社會保險外文翻譯文獻

養(yǎng)老保險外文翻譯文獻PAGEPAGE2社會保險外文翻譯文獻社會保險外文翻譯文獻(文檔含中英文對照即英文原文和中文翻譯)原文：ReintroducingIntergenerationalEquilibrium:KeyConceptsbehindtheNewPolishPensionSystemAbstractPolandadoptedanewpensionsystemin1999.ThisnewpensionsystemallowsPolandtoreducepensionexpenditure(asapercentofGDP),insteadofincreasingitasisprojectedforthemajorityofotherOECDcountries.Thispaperpresentstheconceptualbackgroundofthenewsystemdesign.Thenewsystem’slong-termbjectiveistoensureintergenerationalequilibriumirrespectiveofthedemographicsituation.ThisrequiresstabilisationoftheshareofGDPallocatedtotheentireretiredgeneration.Traditionalpensionsystemsaim,instead,atstabilisationoftheshareofGDPperretiree.ThechangeindemographicstructureobservedoverthepastforacoupleofdecadesandthishistoricattempttostabilisetheshareofGDPperretireeledtoseverefiscalproblemsandnegativeexternalitiesforgrowth,asobservedinnumerouscountries.Manycountrieshavetriedtoreformtheirpensionsystemsindifferentwaystotrytoresolvetheissueoftheseever-increasingcosts.AlthoughthePolishreformusesanumberoftechniquesappliedelsewhere,itsdesigndiffersfromthetypicalapproaches–andthelessonsandresultsarepromisingforallOECDcountries.Thispaperpresentsthetheoreticalandpracticalapplicationofthisalternativeapproachandassuch,thekeyfeaturesofthenewPolishpensionsystemdesign.IntroductionDemographictransitiontogetherwithmyopicpolicieshascausedsevereproblemsintheareaofpensionsinmanycountriesaroundtheworld.Elementsoftraditionalpensionsystems’designincludeaweaklinkofbenefitstocontributionsandthelackofcontrolovercostsofthesystem.Inclusionoftheseelementsinthepensionsystemdesignledtotheexplosionofcosts,causednegativeexternalitiesforgrowthandcontributedtopersistentlyhighunemployment.Assuch,thequestforpensionreformisnowonthetopofpolicyagendasaroundtheworld,andespeciallyinEurope.However,veryfewcountrieshavebeenabletointroducefundamentalreformsintheareaofpensionstothistime.Inthiscase,thedefinitionofreformiscrucial.Forthepurposesofthispaper,“reform”meanschangingthesysteminordertoremovetructuralinefficiencies–andnotjustplayingatthemarginswithcontributionratesandretirementagestoadjustthesystem’sparametersforshort-termfiscalandpoliticalreasons.Traditionalpensionsystemshaveproventobeinefficientinprovidingsocietieswithsocialsecurity.Atthesametimeattemptstocurethesesystemsarehamperedbyalackofconsensusonwhatcouldreplacethetraditionalsystem.Discussionsonthisissueinvolveconfusionstemmingfromtheideologicalcontextofthediscussionparticipants,aswellasfromoveruseofsuchconceptsas“pay-as-you-go”versus“funding”,or“public”versus“private”,whileatthesametimeignoringanumberofimportanteconomicissues.Furthermore,economistshavetraditionallyignoredpensions.Designingandrunningpensionsystemswaslefttonon-economists,whowerenotextensivelyconcernedwithhowtofinancepensionsinthelong-termorwithhowtocounteractthesepensionsystems’negativeexternalities.ThenewPolishpensionsystembelongstoverysmallnumberofsuccessfulattemptstoapplymodernthinkingintheareaofpensions.Thisdoesnotmean–assomemayassume–givingupsocialsecuritygoals.Rather,thekeyideawastogiveuptheinefficientmethodsofdeliveringsocialsecurityinordertosaveitsgoalsandprinciples.Thispaperconsistsoftwoparts.Thefirstfocusesonadiscussionofgeneralissuesthatneedtobeaddressedwhendesigningapensionsystem.Theseissuesarepresentedinawaythatgoesbeyondthetraditionalwayofthinkingonpensions.Inregardstothissecondpartofthepaper,itisimportanttopointoutthatmostcountriesinthecurrentEUmemberstatesandcandidatecountrieshavepensionsystemsthatareessentiallythesameatthebasicpolicylevel.Assuch,thesolutionsinonememberstateorcandidatecountrycanbeexpectedtobethesame.LikeEuropeanstatessuchasFrance,Germany,Italy,theCzechRepublic,HungaryandotherEuropeanstates,PolandandSwedenoverthepastdecadesanduntilthelate1990’sdevelopedinefficient,costlypensionsystems.Assuch,inparttwoofthepaperweshallexaminehowPolandhasnowsuccessfullyimplementedtheapproachpresentedinthefirstpartofthepaper,andcreatedafundamentallystrongandneutralpensionsystem.SelectedgeneralissuesPensionsystemdesignhastotakeintoaccountanumberofissues.TheirfullpresentationanddiscussiongoesbeyondthescopeofthispaperThispaperpresentsonlyalistoftheissuesforconsiderationandthemostimportantobservations.Thepensionsystem:externalitiesversusneutralityThedescriptionofapensionsystemdependsstronglyonboththeaggregatedandindividualviewpoint.Fromtheaggregatedperspective,thepensionsystemisawayofdividingcurrentGDPbetweenapartkeptbytheworkinggenerationandapartallocatedtotheretiredgeneration.Fromtheindividualperspective,thepensionsystemisawayofincomeallocationoveraperson’slifecycle.Theaboveholdsirrespectivetothetechnicalmethodappliedortheideologicalviewpoint.Thepensionsystem–asdefinedabove–isnotnecessarilypay-as-you-goorfunded.Suchfeaturesstemfromtechnicalelementsadditionallyappliedonthetopofthepensionsystem,ratherthanfromthesystemitself.Ifthepensionsystemdesignassumesanonymousparticipationandasubstantialscaleofredistributionthenweusuallycallthissystempay-as-you-go.Ifthepensionsystemdesignusesfinancialmarkets,thenweusuallycallitfunded.However,thesetwotypicallyusedconceptsdonotexhaustallpossiblecombinationsofanonymousversusindividualisedparticipationandfinancialversusnon-financialpensionsystemdesigntechniquesused.Thedualisticpay-as-you-goversusfundedapproachleavesasidethecombinationofindividualparticipationinasystemthatdoesnotusefinancialmarkets.Thisapproachalsoneglectsthefactthatusingfinancialmarketsmeansinvestment(pensionportfolioconsistsofprivateequities)ordeferringtaxes(pensionportfolioconsistsofgovernmentbonds),whichisobviouslynotthesame.Addingredistributionorfinancialmarketstothepensionsystemgeneratesexternalities.Theseexternalitiescanbepositiveandnegative.Redistributionwithinthepensionsystemcangeneratepositiveexternalitiesifthesystemisinexpensive,namelythepartofGDPallocatedtotheretiredgenerationisnotlarge.Iftheredistributionislarge,thenitgeneratesnegativeexternalities,suchascontributingtopersistentlyhighunemploymentandweakgrowth.Usingfinancialmarketscausespositiveexternalitiesforgrowthifthepensionsystemspendscontributionmoneyoninvestment.Ifthecontributionsarespentongovernmentdebttheymayleadtonegativeexternalitiessimilartothoseoflargeredistributivesystem,namelymoretaxdistortions.ThiscanhappeniftherateofreturnongovernmentdebtispersistentlyabovetherateofGDPgrowth.Thereexistsyetanotheroption,namelytobringthepensionsystemasclosetoeconomicneutralityaspossible.Thisoptionrequires,amongotherthings,combiningindividualparticipationinthesystemwithdividingGDPbetweengenerationsbasedonrealeconomydevelopments,suchashasbeendoneinPolandandSweden.Demographicstructure:consequencesofthechange.Irrespectiveofthepensionsystemdesigntechniqueused,thepensionsystemexchangesarightoftheretiredgenerationforapartoftheproductoftheworkinggeneration.Theexchangecanbeorganisedinvariouswaysandalsotherightscanbeexpressedinvariousways.Inparticular,therightscanbeeithertradedinthefinancialmarkets,ordefinedinrelationtosomeeconomicvariables,orjustbasedonpoliticalpromise.Inallofthesecasesthereisakindofmarketforpensionrights.Theworkinggenerationfinancescontributionsinordertopurchasetherights;theretiredgenerationsellstherightsinordertogetapartoftheproductoftheworkinggeneration.Thevarioustypesofpensionsystemscreateaninstitutionalframeworkforthismarket.KeyfeaturesofthenewPolishpensionsystemThenewPolishpensionsystemdesignisagoodexampleofapplyingtheabovedescribedwayofthinkinginpractice.Thesystemnamed“SecuritythroughDiversity”startedon1January1999.Itentirelyreplacedpreviousregulationsonoldagepensionsformajorityofworkingpopulation.Designingthenewsystemfromscratchprovidedtheuniqueopportunitytoavoidcomplicatingthesystem.Instead,thenewsystemdesignissimpleandtransparent.Themaingoalwastodesignasystemthatcanbeneutraloratleastclosetoneutralityforeconomicgrowthirrespectiveofpopulationageing.Thedesignofthenewsystemdoesnotcopyanyotherpensionsystemexistingelsewhere.StrongsimilaritycanbefoundonlytothenewSwedishpensionsystembasedonsimilarprinciplesandstartedonthesameday.16Atthesametime,withinthisgeneralframeworkthenewPolishsystemusesanumberoftechnicalconceptsdevelopedinothercountries.ThisbriefpresentationofthenewPolishpensionsystemfocusesonthegeneraleconomicdesignofthesystem,whileleavingasidemosttechnicaldetails.ThefollowingbulletshelpingraspingtheessenceoftheconceptofthenewPolishsystemdesign.Focusingontheuniversalpartofthepensionsystem;Separationoftheold-agepartofsocialsecurityfromthenon-old-agepartsofsocialsecurity;andsegmentingtheflowsofrevenue;Terminationofthepartoftheprevioussystem;Creationofanewpensionsystem,entirelybasedonindividualaccounts;Accrualaccountingwithinthesystem;Splittingeachperson’sOAcontributionsbetweentwoaccounts(firstaccount–NDC,secondaccount–FDC);Annuitisationofaccountvaluesatthemomentofretirement;Minimumpensionsupplementonthetopofbothannuitiesiftheirsumisbelowcertainlevel(financedoutofthestatebudget).Itshouldbestronglystressedthatbothaccountsareannuitisedatthesamemomentandplayexactlythesamerolewithinsocialsecurity.Inparticularthereisnosuchelementofthesystemasa“basicstatepension”.Socialredistributionexistsbutithasbeenmovedoutfromthepensionsystem.Thesoleroleofthepensionsystemisprovidingworkinggenerationwithanefficientmethodofincomeallocationovertheirlifecycle.Thecontributionratefortheentiresocialsecuritysystemhasnotchanged.Howeverworkers’salarieswere“grossedup”inordertointroducetothemtheideathattheypaypartofthecontributionandtobuildtheirawarenessoftheoverallcostofthepensionsystem.Assuch,since1January1999bothworkersandemployerssharethecostofcontributionswithoutanyrealchangeinthesizeofthetotalcontributions.Thewholeoperationaffectedpercentagesbutnotrealflowsofmoney.Thusthenewsystemisbasedonthesamecontributioninflowastheprevioussystem.FinalremarksProvidingpeoplewithsocialsecurity–includingfinancingconsumptionoftheretiredgenerationoutoftheproductoftheworkinggeneration-isveryhighonthelistofsocialprioritiesinmostcountries.ItisespeciallyimportantinEuropeansocieties.However,theinefficiencyoftraditionalpensionsystemsputachievingthisgoalatrisk.Socialandpopulistrhetoricsuggeststothepublicthatchangeswithinthepensionsystemaredangerousforsocialgoals.Inreality,formostcountriesintheworld,itisjusttheopposite.Thelongerthetraditionalpensionsystemsareheldup,themoresociallydamagingeffectswillbecreated.Polandbelongstoanon-numerousgroupofcountriesthatarepreparedforoneofthemostdifficultchallengesofourtime,namelytheageingofthepopulation.Thenewpensionsystemwillnotonlystoptheincreaseofcostsofthepensionsystembutwillalsoallowfortheirreduction.Thiswillleavemoreresourcesavailablefordevelopment,which,inturn,willcontributetostrongergrowthandtheincreaseoflivingstandardsofboththeworkingandtheretiredgeneration.TheexampleofthenewPolishpensionsystem,aswellastheSwedishone,isinterestingforyetanotherreason.Thistypeofsystemcontributestolabourmobility,whichisparticularlyneededinEurope.Freemovementoflabourcannotbeachievedifmovingfromonecountrytoanotheraffectsexpectedretirementincome.Assuch,aimingatpensionsystemneutralitywillbemoreandmoreimportantforEuropeanintegration.譯文：重新引入代際均衡：波蘭養(yǎng)老保險制度摘要波蘭于1999年通過了新的養(yǎng)老金制度。這種新的養(yǎng)老保險制度允許波蘭，以減少退休金支出（占GDP的百分比），而不是增加它-正如預計的經合組織其他大多數國家。本文介紹了概念背景的新系統(tǒng)的設計。新系統(tǒng)的長期目的是確保人口代際平衡，不論情況。這需要穩(wěn)定的國內生產總值的份額分配給整個退休一代。傳統(tǒng)的養(yǎng)老金制度的目的，相反，在穩(wěn)定的份額人均國內生產總值退休人員。在人口結構的變化觀察到，在過去的一夫妻幾十年，這歷史性的嘗試，以穩(wěn)定為首占GDP的比重為退休人員嚴重的財政問題和經濟增長負外部性，如觀察許多國家。許多國家曾試圖改革其養(yǎng)老金制度不同的方法來嘗試解決這些不斷增加的費用問題。雖然波蘭改革采用了其他地方應用技術，它的設計不同于典型的做法和教訓，結果是有希望的所有經合組織國家。本文介紹了這一理論和實際應用另一種方法，因此，新的波蘭養(yǎng)老保險制度主要特點設計。導言人口結構的轉型與政策過于短視一起造成了嚴重的問題在全世界許多國家地區(qū)的養(yǎng)老金。傳統(tǒng)的要素養(yǎng)老金制度的設計包括對捐款的薄弱環(huán)節(jié)和利益缺乏超過該系統(tǒng)的成本控制。這些因素列入養(yǎng)老保險制度導致爆炸的設計成本，造成了負增長的外部因素和導致失業(yè)率持續(xù)高企。因此，養(yǎng)老金改革的追求現已在世界各地，特別是在歐洲的政策議程的頂部。然而，很少有國家能夠在引進根本性的改革面積到了這個時候養(yǎng)老金。在這種情況下，改革的定義是至關重要的。對于本文的目的，“改革”是指改變系統(tǒng)，以消除而不是僅僅在邊緣玩的貢獻率-結構性效率低下和退休年齡調整為短期財政和系統(tǒng)的參數政治傳統(tǒng)的養(yǎng)老金制度已被證明是低效率的提供與社會保障。在同一時間試圖治愈這些系統(tǒng)阻礙了缺乏共識什么可以取代傳統(tǒng)的制度。討論這問題涉及混亂的思想背景下產生的討論

參與者，以及從這些概念作為過度使用“支付即用即付”與“資金”，即“公”與“私”，而在同一時間，忽略了數重要的經濟問題。

此外，經濟學家們忽略傳統(tǒng)的養(yǎng)老金。設計和運行養(yǎng)老金制度是留給非經濟學家，誰沒有廣泛關注與如何資助長期或如何彌補這些養(yǎng)老金養(yǎng)老金系統(tǒng)的負外部性。波蘭新養(yǎng)老保險制度屬于非常小的成功的嘗試次數適用于現代思想的地區(qū)。這并不意味著如某些人承擔放棄社會安全目標。相反，關鍵想法是放棄提供社會保障的低效率的方法，以挽救其目標和原則。

本文由兩部分組成。第一個重點是一般性問題的討論需要解決的養(yǎng)老保險制度設計時。這些問題是提交方式，超出了傳統(tǒng)思維方式對養(yǎng)老金去。在這方面的論文的第二部分，重要的是要指出，最在目前的歐盟成員國和候選國的國家養(yǎng)老金系統(tǒng)，基本上是在政策層面基本相同。因此，解決方案在一個會員國或候選國可以預期是相同的。比如，在法國，德國，意大利，捷克共和國，匈牙利的歐洲國家和其他歐洲國家，波蘭和瑞典在過去的幾十年，直到晚1990年的開發(fā)效率低下，成本高昂的養(yǎng)老金制度。因此，在部分二論文中，我們會研究如何波蘭現在已經成功實施的辦法列于論文的第一部分，并建立了一個強大的和中立的根本養(yǎng)老保險制度。選擇一般問題養(yǎng)老保險制度的設計已經考慮到了一些問題。它們的充分介紹和討論超出了這個范圍，本文提出僅列出審議的問題和最重要的意見。養(yǎng)老保險制度：外部性與中立養(yǎng)老保險制度的一個描述很大程度上取決于雙方的匯總和個人觀點。從聚合的角度，養(yǎng)老金制度是當前的劃分方式國內生產總值之間的部分工作所保存的一代和部分分配對退休一代。從個人的角度，養(yǎng)老金制度是收入分配方式對一個人的生命周期。不論持有上述方法應用的技術或思想觀點。養(yǎng)老保險制度，上述定義的，并不一定是隨收隨付即付或資助。這些功能源于同時在技術內容上的應用退休金制度，而不是從系統(tǒng)本身。如果養(yǎng)老保險制度設計匿名參與和承擔的再分配規(guī)模相當龐大，然后我們通常稱此系統(tǒng)隨收隨付友去。如果養(yǎng)老保險制度設計采用財務市場，那么我們通常稱之為資助。然而，這些通常用于兩個概念不用盡一切可能的組合匿名與個性化的參與和金融與非金融類養(yǎng)老保險制度設計使用的技術。二元隨收隨付即付與資助撥開樹葉方法在一個系統(tǒng)中，個別參與相結合不使用金融市場。這種方法還忽略了一個事實，即使用金融市場是指投資（私募基金的投資組合養(yǎng)老金組成）或延稅（養(yǎng)老政府債券投資組合的組成），這顯然是不一樣的。添加再分配或金融市場產生的養(yǎng)老保險制度外部性。這些外部可以是積極的和負面的。在再分配養(yǎng)老保險制度可以產生積極的外部性，如果該系統(tǒng)是價格便宜，即GDP的一部分分配給退休一代并不大。如果再分配是大，那么它會產生負外部