不完全信息股利政策和“一鳥在手”的謬論外文翻譯

外文翻譯Imperfectinformation,dividendpolicy,and"thebirdinthehand"fallacyMaterialSource:TheBellJournalofEconomicAuthor:SudiptoBhattacharyaThispaperassumesthatoutsideinvestorshaveimperfectinformationaboutfirms'profitabilityandthatcashdividendsaretaxedatahigherratethancapitalgains.Itisshownthatundertheseconditions,suchdividendsfunctionasasignalofexpectedcashflows.Bystructuringthemodelsothatfinite-livedinvestorsturnovercontinuingprojectstosucceedinggenerationsofinvestors,wederiveacomparativestaticresultthatrelatestheequilibriumlevelofdividendpayouttothelengthofinvestors'planninghorizons.Thisarticledevelopsamodelinwhichcashdividendsfunctionasasignalofexpectedcashflowsoffirmsinanimperfect-informationsetting.Weassumethattheproductiveassetsinwhichagentsinveststayinplacelongerthantheagentsliveandthatownershipoftheassetsistransferred,overtime,tootheragents.Thelatterareaprioriimperfectlyinformedabouttheprofitabilityofassetsheldbydifferentfirms.Themajorsignalingcoststhatleaddividendstofunctionassignalsarisebecausedividendsaretaxedattheordinaryincometaxrate,whereascapitalgainsaretaxedatalowerrate.Withinthisframework,thispaperexplainswhyfirmsmaypaydividendsdespitethetaxdisadvantageofdoingso.Recently,LelandandPyle(1977)andRoss(1977)haveusedtheparadigmofSpence'ssignalingmodel(1974)toexaminefinancialmarketphenomenarelatedtounsystematicriskbornebyentrepreneursandfirmdebt-equitychoicedecisions,respectively.Initsspiritandcoststructure,ourmodeliscloselyrelatedtotheRossmodel(1977).Theessentialcontributionsofourmodelarethefollowing.First,wedevelopatax-basedsignalingcoststructurefoundedontheobservationthatsignalingequilibriaarefeasible,evenifsignalingcostelementsthatarenegativelyrelatedtotrueexpectedcashflowsaresmall,providedthereareothersignalingcoststhatarenotrelatedtotruecashflowlevels.Second,wedevelopthemodelinanintertemporalsettingthatallowsustoidentifytherelativeweightsplacedonthebenefits(increaseinvalue)andcostsofsignalingwithdividends.Ourmodelsuggestsaninterestingcomparativestaticresultconcerningtheshareholders'planninghorizon;namely,theshorterthehorizonsoverwhichshareholdershavetorealizetheirwealth,thehigheristheequilibriumproportionofdividendstoexpectedearnings.Othercomparativestaticpropertiesofthedividend-signalingequilibrium,withrespecttomajorvariableslikethepersonalincometaxrateandtherateofinterest,arealsodevelopedandareshowntobeinaccordwiththeempiricalresultsofBrittain(1966).Tokeeptheanalysismanageable,andtohighlighttheessentialcharacteristics,weemploytwomajoranalyticalsimplifications.First,weassumethatthevaluationofcashflowstreamsisdoneinarisk-neutralworld.Second,weallowthe"urgency"oftheagents'needtorealizetheirwealthtobeparameterizedbythelengthoftheplanninghorizonsoverwhichtheymaximizeexpecteddiscountedrealizedwealth,withnodetailedconsiderationoftheintertemporalpatternofassetdisposal.Theseassumptionsarefurtherdiscussedbelow,afterthebasicmodelisdeveloped.Thegeneralstructureofthedividend-signalingmodelandtheconditionsfortheexistenceofdividend-signalingequilibriaaredevelopedinSection2.InSection3weanalyzeanexamplewithuniformlydistributedcashflowstofacilitatediscussionofcomparativestaticpropertiesandissuesrelatedtomultiperiodplanninghorizonsanddynamiclearningpossibilities.Section4containstheconcludingremarksandsuggestionsforfurtherresearch.Inthissectionweoutlinethenatureofthedividend-signalingmodelandthesignalingcoststructure.Themodelappliestoasettinginwhichoutsideinvestorscannotdistinguish(apriori)theprofitabilityofproductiveassetsheldbyacrosssectionoffirms.Existingshareholdersoffirmscareaboutthemarketvalue"assigned"byoutsiders,becausetheplanninghorizonoverwhichtheyhavetorealizetheirwealthisshorterthanthetimespanoverwhichthefirms'assetsgeneratecashflows.Thesimplifyingassumptionofrisk-neutralityeliminatesthediversificationmotive.TheusualnoncooperativeevolutionargumentsoftheSpence-type(1974)suggestasignalingequilibrium,ifasignalwiththeappropriatecost-structurepropertiesexists.Dividendsareshowntosatisfytherequirements.Weignoretheincorporationofothersourcesofinformation(e.g.,accountants'reports)onthegroundthat,takenbythemselves,theyarefundamentallyunreliable"screening"mechanismsbecauseofthemoralhazardinvolvedincommunicatingprofitability.Hence,themodelofthispaperissomewhatexploratoryinnature,apropertythatitshareswithmostothersignalingmodelsinwhichthecostlinessofsignalsderivesfromexogenousconsideration.Topreservethesimplicityofthemodel'sstructure,weassumethatassetsownedbyfirmsgeneratecashflowsthatareperpetualstreams,whichare,inmostofwhatfollows,takentobeintertemporallyindependentlyidenticallydistributed.Inthissection,andformostofthepaper,weassumethatexistingshareholdershaveasingle-periodplanninghorizon.Thefirmsareassumedtohavesufficientinvestmentopportunities,sothatallofthecashflowsfromexistingassetscanberationallyreinvested.Thissimplifyingassumptioncanberelaxedsomewhat.Thecommunicationofevenexpostcashflowsfromexistingassetsisassumedtobecostly,becausecashpayoutsintheformofdividendsonregularsharerepurchasesareassumedtobetaxedatahigherpersonaltaxratethancapitalgains.Intheabsenceofexplicitcashpayout,beforetakingonoutsidefinancingfornewinvestments,expostcashflowscannotbecommunicatedwithoutmoralhazard,becauseoneofthe"inside"variablesthatafirmcannotreadilycommunicatewithoutmoralhazardisthelevelofnewinvestment.ItisassumedthatthesignalingbenefitofdividendsderivesfromtheriseinliquidationvalueV(D)causedbyacommitted,andactuallypaid,dividendlevelD.Wedevelopthemodelintermsofamarginalanalysisforanewprojecttakenonbyafirm.Thissimplificationservestwopurposes.First,notanalyzingdividenddecisionsvis-à-visexistingandnewassetcashflowsenablesustopostponediscussionofdynamiclearningissuestotheexampleinSection3.Second,thismodeofanalysispermitsustoretainsimplicityandflexibilitywithrespecttothemodelingofcostsincurredinmakingupshortfallsofcashflowsrelativetopromiseddividends.Forexample,onewayofmakingupsuchshort-fallsislikelytobethepostponementofinvestment/replacementplans,althoughfundamentallyweadheretothesoundpartialequilibriumpracticeofanalyzingthedividenddecisionwhentheinvestmentpolicyisgiven.Itisassumedthatdividenddecisionsaretakenbyshareholders'agents,whomweterminsidersormanagers.Theseagentsoptimizetheafter-taxobjectivefunctionofshareholders,possiblybecausetheirownincentivecompensationistiedtothesamecriterion.Theinsidersaretheonlypeoplewhoknowthecashflowdistributionsoftheirprojects.Havingdiscussedthegeneralstructureofthemodelandthecoststhatpermitdividendstofunctionasasignal,wenowuseasimpleexampletoexamineinmoredetailthenatureofequilibriumanditscomparativestatics.Supposetheincrementalcashflowoftheprojectwhosevalueisbeingsignaledis,inanygivenperiod,distributeduniformlyover[0,t]withmeant/2.Allprojectsareperpetuitiesand,forthetimebeing,thecashflowsofeachprojectaretakentobeintertemporallyindependentlyidenticallydistributed.Inthecrosssectionoffirmsthevalueoftisassumedtovarybetweentminandtmax，butinvestorscannotdiscriminateamongprojectswithdifferentt'sheldbydifferentfirms.Itisfurtherassumedthattmin=0.Thisispartlyforanalyticalconveniencebut,vis-à-visamarginalprojectinanygivenfirm,thisisanaturalassumptionsinceoneofthe"inside"variablesthatafirmcannotcostlesslycommunicatetothemarketwithoutmoralhazardistheamountofinvestmentitundertakes.Initially,wecontinuetoassumeshareholdershaveaone-periodplanninghorizon.Thesignalingcoststructurethatwehavedevelopedisnotonlyrealistic(dividendslinkedonlytoexpectedcashflows),butalsotheonlysimplestructureconsistentwiththeassumptionofanexogenouslycostlydividend-signalingequilibrium.Superficially,anothersimplepossibilitythatsatisfiesthemarginal-costcharacteristicsrequiredforsignalingisa"lower-truncated"structurewithcashflowXindividendspaidifandonlyifXislessthansome"promised"D!SincethemoralhazardincostlesslycommunicatingXtooutsidersisthebasisforthedissipativesignalingequilibrium,thisisnotgoingtobeaveryenforceablestructure.InadifferentcontextRoss(1977)hasdevelopedafinancial-signalingmodelofleveragebasedona"lower-truncated"coststructureofsignificantbankruptcypenaltiesformanagers.Adifficultywithsuchastructureisthatunlessenforceablepenaltiesofsimilarmagnituderelativetothebenefitsofnonbankruptcyexistforshareholders,thereisanincentiveforshareholderstomakesidepaymentstomanagerstoinducefalsesignalingbyemployinghigherlevelsofdebt.Inanotherpaper(Bhattacharya,1977),Ihavedevelopedamodelofnondissipative-notexogenouslycostly-signalingofinsiders'informationaboutfuturecashflows,basedonexpectationsrevisioninthemarket,inasettinginwhichthereisnotaxcosttodirectlycommunicatingexpostcashflows.AsnotedinSection2,itismybeliefthatasynthesisofthetwotypesofmodels,whichshouldallowustoprovideapartialroleforsourcesofexpostearningsinformationlikeaccountingreports,isaninteresting,ifdifficult,problemforfurtherresearch.Convergencetoequilibriuminfinancial-signalingmodelsisaninterestingissueprimarilybecausethetimestructureofeventsislikelytobedifferentfromthatinthejob-marketsignalingmodelofSpence(1974).InbothourmodelandthatofRoss(1977),thesignalingcostarisesinthefuture,whereasthebenefit,theriseinvalue,islikelytogetestablishedincurrentaswellasliquidationvalues.Ifunconstrainedliquidationwithnoeffectonvalueisposited,thencurrentshareholders,andtheiragents,clearlyhaveanincentivetosignalfalselyandselloutataninconsistentlyhighvalue.Onemustassumethatprematureorexcessive-relativetonormaltradingby"retiring"stockholders-liquidationbidsbyshareholderswouldsignificantlyaffectmarketvaluesoastovirtuallyeliminatesuchproblems.Itisalsolikelythatobservationsofinsidertrading,conditionalontheirsignalingdecisionsinthecurrentshareholders'interest,oreliciting(conditional)insiderbidsinatatonnementmodelwillplayasignificantroleinconvergencetotheequilibriumvaluationscheduleasafunctionofthesignal.Theseareclearlyissuesthatneedfurtherstudy,asdotheissuesrelatedtomultiperiodplanninghorizonsdiscussedinSection3.譯文不完全信息，股利政策，和“一鳥在手”的謬論資料來源:貝爾經(jīng)濟雜志作者：巴特查亞本文假設(shè)外部投資者對公司的盈利能力持有不完全信息和現(xiàn)金股息比資本利得稅率更高。它表明，在這些情況下這些股息作為預(yù)期現(xiàn)金流量信號的功能。通過建立模式，使短期投資者對項目的投資持續(xù)至之后的投資者，我們得出一個比較靜態(tài)的結(jié)果，是使派息均衡水平與投資者的規(guī)劃期限相聯(lián)系。本文開發(fā)了一個模式，其中現(xiàn)金股利作為對企業(yè)的預(yù)期現(xiàn)金在一個不完全信息設(shè)置流量信號的功能。我們假設(shè)，在其中代理投資留在原處居住時間超過代理和資產(chǎn)的所有權(quán)轉(zhuǎn)移，隨著時間的推移，至其他代理人。后者是一個先天不完全對由不同的公司持有的資產(chǎn)的盈利情況。主要的信號處理成本，導(dǎo)致分紅功能的信號出現(xiàn)，因為股息征稅的普通所得稅率，而資本收益稅率較低。在此框架下，本文解釋了為什么企業(yè)可以支付股息盡管稅率上有劣勢。最近，利蘭和派爾、羅斯(1977)已經(jīng)使用了斯彭斯的信號傳遞模式(1974)，研究企業(yè)家和公司債務(wù)各自相關(guān)的金融市場相關(guān)非系統(tǒng)風(fēng)險。在其精神和成本結(jié)構(gòu)，我們的模式是密切相關(guān)的羅斯模式(1977)。我們的模式中的重要貢獻如下。首先，我們開發(fā)了從稅收為基礎(chǔ)的信令開銷結(jié)構(gòu)上觀察，即使信號成本，預(yù)期現(xiàn)金流量小，只要其他的信號與真實成本現(xiàn)金流水平不相關(guān)，信號均衡也是可行的成立。其次，我們發(fā)展一個跨設(shè)置，允許我們能夠確定利益（價值增加）和信號股息成本的相對權(quán)重。我們的模式顯示了一個有關(guān)股東規(guī)劃期限的有趣的比較靜態(tài)結(jié)果，即在越短的期限股東實現(xiàn)自己的財富，預(yù)期股息收益平衡的比例越高。其他比較靜態(tài)性質(zhì)的股利信號平衡方面的重大變數(shù)，如個人所得稅率和利率等，也證明是和布里廷的(1966)的實證結(jié)果一致的。為了保持分析管理，并突出的本質(zhì)特征，我們采用兩種主要的分析簡化。首先，我們假定現(xiàn)金流估值流是在一個風(fēng)險中性界執(zhí)行。第二，我們允許“緊迫”的代理商的需要，實現(xiàn)他們的財富是由參數(shù)化的規(guī)劃視野長度超過他們實現(xiàn)財富最大化預(yù)期貼現(xiàn)無跨期的資產(chǎn)處置模式的詳細審議。這些假設(shè)在基本模式建立起來后，將在下文進行進一步的討論。對股利信號模式的一般結(jié)構(gòu)和股利信令均衡存在的條件將在第2節(jié)建立。在第3節(jié)中，我們以現(xiàn)金流量為例進行了分析，以方便比較靜態(tài)特性和與多期規(guī)劃的期限和充滿活力的學(xué)習(xí)機會有關(guān)問題的討論。第4節(jié)包含結(jié)語和進一步研究的建議。在本節(jié)中，我們勾勒出股利信號模式的性質(zhì)和信號的成本結(jié)構(gòu)。該模式適用于設(shè)置在境外投資者之中無法區(qū)分（先驗）由各地舉行的公司部分生產(chǎn)性資產(chǎn)的盈利能力。現(xiàn)有的股東企業(yè)關(guān)心的是由外界人士“分配”的市場價值，因為他們的規(guī)劃期限超過了那些他們必須意識到的事實，即他們的財富比時間跨度超過該公司的資產(chǎn)產(chǎn)生的現(xiàn)金流量短。在風(fēng)險中保持中立的簡化假設(shè)消除了多元化的傾向。斯賓塞模式(1974)提出一個與信號均衡通常不相符的演化論點，如果成本結(jié)構(gòu)以適當(dāng)?shù)奶匦源嬖?。股息以滿足要求的形式顯現(xiàn)出來。在這種情況下，我們忽略了其他信息來源（如會計師報告）的融合，因為溝通的盈利能力會涉及道德風(fēng)險機制，所以他們基本上是不可靠的篩選機制。因此，本文的模式是具有試探性的，它與其他大多數(shù)信號模式有共性，由于外在因素使得信號及其昂貴。為保持模型結(jié)構(gòu)的簡單性，我們假設(shè)由企業(yè)資產(chǎn)產(chǎn)生的現(xiàn)金流會源源不斷，在下面的文章大部分內(nèi)容中，這一點會單獨為大家講。在這一節(jié)以及整篇文章，我們假設(shè)現(xiàn)有股東有一個單獨周期的規(guī)劃視野。假定這些公司有足夠的投資機會，從而使所有現(xiàn)有資產(chǎn)產(chǎn)生的資金可以被合理地再次投資。這個簡單的假設(shè)可以放寬一些。從現(xiàn)有資產(chǎn)產(chǎn)生的前后現(xiàn)金流動的交流是很昂貴的，因為以定期購回股份形式存在的現(xiàn)金支出會以一個更高的個人所得稅率進行征稅，而不是按其資本收益征稅。在沒有明確現(xiàn)金支付的情況下，在對新的投資進行外部融資時，前后現(xiàn)金流動是有道德風(fēng)險的，因為一個企業(yè)隨時溝通的具有道德風(fēng)險的一個內(nèi)部變量就是其新投資水平。假定股息的信號收益源于清算值V的上升，而V又取決于實際