IMF-貨幣政策對(duì)利率的傳導(dǎo)：來(lái)自30個(gè)歐洲國(guó)家的風(fēng)格化事實(shí)（英）

MonetaryPolicyPass-ThroughtoInterestRates:StylizedFacts

from30EuropeanCountries

RobertBeyer,RuoChen,ClaireLi,FlorianMisch,EzgiO.Ozturk,and

LevRatnovski

WP/24/9

IMFWorkingPapersdescriberesearchin

progressbytheauthor(s)andarepublishedto

elicitcommentsandtoencouragedebate.

TheviewsexpressedinIMFWorkingPapersare

thoseoftheauthor(s)anddonotnecessarily

representtheviewsoftheIMF,itsExecutiveBoard,

orIMFmanagement.

2024

JAN

NAr

rARY

*Correspondingauthor.

**TheauthorswouldliketothankOyaCelasun,LuisBrandaoMarques,VincenzoGuzzo,SebastianWeber,PelinBerkmen,MahirBinici,OzgeEmeksiz,EzequielCabezon,SalvatoreDell'Erba,FazurinJamaludin,RuiMano,VinaNguyen,YuShiandECB

staffforusefulcomments.KaylaQin,AgnesaZalezakovaandWeiZhaoprovidedusefulassistance.

?2024InternationalMonetaryFund

WP/24/9

IMFWorkingPaper

EuropeanDepartment

MonetaryPolicyPass-ThroughtoInterestRates:StylizedFactsfrom30EuropeanCountries

PreparedbyRobertBeyer,RuoChen,ClaireLi,FlorianMisch*,EzgiO.Ozturk,andLevRatnovski**

AuthorizedfordistributionbyHelgeBerger

January2024

IMFWorkingPapersdescriberesearchinprogressbytheauthor(s)andarepublishedtoelicit

commentsandtoencouragedebate.TheviewsexpressedinIMFWorkingPapersarethoseofthe

author(s)anddonotnecessarilyrepresenttheviewsoftheIMF,itsExecutiveBoard,orIMFmanagement.

ABSTRACT:Theextenttowhichchangesinmonetarypolicyratesleadtochangesinloananddepositrates

forhouseholdsandfirms,referredtoas‘pass-through’,isanimportantingredientofmonetarypolicy

transmissiontooutputandprices.Usingdataonsevendifferentbankinterestratesin30Europeancountries,differentapproaches,andthefullsampleaswellasasubsampleofeuroareacountries,weshowthata)the

pass-throughinthepost-pandemichikingcyclehasbeenheterogenousacrosscountriesandtypesofinterestrates;b)thepass-throughhasgenerallybeenweakerandslower,exceptforratesofnon-financialcorporationloansandtimedepositsineuroareacountries;c)differencesinpass-throughovertimeandacrosscountries

formostdepositratesarecorrelatedwithfinancialsectorconcentration,liquidity,andloanopportunities,andd)theeffectsofpass-throughtooutstandingmortgageratesonmonetarytransmissiononpricesandoutputareheterogenousacrosscountries.

RECOMMENDEDCITATION:Beyer,R.,Chen,R.,Li,C.,Misch,F.,Ozturk,E.,andRatnovski,L.(2024).MonetaryPolicyPass-ThroughtoInterestRates:StylizedFactsfrom30EuropeanCountries.IMFWorkingPaperWP/24/9

JELClassificationNumbers:

E43;E52

Keywords:

MonetaryPolicyTransmission;MonetaryPolicyPass-Through

Author’sE-MailAddress:

rbeyer@;rchen@;yli13@;fmisch@;eozturk@;lratnovski@

IMFWORKINGPAPERSMonetaryPolicyPass-ThroughtoInterestRates

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WORKINGPAPERS

MonetaryPolicyPass-ThroughtoInterestRates:StylizedFactsfrom

30EuropeanCountries

PreparedbyRobertBeyer,RuoChen,ClaireLi,FlorianMisch1,EzgiO.Ozturk,andLevRatnovski2

1Correspondingauthor.

2TheauthorswouldliketothankOyaCelasun,LuisBrandaoMarques,VincenzoGuzzo,SebastianWeber,PelinBerkmen,MahirBinici,OzgeEmeksiz,EzequielCabezon,SalvatoreDell'Erba,FazurinJamaludin,RuiMano,VinaNguyen,YuShiandECB

staffforusefulcomments.KaylaQin,AgnesaZalezakovaandWeiZhaoprovidedusefulassistance.

IMFWORKINGPAPERSMonetaryPolicyPass-ThroughtoInterestRates

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Contents

1.Introduction

5

2.TheRoleofPolicyPass-ThroughforMonetaryPolicyTransmission

6

3.Data

8

4.StylizedFacts

8

4.1Inthepost-pandemichikingcycle,pass-throughhasbeenheterogeneousacrosssectors,loanand

deposittypes,andcountries

8

4.2Thepass-throughhasbeenweakerthistime,excepttoNFCloanrates

10

4.3Thepass-throughhasbeenslowerthistime,excepttoNFCloanrates

13

4.4Lowerbankingcompetition,amplehouseholdandNFCdeposits,andhighbankingliquidityare

sometimesassociatedwithlowerdepositratepass-through

17

4.5Pass-throughtoratesofexistingmortgagesweakenedovertimeastheshareoffixedratemortgages

increased,withheterogeneouseffectsacrosscountries

21

5.Conclusions

22

References

23

AnnexI.DataDescription

26

AnnexII.AdditionalChartsandResults

30

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1.Introduction

Thepost-pandemicsurgeininflationhastriggeredthemostaggressivemonetarypolicytighteningindecades.Thishas,inturn,generatedrenewedinterestintheaggregateeffectsofmonetarypolicy.Thispaperanalyzesthepass-throughofpolicyratesinEuropeaneconomiestolendinganddepositratesofcreditinstitutions,

referredtoasbankinterestrates,therebyprovidinginsightsintoanimportant(butnottheonly)aspectofmonetarypolicytransmission.

Theimpactofmonetarypolicy-inducedchangesinloananddepositinterestratesforhouseholdsandnon-financialcorporations(NFCs)isoneofmanychannelsthroughwhichmonetarypolicyaffectsfinancial

conditions,andtherebyoutputandprices.Bankinterestratescanaffectagents’investment,consumptionandsavingdecisions,debtservicecostsandsavingsincome,aswellasassetvalues,allofwhichaffectreal

economicoutcomes.Theextentofpass-throughofmonetarypolicyratechangestobankinterestrates

thereforeaffectsmonetarypolicytransmissionandeffectiveness.Inturn,pass-throughtobankinterestrates

canbeinfluencedbyfinancialsectorconcentration,liquidity,andtheavailabilityofdepositsrelativetoprofitablelendingopportunities.Thesecharacteristicscanaffectincentivesforbankstocompetefordepositsand

potentiallyunderminepass-throughinhikingcycles.Methodologically,analyzingpass-throughhasadvantages:theeffectsofmonetarypolicyonbankloananddepositratesarearguablymoredirect,oftenwithshorterlagsandfewerconfoundingfactorscomparedtomonetarypolicytransmissiononoutputandprices.

Focusingonmonetarypolicypass-throughinEuropeancountriesduringthepost-pandemichikingcycle,thispapermakestwokeycontributionstothepreviousliterature.First,wecompiledataonsevendifferentinterestratesfor30Europeancountriesbothwithineuroareaandnon-euroareacountrieswithindependentmonetarypolicy(definedashavingnoofficialpegandnotbeingfullyeuroized).Thisdatasetcontainsinterestratesfor

keytypesofnewloansanddepositsofbothhouseholdsandNFCs.Second,wepresentarangeofearly

evidenceonstylizedfactsonmonetarypass-throughduringthepost-pandemichikingcycleusingamixof

descriptivestatisticsandregressionanalyses,bothforthefullsampleofcountriesandasubsetofeuroarea

countries(EA-12countries).Inparticular,wedocumentthat:a)thepass-throughinthepost-pandemichikingcyclehasbeenheterogenousacrosscountriesandtypesofinterestrates;b)thepass-throughhasbeen

weakerandslowerrelativetopasthikingcycles,exceptforratesofnewloanstoNFCsandNFCtimedeposits

(andcontrollingforthepeculiaritiesofthecurrentcycleincludingpossibleanticipationeffectsoflowinitialratesdoesnotalterthesefindingqualitatively);c)theweakeningofpass-throughtodepositratesisinpart

associatedwithhigherfinancialsectorconcentration,moreampledepositsrelativetoloanopportunities,andliquidity;andd)usingdataonoutstandingmortgagesasanexample,theeffectsofpass-throughonaggregatemonetarypolicytransmissionareheterogenousacrosscountries.Takingaccountofthepeculiaritiesofthe

post-pandemichikingcycleincludingpossibleanticipationeffectsandverylowinitialratesdoesnotchangethesestylizedfacts.

Ourpapercontributestotheempiricalliteraturestudyingmonetarypolicypass-throughtobankinterestrates,includinginEurope.Onestrandofthisliteraturefocusesontheeuroareaandmostlycoversthe2000s.For

example,S?rensenandWerner(2006),BernhoferandvanTreeck(2013),SanderandKleimeier(2006)

documenthowpass-throughdiffersacrosscountries,interestratetypes,andintheshortvs.longrun(seeforexampledeBondt,2005,forasurvey),andSaborowskiandWeber(2013)examinethedeterminantsofpass-throughtotheaggregatebanklendingrateinalargepanelofcountries.OtherpapersfocusonEuropean

IMFWORKINGPAPERSMonetaryPolicyPass-ThroughtoInterestRates

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countriesoutsideoftheeurozone.3Ameta-datastudyoninterestratepass-through,basedonmorethanathousandestimatesfrom50studies,findsthattheaveragepass-throughfrommonetarypolicyratestobanklendingratesisaround0.8(GregorandMelecky,2021).

Ourpaperisalsorelatedtoanotherstrandoftheliteraturewhichexploitsheterogeneityinthepass-through

acrossbankswithincountries.Forinstance,Wangetal.(2022)usedataonU.S.banksandshowthatbank

marketpoweraffectspass-through,andthattheeffectsdependonthelevelofthepolicyrate.Kho(2023)usescountry-andbank-leveldatafrom13euroareacountriesfrombeforethepost-pandemichikingcycleand

showsthatthedegreeofbankingsectorconcentrationhasasymmetriceffectsonpass-throughtoovernight(O/N)depositratesduringtighteningandlooseningcycles.López-Quiles(2021)estimatespass-throughtomoneymarketinterestratesusingtransaction-leveldataofthelargestbanksintheeuroarea.

Importantly,ourpaperovercomesacriticallimitationoftheexistingliteraturebycoveringthepost-pandemic

hikingcycleandusesdataonindividualcountriesorcoveringonlyasubsetofeuroareacountries.Hence,ourpaperisrelatedtorecentstudiesanalyzingthepass-throughduringthepost-pandemichikingcycle,whichallreportfindingsthatareconsistentwithours.Forexample,fortheeuroarea,ByrneandFoster(2023)findthatpass-throughisgenerallyweakernowrelativetopreviouscycles,MesserandNiepmann(2023)findthatpass-throughtodepositrateshasbeenmoresluggishthaninthepast,Lane(2023aand2023d)reportsthatthe

pass-throughtoNFCloanshasbeenstrongandthatloanratesstartedtorisebeforetheECBhikeditspolicyratesinJuly2022,andLane(2023c)findsweakerpass-throughtoO/Ndepositratesthantotimedepositratesinthepost-pandemichikingcycle.ForotherEuropeaneconomies,CabezonandKovachevska(2024)finds

thatpass-throughinNorthMacedoniaisweakercomparedtoregionalpeersandtheeuroarea,andBinici(2024)attributesrelativelyweakpass-throughinMaltainthepost-pandemictighteningcycletoabundantliquidityinthebankingsystem.

Thepaperisorganizedasfollows:Section2discussesconceptuallytheroleofpolicypass-throughinoverallmonetarypolicytransmission.Section3describesthedata.Section4presentsstylizedfactsonmonetary

policypass-through.Section5concludes.

2.TheRoleofPolicyPass-ThroughforMonetaryPolicyTransmission

Monetarypolicyusuallyusestheshort-termmoneymarketinterestrateasitsoperationaltarget.Themoney

marketrateistransmittedviafinancialmarketstodepositandlendingratesofcreditinstitutions(‘bankinterestrates’),andthroughthemtothebroadereconomy.Theabilityofthecentralbanktoachieveitsultimate

objectives—price,financial,andoverallmacroeconomicstability—hingesinpartonthetransmissionofthe

policyratetootherinterestrates.Inturn,bankinterestratesaffectthemacroeconomythroughseveralrelatedchannels:

1.Interestratechannel:Changesininterestratesalterfirminvestmentbehaviorandhousehold

consumptionandsavingchoices.Higherrealinterestratesincreasethehurdle(break-even)ratesforinvestment,therebyreducingit,andtheymakesavingmoreattractive,whichinturnreduces

3Forexample,GregorandMelecky(2018)focusonpass-throughtolendingratesinCzechRepublic,Egertetal.(2007)studythe

interestratepass-throughinfivecentralandeasternEuropeancountries,Beckeretal.(2012)analyzethepass-throughto

mortgageratesintheUK,andHansenandWelz(2011)analyzethepass-throughtolendinganddepositratesinSweden.

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consumption.Thisisthestandardneo-classicalchannelofmonetarypolicy(GoodfriendandKing,1997).

2.Cashflowchannel:Changesininterestratesaffectagents’incomeandcostsrelatingtoexisting

assetsandliabilitiesthatcarryvariableinterestrates.Inotherwords,tightermonetarypolicycan

directlyincreaseinterestincomeanddebtservicecosts,butthecashfloweffectsdependonwhetherhouseholdsandfirmsarenetborrowersorsaversandtheirexposuretovariableratedebtand

deposits.Withdifferentpropensitiestoconsumeorinvestacrosshouseholdsandfirms,thischannelcanaffectaggregatemacroeconomicoutcomes(see,e.g.,Auclert,2019).4Lowpass-throughto

depositratesmaymatterinthiscontextgiventhatmanyhouseholdsinEuropearenetsavers.

3.Balancesheetchannel:Higherinterestratesreducethevalueofassetsusedascollateral,therebytighteningagents’financialconstraints.Forfirms,thisamplifiestheneoclassicalimpactofinterest

ratesoninvestment,whileforhouseholdsthiscanaltertheconsumptionofdurablegoods(KiyotakiandMoore,1997).Additionally,wealtheffects(lowerassetvaluationsduetohigherinterestrates)reducethehouseholds’propensitytoconsume(LettauandLudvigson,2004).

4.Bankingchannel:Higherinterestratestendtobeassociatedwithhigherbanknetinterestratemargins,therebyincreasingbankprofits(Borioetal.,2017).Interestratesmayalsoaffectbankfundingconditions,ashigherdepositratesmayincreasedepositsupply.Higherbankprofitsandampledepositsmayincreasebanklendingcapacity(KashyapandStein,2000;Drechsleretal.,2017).5

Table1:Effectsofmonetarypolicypass-throughtobankinterestratesontotherealeconomy

Channelsthatdirectionallyweakentheeffectsofmonetarypolicytighteningshowninorange

ChannelsofMP

transmission

MechanismofchannelduringMPtightening

Effectsofhigherpass-throughduringMPtightening

Effectsofhigherpass-throughtoloanrates

Effectsofhigherpass-throughtodepositrates

Interestratechannel

Higherhurdleratefornewinvestment,andhigher

savingsremuneration

Lessinvestment

Moresaving

Lessconsumption

Cashflowchannel

Higherinterestincomeanddebtservicescostfor

existingexposures

Lowercashflow

Lessconsumptionand

investment

Highercashflow

moreconsumptionand

investment

Balancesheetchannel

Lowervalueofcollateral

Tighternon-pricecredit

conditionsLessinvestment

Bankingchannel

Lowerbanks’networth

Tighterbankfunding

conditionsLesslending

Highercostofbank

funding

MoresupplyofdepositsMorelending

Onbalance,ahigherpass-throughofmonetarypolicytointerestratestendstostrengthenmonetarypolicy

transmissionthrougheachofthesechannels(Table1).However,ahigherpass-throughtodepositratescan

4Thenon-financialsectorinagiveneconomymaypredominantlyconsistofeitherlosersorwinners,sothattheaggregateeffectsdonotnetoutevenifthemarginalpropensitiestoinvestandconsumeareidentical.Inthatcase,theaggregateconsumptionandinvestmenteffectscouldbeoffsetbychangesinthevolumeofloansthroughchangesincreditconditions.

5SeealsoLane(2023a)foradiscussionofthischannel.Obviously,thereareothermonetarypolicytransmissionchannelswhichdonotdirectlydependoninterestratepass-through;see,forexample,Ceviketal.(2023),Lane(2023a),andMishkin(1996)for

moredetailsontheinterestratechannelsdiscussedhereandacomprehensivelistofmonetarytransmissionchannelsmorebroadly.

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createambiguouseffectsinsomecases.Forinstance,higherpass-throughinahikingcyclereducesprivateinvestmentandconsumptionthroughahigherhurdleratefornewinvestmentandsavingsremuneration,butthiseffectisweakenedbyhighercashflowsfromtheexistingstockofsavings.

3.Data

Wecompileadatasetonloananddepositinterestratesofcreditinstitutionsin30Europeaneconomiesusingdatafromcentralbanksandstatisticalagencies,referredtoasbankinterestrates.Ourdataincludesseven

differenttypesofinterestrates:interestratesonovernightdepositsandtimedeposits,bothforhouseholdsandNFCs,consumerloans,mortgages,andloanstoNFCs.Theinterestratesgenerallyrefertonewdepositsandloans,butwealsocollectdataoninterestratesofoutstandingmortgages.6

Ourdataisatmonthlyfrequencyandconstitutesanunbalancedpanel,spanning30Europeancountriesthat

areeitherpartoftheeuroareaorhaveindependentmonetarypolicy(inthesensethattheydonothavehardpegsorarecompletelyeuroized).Twothirdsofcountrieshavedataonallseventypesofinterestrates(AnnexTableA2).Someseriesreachbackto2003,butforsomecountriesthetimecoverageisconsiderablyshorter.Theaveragenumberofyearspercountryis17.8.Wecomplementthisdatawithinformationonthemonetarypolicyrate,prices(HICPandcoreHICPinflation)andeconomicactivity(industrialproduction).Toexaminetheroleofpotentialdeterminantsofpass-through,wealsocollectlongertimeseriesonbankingsector

concentration(Herfindahl-Hirschmanindexusingbankassets)andtheloan-to-depositratioasaproxyoffinancialsectorliquidity.

AnnexTablesA2,A3andA4containdetailsaboutthecountrycoverageofbankinterestratesandthe

completelistofvariableswithbroaddefinitionsandsources.Therearesomeminordifferencesintheexactdefinitionofinterestrates.Forinstance,someinterestratesarecollectedusingtheuniverseofcredit

institutions,whereasothersrefertoalloronlyasubsetofbanks.Inaddition,insomecountries,thehouseholdsectorencompassesnon-profitorganizationservinghouseholds,butinothersitdoesnot.Whilethese

differencesimplythattheinterestrateseriesarenotperfectlycomparableacrosscountries,theyaretoosmalltomateriallyaffectourresults.Reassuringly,theresultfortheeuroarea,whichshouldbeperfectlycomparableacrosscountries,arequalitativelysimilartotheresultsbasedontheoverallsample.

4.StylizedFacts

4.1Inthepost-pandemichikingcycle,pass-throughhasbeenheterogeneousacrosssectors,loananddeposittypes,andcountries

Wedocumentthepass-throughtoeachofthesevenbankinterestrates(timeandO/NdepositratesforbothhouseholdsandNFCs,andratesformortgages,consumerloansandNFCloans)inthepost-

pandemicmonetarypolicytighteningcycle.Wecomputebankinterestratebetas,definedastheratioofthecumulativeincreaseinbankinterestratestothecumulativeincreaseinthepolicyrate.Forthe

purposeofthisexercise,weonlyusedatafromthepost-pandemichikingcycleandtruncatethedatafor

6Insometimeseries,thereisthedistinctionbetweenpurenewbusinessandnewbusinesscombinedwithrenegotiations.Wegenerallyusepurebanksratesfornewbusiness,butforNFCloanratesinCzechRepublic,Cyprus,Estonia,FinlandandRomaniacountries,weuseinformationfrombothseriestocompiledataserieswithfewergaps.

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eachcountryinthemonthofthefirstratehikeuntilthreemonthsafterthelasthike(orthefirstratecutortheendofoursample,whateverisshorter);seeAnnexTableA1forthestartandenddatesofthepost-pandemichikingcycleofeachcountry.Theresultsareasfollows.

First,thereisheterogeneityacrossdifferenttypesofloansanddeposits(Figure1).Wefindthatthepass-throughisonaveragehighestforloanstoNFCs,followedbytimedeposits,andweakestforovernight

(O/N)deposits.Theresponseofmortgageratestochangesinthepolicyrateliesinbetweenthem.In

part,thisheterogeneityinpass-throughcouldbelinkedtodifferencesinthematurityoftheunderlying

loansanddeposits,wherebyalongermaturitycanweakenthelinkbetweenpolicyratesandbankrates.Forinstance,comparedtoNFCloans,whichoftenhaveshortermaturities,itisplausiblethatmortgageratesrespondlesstopolicyratechanges,astermpremiaandotherfactorsaffectlonger-maturityloans(thematurityofmortgagesdifferssignificantlyacrosscountries-seeSection4.5).Thesefindingsare

broadlyconsistentwiththeexistingliterature.Therelativelyweakpass-throughtodepositrates,

especiallyovernightdepositrates,isconsistentwiththenotionthathighswitchingcostsgivebanks

marketpowerindepositmarketsbutrunscounterthehypothesisthatlongerdurationweakensthelink

betweenpolicyandbankrates(seePolo,2021,foradiscussion).MesserandNiepmann(2023)also

documentthatpass-throughtoO/Ndepositrateshasbeenweakerthantotimedepositratesinthepost-pandemiccycle.

Second,thereissignificantheterogeneityacrosscountries,bothinthedispersionofthepass-throughacrossdifferentratesandthelevelofthepass-through(Figure2).Someofthesecross-country

differencescanreflectdifferencesinfinancialsectorconcentration,liquidity,andprofitablelending

opportunitiesrelativetosavingsaswediscussbelow.Inaddition,publicpoliciesthatcaplendingratesor

imposefloorsondepositratescouldalsoplayarole.Forinstance,Hungaryintroducedtemporarymortgageinterestratecaps,withthestatedrationaleofhelpinghouseholdswithrisingdebtservicepayments(Valderrama,2023).7

7TheIMF'sintegratedmacroprudentialpolicy(iMaPP)databasecontainscomparablecross-countrydataontheuseofsuchtools.However,atthetimeofwriting,themostrecentdatarefersto2021anddoesnotcontainmeasuresthatwereintroducedsincethebeginningofthepost-pandemichikingcycle.

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NFCtimedeposits

HUCZNO*SE*RS*SKROPL*

IT

AL*UKATFRDEBELT

PTESEELV*IE*FI

SI

LUNL*GR*MT*CYMK*CH*

1.4

1.2

1

0.8

0.6

0.4

0.2

0

Figure1:BankInterestRateBetasFigure2:BankInterestRateBetasbyCountry

NFCloans

NFCtimedeposits

HHtimedeposits

Mortgages

Consumerloans

NFCO/Ndeposits

HHO/Ndeposits

00.20.40.60.81

-0.6-0.4-0.200.20.40.60.811.21.4

Sources:ECB;Haveranalytics;countryauthorities;andIMFstaffcalculations.

Note:Ratioofcumulativechangeininterestratesrelativetocumulativechangesinthepolicyratefrommonthoffirstrate

increasetothreemonthsafterlastrateincrease(orthefirstratecutortheendofthesample,whicheverisshorter)inthepost-pandemictighteningcycle.Figure1representstheunweightedaverageofupto30countries.CountrieswithashadedareafortherangeofinterestratebetasinFigure2indicatethatatleastonebankrateisnotavailable.Thus,Figure2doesnotimplya

cross-countryrankingofthecombinedpass-throughtoallbankrates,notallofwhichareavailableforallcountries.For

example,forSwitzerland,theNFCandhouseholdtimedepositrates,theaggregatemortgagerateandtheaggregateNFCloanratearenotavailable,butevidencesuggeststhatthepass-throughtoflexibleratemortgageshasbeenstrong(seeAnnexTableA2fordetailsondata).ForNorway,theendmonthhasbeenshiftedbackonemonthinordertohavemorethanonerate

available.

Third,therearedifferencesacrosscustomertypes(orsectors):thepass-throughtoNFCdepositratesgenerallyexceedsthepass-throughtohouseholddepositrates(Figures3and4).Thisfindingholdsfornearlyallcountries,whichcouldsuggestgreatermarketpowerofcreditinstitutionsvis-à-vishouseholdsrelativetoNFCsandreflectlowerstickinessofNFCdeposits.

Figure3:OvernightDepositRateBetas

NFCO/Ndeposits

0.6

0.5

0.4

0.3

0.2

0.1

0

MT

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FR

SK

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SE

UK

NL

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EE

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.Non-CESEE.CESEE

CZ

PL

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HU

LT

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ESRO

LV

BE

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/

-0.100.10.20.30.40.50.6

HHO/Ndeposits

Figure4:TimeDepositRateBetas

HU

NL

SI

PT

.

●GR

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FRDE

CZ

UKBE

PL●

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