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PublicDisclosureAuthorizedPublicDisclosureAuthorized

PolicyResearchWorkingPaper10713

GovernanceinSub-SaharanAfrica

inthe21stCentury

FourTrendsandanUncertainOutlook

DeborahIsser

GaelRaballand

MichaelWatts

DianeZovighian

GovernanceGlobalPractice

March2024

PolicyResearchWorkingPaper10713

Abstract

WhatcanbelearnedfromthegovernancetrajectoryofAfricancountriessincethebeginningofthe21stcentury?WhatisthequalityofgovernanceontheAfricancontinentandhowdoesitshapedevelopment?Thefirstdecadeofthemillenniumsawpromisinggrowthandpovertyreductioninmuchofthecontinent.Yet,Sub-SaharanAfricahasalsobeenthestageofastreamofgovernancereformfailuresandpolicyreversals,andmanycountriescontinuetosufferfromtheconsequencesofpoorgovernance.Thispaperexploresthedynamicsofgovernancereformonthecontinentoverthepasttwodecadesandpointstofourkeytrends.First,effectivestateinstitutions,capableofmaintainingpeace,

fosteringgrowth,anddeliveringservices,havedevelopedunevenly.Second,progresshasbeenmadeonenhancingtheinclusivenessandaccountabilityofinstitutions,butitremainsconstrainedbytheweaknessofchecksandbalancesandthepersistenceofpatternsofcentralizedandexclu-sivepowerarrangements.Third,civiccapacityhasrisenconsiderably,buttheinabilityofinstitutionstorespondtosocialexpectationsandpoliticalmobilizationthreatenstoturnliberalcivicengagementintodistrust,populism,andradicalization.Fourth,thecombinationofthesethreetrendscontributestotheriseofpoliticalinstability,whichconstitutesamajorthreatforthecontinent.

ThispaperisaproductoftheGovernanceGlobalPractice.ItispartofalargereffortbytheWorldBanktoprovideopenaccesstoitsresearchandmakeacontributiontodevelopmentpolicydiscussionsaroundtheworld.PolicyResearchWorkingPapersarealsopostedontheWebat

/prwp.Theauthorsmaybecontactedatdisser@

andgraballand@@.

ThePolicyResearchWorkingPaperSeriesdisseminatesthefindingsofworkinprogresstoencouragetheexchangeofideasaboutdevelopmentissues.Anobjectiveoftheseriesistogetthefindingsoutquickly,evenifthepresentationsarelessthanfullypolished.Thepaperscarrythenamesoftheauthorsandshouldbecitedaccordingly.Thefindings,interpretations,andconclusionsexpressedinthispaperareentirelythoseoftheauthors.TheydonotnecessarilyrepresenttheviewsoftheInternationalBankforReconstructionandDevelopment/WorldBankanditsaffiliatedorganizations,orthoseoftheExecutiveDirectorsoftheWorldBankorthegovernmentstheyrepresent.

ProducedbytheResearchSupportTeam

GovernanceinSub-SaharanAfricainthe21stCentury:

FourTrendsandanUncertainOutlook

DeborahIsser

GaelRaballand

MichaelWatts

DianeZovighian1

JEL:D73,D74,H11,F51,N57.

Keywords:Sub-SaharanAfrica,governance,statecapacity,institutionalreform,servicedelivery,corruption,democraticdevelopment,conflict,stability,socialcontract.

1TheauthorsthankMonicaBeuran,MathieuCloutier,Anne-LiseCogoli-BelandLenaRaballandforbackgroundresearchandinputs,andAbebeAdugna,AndrewDabalen,AidanEyakuze,ChorchingGoh,TraceyLane,BobRijkers,ZainabUsman,LeonardWantchekonandAlbertZeufackfortheircommentsandsuggestionsonpreviousversionsofthispaper.

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Introduction

Thereisastrongacademicandpolicyconsensusthatgovernancemattersfordevelopment.2Empiricalevidenceshowsthatdevelopmenttrajectoriesarelargelyshapedbythepresence–orabsence–of:aneffectivestatemonopolyontheuseofviolence;stableandpredictablerulesandinstitutionsthatregulateeconomicrelations,enforcecontractsandregulations,andpromoteeconomicinvestments;aswellasopenandinclusivepoliticalinstitutionsthatensuretherepresentationofpluraleconomicinterestsandcreatepoliticalincentivestoleveltheeconomicplayingfield(North1990,Rodriketal.2004,AcemogluandRobinson2012).Figures1to3illustratethepositivecorrelationbetweengovernancedeterminants(politicalstability,ruleoflaw,andvoiceandaccountability)andgrowthinSub-SaharanAfrica(SSA).Theyalsohint,however,atthemanyconundrumsofinstitutionalandeconomicdevelopment,includingtheuneasyrelationbetweennaturalresources,governanceandgrowthaswellasthewidevariationsineconomicperformanceofcountriessituatedinthe‘messymiddle’ofthegovernancespectrum.

WhatisthequalityofgovernanceontheAfricancontinentandhowdoesitshapedevelopment?WhatcanbelearnedfromthegovernancetrajectoryofAfricancountriessincethebeginningofthe21stcentury?Thefirstdecadeofthemillenniumsawpromisinggrowthandpovertyreductioninmuchofthecontinent.ViolenceandfatalitiesdroppedsignificantlyasmajorconflictsinLiberia,SierraLeoneandtheGreatLakesregionwerebroughtifnotunderfullcontrolatleasttonewstatesofstability.Anecdotalevidenceandcountrycasestudiespointto(sometimesunexpected)governancewins:apost-conflictcountrysuchasRwandahasmanagedtoreformitspublicadministrationtoimproveservicedeliveryespeciallyforhealth;andsomecountries,suchasBotswana,havemanagedtosafeguardtheirstabilityfordecadesandhavebuiltonthisconduciveenvironmenttopushforwardselectedfinancialmanagementandregulatoryreforms.Inaddition,thecontinenthaswitnessedalargenumberofpeacefulelectoraltransitionstooppositionparties,includinginplacessuchasNigeriawithlegaciesofauthoritarianruleandcivilconflict,eveniftheelectionsthemselvespointedtowardtheexistenceofballotrigging,intimidationandfraud.

YetSSAhasalsobeenthestageofastreamofgovernancereformfailuresandpolicyreversals,andmanycountriescontinuetosufferfromtheconsequencesofpoorgovernance.Sincearound2015,aseriesofcriseswithmostlyexternalorigins–plungingcommoditymarkets,thespreadofinsecurityandreligiousextremism,theCOVID-19pandemic,ariseinauthoritarianformsofpopulismandamajorshiftinthegeopoliticallandscape–haverevealedtheunderlyingweaknessofdemocraticinstitutionsandstatecapacityinmuchofthecontinent.Basedonapossibleoverlyoptimisticvisionin2000(duetothecurrentcontextatthattime),manyAfricancountries,relyingonthecommoditysupercyclebetweenthelate1990sand2008havenotundertakenthenecessarygovernancereformsandhavestartedtosufferfrom

2ThispaperadoptsthedefinitionofgovernanceofferedbytheWorldDevelopmentReport2017(GovernanceandtheLaw):“theprocessthroughwhichstateandnonstateactorsinteracttodesignandimplementpolicieswithinagivensetofformalandinformalrulesthatshapeandareshapedbypower.”Thisdefinitionemphasizestherolethatpower,normsandincentivesplayinshapingthewayformalgovernmentorganizationsandagenciesworkinpractice.Althoughinclusive,representativeinstitutionsareanintrinsicgood,governancehereisalsoassessedwithrespecttotheabilityofinstitutionstomakedecisionsandimplementpoliciesthatdeliverpro-poordevelopment.

3

growingdebtandeconomicimbalances,whichhascontributedtothestate’sinabilitytorespondtogrowingdemandsanddissatisfactionfromcitizens(Blas2023).

Figure1.PoliticalstabilityandeconomicdevelopmentinSub-SaharanAfrica(2021)

Sudan

South

SaoTome

Rwanda

Nigeria

Sudan

Niger

Mali

The

BurkinaFaso

Zimbabwe

Chad

Ethiopia

Coted'Ivoiengola

KenyaMauritaniaGhana

Zambia

GuineaSenegal

Congo,Rep.Benin

andPrincipe

UgandaComoros

MaTdggscaanzaniaLesotho

SierraLeoneGambia,

Somalia

Guinea-BissauMalawi

EritreaMozambique

Congo,Dem.Rep.Burundi

CentralAfrican

Liberia

Seychelles

SouthAfricaEquatorial

Mauritius

Guinea

Namibia

Gabon

Eswatini

Botswana

CaboVerde

Cameroon

Republic

-3.00-2.50-2.00-1.50-1.00-0.500.000.501.00

PoliticalStability

4.6

4.4

4.2

4

3.8

3.6

3.4

3.2

3

2.8

logGDPpcPPP

Note:Thex-axisrepresentstheWorldGovernanceIndicatoronpoliticalstability.Oilricheconomiesarerepresentedinyellow;non-oilbutresource-richeconomiesingreen;non-resourcerichcountriesinblue.Thedataisthelatestavailable(2021).Source:WGIdatabaseforpoliticalstabilityindicatorandWDIdatabasefordatabaseforGDPpercapita.

Figure2.RuleoflawandeconomicdevelopmentinSub-SaharanAfrica(2021)

Seychelles

Mauritius

EquatorialGuineaGabonSouthAfricaBotswana

Namibia

AngolaCoted'IvoireGhana

Guinea-iibweMaliToourkinaFasoGambia,The

EritreaChadLiberiaMadagascarMalawi

CentralAfricanRepublic

Burundi

Congo,Dem.Rep.MozambiqueNiger

NigeriaMauritaniaKenya

SudanCameroonSaoTomeandPrincipe

ComorosCongo,Rep.ZambieninSenegal

GuineaEthiopiaTanzthoUga…

SierraLeone

CaboVerde

Eswatini

Rwanda

SouthSudan

Somalia

4.6

4.4

4.2

4

3.8

3.6

3.4

3.2

3

2.8

logGDPpcPPP

-2.40-1.90-1.40-0.90Ruleoflaw-0.400.100.60

Note:Thex-axisrepresentstheWorldGovernanceIndicatoronruleoflaw.Oilricheconomiesarerepresentedinyellow;non-oilbutresource-richeconomiesingreen;non-resourcerichcountriesinblue.Thedataisthelatestavailable(2021).Source:WGIdatabaseforruleoflawindicatorandWDIdatabasefordatabaseforGDPpercapita.

4

Figure3.PoliticalinclusionandaccountabilityandeconomicdevelopmentinSub-SaharanAfrica(2021)

SouthAfrica

Seychelles

Mauritius

Botswana

Gabon

EquatorialGuinea

Eswatini

Namibia

Eritrea

Somalia

SouthSudan

ChadCongo,Rep.EthiopiaUgandaTanzaniaZamGbuiianea-BissaurkinaFothoSaoTomeandPrincipe

ZimbabweRwandaTogoMMaolizambiqueNigerGambia,The

SierraLeone

CentralAfricanRepublic

Congo,Dem.Rep.

Malawi

BurundiMadagascarLiberia

AngolaMaiiaCoted'IvoKienya

SudanCameroonBeninSenegal

Comoros

GuineaGhana

CaboVerde

4.5

4

3.5

3

2.5

logGDPpcPPP

-2.00

-1.50

-1.00

Voiceandaccountability

-0.50

0.00

0.50

1.00

Note:Thex-axisrepresentstheWorldGovernanceIndicatoronvoiceandaccountability.Oilricheconomiesarerepresentedinyellow;non-oilbutresource-richeconomiesingreen;non-resourcerichcountriesinblue.Thedataisthelatestavailable(2021).Source:WGIdatabaseforvoiceandaccountabilityindicatorandWDIdatabasefordatabaseforGDPpercapita.

Governancebreakdownsunderliesecurityandservicedeliverychallengesandweakenthesocialcontract.3Despiteincreasedmilitaryspending,nationalsecurityforcestendtobeindecay(Dwyer2017andBagayoko2022),andAfricanstatesstruggletorespondtothesecuritydemandsoftheircitizens.Inefficientpublicspendingandchronicpoororunder-administrationduetolowrevenuecollectionpreventimprovementsinqualityservicedelivery.Morebroadly,aglobalbacklashagainstliberalinstitutionscoupledwiththeriseofpopulism,facilitatedbytheriseofsocialmediaandpressureontraditionalmedia,hasalsocontributedtotheweaknessofsocialcontractsonwhatasocialcontractis).Highlevelsofcorruptionincludingillicitfinancialflowsarefurtherfuelingcitizendistrustinpoliticalauthoritiesandstateinstitutions.

Thecontinenthasalsowitnessedasharpincreaseinconflictandviolencefueledbyextremistgroupscapitalizingonlocally-basedgrievances,suchaspoliticalmarginalization(Dowd2015)acrosstheSahel,theHornofAfrica,Mozambiqueandelsewhere(BolyandKere2023).Inanumberofcountries,afailingsocialcontractandtheriseofnon-statearmedgroupshavealsogonehandinhandwiththereturnofcoupsandthemilitarizationofpolitics–furtherfuelingpoliticalinstability.Whilecoupswereacommonoccurrenceinthepost-independenceera,theirnumbersubstantiallydecreasedfromthe2000s;inthe

3A2021WorldBankreport,SocialContractsforDevelopment:Bargaining,ContentionandSocialInclusioninSub-SaharanAfrica,builtontheframeworkofWDR2017toexaminehowthecitizen-statebargainingprocessshapesgovernance.Socialcontractscanbeunderstoodas“adynamicagreementbetweenstateandsocietyontheirmutualrolesandresponsibilities.”Socialcontractscanbeevaluatedonthree“compasses”:(1)process—howformalandinformalbargainingmechanismsmediatecivilandstateinterestsandcapabilities;(2)outcomes—theextenttowhichtheydeliverinclusivedevelopmentalpoliciesandoutcomes;and(3)resilience—theextenttowhichtheyareresponsivetoandalignedwithcitizenexpectations.ThereporthighlightsthewaysinwhichcitizencollectiveactioninSSAishamperedbylowlevelsoftrust,appealstoidentitypoliticsandlayersofmediatedauthorities.Thestate,inturn,tendstoinvestcapacityinmaintainingbargainsamongtheelitewhileappeasingcitizenswithpopulistpolicieslikesubsidies.Wherecitizencapacityandexpectationsoutpacewhatthestateisoffering,thiscanresultinrealigningthesocialcontract.Butwheretheinterestsandcapabilitiesofthestatecannotaccommodatesuchchanges,itcanresultindeepermistrustandevenconflict.

5

decadebefore2021,therewasonaverageonlyonesuccessfulcoupperyear.Since2020,however,thecontinenthasseentheresurgenceofmilitarycoups,incountriesasvariedasBurkinaFaso,Sudan,Guinea,Chad,Mali,NigerandGabon.Thecontextofthosecoupsvariessubstantially;yetseveralfactorsemergeasreliablecouppredictors,includingfailingsocialcontracts,insecurityandthemilitarizationofpolitics.Citizendissatisfactionwiththefailuresofservicedeliveryanddemocraticgovernance(includingflawedelections),andtherelatedlackofperceivedlegitimacyofgovernments,havebeenrecurrentoccurrencesinpre-coupcontexts;inseveralcountriesitmaterializedinsocialprotestsand,intheinitialphasesatleast,inpopularsupportformilitarycoupsandmilitarygovernance,despitecitizens’strongexpressedpreferencesfordemocraticformsofgovernment.4

ThispaperexploresthedynamicsofgovernancereformonthecontinentoverthepasttwodecadesandattemptstomakesenseoftheheterogeneityofAfricangovernancetrajectories.Itidentifieslong-termtrendsandtentativelylaysoutsomeofthereformwinsandsomeoftheareasthatlagbehind.Whiletheanalysisinevitablyreliesonaggregateddatatomakegeneralizationsandonimperfectbenchmarksforcomparisons,italso,wherepossible,attemptstoprovidenuancedandfine-grainedcountryperspectives.

TakingstockofgovernanceinthelasttwentyyearsinSub-SaharanAfrica

Thecontinent’strackrecordonachievingeffectiveandaccountablegovernanceinstitutionscapableofmanagingconflictanddrivinginclusivegrowthismixed,butoverallhasnotmatchedthe(arguablyexcessive)expectationsoftheearly2000s.

TheanalysisofthestateofgovernanceinAfricasince2000pointstofourkeytrends,whichthispaperexploresindepth:

1.Effectivestateinstitutions,capableofmaintainingpeace,fosteringgrowthanddeliveringservices,havedevelopedunevenly.Therehasbeensomeprogressinreformingstateinstitutions,includingonfundamentalssuchasrevenuemobilizationandpublicfinancialmanagementinsomeselectedcountries.Yet,overallprogressonbuildingstrongandeffectivestateinstitutions,includingpublicadministrationandregulatorycapacities,hasstagnatedandreformershavehadtocontendwithrepeatedreformfailuresandreversals,inparticularinfragileandresource-richcountries.Thissubparprogressoninstitutionaldevelopmentunderliesthepersistenceofpettyandgrandcorruption,andlowperformanceofpublicservicedelivery.

2.Progresshasbeenmadeonenhancingtheinclusivenessandaccountabilityofinstitutions–butitremainsconstrainedbytheweaknessofchecksandbalancesandthepersistenceofpatternsof

4Themajorityofcountriesalsoexperiencedcoupspartiallyasa“by-productoftheimbalancedaggrandizementoftheirarmedforcesinthefaceofserioussecuritythreats—whetherfromdomesticinsurgencies,organizedcrime,orthespreadofmilitancyrelatedtotheglobal“waronterror”and/orinsecuritycontagionfromfailingneighboringstates”.SeeOpalo,Ken.“PuttingtherecentcoupsintheSahelinbroaderperspective”.AnAfricanistPerspective(blog).August3,2023.

/p/putting-the-recent-coups-in-the-

sahel#:~:text=The%20recent%20spate%20of%20coups,shaky%20sovereignty%20of%20these%20states

6

centralizedandexclusivepowerarrangements.Therepeatedholdingofmultipartyelectionsacrossthecontinenthasintroducedsomelevelsofelectoralaccountability,buttheexerciseofpowerandtheworkingofinstitutionsremainvulnerabletoopacity,extractivebehaviorandexclusiveelitepacts.Checksandbalancesonexecutivepowertendtobeweak,transparencylimited,andaccesstopoliticalandeconomicpowerremainshighlyunequal.Inthatcontext,countriesindemocratictransitionshavetendedtostruggletodeliverontheirdevelopmentpromises–andmanycountriesarestuckinastableequilibriumofextractivepoliticalandeconomicinstitutions.

3.Civiccapacityhasrisenconsiderably–buttheinabilityofinstitutionstorespondtosocialexpectationsandpoliticalmobilizationthreatenstoturnliberalcivicengagementintodistrust,populismandradicalization.Democraticdevelopmentattheturnofthecenturyopenedawindowofopportunity.Itcreatedpressureformorepublictransparencyandspaceforsocialmobilization,whichculminatedintheArabandAfricanspringsintheearly2010s.Yet,civicmobilizationhasnotbeenmatchedbycomplementarystateresponsiveness,whetherintermsofservicedelivery,security,orpublicintegrity.Thismismatchcomeswithhighrisksofinstability,asillustratedbythedeclineincitizens’trustininstitutionsandcouldopenthedoorforsocialdemandsforlessliberalformsofgovernance.

4.Thecombinationoftheabovethreetrendscontributestotheriseofpoliticalinstability,whichconstitutesamajorthreattothecontinent’sabilitytoclaimthe21stcentury.Disappointmentintheabilityofstatestodeliverbasicservices,weakinstitutionalchannelsforaccountabilityandhighlevelsofdistrustpointtothefragilityofthesocialcontract.Interstatewarshavedeclinedsincetheturnofthemillennium,buttheregionhasexperiencedasharpuptickinviolenteventssince2015,withinsecurityspreadingacrosstheSahelregiontotheHornofAfricaasevidencedbytherecentstreamofmilitarycoups–eightsuccessfulsinceAugust2020.Suchinstabilityandviolencearecorebindingconstraintstogrowthonthecontinent:instabilitycreatespolicyvolatility,shortenspolicyhorizonsleadingtosuboptimalmacroeconomicpolicydecisions,anddecreasesinvestors’confidence–withnegativeeffectsoneconomicperformance.Africandemocraciesaremorelikelytoinvestinpro-poorgrowth:militaryexpendituresarehigherinautocraticregimesthanindemocraticregimesinAfrica,whereasdemocraticregimesspendmoreoneducationandhealth(Ndayikeza2021).Fangetal.(2020)estimatethatinSSAannualgrowthincountriesinconflictisabout2.5percentagepointsloweronaverage,andthattheimpactonpercapitaGDPiscumulativeandincreasesovertime.Althoughtransitionstodemocracycanbevolatile,ultimatelydemocraciestendbebettergovernedandabletosustaininclusivegrowth.

Ahigh-levellookatgovernancedata

Ahigh-levellookatgovernancedatasuggeststhatchangehasbeenslowoverthepast20yearsinSSAandthatgovernanceintheregionstilltendstolagbehindotherworldregions.AggregateWorldGovernanceIndicatorsillustratethosemacro-trends.ThethreeaggregatevariablespresentedinFigure4measurekeydimensionsofgovernance,namelygovernmenteffectiveness,voiceandaccountability,andpoliticalstability.TheyshowthatSSAslightlyimproveditspercentilerankforvoiceandaccountabilityand

7

deterioratedongovernmenteffectivenessandpoliticalstability.SSAtendstoperformworsethanallotherworldregions–withtheexceptionoftheMiddleEastandNorthAfrica(MENA),whichSSAoutperformsontheindicatorsrelatedtovoiceandaccountabilityandpoliticalstability.SSAlagsbehindallotherworldregionsonmeasuresofgovernmenteffectivenessanditspositionappearstohaveslightlydeterioratedsincetheearly2000s.

Figure4.WorldGovernanceIndicatorsbyregion,2000-2020

GovernmentEffectiveness(percentilerank:0to100)

80

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

2000

2005

2010

2015

2020

EAP

2000

2005

2010

2015

2020

ECA

2000

2005

2010

2015

2020

LAC

2000

2005

2010

2015

2020

MENA

2000

2005

2010

2015

2020

SA

2000

2005

2010

2015

2020

SSA

Source:WorldwideGovernanceIndicators(WB).Definitions:Percentilerankrangesfrom0(lowest)to100(highest).Regions:EAP(EastAsia&Pacific);ECA(Europe&CentralAsia);LAC(LatinAmerica&Caribbean);MENA(MiddleEast&NorthAfrica);SA(SouthAsia);SSA(Sub-SaharanAfrica).

VoiceandAccountability(percentilerank:0to100)

80

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

2000

2005

2010

2015

2020

EAP

2000

2005

2010

2015

2020

ECA

2000

2005

2010

2015

2020

LAC

2000

2005

2010

2015

2020

MENA

2000

2005

2010

2015

2020

SA

2000

2005

2010

2015

2020

SSA

Source:WorldwideGovernanceIndicators(WB).Definitions:Percentilerankrangesfrom0(lowest)to100(highest).Regions:EAP(EastAsia&Pacific);ECA(Europe&CentralAsia);LAC(LatinAmerica&Caribbean);MENA(MiddleEast&NorthAfrica);SA(SouthAsia);SSA(Sub-SaharanAfrica).

8

PoliticalStability(percentilerank:0to100)

0

80

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

2000

2005

2010

2015

2020

EAP

2000

2005

2010

2015

2020

ECA

2000

2005

2010

2015

2020

LAC

2000

2005

2010

2015

2020

MENA

2000

2005

2010

2015

2020

SA

2000

2005

2010

2015

2020

SSA

Source:WorldwideGovernanceIndicators(WB).Definitions:Percentilerankrangesfrom0(lowest)to100(highest).Regions:EAP(EastAsia&Pacific);ECA(Europe&CentralAsia);LAC(LatinAmerica&Caribbean);MENA(MiddleEast&NorthAfrica);SA(SouthAsia);SSA(Sub-SaharanAfrica).

Thenextsectionsdelvemoredeeplyintotheregion’sgovernancerecord.Theylookatfourbuildingblocksofinclusiveandeffectivegovernance,namely:(i)stateeffectivenessandcapability;(ii)inclusiveandaccountablepoliticalinstitutions;(iii)civiccapacity;and(iv)politicalstability.Moredisaggregateddataprovidesomenuancetothegovernancediagnostic.Ithelpsidentifysomepositivetrendsthatarehiddenbyaggregatevariables,suchastheprogressmadeonselectedfundamentalsofgovernmenteffectiveness(includingpublicfinancialmanagementandrevenuegeneration),thedurabilityofdemocratic(andelectoral)processes,andthedeclineininterstatewars.Yet,italsoshowsthat,despitethistrioofadvances,progresshasoftenbeensubjecttoreversalsandstagnation,andmanyareasofgovernancecontinuetolagbehind.

Stateeffectivenessandstatecapacitytrends

Long-termtrend1.Effectivestateinstitutions,capableofmaintainingpeace,fosteringgrowthanddeliveringservices,havedevelopedunevenlysince2000.Therehasbeensomeprogressinreformingstateinstitutions,includingon‘fundamentals'suchaspublicfinancialmanagementorrevenuemobilizationinselectedcountries.Yet,overallprogressonbuildingstrongandeffectivestateinstitutions,includingpublicadministrationandregulatorycapacityimplementationhasstagnatedandreformershavehadtocontendwithrepeatedreformfailuresandreversals,inparticularinfragileandresource-richcountries.Thissubparprogressoninstitutionaldevelopmentunderliesthepersistenceofpettyandgrandcorruption,andthelowperformanceofpublicservicedelivery.

Overallprogressonstateeffectivenessandcapacityhasstagnatedsince

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