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PolicyResearchWorkingPaper10713
GovernanceinSub-SaharanAfrica
inthe21stCentury
FourTrendsandanUncertainOutlook
DeborahIsser
GaelRaballand
MichaelWatts
DianeZovighian
GovernanceGlobalPractice
March2024
PolicyResearchWorkingPaper10713
Abstract
WhatcanbelearnedfromthegovernancetrajectoryofAfricancountriessincethebeginningofthe21stcentury?WhatisthequalityofgovernanceontheAfricancontinentandhowdoesitshapedevelopment?Thefirstdecadeofthemillenniumsawpromisinggrowthandpovertyreductioninmuchofthecontinent.Yet,Sub-SaharanAfricahasalsobeenthestageofastreamofgovernancereformfailuresandpolicyreversals,andmanycountriescontinuetosufferfromtheconsequencesofpoorgovernance.Thispaperexploresthedynamicsofgovernancereformonthecontinentoverthepasttwodecadesandpointstofourkeytrends.First,effectivestateinstitutions,capableofmaintainingpeace,
fosteringgrowth,anddeliveringservices,havedevelopedunevenly.Second,progresshasbeenmadeonenhancingtheinclusivenessandaccountabilityofinstitutions,butitremainsconstrainedbytheweaknessofchecksandbalancesandthepersistenceofpatternsofcentralizedandexclu-sivepowerarrangements.Third,civiccapacityhasrisenconsiderably,buttheinabilityofinstitutionstorespondtosocialexpectationsandpoliticalmobilizationthreatenstoturnliberalcivicengagementintodistrust,populism,andradicalization.Fourth,thecombinationofthesethreetrendscontributestotheriseofpoliticalinstability,whichconstitutesamajorthreatforthecontinent.
ThispaperisaproductoftheGovernanceGlobalPractice.ItispartofalargereffortbytheWorldBanktoprovideopenaccesstoitsresearchandmakeacontributiontodevelopmentpolicydiscussionsaroundtheworld.PolicyResearchWorkingPapersarealsopostedontheWebat
/prwp.Theauthorsmaybecontactedatdisser@
andgraballand@@.
ThePolicyResearchWorkingPaperSeriesdisseminatesthefindingsofworkinprogresstoencouragetheexchangeofideasaboutdevelopmentissues.Anobjectiveoftheseriesistogetthefindingsoutquickly,evenifthepresentationsarelessthanfullypolished.Thepaperscarrythenamesoftheauthorsandshouldbecitedaccordingly.Thefindings,interpretations,andconclusionsexpressedinthispaperareentirelythoseoftheauthors.TheydonotnecessarilyrepresenttheviewsoftheInternationalBankforReconstructionandDevelopment/WorldBankanditsaffiliatedorganizations,orthoseoftheExecutiveDirectorsoftheWorldBankorthegovernmentstheyrepresent.
ProducedbytheResearchSupportTeam
GovernanceinSub-SaharanAfricainthe21stCentury:
FourTrendsandanUncertainOutlook
DeborahIsser
GaelRaballand
MichaelWatts
DianeZovighian1
JEL:D73,D74,H11,F51,N57.
Keywords:Sub-SaharanAfrica,governance,statecapacity,institutionalreform,servicedelivery,corruption,democraticdevelopment,conflict,stability,socialcontract.
1TheauthorsthankMonicaBeuran,MathieuCloutier,Anne-LiseCogoli-BelandLenaRaballandforbackgroundresearchandinputs,andAbebeAdugna,AndrewDabalen,AidanEyakuze,ChorchingGoh,TraceyLane,BobRijkers,ZainabUsman,LeonardWantchekonandAlbertZeufackfortheircommentsandsuggestionsonpreviousversionsofthispaper.
2
Introduction
Thereisastrongacademicandpolicyconsensusthatgovernancemattersfordevelopment.2Empiricalevidenceshowsthatdevelopmenttrajectoriesarelargelyshapedbythepresence–orabsence–of:aneffectivestatemonopolyontheuseofviolence;stableandpredictablerulesandinstitutionsthatregulateeconomicrelations,enforcecontractsandregulations,andpromoteeconomicinvestments;aswellasopenandinclusivepoliticalinstitutionsthatensuretherepresentationofpluraleconomicinterestsandcreatepoliticalincentivestoleveltheeconomicplayingfield(North1990,Rodriketal.2004,AcemogluandRobinson2012).Figures1to3illustratethepositivecorrelationbetweengovernancedeterminants(politicalstability,ruleoflaw,andvoiceandaccountability)andgrowthinSub-SaharanAfrica(SSA).Theyalsohint,however,atthemanyconundrumsofinstitutionalandeconomicdevelopment,includingtheuneasyrelationbetweennaturalresources,governanceandgrowthaswellasthewidevariationsineconomicperformanceofcountriessituatedinthe‘messymiddle’ofthegovernancespectrum.
WhatisthequalityofgovernanceontheAfricancontinentandhowdoesitshapedevelopment?WhatcanbelearnedfromthegovernancetrajectoryofAfricancountriessincethebeginningofthe21stcentury?Thefirstdecadeofthemillenniumsawpromisinggrowthandpovertyreductioninmuchofthecontinent.ViolenceandfatalitiesdroppedsignificantlyasmajorconflictsinLiberia,SierraLeoneandtheGreatLakesregionwerebroughtifnotunderfullcontrolatleasttonewstatesofstability.Anecdotalevidenceandcountrycasestudiespointto(sometimesunexpected)governancewins:apost-conflictcountrysuchasRwandahasmanagedtoreformitspublicadministrationtoimproveservicedeliveryespeciallyforhealth;andsomecountries,suchasBotswana,havemanagedtosafeguardtheirstabilityfordecadesandhavebuiltonthisconduciveenvironmenttopushforwardselectedfinancialmanagementandregulatoryreforms.Inaddition,thecontinenthaswitnessedalargenumberofpeacefulelectoraltransitionstooppositionparties,includinginplacessuchasNigeriawithlegaciesofauthoritarianruleandcivilconflict,eveniftheelectionsthemselvespointedtowardtheexistenceofballotrigging,intimidationandfraud.
YetSSAhasalsobeenthestageofastreamofgovernancereformfailuresandpolicyreversals,andmanycountriescontinuetosufferfromtheconsequencesofpoorgovernance.Sincearound2015,aseriesofcriseswithmostlyexternalorigins–plungingcommoditymarkets,thespreadofinsecurityandreligiousextremism,theCOVID-19pandemic,ariseinauthoritarianformsofpopulismandamajorshiftinthegeopoliticallandscape–haverevealedtheunderlyingweaknessofdemocraticinstitutionsandstatecapacityinmuchofthecontinent.Basedonapossibleoverlyoptimisticvisionin2000(duetothecurrentcontextatthattime),manyAfricancountries,relyingonthecommoditysupercyclebetweenthelate1990sand2008havenotundertakenthenecessarygovernancereformsandhavestartedtosufferfrom
2ThispaperadoptsthedefinitionofgovernanceofferedbytheWorldDevelopmentReport2017(GovernanceandtheLaw):“theprocessthroughwhichstateandnonstateactorsinteracttodesignandimplementpolicieswithinagivensetofformalandinformalrulesthatshapeandareshapedbypower.”Thisdefinitionemphasizestherolethatpower,normsandincentivesplayinshapingthewayformalgovernmentorganizationsandagenciesworkinpractice.Althoughinclusive,representativeinstitutionsareanintrinsicgood,governancehereisalsoassessedwithrespecttotheabilityofinstitutionstomakedecisionsandimplementpoliciesthatdeliverpro-poordevelopment.
3
growingdebtandeconomicimbalances,whichhascontributedtothestate’sinabilitytorespondtogrowingdemandsanddissatisfactionfromcitizens(Blas2023).
Figure1.PoliticalstabilityandeconomicdevelopmentinSub-SaharanAfrica(2021)
Sudan
South
SaoTome
Rwanda
Nigeria
Sudan
Niger
Mali
The
BurkinaFaso
Zimbabwe
Chad
Ethiopia
Coted'Ivoiengola
KenyaMauritaniaGhana
Zambia
GuineaSenegal
Congo,Rep.Benin
andPrincipe
UgandaComoros
MaTdggscaanzaniaLesotho
SierraLeoneGambia,
Somalia
Guinea-BissauMalawi
EritreaMozambique
Congo,Dem.Rep.Burundi
CentralAfrican
Liberia
Seychelles
SouthAfricaEquatorial
Mauritius
Guinea
Namibia
Gabon
Eswatini
Botswana
CaboVerde
Cameroon
Republic
-3.00-2.50-2.00-1.50-1.00-0.500.000.501.00
PoliticalStability
4.6
4.4
4.2
4
3.8
3.6
3.4
3.2
3
2.8
logGDPpcPPP
Note:Thex-axisrepresentstheWorldGovernanceIndicatoronpoliticalstability.Oilricheconomiesarerepresentedinyellow;non-oilbutresource-richeconomiesingreen;non-resourcerichcountriesinblue.Thedataisthelatestavailable(2021).Source:WGIdatabaseforpoliticalstabilityindicatorandWDIdatabasefordatabaseforGDPpercapita.
Figure2.RuleoflawandeconomicdevelopmentinSub-SaharanAfrica(2021)
Seychelles
Mauritius
EquatorialGuineaGabonSouthAfricaBotswana
Namibia
AngolaCoted'IvoireGhana
Guinea-iibweMaliToourkinaFasoGambia,The
EritreaChadLiberiaMadagascarMalawi
CentralAfricanRepublic
Burundi
Congo,Dem.Rep.MozambiqueNiger
NigeriaMauritaniaKenya
SudanCameroonSaoTomeandPrincipe
ComorosCongo,Rep.ZambieninSenegal
GuineaEthiopiaTanzthoUga…
SierraLeone
CaboVerde
Eswatini
Rwanda
SouthSudan
Somalia
4.6
4.4
4.2
4
3.8
3.6
3.4
3.2
3
2.8
logGDPpcPPP
-2.40-1.90-1.40-0.90Ruleoflaw-0.400.100.60
Note:Thex-axisrepresentstheWorldGovernanceIndicatoronruleoflaw.Oilricheconomiesarerepresentedinyellow;non-oilbutresource-richeconomiesingreen;non-resourcerichcountriesinblue.Thedataisthelatestavailable(2021).Source:WGIdatabaseforruleoflawindicatorandWDIdatabasefordatabaseforGDPpercapita.
4
Figure3.PoliticalinclusionandaccountabilityandeconomicdevelopmentinSub-SaharanAfrica(2021)
SouthAfrica
Seychelles
Mauritius
Botswana
Gabon
EquatorialGuinea
Eswatini
Namibia
Eritrea
Somalia
SouthSudan
ChadCongo,Rep.EthiopiaUgandaTanzaniaZamGbuiianea-BissaurkinaFothoSaoTomeandPrincipe
ZimbabweRwandaTogoMMaolizambiqueNigerGambia,The
SierraLeone
CentralAfricanRepublic
Congo,Dem.Rep.
Malawi
BurundiMadagascarLiberia
AngolaMaiiaCoted'IvoKienya
SudanCameroonBeninSenegal
Comoros
GuineaGhana
CaboVerde
4.5
4
3.5
3
2.5
logGDPpcPPP
-2.00
-1.50
-1.00
Voiceandaccountability
-0.50
0.00
0.50
1.00
Note:Thex-axisrepresentstheWorldGovernanceIndicatoronvoiceandaccountability.Oilricheconomiesarerepresentedinyellow;non-oilbutresource-richeconomiesingreen;non-resourcerichcountriesinblue.Thedataisthelatestavailable(2021).Source:WGIdatabaseforvoiceandaccountabilityindicatorandWDIdatabasefordatabaseforGDPpercapita.
Governancebreakdownsunderliesecurityandservicedeliverychallengesandweakenthesocialcontract.3Despiteincreasedmilitaryspending,nationalsecurityforcestendtobeindecay(Dwyer2017andBagayoko2022),andAfricanstatesstruggletorespondtothesecuritydemandsoftheircitizens.Inefficientpublicspendingandchronicpoororunder-administrationduetolowrevenuecollectionpreventimprovementsinqualityservicedelivery.Morebroadly,aglobalbacklashagainstliberalinstitutionscoupledwiththeriseofpopulism,facilitatedbytheriseofsocialmediaandpressureontraditionalmedia,hasalsocontributedtotheweaknessofsocialcontractsonwhatasocialcontractis).Highlevelsofcorruptionincludingillicitfinancialflowsarefurtherfuelingcitizendistrustinpoliticalauthoritiesandstateinstitutions.
Thecontinenthasalsowitnessedasharpincreaseinconflictandviolencefueledbyextremistgroupscapitalizingonlocally-basedgrievances,suchaspoliticalmarginalization(Dowd2015)acrosstheSahel,theHornofAfrica,Mozambiqueandelsewhere(BolyandKere2023).Inanumberofcountries,afailingsocialcontractandtheriseofnon-statearmedgroupshavealsogonehandinhandwiththereturnofcoupsandthemilitarizationofpolitics–furtherfuelingpoliticalinstability.Whilecoupswereacommonoccurrenceinthepost-independenceera,theirnumbersubstantiallydecreasedfromthe2000s;inthe
3A2021WorldBankreport,SocialContractsforDevelopment:Bargaining,ContentionandSocialInclusioninSub-SaharanAfrica,builtontheframeworkofWDR2017toexaminehowthecitizen-statebargainingprocessshapesgovernance.Socialcontractscanbeunderstoodas“adynamicagreementbetweenstateandsocietyontheirmutualrolesandresponsibilities.”Socialcontractscanbeevaluatedonthree“compasses”:(1)process—howformalandinformalbargainingmechanismsmediatecivilandstateinterestsandcapabilities;(2)outcomes—theextenttowhichtheydeliverinclusivedevelopmentalpoliciesandoutcomes;and(3)resilience—theextenttowhichtheyareresponsivetoandalignedwithcitizenexpectations.ThereporthighlightsthewaysinwhichcitizencollectiveactioninSSAishamperedbylowlevelsoftrust,appealstoidentitypoliticsandlayersofmediatedauthorities.Thestate,inturn,tendstoinvestcapacityinmaintainingbargainsamongtheelitewhileappeasingcitizenswithpopulistpolicieslikesubsidies.Wherecitizencapacityandexpectationsoutpacewhatthestateisoffering,thiscanresultinrealigningthesocialcontract.Butwheretheinterestsandcapabilitiesofthestatecannotaccommodatesuchchanges,itcanresultindeepermistrustandevenconflict.
5
decadebefore2021,therewasonaverageonlyonesuccessfulcoupperyear.Since2020,however,thecontinenthasseentheresurgenceofmilitarycoups,incountriesasvariedasBurkinaFaso,Sudan,Guinea,Chad,Mali,NigerandGabon.Thecontextofthosecoupsvariessubstantially;yetseveralfactorsemergeasreliablecouppredictors,includingfailingsocialcontracts,insecurityandthemilitarizationofpolitics.Citizendissatisfactionwiththefailuresofservicedeliveryanddemocraticgovernance(includingflawedelections),andtherelatedlackofperceivedlegitimacyofgovernments,havebeenrecurrentoccurrencesinpre-coupcontexts;inseveralcountriesitmaterializedinsocialprotestsand,intheinitialphasesatleast,inpopularsupportformilitarycoupsandmilitarygovernance,despitecitizens’strongexpressedpreferencesfordemocraticformsofgovernment.4
ThispaperexploresthedynamicsofgovernancereformonthecontinentoverthepasttwodecadesandattemptstomakesenseoftheheterogeneityofAfricangovernancetrajectories.Itidentifieslong-termtrendsandtentativelylaysoutsomeofthereformwinsandsomeoftheareasthatlagbehind.Whiletheanalysisinevitablyreliesonaggregateddatatomakegeneralizationsandonimperfectbenchmarksforcomparisons,italso,wherepossible,attemptstoprovidenuancedandfine-grainedcountryperspectives.
TakingstockofgovernanceinthelasttwentyyearsinSub-SaharanAfrica
Thecontinent’strackrecordonachievingeffectiveandaccountablegovernanceinstitutionscapableofmanagingconflictanddrivinginclusivegrowthismixed,butoverallhasnotmatchedthe(arguablyexcessive)expectationsoftheearly2000s.
TheanalysisofthestateofgovernanceinAfricasince2000pointstofourkeytrends,whichthispaperexploresindepth:
1.Effectivestateinstitutions,capableofmaintainingpeace,fosteringgrowthanddeliveringservices,havedevelopedunevenly.Therehasbeensomeprogressinreformingstateinstitutions,includingonfundamentalssuchasrevenuemobilizationandpublicfinancialmanagementinsomeselectedcountries.Yet,overallprogressonbuildingstrongandeffectivestateinstitutions,includingpublicadministrationandregulatorycapacities,hasstagnatedandreformershavehadtocontendwithrepeatedreformfailuresandreversals,inparticularinfragileandresource-richcountries.Thissubparprogressoninstitutionaldevelopmentunderliesthepersistenceofpettyandgrandcorruption,andlowperformanceofpublicservicedelivery.
2.Progresshasbeenmadeonenhancingtheinclusivenessandaccountabilityofinstitutions–butitremainsconstrainedbytheweaknessofchecksandbalancesandthepersistenceofpatternsof
4Themajorityofcountriesalsoexperiencedcoupspartiallyasa“by-productoftheimbalancedaggrandizementoftheirarmedforcesinthefaceofserioussecuritythreats—whetherfromdomesticinsurgencies,organizedcrime,orthespreadofmilitancyrelatedtotheglobal“waronterror”and/orinsecuritycontagionfromfailingneighboringstates”.SeeOpalo,Ken.“PuttingtherecentcoupsintheSahelinbroaderperspective”.AnAfricanistPerspective(blog).August3,2023.
/p/putting-the-recent-coups-in-the-
sahel#:~:text=The%20recent%20spate%20of%20coups,shaky%20sovereignty%20of%20these%20states
6
centralizedandexclusivepowerarrangements.Therepeatedholdingofmultipartyelectionsacrossthecontinenthasintroducedsomelevelsofelectoralaccountability,buttheexerciseofpowerandtheworkingofinstitutionsremainvulnerabletoopacity,extractivebehaviorandexclusiveelitepacts.Checksandbalancesonexecutivepowertendtobeweak,transparencylimited,andaccesstopoliticalandeconomicpowerremainshighlyunequal.Inthatcontext,countriesindemocratictransitionshavetendedtostruggletodeliverontheirdevelopmentpromises–andmanycountriesarestuckinastableequilibriumofextractivepoliticalandeconomicinstitutions.
3.Civiccapacityhasrisenconsiderably–buttheinabilityofinstitutionstorespondtosocialexpectationsandpoliticalmobilizationthreatenstoturnliberalcivicengagementintodistrust,populismandradicalization.Democraticdevelopmentattheturnofthecenturyopenedawindowofopportunity.Itcreatedpressureformorepublictransparencyandspaceforsocialmobilization,whichculminatedintheArabandAfricanspringsintheearly2010s.Yet,civicmobilizationhasnotbeenmatchedbycomplementarystateresponsiveness,whetherintermsofservicedelivery,security,orpublicintegrity.Thismismatchcomeswithhighrisksofinstability,asillustratedbythedeclineincitizens’trustininstitutionsandcouldopenthedoorforsocialdemandsforlessliberalformsofgovernance.
4.Thecombinationoftheabovethreetrendscontributestotheriseofpoliticalinstability,whichconstitutesamajorthreattothecontinent’sabilitytoclaimthe21stcentury.Disappointmentintheabilityofstatestodeliverbasicservices,weakinstitutionalchannelsforaccountabilityandhighlevelsofdistrustpointtothefragilityofthesocialcontract.Interstatewarshavedeclinedsincetheturnofthemillennium,buttheregionhasexperiencedasharpuptickinviolenteventssince2015,withinsecurityspreadingacrosstheSahelregiontotheHornofAfricaasevidencedbytherecentstreamofmilitarycoups–eightsuccessfulsinceAugust2020.Suchinstabilityandviolencearecorebindingconstraintstogrowthonthecontinent:instabilitycreatespolicyvolatility,shortenspolicyhorizonsleadingtosuboptimalmacroeconomicpolicydecisions,anddecreasesinvestors’confidence–withnegativeeffectsoneconomicperformance.Africandemocraciesaremorelikelytoinvestinpro-poorgrowth:militaryexpendituresarehigherinautocraticregimesthanindemocraticregimesinAfrica,whereasdemocraticregimesspendmoreoneducationandhealth(Ndayikeza2021).Fangetal.(2020)estimatethatinSSAannualgrowthincountriesinconflictisabout2.5percentagepointsloweronaverage,andthattheimpactonpercapitaGDPiscumulativeandincreasesovertime.Althoughtransitionstodemocracycanbevolatile,ultimatelydemocraciestendbebettergovernedandabletosustaininclusivegrowth.
Ahigh-levellookatgovernancedata
Ahigh-levellookatgovernancedatasuggeststhatchangehasbeenslowoverthepast20yearsinSSAandthatgovernanceintheregionstilltendstolagbehindotherworldregions.AggregateWorldGovernanceIndicatorsillustratethosemacro-trends.ThethreeaggregatevariablespresentedinFigure4measurekeydimensionsofgovernance,namelygovernmenteffectiveness,voiceandaccountability,andpoliticalstability.TheyshowthatSSAslightlyimproveditspercentilerankforvoiceandaccountabilityand
7
deterioratedongovernmenteffectivenessandpoliticalstability.SSAtendstoperformworsethanallotherworldregions–withtheexceptionoftheMiddleEastandNorthAfrica(MENA),whichSSAoutperformsontheindicatorsrelatedtovoiceandaccountabilityandpoliticalstability.SSAlagsbehindallotherworldregionsonmeasuresofgovernmenteffectivenessanditspositionappearstohaveslightlydeterioratedsincetheearly2000s.
Figure4.WorldGovernanceIndicatorsbyregion,2000-2020
GovernmentEffectiveness(percentilerank:0to100)
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
2000
2005
2010
2015
2020
EAP
2000
2005
2010
2015
2020
ECA
2000
2005
2010
2015
2020
LAC
2000
2005
2010
2015
2020
MENA
2000
2005
2010
2015
2020
SA
2000
2005
2010
2015
2020
SSA
Source:WorldwideGovernanceIndicators(WB).Definitions:Percentilerankrangesfrom0(lowest)to100(highest).Regions:EAP(EastAsia&Pacific);ECA(Europe&CentralAsia);LAC(LatinAmerica&Caribbean);MENA(MiddleEast&NorthAfrica);SA(SouthAsia);SSA(Sub-SaharanAfrica).
VoiceandAccountability(percentilerank:0to100)
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
2000
2005
2010
2015
2020
EAP
2000
2005
2010
2015
2020
ECA
2000
2005
2010
2015
2020
LAC
2000
2005
2010
2015
2020
MENA
2000
2005
2010
2015
2020
SA
2000
2005
2010
2015
2020
SSA
Source:WorldwideGovernanceIndicators(WB).Definitions:Percentilerankrangesfrom0(lowest)to100(highest).Regions:EAP(EastAsia&Pacific);ECA(Europe&CentralAsia);LAC(LatinAmerica&Caribbean);MENA(MiddleEast&NorthAfrica);SA(SouthAsia);SSA(Sub-SaharanAfrica).
8
PoliticalStability(percentilerank:0to100)
0
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
2000
2005
2010
2015
2020
EAP
2000
2005
2010
2015
2020
ECA
2000
2005
2010
2015
2020
LAC
2000
2005
2010
2015
2020
MENA
2000
2005
2010
2015
2020
SA
2000
2005
2010
2015
2020
SSA
Source:WorldwideGovernanceIndicators(WB).Definitions:Percentilerankrangesfrom0(lowest)to100(highest).Regions:EAP(EastAsia&Pacific);ECA(Europe&CentralAsia);LAC(LatinAmerica&Caribbean);MENA(MiddleEast&NorthAfrica);SA(SouthAsia);SSA(Sub-SaharanAfrica).
Thenextsectionsdelvemoredeeplyintotheregion’sgovernancerecord.Theylookatfourbuildingblocksofinclusiveandeffectivegovernance,namely:(i)stateeffectivenessandcapability;(ii)inclusiveandaccountablepoliticalinstitutions;(iii)civiccapacity;and(iv)politicalstability.Moredisaggregateddataprovidesomenuancetothegovernancediagnostic.Ithelpsidentifysomepositivetrendsthatarehiddenbyaggregatevariables,suchastheprogressmadeonselectedfundamentalsofgovernmenteffectiveness(includingpublicfinancialmanagementandrevenuegeneration),thedurabilityofdemocratic(andelectoral)processes,andthedeclineininterstatewars.Yet,italsoshowsthat,despitethistrioofadvances,progresshasoftenbeensubjecttoreversalsandstagnation,andmanyareasofgovernancecontinuetolagbehind.
Stateeffectivenessandstatecapacitytrends
Long-termtrend1.Effectivestateinstitutions,capableofmaintainingpeace,fosteringgrowthanddeliveringservices,havedevelopedunevenlysince2000.Therehasbeensomeprogressinreformingstateinstitutions,includingon‘fundamentals'suchaspublicfinancialmanagementorrevenuemobilizationinselectedcountries.Yet,overallprogressonbuildingstrongandeffectivestateinstitutions,includingpublicadministrationandregulatorycapacityimplementationhasstagnatedandreformershavehadtocontendwithrepeatedreformfailuresandreversals,inparticularinfragileandresource-richcountries.Thissubparprogressoninstitutionaldevelopmentunderliesthepersistenceofpettyandgrandcorruption,andthelowperformanceofpublicservicedelivery.
Overallprogressonstateeffectivenessandcapacityhasstagnatedsince
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