancedeconomiesreducethethreatofafinancialmeltdownbyofferingasaferhavenfromfinancialturbulence.Buttheywilltiltthescaleoffinancialflowsfurtherinadvancedeconomies’favour,aswellasbenefitinglargerfinancialinstitutionswithintheirownmarkets.
Areasofpolicyconcernfor2023
?Itappearsthattheyear2023willtestthefinancialresilienceofthepost-pandemicworld.Whileitisdifficulttopredicttheprecisetimingandcontoursofafinancialcrisis,ifany,thefirstweeksofspring2023domakeitclearthatinaninterconnectedandfragileworldeconomy,centralbankdecisionsinadvancedcountriesshouldnotbetakenwithoutconsiderationoftheirwider
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TRADEANDDEVELOPMENTREPORTUPDATE
April2023
systemicimpact.Thisshouldinformpolicymakers’thinkingwhentheytrytofindabalancebetweenfinancialstabilityandpricestabilityinthecomingmonthsof2023.
?Itisalsobecomingclearthattheageofultra-lowinterestratesisgivingwaytooneofhigherinterestrates.Threeentrenchedlegaciesfromthispassingerawillneedurgentattentionandactionfromtheinternationalcommunityiftheglobaleconomygenerally,andthedevelopingworldinparticular,istoendthisdecadeinahealthierpositionthanitbegan.
?First,theweaknessofproductiveinvestment,includingfortheclimatetransition.Thiswillrequirepolicymakerstotakeacloserexaminationofcorporategovernanceandthewayinwhichprofitsaregenerated,managedanddistributed.
?Second,theuseofmonetarypolicyasthemaintoolofmacroeconomicmanagement.Thiswillrequirerecoveringtheactiveroleoffiscalpolicyandanoverhaulofthetaxsystemsinbothadvancedanddevelopingcountriestowardshigherprogressivity,butalsoreformoftheinternationalfinancialsystemtoprotectandexpandfiscalspace.
?Third,thegrowingdependenceondebt.Thiswillnotonlyrequireareturntoresponsiblelendingandborrowing,butanewinstitutionalarchitecturetobettermanagedebtdistressandrestructuring.
B.WEAKENINGGROWTHOUTLOOKAGAINSTMOUNTINGFINANCIALSTRAINS
1.Bailingoutbetter?
AsthisReportgoestopress,financialmarketsarerattledbyfearsofcontagion,followingaseriesofbankfailuresandnear-collapsesinEuropeandtheUnitedStatesinthefirsttwoweeksofMarch2023.Meanwhile,sharevaluesacrossthebankingsectoronbothsidesoftheAtlantichavecontinuedtofallandaheightenedsenseofinvestoranxietyremains.
IntheUnitedStates,depositorsoftworegionallenders–SiliconValleyBank(SVB)andSignatureBank–wererescuedbyamixtureofgovernmentsupportandliquidityinjectionfromotherbanks.SVBwaslateracquiredbyFirstCitizenBank.Thebankruptcyofathirdlender,FirstRepublic,wasavertedbyaconsortiumofleadingbanks.IntheUnitedKingdom,thebankinggiantHSBCacquiredthedomesticarmofthefailingSVBforjustonepoundsterling.InSwitzerland,amajorrescuemergerwasrushedthroughbytheGovernment.Asaresult,UBSacquireditsformerrivalCreditSuissefor€3.5billion.
Sixmajorcentralbanksoftheadvancedeconomies–includingtheFederalReserveoftheUnitedStates(hereafterFed),theECB,theBankofEngland,theSwissNationalBank,theBankofJapanandtheBankofCanada–releasedajointstatementon19March2023announcingthattheywouldlaunchaseriesofjointoperationstomakefundingavailabletothemarketviastandingswaplines.TheSecretaryoftheTreasuryoftheUnitedStates,JanetYellen,haspledgedcontinued,thoughnotblanket,supporttosmallerlendersanddepositors(Politi,2023).
Thefactthatbanks,includingmajorregionallendersaswellasasystemicallyimportantinstitutionsuchasCreditSuisse,needrescuingagain,doesnotnecessarilymeanarepeatofthe2007–09crisis.Buttherearerhymingmotifs.Beginninginthespringof2007,havingstartedwithcrisisofregionalmortgage
3
GlobalTrendsandProspects
lendersintheUnitedStates,aninternationalfinancialmeltdown.Thiswasdrivenbyacascadeofundetectedrisks,unknowninterconnectionsinsidebankingstructuresandthegrowthofade-factounregulatedshadowbankingsystem.Badfinancialgovernance,aswellastheveryideathatfinancialmarketsareself-regulating,amplifiedthoserisks,theconsequencesofwhichlingeroneventoday.
Policymakersnowadaysarebetterpreparedthanpreviouslytoaddresssignsofmarketdistressandtroublesatindividualinstitutions,andthefinancialsystem,partofwhichisregulatedwithaviewtomacroprudentialandsystemicconcerns,ismorerobust.Also,astheexperienceofthepandemicshows,centralbankshaveexpandedtheirarsenalofliquiditysupportandcoordinationmeasures.
Buttherearestillgroundsforconcern.Theactualimplementationofpost-2009financialregulationshasleftthenon-bankingpartsofthefinancialsystemoutsideoftheareaofsystemicoversight.Thedecadeofquantitativeeasing(QE)andultra-lowinterestrateshascontributedtoassetinflation,newrisksandcapitalmarketdistortions(Harnett,2023).Inthecurrentglobalenvironmentofheighteneduncertainty,higherinflationandmarketvolatility,suchrisksmaycascadethroughthesysteminnewways.Importantly,whilefailuresofindividualbanksmaynotnecessarilyheraldawiderfinancialcrisis,theinversionoftheyieldcurveposesseriousriskstothebalancesheetsoffinancialinstitutions,aswasthecasein2007afterthreeyears(and500basispoints)ofinterestratehikes(Rennison,2022).
AsinvestorsmovecapitalintoUnitedStatesassetsseekingsafetyamidstglobalpolitical-economicuncertainty,thereisstrongdownwardpressureonlong-termyieldsinthecountry.Atthesametime,ratehikesbytheFedarepushingshort-termrateshigher,addingfurtherstresstofinancialinstitutions’balancesheets.Inthisrespect,whileloseregulationofmid-sizebanksmayofferoneexplanationforthefailureofUnitedStateslendersinspring2023,thewiderstructuralproblemshouldnotbeignored.
Nomatterhowtightlythebankingsystemisregulated,thiscannotcoverforamajorglobalstructuralimbalanceintheworldfinancialsystem.Intimesofglobaluncertainty,thereisashortageofsafeassets,andinvestorstendtopileintoUnitedStatesTreasurybonds(hereafterTreasuries),forcingdowntheyield.Asmonetarypolicytightens,short-termratesgoup,yieldcurvesareinverted,andbalancesheetdistresscancascadethroughthesystem,threateningawidercrisis.
Giventheimpactofmonetarypolicyonassetprices(box1),centralbanksacrosstheadvancedeconomieswillhavetofindabalancebetweentheiranti-inflationmeasures,andfinancialstabilityconcerns.Thefinancialstresscausedbyrecenteventsisleadingtoareassessmentofglobaleconomicprospectsandrisks,withmarketseffectivelyanticipatingsubstantialinterestratecutsalreadythisyear(seefigure9).
Thestructuralimbalanceinthefinancialsystemisalreadyhavingcontagioneffects.Developingcountriesareinaparticularlyvulnerablepositionduetothelackofanadequateglobalfinancialsafetynet(GFSN).Undernormalcircumstances,expectationsoflowerinterestratesindevelopedcountriesaresupportiveofcapitalflowstodevelopingcountries.However,inthecurrentcontext,uncertaintyistriggeringaflighttosafetywhichisvisiblyhurtingdevelopingcountries.Capitaloutflowsfromdevelopingcountriesareaccelerating,asindicatedbytheevolutionofnetinvestorsflowstoemergingmarketfunds(sectionD).
Sovereignbondspreadsvis-à-visTreasurieshavealreadywidenedconsiderablyinthefaceofthesedevelopments.ThisisanindicatorofheightenedriskaversionasinvestorsdumpriskyassetswithcountriesinAfricaparticularlyaffectedbythisdynamic(figure10).ThesechallengeshighlighttheurgentneedtostrengthentheGFSN.Thespecialdrawingrights(SDRs)areacentralpartoftheGFSNaswellasthefastliquiditywindowsintheIMFandtheWorldBank.ThatiswhyUNCTAD,aswellastheUnitedNationsGlobalCrisisResponseGroup(GCRG),haveinsistedthataspartofanemergencyresponsepackage,anewSDRissuanceshouldbeconsideredtoprovideliquiditysupporttodevelopingcountries.Andthatthequotalimitsoftheemergencywindowshavetoberevised.
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TRADEANDDEVELOPMENTREPORTUPDATE
April2023
Box1Inflationtargetingandtheprimacyoffinancialstability
TherecentfailureofSVBintheUnitedStates,andtheliquidityassistanceoftheSwissNationalBanktoCreditSuisseinEuropehasraisedconcernsaboutprimacyoffinancialstabilityovercentralbanks’otherconcerns.Oftenreferredtoas“financialdominance”concerns,thisstancecontrastswithfiscaldominanceandexchangeratedominance.
Underfiscaldominance,anincreaseintheinterestratetofightinflationmayalsopushtherequiredprimarybalancetostabilizepublicdebtbeyondwhatispoliticallyacceptablebythecitizens(Ghoshetal.,2017).Insuchacontextoffiscalfatiguesomethinghastogive,thestanceofthecentralbankorfiscalpolicy.Wheninvestorsanticipatehigherbudgetdeficitandthattheauthoritieswillresorttomoneyprintingordefault,theresultisa“flighttoquality”,usuallytorealassetsandforeignexchange.Thispushesinflationupinsteadofdown.Knowingthatmonetarypolicywillbackfire,thecentralbankdoesnothiketheinterestrateandmonetarypolicybecomessubordinatetofiscalpolicy(Blanchard,2004).
Underexchangeratedominance,theeconomymaybeinadepressedstate,wherethelevelofeconomicactivityjustifiescuttingthedomesticinterestrate,butthecentralbankcannotdosobecausetheresultingreductioninthecarrytradebetweendomesticmoneyandforeignexchangewouldweakendomesticcurrency,whichinturnwillpushthepriceoftradableproductsup.Cuttingrateswouldthusleadtohigherinflationthroughtheexchange-ratechannel.Thiskindofconstraintisverycommonindevelopingcountrieswithhighcapitalmobilityandafullyfloatingexchangerate(Barbosa-Filho,2008and2015).
Third,byanalogywiththepreviouscases,financialdominanceariseswhen,say,inflationisupandunemploymentisdown.Thistriggersanincreaseintheinterestrateandrisksafinancialcrisisduetoliquidityand/orsolvencyproblemsinthefinancialsystem(GrosandShamsfakhr,2021).SimilaritieswiththecurrentsituationintheUnitedStatesareapparentsincemostmonetarytighteningcyclesbytheFedhaveendedupinheightenedfinancialstressthatinvertedthedirectionofmonetarypolicyitself(Minsky,1982).
Themostrecentanddramaticcaseoffinancialdominancehappenedin2006–2008,whenthesubprimemeltdownfirststoppedandthenreversedBenBernanke’sfirstmonetarytighteningcycle.ThesamethinghappenedtwiceunderAlanGreenspan,duringthe“financialcrashof1989”andtheburstofthe“dot-combubble”intheearly2000s.
Goingbackalittlefurther,itwasnotbyaccidentthatthedebtcrisisof1982coincidedwiththechangeindirectionoftheFedinterestratesduringthatsameyear,northatthenexthikingcycleendedpreciselywhenthesavingandloanscrisisgainedforceattheendof1980s.
Ratherthananexception,financialdominanceseemstobeacommonpatternintheUnitedStateseconomy.Assetpricemovementssignaltheneedtolowerinterestratestoavoidmajorcapitallossesinadvanceofanysignalsfromproductandlabourmarketsthatitisnecessarytoeasemonetarypolicy.
GlobalTrendsandProspects
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FigureB1Effectivefederalfundsrate,June1976–February2023
(Percentage)
20
LatinAmericadebtcrisis
Savingsandloanscrisis
Dot-combubbleburst
Subprimemeltdown
Source:FederalReserveBankofSt.Louis.
ReturningtothecurrentsituationandassumingtheUnitedStatesisexperiencingfinancialdominance,therearebasicallytwoscenariosfacingtheFed.First,toproceedwithahawkishmonetarypolicyusingthecreditcrunchtoacceleratedisinflationandtohopethatexistingsupportmechanismsandregulationswillpreventwidespreadbankruns,afinancialmeltdownandareturntorecession.Alternatively,theFedcanfirstslowdownandthenquicklystopraisinginterestrates,acceptingaslowerdisinflationinexchangeforavoidingafinancialcrisisandcrashingtheeconomy.
TherecenteconomichistoryoftheFed,includingthemostrecentmove,suggeststhatthesecondscenarioisthemorelikelypathitwilltake.Thefederalfundsinterestratewillthereforeprobablystopbetween5.0and5.5percentinthecomingmonths,whileinflationmayslowsmoregraduallythaninitiallyexpected,withoutputgrowthdeceleratingtoanannualgrowthrateofabout1percent.
2.Globalgrowthandtrade
Globalgrowthin2023(measuredinconstantUnitedStatesdollarsatmarketexchangerates)isexpectedtodropto2.1percentcomparedto3.1percentin2022(table1).However,therisksarestronglyonthedownsidewithglobalmacroeconomicconditionsthisyearhanginginaprecariousbalanceasmonetaryandfiscalpoliciesadjusttoslowingglobalgrowthandthefinancialfalloutfromayearofrisinginterestrates.
6
TRADEANDDEVELOPMENTREPORTUPDATE
April2023
Table1Worldoutputgrowth,1991–2023
(Annualpercentagechange)
Reported
TDR2022
Revision
Countrygroups
1991-1999a
2000-2009a
2010-2014a
2015-2019a
2019
2020
2021
2022b
2023b
2022
2023
2022
2023
World
2.9
3.4
3.2
3.0
2.5
-3.2
5.9
3.1
2.1
2.5
2.2
+0.6
-0.0
Africa
2.4
5.5
2.7
3.0
2.6
-2.3
4.4
3.0
2.5
2.7
2.4
+0.3
+0.2
NorthAfrica(incl.SouthSudan)
2.7
5.3
-1.9
4.1
2.3
-3.1
4.6
2.3
2.9
3.0
2.4
-0.6
+0.5
SouthAfrica
2.7
4.0
2.5
1.0
0.3
-6.3
4.9
2.0
-0.3
1.4
1.3
+0.6
-1.6
Sub-SaharanAfrica(excl.SouthAfricaandSouthSudan)
2.0
6.4
6.3
2.9
3.4
-0.7
4.2
3.6
3.0
2.8
2.6
+0.8
+0.4
America
3.4
2.5
2.4
1.9
1.7
-3.8
6.0
2.5
1.1
2.1
1.0
+0.4
+0.1
LatinAmericaandtheCaribbean
3.3
3.5
3.4
0.1
-0.3
-7.2
6.7
3.9
1.3
2.6
1.1
+1.3
+0.2
CentralAmerica(excl.Mexico)andCaribbean
2.8
4.4
3.5
3.1
2.2
-8.6
8.0
4.3
2.5
3.7
2.5
+0.6
-0.1
Mexico
3.0
1.9
3.2
2.1
-0.2
-8.3
5.0
3.1
1.8
1.8
1.4
+1.2
+0.4
SouthAmerica
3.4
3.9
3.4
-0.9
-0.8
-6.6
7.1
4.1
0.9
2.7
0.7
+1.4
+0.2
Argentina
4.6
3.8
2.7
-0.3
-2.0
-9.9
10.3
5.4
-0.5
4.1
-0.8
+1.3
+0.3
Brazil
2.9
3.6
3.2
-0.4
1.2
-3.3
5.0
2.9
0.9
1.8
0.6
+1.1
+0.3
NorthAmerica
3.4
2.3
2.1
2.3
2.3
-3.0
5.8
2.2
1.0
2.0
1.0
+0.2
+0.0
Canada
2.8
2.3
2.6
2.0
1.9
-5.1
5.0
3.4
2.1
3.2
2.2
+0.2
-0.0
UnitedStates
3.5
2.3
2.1
2.3
2.3
-2.8
5.9
2.1
0.9
1.9
0.9
+0.2
+0.0
Asia(excl.Cyprus)
4.3
5.6
5.7
4.8
3.8
-1.0
6.3
3.6
4.0
3.5
4.1
+0.0
-0.1
CentralAsia
-4.4
8.3
6.8
3.4
3.8
-1.2
5.5
4.4
4.4
3.6
3.5
+0.8
+0.9
EastAsia
4.4
5.6
5.8
4.8
4.1
0.3
6.4
2.6
3.9
3.2
4.3
-0.6
-0.4
China
11.0
10.6
8.6
6.8
6.0
2.2
8.1
3.0
4.8
3.9
5.3
-0.9
-0.5
Japan
1.2
0.9
1.4
0.9
-0.2
-4.5
1.6
1.6
1.6
1.0
1.8
+0.6
-0.2
RepublicofKorea
6.8
4.9
3.6
2.9
2.2
-0.7
4.1
2.6
1.9
2.2
2.0
+0.4
-0.1
SouthAsia
4.7
6.3
5.4
6.0
3.6
-4.2
7.2
5.7
5.1
4.9
4.1
+0.9
+1.0
India
5.9
7.2
6.6
7.0
4.5
-6.6
8.3
6.6
6.0
5.7
4.7
+0.8
+1.3
South-EastAsia
5.3
5.4
5.6
5.0
4.4
-3.7
3.7
5.4
4.1
4.1
3.8
+1.3
+0.3
Indonesia
4.8
5.2
5.8
5.1
5.0
-2.1
3.7
5.2
4.6
4.3
4.4
+0.9
+0.3
WesternAsia(excl.Cyprus)
4.1
5.0
5.5
2.9
1.4
-3.2
6.4
6.1
3.1
4.1
2.9
+2.0
+0.2
SaudiArabia
1.7
4.0
5.8
1.9
0.8
-4.3
3.9
8.6
3.6
6.6
3.9
+2.0
-0.3
Türkiye
3.9
5.0
7.6
4.3
0.9
1.8
11.6
4.6
2.6
2.4
2.4
+2.1
+0.2
Europe(incl.Cyprus)
1.3
2.2
1.2
2.1
1.8
-6.1
5.6
2.9
0.5
1.2
0.5
+1.7
-0.0
EuropeanUnion(EU27)
1.9
1.8
0.8
2.2
1.8
-5.7
5.4
3.5
0.8
2.0
0.6
+1.4
+0.1
Euroarea
1.9
1.6
0.6
2.0
1.6
-6.2
5.3
3.4
0.7
2.0
0.6
+1.4
+0.1
France
1.8
1.6
1.1
1.7
1.8
-7.8
6.8
2.6
1.0
2.0
1.0
+0.6
-0.0
Germany
1.6
1.0
2.0
1.8
1.1
-3.7
2.6
1.9
0.0
1.1
0.0
+0.8
+0.0
Italy
1.5
0.7
-0.8
1.1
0.5
-9.0
6.6
3.7
0.7
2.5
0.5
+1.2
+0.2
RussianFederation
-5.9
6.2
3.1
1.2
2.2
-2.7
5.6
-2.1
-1.3
-7.4
1.3
+5.3
-2.7
UnitedKingdom
2.3
2.0
1.8
2.1
1.6
-11.0
7.5
4.1
0.0
2.6
-0.9
+1.5
+0.9
Oceania
3.6
3.2
2.8
2.6
2.1
-2.1
4.8
3.8
1.9
3.6
2.1
+0.1
-0.3
Australia
3.7
3.3
2.8
2.5
2.0
-2.1
4.8
3.9
1.8
3.9
2.3
+0.0
-0.4
Memoitems:
Developed
(M49,incl.RepublicofKorea)
2.3
2.2
1.7
2.1
1.8
-4.3
5.3
2.5
0.9
1.7
1.0
+0.9
-0.0
Developing(M49)
4.9
6.4
5.8
4.4
3.6
-1.6
6.9
3.8
3.9
3.7
3.9
+0.1
-0.0
Source:UNCTADsecretariatcalculations,basedonUnitedNationsGlobalPolicyModel;UnitedNations,DepartmentofEconomicandSocialAffairsNationalAccountsMainAggregatesdatabase,andWorldEconomicSituationandProspects2023;andnationalsources.
Note:CalculationsforcountryaggregatesarebasedonGDPatconstant2015dollars.
aAverage.
bForecasts.
7
GlobalTrendsandProspects
Financialdistressindevelopingcountriesandprivatefinancialinstitutionsindevelopedcountries,heightenedbyrisingborrowingcosts,cantriggeracrisisthatmayspreadtotherealeconomythroughhighlyleveragedsectors,suchasnon-financialcorporationsandrealestate.Ifcentralbanksindevelopedcountriescontinuetoincreasepolicyrates,lossesforholdersofexistingbondswillmountaswillthefinancialburdenfordevelopingcountriesfacingthethreatofcapitalflightandcurrencydeclinesastheylooktorollovertheirdebts.
Theglobalaverageresultsfromaslightdownwardrevisionsfordevelopedanddevelopingcountries.Indevelopedcountries,fiscalpolicyin2022retrenchedmoregraduallythananticipated,likelyinresponsetoconcernsthatmonetarytighteningwouldchokeoffdemandquicklyandinordertocushiontheenergycrisisinthefall.Infact,householdconsumptioncontractedinmostlargeeconomies,asrealwagesstagnatedordecreased,butbusinessinvestmentheldup.In2023,thecombinedimpactofhigherinterestratesandhighenergyprices(eventhoughnotashighasinearly2022)withrecedingfiscalsupportisexpectedtofurtherweakenhouseholdspendingforconsumptionandresidentialinvestment.Businessinvestmentisalsoexpectedtoslowdownfurtherorcontractinresponse,asalreadywitnessedinrealestate,toweakeningaggregatedemand.Thiswillleaveannualgrowthwellbelowtheperforma
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