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STATEOFTHEU.S.SEMICONDUCTORINDUSTRY
20
24
TABLEOFCONTENTS
2024STATEOFTHEU.S.SEMICONDUCTORINDUSTRY3
6CHIPSIMPLEMENTATION
11THESEMICONDUCTORWORKFORCE
13EXPANDINGTHETALENTPIPELINE
16PROMOTINGSUSTAINABILITY
17SUPPLYCHAINREBALANCING
19GOVERNMENTSRACETODEVELOPCHIPSTRATEGIESANDINCENTIVES
21TRADEANDSEMICONDUCTORS
22GEOPOLITICSANDTHESEMICONDUCTORINDUSTRY
23THEGLOBALSEMICONDUCTORMARKET
24SEMICONDUCTORDEMANDDRIVERS
27GLOBALMARKETSHARE
28U.S.TECHNOLOGYCOMPETITIVENESS
30U.S.SEMICONDUCTORINDUSTRYDOMESTICECONOMICCONTRIBUTION
31U.S.SEMICONDUCTORINNOVATIONPOLICYLANDSCAPE
INTRODUCTION
2024STATEOFTHEU.S.SEMICONDUCTORINDUSTRY4
SEMICONDUCTORS—THECHIPSTHATENABLE
VIRTUALLYALLMODERNTECHNOLOGIES—
areoneofthemosttransformativeinventionsinallofhumanhistory.Thankstogroundbreaking
advancementsinsemiconductorresearch,design,
andmanufacturingoverthelast65years,
modernchipscanhaveuptotensofbillionsoftransistorsonasmallsliceofsilicon.
Therapidpaceofsemiconductorinnovationhasmadetheworldsmarter,healthier,
greener,andbetterconnected.Andchipsarepoweringthetransformativetechnologies
oftomorrow,includingartificialintelligence,autonomousdrivingandelectricvehicles,andadvancedwirelessnetworks.
In2023,despiteacyclicalmarketdownturn
thatlingeredearlyintheyear,globalsales
reboundedthesecondhalfoftheyeartoreach$527billion.Nearly1trillionsemiconductors
weresoldglobally,morethan100chipsfor
everypersononearth.Withthedownturnnowoveranddemandforsemiconductorshigh,
industryanalystsprojectdouble-digitannualgrowthin2024.
Risingdemandhasalsopromptednew
industryinvestmentstoincreasechip
production.ThanksinparttothelandmarkCHIPSandScienceAct,theUnitedStatesisforecasttosecurealargershareof
newprivateinvestmentinsemiconductormanufacturing.Infact,asofAugust
2024,companiesinthesemiconductor
ecosystemhadannouncedmorethan90newmanufacturingprojectsintheU.S.sinceCHIPSwasfirstintroducedinCongress,totaling
nearly$450billioninannouncedinvestmentsacross28states.Theseinvestmentsare
projectedtocreatetensofthousandsofdirectjobsandsupporthundredsofthousandsof
additionaljobsthroughouttheU.S.economy.Theindustryisalsomakinginvestmentsin
countriesaroundtheworld,creatingaresilientsupplychain.
InthedecadefollowingCHIPSenactment
(2022to2032),theUnitedStatesisprojected
tomorethantripleitssemiconductor
manufacturingcapacity—thehighestrateofgrowthintheworldduringthatperiod—accordingtoaMay2024SIA-Boston
ConsultingGroupreport.ThereportalsoforecaststheU.S.willgrowitsshareof
advanced(lessthan10nm)chipmanufacturingto28%ofglobalcapacityby2032andcapture28%oftotalglobalcapitalexpenditures
(capex)from2024to2032.Bycomparison,intheabsenceoftheCHIPSAct,thereportestimatestheU.S.wouldhavecapturedonly9%ofglobalcapexby2032.
ReinforcingchipsupplychainsonU.S.shoresofferstremendousopportunities,butitalsopresentssignificantchallenges.Forexample,asU.S.chipoperationsexpandintheyears
2024STATEOFTHEU.S.SEMICONDUCTORINDUSTRY5
ahead,sotoowilldemandforskilledtalent.
A2023SIA-OxfordEconomicsstudyprojectedashortfallof67,000technicians,computer
scientists,andengineersinthesemiconductorindustryby2030andagapof1.4millionsuchworkersthroughoutthebroaderU.S.economy.Forthesemiconductorindustrytogrowand
innovateatitsfullpotential,andfordomesticinvestmentprojectionstobefullyrealized,
governmentleadersmustadvancepoliciesthatbuildonourindustry’slongstanding
workforcedevelopmentefforts,expandthepipelineofSTEMgraduatesinAmerica,andretainandattractmoreofthetopengineersandscientistsfromaroundtheworld.
Policyactionisneededinotherareasaswellifwearetobuildonourcurrentmomentum.TheU.S.shouldadoptmeasurestofurther
strengthenthesemiconductorsupplychainbyextendingthedurationoftheincentivesundertheCHIPSandScienceAct,includingtheadvancedmanufacturinginvestment
credit,whichisscheduledtoexpirein2026.
Further,theexistingCHIPStaxcreditshouldbeexpandedtoincludechipdesigntoensuremoreofthiscriticalprocessisconductedintheU.S.Inaddition,theU.S.shouldcontinuetofundthefederalresearchprograms
authorizedintheCHIPSandScienceActto
maintainandgrowU.S.technologyleadership.AndtoensuretheU.S.semiconductor
industryremainsgloballycompetitiveand
abletocontinuouslyinvestinresearchand
innovation,theU.S.shouldpursueagreementsandinitiativesthatopenaccesstooverseas
marketswherecompaniescansellthechipsmanufacturedhereathome.
Semiconductorshaveneverplayedamore
importantroleinsocietythantheydotoday,andthefutureofourindustryhasneverbeenbrighter.SIAlooksforwardtocontinuing
toworkwithgovernmentleadersto
strengthenthisfoundationalindustryformanyyearstocome.
2024STATEOFU.S.SEMICONDUCTORINDUSTRY6
CHIPS
IMPLEMENTATION
ImplementationoftheCHIPSandScienceActcontinuesin2024,withsignificantheadwaymadeinrollingoutthelaw’slandmarkmanufacturingincentivesandR&Dinvestments.
2024STATEOFTHEU.S.SEMICONDUCTORINDUSTRY6
CHIPSIMPLEMENTATION
MANUFACTURINGINCENTIVES
TheCHIPSProgramOffice(CPO)continuestomakeprogressinitsdeploymentofthe
$39billionCHIPSmanufacturingincentivesprogram.Consistentwiththegoalsofthe
law,theCHIPSandScienceActincentives
announcedthusfarwillenhancenational
security,createjobs,boostU.S.andlocal
economies,andmakeAmericastrongerandmoretechnologicallyadvanced.
Applicationsforcommercialfabrication
facilitiesandequipmentandmaterials
manufacturingfacilitiesarenolongerbeingaccepted.AsofAugust2024,theCPO
hasannounced17preliminaryagreements
representingover$32billioningrantsand
$28billioninloansacross26projectsin16
states.Theseprojectsincludeprojectedtotalinvestmentofmorethan$350billionand
areexpectedtocreateover118,000newjobs--over38,000manufacturingjobsandover78,000constructionjobs.Afterstrikinga
preliminaryagreement,companiesengageinfurtherduediligenceandnegotiationwiththeCommerceDepartmentbeforereachingafinaldeal.TheCPOplanstocommitallfundsbytheendof2024.
Duetostrongdemandforfundingthroughoutthesupplychainandlimitedavailablefunding,CPOunfortunatelyannouncedthesuspensionofafundingopportunityforcommercial
researchanddevelopmentfacilities.
Furthermore,theCHIPSadvanced
manufacturinginvestmentcredit(AMIC)alsoprovidesapowerfulincentiveforinvestmentsinfabricationandequipmentmanufacturingfacilities.Asofthedateofpublication,the
industryisawaitingfinalregulationsfromtheDepartmentoftheTreasury.
2024STATEOFTHEU.S.SEMICONDUCTORINDUSTRY7
CHIPSIMPLEMENTATION
2024STATEOFTHEU.S.SEMICONDUCTORINDUSTRY8
CHIPSSPARKING
COMPANYINVESTMENTS
SincetheintroductionoftheCHIPSActin2020,companiesinthesemiconductorecosystemhaveannouncedmorethan
90projectsacross28states,totalingnearly$450billioninprivateinvestments.These
projectswillcreateover58,000ofnew,
high-qualityjobsintheU.S.semiconductorecosystemalone,aswellashundredsof
thousandsofsupportedjobsthroughoutthebroaderU.S.economy.
Thefigurebelowshowsprojectsinthe
domesticsemiconductorsupplychain
announcedbetweenMay2020andAugust2024,representingindustryinvestmentinsemiconductorfabricationandpackaging,equipmentandmaterialsmanufacturing,andR&Dfacilities.
THECHIPSACTINACTION
SEMICONDUCTORSUPPLYCHAINMANUFACTURINGINVESTMENTSANNOUNCEDMAY2020-AUGUST2024
●SemiconductorsEquipment
●Materials
R&DFacilityPackaging
CHIPSIMPLEMENTATION
R&DINVESTMENTS
AcrosstheDepartmentsofCommerceandDefense,aswellasattheNationalScienceFoundation,activitiesarerampingupforthe$13billioninR&DfundingappropriatedthroughtheCHIPSandScienceAct.
TheDepartmentofCommerceisproceedingwiththeNationalSemiconductorTechnologyCenter(NSTC),awardingit$5billion.The
NSTCisexpectedtobethecenterpieceof
theCommerceDepartment’ssemiconductorR&Dactivitiesandwillmostlikelyconsist
ofanationalnetworkofresearchfacilities,
includingaNSTCAdministrativeandDesignFacility,aNSTCEUVCenter,andaNSTC
PrototypingandNAPMPAdvancedPackagingPilotingFacility.
Commercealsoinitiatedactivitiesforits
NationalAdvancedPackagingManufacturingProgram(NAPMP).This$3billionprogram
willconsistofaseriesofinternalNational
InstituteofStandardsandTechnology(NIST)researchprogramstodistributegrantfunding,
aswellasthebrick-and-mortarpiloting
facilitywhichwillbeco-locatedwiththeNSTCprototypingfacility.
ProgressisalsounderwayfortheCHIPS
MetrologyProgram,theCHIPSDigitalTwinsManufacturingUSAInstitute,andtheDODMicroelectronicsCommons.
Takenasawhole,theseprogramswillhelpadvancesemiconductorinnovationandbuild
onU.S.technologyleadership.ForupdatedinformationontherolloutoftheresearchprogramsundertheCHIPSAct,visit
/chips-rd-programs
.
2024OFU.SEMICONDUCTORINDUSTRY9
CHIPSIMPLEMENTATION
2024STATEOFTHEU.S.SEMICONDUCTORINDUSTRY10
STRENGTHENING
THEU.S.SUPPLYCHAIN
AnewreportbySIAandtheBostonConsultingGrouponthesemiconductorsupplychainforecastssignificantimprovementsintheresilienceofthesupplychainintheU.S.and
globallyincomingyears.Inparticular,thestudyshowsinvestmentsfromtheindustry,
facilitatedbyincentivesundertheCHIPSAct,aremakingprogressingrowingdomesticsemiconductormanufacturingandstrengtheningtheU.S.economy.Amongotherthings,thereportprojectsthefollowing:
U.S.fabcapacitywillincreaseby203%from2022-2032,atriplingofU.S.capacity.The
projected203%growthisthelargestprojectedpercentincreaseintheworldoverthattime.
TheU.S.willsecuremorethanone-quarter(28%)ofglobalcapitalexpendituresbetween2024-2032—anestimated$646billion—anamountsecondonlytoTaiwan.IntheabsenceoftheCHIPSAct,theU.S.wouldhavecapturedonly9%ofglobalcapexby2032,accordingtothereport.
TheU.S.willincreaseitsshareofglobalfabcapacityforthefirsttimeindecades,growingfrom10%todayto14%by2032.IntheabsenceofCHIPSenactment,theU.S.sharewouldhaveslippedfurtherto8%by2032,accordingtothereport.
TheU.S.willgrowitscapabilitiesincriticaltechnologysegments,suchasleading-edgefabrication,DRAMmemory,analog,andadvancedpackaging.Forexample,U.S.capacityforadvancedlogic(lessthan10nm)willgrowto28%by2032,includingnewcapabilitiesattheleadingedge.
Despitethissubstantialprogress,areasofvulnerabilityintheecosystemremain,andadditionalworkisneededtomaintainthismomentumandsecurekeyareasofthechipsupplychain.
GLOBALSEMICONDUCTORCAPACITYINCREASEBYLOCATION
(%CHANGEINWSPMCAPACITY)2012-2022VS.2022-2032
365%
203%
124%
WorldAverage
22-32(108%)12-22(81%)
129%
97%
90%
86%
86%
72%
67%
62%
36%
11%
63%
U.S.EuropeJapanSKoreaTaiwanChinaOthers
Source:SEMI,BCGAnalysis
2024STATEOFTHEU.S.SEMICONDUCTORINDUSTRY11
THESEMICONDUCTORWORKFORCE
Havingacompetitivedomesticworkforceandresilient
manufacturingcapabilitiesarecriticaltoAmerica’s
leadinsemiconductors.Inaddition,astrongdomestic
semiconductorindustryisessentialtotheU.S.economy.
ThesemiconductorindustryhasaconsiderableeconomicfootprintintheUnitedStates,withroughly338,000peopleworkingintheindustry,includingrolesinchipdesign,electronicdesignautomation(EDA),semiconductormanufacturing,andequipmentmanufacturing.Additionally,semiconductorsenableover300
downstreameconomicsectorsaccountingforover26millionU.S.workers.
U.S.SEMICONDUCTORWORKFORCEBYFIELD,2023
DeviceManufacturing
200,000
MachineryManufacturing
29,000
Design
100,000
EDA
9,000
TotalJobs
338,000
050,000100,000150,000200,000250,000300,000350,000
Employment
Source:CES,QCEW,OxfordEconomics
TheU.S.semiconductorindustryaccountsformorethan300,000directU.S.jobsandnearly2millionadditionalindirectandinducedU.S.jobs.
ONE
U.S.semiconductor
jobsupports
5.7
jobsinotherpartsin
theU.S.economy...
...that’snearly
2,000,000
ADDITIONAL
Americanjobs
2024STATEOFTHEU.S.SEMICONDUCTORINDUSTRY12
2024STATEOFTHEU.S.SEMICONDUCTORINDUSTRY13
EXPANDINGTHETALENTPIPELINE
Withdemandforchipsontheriseandnewcapacitycomingonlineintheyearsahead,demandforindustry-readytalentwillalsoincrease.
Accordingtoa2023studybySIAandtheBostonConsultingGroup,theUnitedStatesfacesasignificantshortageoftechnicians,
computerscientists,andengineers,withaprojectedshortfallof67,000workersinthesemiconductorindustryby2030andagapof1.4millionsuchworkersthroughoutthebroaderU.S.economy.
U.S.SEMICONDUCTORWORKFORCEANDEXPECTEDGAP,2010-2030
JobstodateProjected67,000,or58%,
ofnewjobsacross
manufacturinganddesignwillriskgoingunfilledby2030.
450,000
CHIPSActenacted
Industrytoadd114,800jobs
by2030
400,000
350,000
Whoismissing?
Employment
300,000
Totals
13,400computerscientists
250,000
Design
5,100PhDs
12,300master’s
9,900
bachelor’s
200,000
27,300
engineers
150,000
Manufacturing
100,000
26,400
technicians
50,000
2010-20222023-2030
2024STATEOFTHEU.S.SEMICONDUCTORINDUSTRY14
Tomeetthischallengeandaddressthegrowingtalentgap,SIA
recommendsaholisticpublicpolicyapproachwiththefollowingpillars:
1.BUILDTHESUPPLYOFENGINEERS
ANDSCIENTISTS
InvestintheInnovationWorkforce:
Increaseandsustainfunding
forfederalresearchanddevelopment(R&D)programstobuildAmerica’s
innovationworkforce.
High-skilledGlobalTalent:AdoptcriticalandtargetedSTEMimmigrationreforms
toensureAmericaattractsandretainstheworld’stoptalent.
2.IMPROVEANDSIMPLIFYTRAINING
OFSKILLEDTECHNICIANS
High-qualityWorkforceTraining:Expandworkforcetrainingprogramsthatmeet
industryneeds,includingapprenticeshipsandcareerandtechnicaltraining
programs,withcommonandtransparentmetricsofperformance.
StandardizationandPortabilityofSkills:
Easethetransitionacrosseducationalinstitutionsandworkforcedevelopmentprograms.
3.CROSS-CUTTINGWORKFORCE
CHALLENGES:EXPANDINGTHEPIPELINEANDADDRESSINGAFFORDABILITY
ExpandandAdvancetheSTEMTalentPipeline:PrioritizeSTEMeducationforindividualsenteringoralreadyinthe
pipelineandexpandthepoolofpotentialworkers,includingveterans,women,
andunderrepresentedminorities.
Affordability:Removebarrierstoentryintosemiconductoreducationand
workforcetrainingprogramsthroughPellgrants,favorableloans,andotherfinancialincentives.
2024STATEOFTHEU.S.SEMICONDUCTORINDUSTRY15
SUSTAININGU.S.LEADERSHIPINSEMICONDUCTORDESIGN
Advancesinchipdesignhaveledto
breakthroughsinsemiconductor-enabled
technologiesthatareadrivingforcebehind21stcenturyU.S.technologyleadership.
ThisleadershipprovidestheU.S.withthetechnologicaledgetobethe“firstmover”incountlessindustriesandsecurethe
economicandsecuritybenefitsresultingfromthisadvantage.
Currently,U.S.companiesaccountforhalf
ofglobalchipdesignrevenue,butglobal
competitorsarechallengingthisleadership.Somecountriesprovidetaxcreditsofupto50%fordesignefforts,whiletheU.S.failstoofferatargetedincentiveforchipdesign.
TomaintainU.S.leadershipinchipdesign
—andcontinuetoderivetheenormous
economicbenefitsandstrategicadvantageofthisleadership—theU.S.mustensureithasafavorableclimateformorechipdesigntobeconductedintheU.S.
BipartisanlegislationwasrecentlyintroducedtheHouseofRepresentativestoexpandtheCHIPSAct’s25%investmenttaxcreditto
includeinvestmentsinsemiconductordesign.Passingthe“SemiconductorTechnology
AdvancementandResearch(STAR)Act”willestablishanimportantincentivetomaintainandenhancecriticalU.S.semiconductor
technologyleadership.
2024STATEOFTHEU.S.SEMICONDUCTORINDUSTRY16
PROMOTING
SUSTAINABILITY
Thesemiconductorindustryhasalonghistoryofleadership
onenvironmentalsustainability,rangingfromactions
toreducegreenhousegasemissionsassociatedwith
semiconductorfabricationprocessestoreplacingchemicalsofconcernwithinsemiconductormanufacturingprocesses.
TACKLINGTHEPFAS
CHALLENGEHEAD-ON
Oneimportantsustainabilitypriorityforthe
semiconductorindustryistoaddressthe
environmentalandhealthconcernsassociatedwithper-andpolyfluorinatedsubstances
(PFAS),abroadcategoryofchemicalsidentifiedaspotentiallyposingenvironmentalandhealthrisks.SIAestablishedtheSemiconductor
PFASConsortiuminJanuary2022to
betterunderstandtheusesofPFASinthe
semiconductorsupplychain,PFAStreatment
anddetectionmethods,abatementandprocesstechnologies,andthepotentialavailability
(orabsence)ofalternatives.
Todate,theConsortiumhasidentifiedover1,000usesofPFASinthesemiconductor
manufacturingprocessandassociated
supplychain,includingnumerousessentialapplications.TheConsortiumhaspublishedtechnicalwhitepapers,availableat
/PFAS,documenting
theseuses,theuniqueperformanceandfunctionalattributesofPFASineach
application,andthechallengesassociated
withidentifyingandqualifyingsubstitutes.Whileresearchcontinuesonidentifying
potentialalternativestoPFASinthe
semiconductorfabricationprocess,additional
workisneededonprocessoptimizationto
reducetheuseofPFASanddetectionand
treatmenttechnologiestominimizeoreliminatereleasestotheenvironment.
AsregulatorsaroundtheworldtakeactiontoaddressthechallengecertainPFASposetohumanhealthandtheenvironment,SIAencouragespolicymakerstoleveragethefindingsofthePFASConsortiumand
accountfortheessentialityofPFAStosemiconductormanufacturing.
2024STATEOFTHEU.S.SEMICONDUCTORINDUSTRY17
SUPPLYCHAINREBALANCING
StrengtheningAmericanandglobalsemiconductorsupplychainsremainsatoppriorityfortheU.S.semiconductorindustry,
withcompaniesacrossthesectorworkingtodiversifyriskby
broadeningtheiroperationalfootprint.Governmentshavealso
takenaparticularinterestinadvancingsupplychainresilience
whenitcomestotheproductionofchipsandupstreammaterialscapacity,withagoaltoreducestrategicdependencies.
ITSIFund:TheCHIPSandScienceActallocated$500milliontotheInternationalTechnology
SecurityandInnovation(ITSI)Fund,whichwillhelpexpandanddiversifysegmentsofthe
semiconductorsupplychainssuchascritical
materialsandassembly,testing,andpackaging.
TheStateDepartmenthasestablishedpartnershipswithCostaRica,Panama,Vietnam,Indonesia,thePhilippines,andMexicoundertheITSIFund.
U.S.-Japan:TheU.S.andJapanarepursuing
arangeofcooperativeeffortstoenhance
semiconductorsupplychainresilience,includingthroughtheU.S.-JapanCommercialand
IndustrialPartnership(JUCIP),cooperationbetweentheNationalSemiconductor
TechnologyCenter(NSTC)andJapan’s
Leading-EdgeSemiconductorTechnology
Center(LSTC),andtheU.S.-JapanUniversityPartnershipforWorkforceAdvancementandResearch&DevelopmentinSemiconductors(UPWARDS)initiative.
U.S.-Korea:TheU.S.andKoreaarealso
deepeningcollaborationontechnologyand
economicsecuritypoliciesinsupportofthe
semiconductorindustry.Forexample,theU.S.-KoreaSupplyChainandCommercialDialogue(SCCD)establishedasemiconductor-specificworkinggrouptoenhanceindustrysupply
chainsandpromotejointR&Defforts.
2024STATEOFTHEU.S.SEMICONDUCTORINDUSTRY18
U.S.-EU:ThroughtheTradeandTechnology
Council(TTC),theU.S.andEuropeanUnion(EU)
arecooperatingtoimprovetheresilienceoftransatlanticsemiconductorsupplychains
andfacilitateinformationexchangeon
governmentincentivesprovidedtothe
semiconductorsector.TheU.S.andEUmayalsodevelopjointorcooperativemeasurestoaddressdistortionaryeffectsontheglobalsupplychainforlegacysemiconductors.
NorthAmericanLeadersSummit:InMay2023,theU.S.,Canada,andMexicoestablishedthe
firstNorthAmericaSemiconductorConferencetocollectivelystrengthentheNorthAmericansemiconductorsupplychain,includingcriticalmineralsandworkforce.Insubsequent
dialogues,thegovernmentscommittedto
workwithacademiaandtheprivatesectortodeveloppoliciesthatwilladvanceregionalcompetitivenessinsemiconductors.
U.S.-India:TheU.S.andIndiaarecollaborating
tocreatestrongerandmoresecure
semiconductorsupplychainsthroughmultiplebilateraldialogues.AFebruary2024InformationTechnologyandInnovationFoundation(ITIF)
reportfoundIndiacouldexpanditsroleinsemiconductorsupplychains,particularlyifthegovernmentpursuesandimplementssystemicpolicyreformstobetterattract
andsupportsemiconductorcompanyoperationsinthecountry.
2024STATEOFTHEU.S.SEMICONDUCTORINDUSTRY19
GOVERNMENTSRACETODEVELOPCHIP
STRATEGIESANDINCENTIVES
Governmentsaroundtheglobearedevelopingcomprehensivestrategiesandofferingtargetedincentivepackagestoattractsemiconductorinvestment.
Companieshaverespondedbyannouncinglarge-scaleinvestmentsinnew
front-endandback-endmanufacturingcapacity,R&Danddesigncenters,and
workforcedevelopment.Whenofferingincentives,governmentsshouldrequire
aminimumlevelofprivatesectorinvestmentinprojectstoensuregovernmentsupportismarketbased.SIAandBCGpublishedareportinAugust2024
outliningkeyfactorssemiconductorcompaniesevaluatewhenselectingsitesforsemiconductorecosysteminvestments.
China:Chinacontinuestoinvestheavilyinitsdomesticsemiconductorproductioncapacity,recentlyannouncinganother$47billionin
fundingfrom19governmentandstate-ownedinvestorsinthethirdphaseofitsNationalIC
Fund.Chinaisalsousingarangeoflevers,
includinglocalcontentpreferences,domesticstandards,andinformalgovernmentdirectivestocreatedemandfordomesticallyproduced
semiconductors.
EU:TheEUChipsAct,enactedinSeptember
2023,seekstomobilize$47billioninpublicandprivatefundingforEurope’ssemiconductor
ecosystem,withsubsidypackagesdisabused
byEUmemberstates.ThegoaloftheEUChipsActistodoubleEurope’sglobalmarketin
semiconductorproductionto20%by2030.
Japan:Japanisinvestingroughly$25billiontodevelopitsdomesticsemiconductorproductioncapabilities.Japanhasdirectedthisfundingtosubsidizefabconstructionaswellastosupportleading-edgechipinnovationthroughRapidus,adomesticsemiconductormanufacturerthataimstoproduce2nmchipsby2027.
Korea:InMay2024,Koreaannounced
asupportpackagetotalingapproximately
$19billiontobolsterdomesticchipdesignandmanufacturingcapacity.ThisfollowsaJanuary2024announcementtobuildtheworld’slargestsemiconductormegaclusterinthecountry,
withaninvestmentof$472billionoverthen
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