布雷頓森林機(jī)構(gòu)80周年：邁向更大、更好、更具包容性的全球經(jīng)濟(jì)治理架構(gòu)（英文）-波士頓大學(xué)

GlobalDevelopmentPolicyCenterJuly2024

TheBrettonWoods

Institutionsat80

TowardsABigger,BetterandMoreInclusive

GlobalEconomicGovernanceArchitecture

BYWILLIAMN.KRING,RISHIKESHRAMBHANDARY,RACHELTHRASHER,MARINAZUCKER-

MARQUES,TIMHIRSCHEL-BURNS

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Thisreportbene?tedfromthesupportofMaureenHeydt,SamanthaIgoandHopeMarshall.

SUGGESTEDCITATION

Kring,W.N.,Bhandary,R.R.,Thrasher,R.,Zucker-Marques,M.,Hirschel-Burns,T.2024.“TheBrettonWoodsInstitutionsat80:TowardsaBigger,BetterandMoreInclusiveGlobalEconomicGovernanceArchitecture.”BostonUniversityGlobalDevelopmentPolicyCenter.

Cover:PhotobyKlimMusalimovviaUnsplash.

ABOUTTHEAUTHORS

WilliamN.KringistheExecutiveDirectoroftheBostonUniversityGlobalDevelopmentPolicyCenter.Hisresearchandteachinginterestsfocusoninternationalpoliticaleconomy,globaleconomicgovernance,international?nancialinstitutionsandSouthern-led?nancialinstitutions.Heactivelyconductspolicy-orientedresearchonglobaleconomicgovernanceandworksregularlywithgovernmento?cialsandstafo?cialsofvariousinternational?nancialinstitutions,particularlyregional?nancialarrangements.HehasservedasaconsultantfortheUnitedNationsConferenceonTradeandDevelopment(UNCTAD)andhasbeenawardedgrantsbytheRockefellerBrothersFund,JapanFoundationCenterforGlobalPartnership,theAcademyofKoreanStudiesandUNCTAD.HisworkhasappearedinWorldDevelopment,DevelopmentandChange,GlobalPolicy,GlobalGovernanceandInternationalRelationsoftheAsia-Paci?c.

RishikeshRamBhandaryistheAssistantDirectoroftheGlobalEconomicGovernanceInitiativeattheBostonUniversityGlobalDevelopmentPolicyCenter.Hepreviouslyworkedasapost-doctoralscholarattheClimatePolicyLabintheFletcherSchoolatTuftsUniversity.HeisalsoamemberoftheTaskForceonClimate,DevelopmentandtheInternationalMonetaryFund.

RachelThrasherisaResearcherwiththeGlobalEconomicGovernanceInitiativeandservesasTeamLeadfortheTradeandInvestmentRulesworkstream.SheholdsaJDandaMaster’sdegreeinInternationalRelations,bothfromBostonUniversity.Sheworksonpolicyissuesrelatedtotradeandinvestmentagreements,policyspacefordevelopment,intellectualpropertyandaccesstomedicinesandtheclimateimpactsoftradeandinvestmenttreaties.Sheistheauthorofthebook,

ConstrainingDevelopment:TheShrinkingofPolicySpaceintheInternationalTrade

Regime,publishedbyAnthemPressin2021.ShecurrentlyteachesInternational

EconomicLawandClimateChangeattheBostonUniversitySchoolofLaw.

MarinaZucker-MarquesisaSeniorAcademicResearcherfortheGlobalEconomicGovernanceInitiativeandservesasTeamLeadfortheFinancialStabilityworkstream.Formerly,shewasaPost-doctoralResearcherattheDebtReliefforaGreenandInclusiveRecoveryProjectanda?liatedwithSOAS,UniversityofLondon.Previously,sheworkedattheUnitedNationsConferenceonTradeandDevelopment(UNCTAD)intheDebtandDevelopmentFinanceBranch(GlobalizationandDevelopmentStrategies).Sheisanexperton

sovereigndebt,theGlobalFinancialSafetyNet,international?nanceand

currencyinternationalization.Sheisalsoco-chairfortheBrazilT20TaskForce3

onreformingtheInternationalFinancialArchitecture.MarinaholdsaPhDfrom

FreieUniversit?tBerlinandaBachelor’sdegreefromFACAMP,andamaster’s

degreefromZhejiangGongshangUniversity.

TimHirschel-BurnsisPolicyLiaisonfortheGlobalEconomicGovernanceInitiativeattheBostonUniversityGlobalDevelopmentPolicyCenter.Hisworkfocusesondevelopment?nance,?nancialstability,andtradeandinvestment.HehaswrittenforpublicationsincludingForeignPolicy,JustSecurity,TheLosAngelesReviewofBooksandTheYaleJournalofInternationalLaw,andhisanalysishasbeenfeaturedinoutletsincludingtheNewYorkTimes,theWashingtonPost,theGuardianandtheBBC.Priortohiscurrentrole,TimwasaBernsteinInternationalHuman

RightsFellowwithOxfamAmerica,workingonclimatechange,taxationand

humanrightsastheyintersectwithnaturalresources.Heisatrainedlawyerwith

aJ.D.fromYaleLawSchool.Whileinlawschool,Timco-foundedLawStudents

forClimateAccountability.HeholdsaB.A.inPoliticalSciencefromSwarthmore

CollegeandservedasaPeaceCorpsvolunteerinBenin.

BuenosAires,Argentina.PhotobyLeonardoMirandaviaUnsplash.

CONTENTS

EXECUTIVESUMMARY

VI

INTRODUCTION

1

PILLAR1:FINANCIALSTABILITYANDTHEIMF

2

PILLARII:DEVELOPMENTFINANCEANDTHEWORLDBANK

5

PILLARIII:TRADEANDTHEWTO

6

CONCLUSION

10

REFERENCES

14

EXECUTIVESUMMARY

July2024marksthe80thanniversaryoftheBrettonWoodsAgreementthatestablishedthepost-WorldWarIImultilateraleconomicorder.Theagreement,reachedattheMountWashingtonHotelinBrettonWoods,NewHampshirein1944,ledtotheestablishmentoftheBrettonWoodsinstitutions,theInternationalMonetaryFund(IMF)andtheInternationalBankforReconstructionandDevelopment(IBRD),theprecursortotheWorldBank,bothofwhichintheircurrentforms“remainatthecenterofglobal?nancialgovernancetoday”(Helleiner2016).Whiletheoriginalagreementalsoconsideredtradetobeakeypillar,proposingtheInternationalTradeOrganization(ITO),progresstowardsamultilateralorganizationgoverningglobaltradetookconsiderablylonger.Inthemeantime,ahandfulofcountriesjoinedtheGeneralAgreementonTarifsandTrade(GATT)in1947,whichwouldeventuallyprovidethestructureandformoftheWorldTradeOrganization(WTO),establishedin1995.

ThisreportsynthesizestheworkoftheBostonUniversityGlobalDevelopmentPolicyCenter(GDPCenter)onglobaleconomicgovernancefocusedontheBrettonWoodsinstitutionsacrossthreekeypillarsof?nancialstability,development?nanceandtrade.

WhiletheBrettonWoodsinstitutionshaveestablishedarules-based,multilateralsystemofglobaleconomicgovernance,theGDPCenter’spolicy-orientedresearch?ndsthatthissystemisinurgentneedoffundamentalreform.Thisreportrecognizesboththebene?tsandcontributionsofthemultilateralinstitutionsestablishedatBrettonWoods,whileidentifyingareaswherereformisrequired.Whiletheseinstitutionshaveexpandedtherangeofoptionsavailableforcountries,theyareindicativeofalonggridlockedsystemthathasnottransformeditselftoaccommodateexistingeconomicrealities.

GDPCenterresearchhasalsotrackedSouthern-ledefortstocreatealternativeinstitutionsacrossthethreepillars(KringandGallagher2019;Barrowcloughetal.2022).Whiletheseinstitutionshavebeenimportantsourcesofadditional?nancingandviablealternativeoptions,theiremergenceunderscoresthesamegridlockednatureofglobaleconomicgovernancereformandthecrisisoflegitimacyattheheartofthesystem.

Inrecentyears,policymakershaveincreasinglyemphasizedtheneedtoreformglobaleconomicgovernanceinordertoachieveshareddevelopmentandclimatechangegoals.TheBridgetownAgenda,theVulnerable20(V20)’sAccra-to-MarrakeshAgendaandtheAfricaClimateSummitamongothersareexamplesofinitiativesseekingtotransformtheglobaleconomicgovernancesysteminpursuitofsustainabledevelopmentonaliveableplanet.

BuildingonGDPCenterresearch,thisreportoutlineskeyglobaleconomicgovernancereformproposalstoensureabigger,betterandmoreinclusiveBrettonWoodsSysteminthecomingdecades.Weidentifypathwaystoimprovingglobaleconomicgovernancearchitectureandensuringthattherearesu憂cientresourcestofoster?nancialstabilityanddevelopment;improvethefunctioningoftheglobaleconomicgovernancesystem;andtoincreasevoiceandrepresentationforemergingmarketanddevelopingeconomies(EMDEs)withintheseinstitutions.

Policyrecommendations:

?Scaleupresourcesfor?nancialstabilityanddevelopment?nance:

?TheIMFandtheWorldBankneedtobeequippedwithresourcesthatarecommensuratewiththeneedsandprioritiesofEMDEs.TheWorldBankandotherdevelopment?nanceinstitutionsneedtoplayakeyroleinsupportingthe‘bigpush’ofinvestmentsneededtoachievedevelopmentandclimategoals(KharasandRivard

2022).Likewise,awell-resourcedIMFisneededforanefectiveGlobalFinancialSafetyNet(WorldBankGroup2023).

?Themultilateraltradingsystemshouldfacilitatethescalingupofdevelopment,climateresilienceandmitigationbyincreasingtradewithdevelopingcountriesinclimate-friendlytechnologyandproducts.Anefectiveresponsetotheclimatecrisisrequiresparticipationbyallcountries.IftheGlobalSouthisleftbehind,withoutaccesstokeytechnologytomaketheenergytransition,orstuckoncemorewiththeshortstrawofsupplyingonlyprimarycommoditiesforthenewrenewableenergysupplychains,thosecountrieswillbehinderedfromtakingclimateaction,andwillfaceadditionalpoliticalobstaclestoparticipatingintheglobalproject.

?OverhaullendingpracticesandprioritiesattheBrettonWoodsinstitutions:

?TheWorldBankneedstoshiftitslendingtowardssupportingstructuraltransformationsinEMDEs.Thisstructuralshiftneedstobesupportedbyappropriatelycalibratedinstruments.ThesocialandenvironmentalrisksofabigpushneedtobeminimizedandtheWorldBankoperatingmodelneedstobetterrecognizethe?nancialrisksfacedbymembers.

?TheIMFneedstoimproveitslendingpracticesandtools.TheIMFandWorldBankshouldimprovetheirDebtSustainabilityAnalysisframeworktoaccountforthenecessarydevelopmentandclimateinvestmentsandshocks.Moreover,theIMFshouldeliminatesurchargesonborrowingmemberstoavoidfurtherbuildupofdebtvulnerabilities.Finally,lendingconditionsandrestructuringpackagesshouldbeconnectedtogrowthenhancingplans,ratherthanausteritypackages.

?WTOmembersneedtoproactivelytransformthemultilateraltradingsystemsothatitfacilitatesincreasedinnovation,productionandtradeinessentialclimate-relatedproductsanddiscouragescontinuedrelianceonfossilfuels.

?EnhancevoiceandrepresentationacrossallpillarsoftheBrettonWoodsinstitutions.

?FortheIMFandtheWorldBank,asigni?cantrebalancingofvotingpowermustbecomplementedbyfundamentalgovernancereformstoensuremorevoiceandrepresentationforEMDEs.

?FortheWTO,thismeansmaintainingacommitmenttomultilateraldecision-making,recognizingtheeconomicandsocialimpactsofGlobalNorthpolicymakingontheGlobalSouth,andallowingspecialanddiferentialtreatmentforthosecountriesthatneedmore?exibilityduringtheenergyandeconomictransition.

Themountingglobalchallengesandtheintersectingcrisesoftheearly2020srequireanambitiousmultilateralresponse.Overtheyears,theBrettonWoodsinstitutionshaveservedasananchoroftheglobaleconomicgovernancesystem.Astheresearchdiscussedinthisreportdemonstrates,theycanandmustplayabigger,betterandmoreinclusiveroleinsupportingsustainabledevelopmentandclimateresilience.ThechallengesconfrontingcountriestodayprovidetheBrettonWoodsinstitutionsandtheirmemberswithanimportantopportunitytotransformtheseinsitutionstomeettheneedsandaspirationsofpeoplearoundtheworld.

Athens,Greece.PhotobyNomadicJulienviaUnsplash.

INTRODUCTION

EightyyearsagoinJuly1944,theBrettonWoodsConferenceresultedinawide-rangingagreementtoestablishaninternational?nancialarchitecture.Thepost-WorldWarIImultilateralorderthatwascreatedledtotheestablishmentoftheBrettonWoodsinstitutions,theInternationalMonetaryFund(IMF)andtheInternationalBankforReconstructionandDevelopment(IBRD),theprecursortotheWorldBank,aswellasaproposalforanInternationalTradeOrganization(ITO).Whileprogressontradewasconsiderablyslower,thisthirdpillaroftheinternational?nancialarchitecturematerializedin1947withtheGeneralAgreementonTarifsandTrade(GATT),whichprovidedthefoundationfortheWorldTradeOrganization(WTO)toemergein1995.

Nearlyacenturylater,theBrettonWoodsInstitutionsintheircurrentform“remainatthecenterofglobal?nancialgovernancetoday”(Helleiner2016).Despitetheirevolutionoverthe20thcentury,theinternational?nancialarchitecturefacesadramaticallydiferentsetofchallengesthatwilltestitsadequacyandlegitimacyoverthenext80years(Volzetal.2024)..Fromclimatechangeandhighlevelsofsovereigndebt,to?nancialinstabilityandthefalloutfromtheglobalpandemic,theinternational?nancialarchitecturewillbeincreasinglytestedinthecriticaldecadestocome.

ThisreportsynthesizestheworkoftheBostonUniversityGlobalDevelopmentPolicyCenter(GDPCenter)onglobaleconomicgovernancefocusedontheBrettonWoodsinstitutionsacrossthreekeypillarsof?nancialstability,development?nanceandtrade.

WhiletheBrettonWoodsinstitutionshaveestablishedarules-based,multilateralsystemofglobaleconomicgovernancethathasbroughtmanybene?tstotheglobaleconomysinceWorldWarII,ourpolicy-orientedresearch?ndsthatthissystemisinurgentneedoffundamentalreform.Tothatend,weadvancethreekeyrecommendations.

First,resourcesfor?nancialstabilityanddevelopmentmustbescaledupandmadeavailableacrosstheBrettonWoodsinstitutionstobackstoptheglobaleconomyandcountriesinmomentsofcrisisandmeetdevelopmentneeds.Second,lendingpracticesandprioritiesattheBrettonWoodsinstitutionsmustbeoverhauledinordertosupportthestructuraltransformationsrequiredforlow-carbonsustainabledevelopmentandeconomicgrowth.Finally,theBrettonWoodsinstitutionsareinneedofarebalancingofvoiceandrepresentationtoensurethatEMDEsandthemostvulnerablecountrieshaveasayinthepoliciesandpracticestheywillbesubjecttoinmomentsofcrisisandbeyond.

Thereportisstructuredasfollows.Foreachofthethreepillars,thebene?tsandcontributionsoftherelevantBrettonWoodsinstitutionsareexplored,followedbyadiscussionoftheirkeyshortcomingsasidenti?edbyourresearch.The?nalsectionadvancespolicy-orientedrecommendationsforfundamentalreformstotheBrettonWoodsinstitutionstomakethembigger,betterandmoreinclusiveforthedecadestocome.

TheBrettonWoodsInstitutionsat80:TowardsABigger,BetterandMoreInclusiveGlobalEconomicGovernanceArchitecture1

PILLAR1:FINANCIALSTABILITYANDTHEIMF

The?rstpillaroftheBrettonWoodsinstitutions,?nancialstability,isanchoredbytheIMF.TheinternationalmonetarysystemthatemergedatBrettonWoods?lledacriticalgapintheglobaleconomy.TheIMF,theonlyglobal,multilateralrules-basedinstitutionprovidingbalanceofpaymentsupport,iscrucialformaintaininginternational?nancialstabilityandpreventing?nancialcrisiscontagioninahighlyglobalizedsystem(RodrikandSubramanian2009;Obstfeld2009).Accordingtoourresearchandthebroaderliterature,theIMFhascontributedtoglobal?nancialstabilityinanumberofways,forexample,byprovidingliquiditytocountriesinneedorbyconductingeconomicsurveillance(Stiglitz2011;BradlowandGallagher2021).

Overthepasttwodecades,therehasbeenaproliferationofalternativesourcesofliquidity?nanceforcertaincountriestocombatbalanceofpaymentcrises(KringandGallagher2019;KringandGrimes2019;Muhlichetal.2022;Barrowcloughetal.2022).AsFigure1shows,currently,theIMFrepresentslessthanone-thirdoftheGlobalFinancialSafetyNet(GFSN)-thenetworkofinstitutionsaimedatsupportingcountriesduringtimesof?nancialdistressincludingtheIMF,regional?nancialarrangements(RFAs)andbilateralcreditlinesprovidedbycentralbankscalledcurrencyswaps.WhiletheemergenceandexpansionofRFAsandcentralbankcurrencyswaplineshavecontributedtoadiversi?edGFSN,lowerincomecountriesarelargelyexcludedfromtheseresources(Mühlichetal.2022).Thesystemicbiasagainstlower-incomecountriesincurrencyswapsarisesfromtheeconomic,trade,?nancialandpoliticalconsiderationsofthecentralbanksprovidingtheseswapsinrelationtotherecipientcountries(Godaetal.2024).Moreover,thelackofanAfricanRFAcontributestothisbias(Dagahetal.2019).Ataminimum,theIMFensuresthateconomiesnotconsideredsystemicallyimportanthavealendertoturntointimesofcrisis,thoughthesu憂ciencyoftheseresourcesmaybelimited(Mühlichetal.2022;Godaetal.2024).

Figure1:CompositionoftheGlobalFinancialSafetyNet

Source:AdaptedfromMühlichetal(2022).

Toitscredit,theIMFhasshownsomewillingnesstoevolve,albeitataslowpace.TheIMFrespondedrelativelyrapidlytotheCOVID-19pandemic,recognizingtheneedforcountercyclicalpublicspending(GallagherandMaldonado-Carlin2020;RamosandGallagher2021)andvitally,itsmembersagreed

2TheBrettonWoodsInstitutionsat80:TowardsABigger,BetterandMoreInclusiveGlobalEconomicGovernanceArchitecture

toinject$650billionworthofSpecialDrawingRights(SDRs),supplementaryinternationalreserveassetscreatedbytheIMF,intotheglobaleconomy(Gallagheretal.2020).TheIMFhasalsocometounderstandclimatechangeasbeingcloselytiedtoitscoremandateandlaunchednewclimate-focusedinitiativesliketheResilienceandSustainabilityTrust(RSF)(Titelmanetal.2023).TheIMFalsomovedtowardsbecomingmorepermanentlyresourced,basedonthedecisionstakenatthe16thGeneralReviewofQuotas,theprocessbywhichtheIMFdeterminesthesu?ciencyofitsresourcebase,thoughincreasedshareswereultimatelyallocatedequi-proportionally.Hence,thisuniformpercentageincreaseofquotasdidnotadjustthecurrentquotasystemtore?ectthecurrenteconomicweightandpowerofdevelopingcountries(KringandGao2023).WhiletheIMF’sscaleofavailablelendingresourcesdidnotincreaseandsigni?cantshortcomingsinvoiceandrepresentationremain,thismovetopermanent,quota-basedresourcesisawelcomeshiftalignedwithGroupof20(G20)objectivesforstrengtheningtheGFSNinrecentyears(IntergovernmentalGroupof242022).

TheIMFalsohasakeyroletoplayinsupportingcountriesthatareexperiencingdebtdistress.Tobegin,theIMFmonitorsandassessesdebtvulnerabilitiesofcountries,throughitsDebtSustainabilityAnalyses(DSAs),atooltoassessacountry’sabilitytomeetitscurrentandfuturedebtobligationswithoutexceptional?nancialassistanceordefault(Hakura2020).TheresultofaDSAcanin?uencetheIMF’sdecisionofwhetheracountryneedsdebtrestructuringandtheamountofdebtreliefthatshouldbeprovided(Zucker-Marquesetal.2024).Moreover,giventheIMF’s‘super-senior’creditorstatus(withthehighestpriorityforrepayment),thisinstitutionprovides?nancetocountriesduringdebtrestructuring-whennoothercreditorwouldbewillingtoprovideadditionalresources.

WhilethecreationandevolutionoftheIMFasakeypillaroftheBrettonWoodsinstitutionshavebroughtconsiderablebene?ts,signi?cantshortcomingsmustbeaddressedfortheIMFtomaintainitscredibilityandlegitimacyastheanchoroftheGFSN.

Intermsofitslendingcapacity,theIMFhasfailedtokeeppacewiththegrowthoftheglobaleconomyorglobaltrade?ows,as“itssizerelativetoglobalGDPorglobaltradevolumeshasfallen”(Kringetal.2023;MühlichandZucker-Marques2023).Whilethe16thGeneralReviewofQuotas,resultedinanincreaseinthepermanentresourcebaseoftheIMF,therewasnonetincreaseintheIMF’slendingcapacity(KringandGao2023).Infact,theIMFwouldneedtodoublethequotasoflow-andmiddle-incomecountriesinordertocorrectforstructuralgapsintheGFSN(MühlichandZucker-Marques2023).

Inaddition,theIMFhasbeenwidelycriticizedfortheprocyclicalconditionalityassociatedwithitslendingprograms.TheIMFhaspromotedcontractionaryconditionalitiesinitslending,withborrowingcountries’lackofvoiceintheIMFandlackofalternativelendersoferingthemlittlepowertopushback(Stubbsetal.2021;Rayetal.2022;Merling2022).TheIMF’sconditionalitieshaveregressivedistributionalefects,asgovernmentsareforcedtocutpublicservicesandpublicsectorwages,andasigni?cantbodyofevidencedemonstratestheseprocyclicalconditionalitiesalsofailtoachievetheirstatedpurposeofstimulatinggrowth(Ocampo2017;KentikelenisandStubbs2023).WhiletheIMF’spublicpositionisthatithasmovedawayfromausterityanditsconditionalitieshaveshiftedtosomedegree(IMF2014),withtheexceptionof2020duringthepeakoftheCOVID-19crisis,theIMF’s?scalconsolidationconditionalitiesremainprominant(Rayetal.2022).Moreover,theinstitutionremainsexcessivelyskepticalofthepublicsectoranditssocialspending?oorsareinsu?cienttopreventnegativesocialrepercussionsof?scalconsolidationinlowerincomecountries.

Voiceandrepresentationalsoremainasigni?cantissueattheIMF,asEMDEsarehighlyunderrepresentedinIMFdecision-makingprocesses(Merling2022).TheshareofquotasandvotingpowerforEMDEsisdramaticallylessthantheirshareoftheglobalpopulation,andalsolagssigni?cantlybehindtheGlobalSouth’sshareoftheglobaleconomy(Merling2022;MerlingandKring2023).Repeateddelaysinpromisestorealignquotashaveallowedtheseimbalancestogrow

TheBrettonWoodsInstitutionsat80:TowardsABigger,BetterandMoreInclusiveGlobalEconomicGovernanceArchitecture3

andunderminethelegitimacyoftheinstitution(Kringetal.2023;KringandGao2023).Indeed,thepowerofdecision-makingattheIMFisdisproportionatelyconcentratedamongahandfulofadvancedeconomies,“withtheUnitedStatesmaintainingadominantroleandvetopowerofmajorreforms”(Merling2022).ThislackofvoiceandrepresentationforEMDEsisespeciallyconcerningconsideringthattheyaremostlikelytoneedassistancefromtheIMFandbesubjecttoitsconditionality,allwhilesimultaneouslyholdingtheleastin?uenceovertheFund(Merling2022).Furthermore,undersizedquotasharesleadtoinadequatelendingthresholdsandSDRallocationsforEMDEs,whichfurthercontributesto?nancialinstability.

Figure2:IMFQuotasandVotingSharesComparedtoShareofPopulationandGlobalEconomy,byGrouping

Source:MerlingandKring2023.

Finally,theIMFbearsresponsibilityfortheinadequaciesoftheglobalsovereigndebtarchitecture.Asthelenderoflastresort,itholdssigni?cantin?uenceoverdebtrestructuringnegotiations,whichhavebecomeincreasinglycomplexduetorisingdebtburdensandamorediversecreditorlandscape,asshowninFigure3.

Figure3:EMDEs’(excludingChina)PublicExternalDebtCompositionbyCreditor,2008-2022,inUSDBillions

3,500

3,000

Billions(USD)

2,500

2,000

1,500

1,000

500

0

Bondholders

China(Bilateral)

ParisClub(Bilateral)

OtherBilateral

OtherPrivateCreditorsWorldBank

OtherMultilateralCreditors

UseofIMFCredit

200820182022

Source:ZuckerMarquesetal.(2024)basedonWorldBankInternationalDebtStatistics(2023).

4TheBrettonWoodsInstitutionsat80:TowardsABigger,BetterandMoreInclusiveGlobalEconomicGovernanceArchitecture

Akeyproblemofthecurrentdebtrenegotiationprocessliesinthe?awedDSAs.TheIMF’sDSAsoftenfailtoconsiderthelevelofspendingrequiredtomeetdevelopmentandclimategoals,aswellasclimateshocks(Gallagher&Maldonado2022;Zucker-Marquesetal.2024),resultingininadequatedebtreliefpackagesormisdiagnoseswherecountriesneedingdebtreliefarenotidenti?edassuch.FlawedDSAscan,inparticular,havenegativeconsequencesforthemostdebtandclimate-vulnerableregionslikesub-SaharanAfrica(Gallagheretal.2023)andgroupsliketheVulnerableTwenty(V20)GroupofMinistersofFinanceoftheClimateVulnerableForum(Bhandary&Marins2024).

Additionally,theIMF’spracticeofapplyingsurcharges-oradditionalfeesonborrowingmembers-isnotinlinewiththeroleoftheIMFasalenderoflastresortor‘super-senior’creditor,assurchargeshavebeenshowntoexacerbatedebtvulnerabilities(StiglitzandGallagher2022).SurchargeswereinitiallydesignedtoincentivizeIMFmemberstorepaytheirloansquicklyandbuildreservesforthepossibilityofdefault.However,surchargeshaveproventobecounterproductive,ashigherborrowingcostsimposedonIMFmembersjeopardizetheirabilitytorepaytheirdebtandfurtherincreasesrelianceontheFund(StiglitzandGallagher2022).

PILLARII:DEVELOPMENTFINANCEANDTHEWORLDBANK

Intermsofthedevelopment?nancepillaroftheBrettonWoodsinstitutions,multilateraldevelopmentbanks(MDBs)havebeenanimportantsourceoflow-cost,long-term?nanceforEMDEs,providing?nanceandexpertisetocountriesaroundtheworld.MDBshaveanimportantroletoplayinsupportingthetransformationofeconomiesandprovidingcounter-cyclical?nance.Overtime,MDBs,suchastheWorldBank,haveexpandedtheirfocusfrompredominantlyinfrastructuretosocialsectorsaswell.In2022,USTreasurySecretaryJanetYellencalledontheWorldBanktoevolveitspracticestohelpclientgovernmentsaddress21stcenturychallenges(Yellen2022).TheWorldBa