1977年巴菲特致股東的信_W

1、巴菲特研究中心 Research Centre for BuffettismBuffetts Letters To Berkshire Shareholders 1977巴菲特致股東的信 1977 年 Operating earnings in 1977 of $21,904,000, or $22.54 per 1977 年本公司的營業(yè)凈利為 2,190 萬 share, were moderately better than anticipated a year美元，每股約當 22.54 美元，表現(xiàn)較ago. Of these earnings, $1.

2、43 per share resulted from年前的預(yù)期稍微好一點，在這些盈余 substantial realized capital gains by Blue Chip Stamps 中，每股有 1.43 美元的盈余，系藍籌 which, to the extent of our proportional interest in 郵票大量實現(xiàn)的資本利得，本公司依 that company, are included in our operating earnings 照投資比例認列投資收益所貢獻，至 figure. Capital gains or losses realized

3、directly by 于伯克希爾本身及其保險子公司已實 Berkshire Hathaway Inc. or its insurance subsidiaries現(xiàn)的資本利得或損失，則不列入營業(yè) are not included in our calculation of operating 利益計算，建議大家不必太在意單一 earnings. While too much attention should not be paid期間的盈余數(shù)字，因為長期累積的資 to the figure for any single year, over the longer term 本利得或損失才是真

4、正的重點所在。 the record regarding aggregate capital gains or losses obviously is of significance. Textile operations came in well below forecast, while紡織事業(yè)的表現(xiàn)遠低于預(yù)估，至于伊 the results of the Illinois National Bank as well as the 利諾國家銀行的成績以及藍籌郵票貢 operating earnings attributable to our equity interest 獻給我們的投資利

5、益則大致如預(yù)期， in Blue Chip Stamps were about as anticipated. However, 另外，由 Phil Liesche 領(lǐng)導(dǎo)的國家產(chǎn) insurance operations, led again by the truly 險保險業(yè)務(wù)的表現(xiàn)甚至比我們當初最 outstanding results of Phil Liesches managerial group 樂觀的期望還要好。 at National Indemnity Company, were even better than our optimistic expectations. Mo

6、st companies define “record” earnings as a new high 通常公司會宣稱每股盈余又創(chuàng)下歷史 in earnings per share. Since businesses customarily add 新高，然而由于公司的資本會隨著盈 from year to year to their equity base, we find nothing 余的累積擴增，所以我們并不認為這 particularly noteworthy in a management performance 樣的經(jīng)營表現(xiàn)有什么大不了的，比如 combining, say,

7、a 10% increase in equity capital and a 說每年股本擴充 10%或是每股盈余成 5% increase in earnings per share. After all, even a 長 5%等等，畢竟就算是靜止不動的定totally dormant savings account will produce steadily存帳戶，由于復(fù)利的關(guān)系每年都可穩(wěn) rising interest earnings each year because of 定地產(chǎn)生同樣的效果。 compounding. Except for special cases (for e

8、xample, companies with除非是特殊的情況(比如說負債比例 unusual debt-equity ratios or those with important 特別高或是帳上持有重大資產(chǎn)未予重 assets carried at unrealistic balance sheet values), we 估)，否則我們認為 “股東權(quán)益報酬 believe a more appropriate measure of managerial 率”應(yīng)該是衡量管理表現(xiàn)比較合 economic performance to be return on equity capital. In

9、 理的指針，1997 年我們期初股東權(quán)益1977 our operating earnings on beginning equity capital 的報酬率約為 19%，這比去年同期稍 amounted to 19%, slightly better than last year and 微好一點，但遠高于本身過去長期以 above both our own long-term average and that of 及當年美國企業(yè)整體的平均數(shù)，所以 American industry in aggregate. But, while our 雖然我們每股的盈余成長了 37%，但 oper

10、ating earnings per share were up 37% from the year 由于期初的資本也增加了 34%，這使 before, our beginning capital was up 24%, making the 得我們實際的表現(xiàn)并沒有想象中那么 9gain in earnings per share considerably less impressive than it might appear at first glance. 好。 We expect difficulty in matching our 1977 rate of return durin

11、g the forthcoming year. Beginning equity capital is up 23% from a year ago, and we expect the trend of insurance underwriting profit margins to turn down well before the end of the year. Nevertheless, we expect a reasonably good year and our present estimate, subject to the usual caveats regarding t

12、he frailties of forecasts, is that operating earnings will improve somewhat on a per share basis during 1978. 我們預(yù)期未來年度將很難再達到1977 年這樣的報酬率水準，一方面是因為期初資本又增加了 23%，一方面我們預(yù)期保險核保利潤率會在年底以前開始反轉(zhuǎn)，盡管如此，大家還是可以期待豐收的一年，而我們現(xiàn)在的估計是，雖然預(yù)測有其先天上的限制， 我認為每股營業(yè)利益在 1978 年應(yīng)該 還有些許成長的空間。 Textile Operations 紡織事業(yè) The textile busines

13、s again had a very poor year in 1977. We have mistakenly predicted better results in each of the last two years. This may say something about our forecasting abilities, the nature of the textile industry, or both. Despite strenuous efforts, problems in marketing and manufacturing have persisted. Man

14、y difficulties experienced in the marketing area are due primarily to industry conditions, but some of the problems have been of our own making. 1977 年紡織事業(yè)的表現(xiàn)依舊不振，過去兩年我們樂觀的預(yù)期紛紛落空，這或許也說明了我們預(yù)測能力的薄弱，或是紡織產(chǎn)業(yè)的本質(zhì)，盡管一再地努力與掙扎，行銷與制造的問題依舊存在，雖然市場上面臨的困境與產(chǎn)業(yè)情勢相關(guān)，但也有不少問題是我們自己造成。 A few shareholders have questioned t

15、he wisdom of remaining in the textile business which, over the longer term, is unlikely to produce returns on capital comparable to those available in many other businesses. Our reasons are several: (1) Our mills in both New Bedford and Manchester are among the largest employers in each town, utiliz

16、ing a labor force of high average age possessing relatively non-transferable skills. Our workers and unions have exhibited unusual understanding and effort in cooperating with management to achieve a cost structure and product mix which might allow us to maintain a viable operation. (2) Management a

17、lso has been energetic and straightforward in its approach to our textile problems. In particular, Ken Chaces efforts after the change in corporate control took place in 1965 generated capital from the textile division needed to finance the acquisition and expansion of our profitable insurance opera

18、tion. (3) With hard work and some imagination regarding manufacturing and marketing configurations, it seems reasonable that at least modest profits in the textile division can be achieved in the future. 部份股東開始質(zhì)疑我們是否應(yīng)該繼續(xù)留在紡織產(chǎn)業(yè)，雖然就長期而言其投資報酬率明顯低于其它的投資，但我們的理由有以下幾個：(1)我們在紐貝福及 Manchester 的工廠都是當?shù)刈畲蟮钠腹蜆I(yè)者，員

19、工的年齡偏高，缺乏轉(zhuǎn)換工作的能力，同時我們的員工及其公會也已經(jīng)盡其所能地與經(jīng)營階層配合努力改善成本結(jié)構(gòu)及產(chǎn)品組合，以使我們的經(jīng)營得以維持下去(2) 管理階層也相當努力同時坦承面對產(chǎn)業(yè)的問題，尤其是在 1965 年經(jīng)營權(quán)易主后，Ken Chace 依然盡力盡力地協(xié)助我們把紡織部門產(chǎn)生穩(wěn)定的資金流入轉(zhuǎn)到獲利更加的保險事業(yè)投資與購并之上(3)努力工作加上對制造與行銷組合的樂觀預(yù)期，我們的紡織事業(yè)在未來看起來應(yīng)該可以維持一個起碼的利潤空間。 Insurance Underwriting 保險事業(yè) Our insurance operation continued to grow significant

20、ly in 1977. It was early in 1967 that we made our entry into this industry through the purchase of National Indemnity Company and National Fire and Marine Insurance Company (sister companies) for approximately $8.6 million. In that year their premium volume amounted to $22 million. In 1977 our aggre

21、gate insurance premium volume was $151 million. No additional shares of Berkshire Hathaway stock have been issued to achieve any of this growth. 我們的保險事業(yè)在 1977 年持續(xù)大幅地成長，早在 1967 年我們以 860 萬美元購并國家產(chǎn)險及國家海上火險公司(兩者為姊妹公司)的方式進軍保險業(yè)，當年他們的保費收入大約為2,200 萬美元，時至今日，1977 年的累積年保費收入已達 1.51 億美元，必須強調(diào)的是，在此期間，伯克希爾沒有再發(fā)行過任何一股

22、新股以支應(yīng)成 長。 Rather, this almost 600% increase has been achieved through large gains in National Indemnitys traditional liability areas plus the starting of new companies (Cornhusker Casualty Company in 1970, Lakeland Fire and Casualty Company in 1971, Texas United Insurance Company in 1972, The Insura

23、nce Company of Iowa in 1973, and Kansas Fire and Casualty Company in late 1977), the purchase for cash of other insurance companies (Home and Automobile Insurance Company in 1971, Kerkling Reinsurance Corporation, now named Central Fire and Casualty Company, in 1976, and Cypress Insurance Company at

24、 yearend 1977), and finally through the marketing of additional products, most significantly reinsurance, within the National Indemnity Company corporate structure. 相反地，這 600%的成長幾乎都是來自于國家產(chǎn)險本身的傳統(tǒng)業(yè)務(wù)的穩(wěn)定成長再加上新創(chuàng)立的公司(包含 1970 年的 Cornhusker 產(chǎn)險、 1971 年的L a k e l a n d 火險、1972 年的德州聯(lián)合保險、1973 年的愛荷華保險及 1977 年的堪薩

25、斯火險公司等)，以購并方式買下的(1971 年的家庭與汽車保險、1976 年現(xiàn)已更名為中央火險的K e r k l i n g 再保險以及 1977 年的賽普路斯保險公司)，以及最后透過行銷新業(yè)務(wù)-主要以國家保險名下進行的再保險業(yè)務(wù)所得。 In aggregate, the insurance business has worked out very well. But it hasnt been a one-way street. Some major mistakes have been made during the decade, both in products and person

26、nel. We experienced significant problems from (1) a surety operation initiated in 1969, (2) the 1973 expansion of Home and Automobiles urban auto marketing into the Miami, Florida area, (3) a still unresolved aviation “fronting” arrangement, and (4) our Workers Compensation operation in California,

27、which we believe retains an interesting potential upon completion of a reorganization now in progress. It is comforting to be in a business where some mistakes can be made and yet a quite satisfactory overall performance can be achieved. In a sense, this is the opposite case from our textile busines

28、s where even very good management probably can average only modest results. One of the lessons your management has learned - and, unfortunately, sometimes re-learned - is the importance of being in businesses where tailwinds prevail rather 總的來險事業(yè)的表現(xiàn)還算不錯， 但情況并非全然如此，過去十年來， 我們也犯過一些大錯，不論是在產(chǎn)品或是人員方面，比如說我們

29、在以下方面就曾遇到重大的困難：(1)1969 年推出的保證責任險(2)1973 年擴充佛羅里達邁阿密地區(qū)的家庭及汽車保險業(yè)務(wù)(3) 目前尚未解決的航空”前置”安排(4)我們在加州的勞工退休金業(yè)務(wù)，我們相信這業(yè)務(wù)一旦改組完成應(yīng)該還是相當有潛力。保險這行業(yè)雖然小錯不斷，但大致上還是可以獲得不錯的成果，就某些方面而言，這情況與紡織業(yè)剛好完全相反，管理階層相當優(yōu)秀，但卻只能獲得微薄的利潤，各位的管理階層所學到的一課， 很不幸一再學到的就是，選擇順風而非逆風產(chǎn)業(yè)環(huán)境的重要性。 than headwinds. In 1977 the winds in insurance underwriting were

30、 squarely behind us. Very large rate increases were effected throughout the industry in 1976 to offset the disastrous underwriting results of 1974 and 1975. But, because insurance policies typically are written for one-year periods, with pricing mistakes capable of correction only upon renewal, it w

31、as 1977 before the full impact was felt upon earnings of those earlier rate increases. 1977 年保險業(yè)核保的順風不斷地從后方吹來，保費大幅度的調(diào)整在 1976 年正式生效后，適時地抵消 1974 年及1975 年慘痛的核保記錄，而由于保單的簽訂通常以一年為期，所以定價的修正通常必須等到換 時，所以實際上費率的上漲一直等到 1977 年才充分反應(yīng)在盈余之上。 The pendulum now is beginning to swing the other way. We estimate that cost

32、s involved in the insurance areas in which we operate rise at close to 1% per month. This is due to continuous monetary inflation affecting the cost of repairing humans and property, as well as “social inflation”, a broadening definition by society and juries of what is covered by insurance policies

33、. Unless rates rise at a comparable 1% per month, underwriting profits must shrink. Recently the pace of rate increases has slowed dramatically, and it is our expectation that underwriting margins generally will be declining by the second half of the year. 可惜的是鐘擺再度開始擺蕩到另一方向，我們預(yù)估保險理賠成本以每個月1%的幅度增加，主要的

34、原因除了持續(xù)性的通貨膨脹使得修復(fù)人體及財產(chǎn)的成本不停上漲，另一方面社會通膨， 亦即社會及陪審團對于保單理賠范圍不斷擴大解釋的傾向，因此除非費率每個月也能同步上漲 1%，否則核保利益肯定會縮水，只是最近保費調(diào)漲的速度明顯趨緩，所以我們預(yù)期下半年的核保利潤空間將大幅縮減。 We must again give credit to Phil Liesche, greatly assisted by Roland Miller in Underwriting and Bill Lyons in Claims, for an extraordinary underwriting achievement

35、in National Indemnitys traditional auto and general liability business during 1977. Large volume gains have been accompanied by excellent underwriting margins following contraction or withdrawal by many competitors in the wake of the 1974-75 crisis period. These conditions will reverse before long.

36、In the meantime, National Indemnitys underwriting profitability has increased dramatically and, in addition, large sums have been made available for investment. As markets loosen and rates become inadequate, we again will face the challenge of philosophically accepting reduced volume. Unusual manage

37、rial discipline will be required, as it runs counter to normal institutional behavior to let the other fellow take away business - even at foolish prices. 講到這里，我們必須再度將殊榮歸予Phil Liesche，在核保部門 Roland Miller 以及理賠部門 Bill Lyons 的大力協(xié)助下，國家產(chǎn)險 1977 年在傳統(tǒng)的汽車及責任險業(yè)務(wù)方面又大放異彩，保費收入不但大幅成長，相較于其它同業(yè)不堪 1974-75 年的陸續(xù)退出市場，其優(yōu)

38、異的核保利益更屬難 得，國家產(chǎn)險的核保利益大幅地成長， 此外可供投資的資金亦迅速累積，只可惜這樣的情況維持不了多久，這些業(yè)者又會再度卷土重來，隨著市場緊繃情勢轉(zhuǎn)為寬松，費率又將變得失控， 屆時我們又必須回復(fù)過去冷靜地接受保費收入銳減的考驗，嚴格的核保紀律絕對必須維持，如此我們才能抗拒直覺，眼睜睜地看著其它業(yè)者以瘋狂的價格搶走生意。 Our reinsurance department, managed by George Young, improved its underwriting performance during 1977. Although the combined ratio (

39、see definition on page 12) 1977 年由 George Young 管理的再保險部門改善了其核保的績效，雖然高 達 107.1 的綜合比率不算理想(相關(guān) of 107.1 was unsatisfactory, its trend was downward throughout the year. In addition, reinsurance generates unusually high funds for investment as a percentage of premium volume. 定義請參閱第 12 頁)，但至少趨勢是向下，此外再保險的保費

40、收入依然貢獻大量的資金以供我們進行投資。 At Home and Auto, John Seward continued to make progress on all fronts. John was a battlefield promotion several years ago when Home and Autos underwriting was awash in red ink and the company faced possible extinction. Under his management it currently is sound, profitable, and

41、 growing. 至于 John Seward 領(lǐng)導(dǎo)的家庭與汽車保險在各個方面都有重大進展，幾年前當該公司因核保大幅虧損，面臨倒閉時，John 跳上火線，在他的管理之下，公司的營運漸上軌道。 John Ringwalts homestate operation now consists of John Ringwalt 負責的 Homestate 業(yè)five companies, with Kansas Fire and Casualty Company 務(wù)旗下主要包含五家公司，其中堪薩斯becoming operational late in 1977 under the directio

42、n 火險在 Floyd Taylor 籌備下于of Floyd Taylor. The homestate companies had net premium 1977 年底正式營運，Homestate 1977 volume of $23 million, up from $5.5 million just three years ago. All four companies that operated throughout 年的保費凈收入達到 2,300 萬美元， 三年前不過只有 550 萬美元，其余四the year achieved combined ratios below 100

43、, with 家的年度綜合比率都低于 100，其中Cornhusker Casualty Company, at 93.8, the leader. In Cornhusker 甚至只有 93.8，John 在addition to actively supervising the other four 努力管理其它四家公司的同時，更讓homestate operations, John Ringwalt manages the Cornhusker 過去七年有六年的綜合operations of Cornhusker which has recorded combined 比率低于 100，

44、從 1970 年正式營運ratios below 100 in six of its seven full years of 以來，該公司已順利成為內(nèi)布拉斯加existence and, from a standing start in 1970, has grown 州傳 立經(jīng)紀系統(tǒng)的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)業(yè)者，至to be one of the leading insurance companies operating 于由 Jim Stodolka 帶領(lǐng)的 Lakeland in Nebraska utilizing the conventional independent 火險則榮獲 1977 年主席杯

45、的頭銜，因agency system. Lakeland Fire and Casualty Company, 為去年該公司的綜合比率最低，總的來managed by Jim Stodolka, was the winner of the 說，Homestate 集團的營運在去年大有Chairmans Cup in 1977 for achieving the lowest loss 進展。 ratio among the homestate companies. All in all, the homestate operation continues to make excellent p

46、rogress. The newest addition to our insurance group is Cypress Insurance Company of South Pasadena, California. This Workers Compensation insurer was purchased for cash in the final days of 1977 and, therefore, its approximate $12.5 million of volume for that year was not included in our results. Cy

47、press and National Indemnitys present California Workers Compensation operation will not be combined, but will operate independently utilizing somewhat different marketing strategies. Milt Thornton, President of Cypress since 1968, runs a first-class operation for policyholders, agents, employees an

48、d owners alike. We look forward to working with him. 我們旗下保險事業(yè)最新加入的成員是位于加州的賽普路斯保險，至于勞工退休金保險則因為是在 1977 年底以現(xiàn)金買下，所以其 1,250 萬美元的保費收入并未列入我們當年的營運記錄，賽普路斯與國家產(chǎn)險現(xiàn)有的勞工退休金保險業(yè)務(wù)不會合并，而會采用不同的行銷策略各自獨立經(jīng)營，賽普路斯現(xiàn)任總裁 Milt Thornton，在保戶、業(yè)務(wù)員、員工及股東方面的營運管理皆屬一流，對于能與他一起共事， 我們相當期待。 Insurance companies offer standardized policies

49、which can be copied by anyone. Their only products are promises. It is not difficult to be licensed, and rates are an open book. There are no important advantages from trademarks, patents, location, corporate longevity, raw material sources, etc., and very little consumer differentiation to produce

50、insulation from competition. It is commonplace, in corporate annual reports, to stress the difference that people make. Sometimes this is true and sometimes it isnt. But there is no question that the nature of the insurance business magnifies the effect which individual managers have on company perf

51、ormance. We are very fortunate to have the group of managers that are associated with us. 保險公司提供的制式保單很容易為其它同業(yè)所模仿，他們唯一的產(chǎn)品就是承諾，保險執(zhí)照不難取得，而費率也是公開的，這行業(yè)商標、專利、地點、企業(yè)年資、原物料等都不重要，消費者對于產(chǎn)品也很難產(chǎn)生特別的偏好， 在企業(yè)的年報中，常常看到有人強調(diào)自己不同于其它同業(yè)的特殊之處，有時這樣的說法有道理，有時沒什么道理，但不可否認的是，保險事業(yè)的本質(zhì)使得經(jīng)理人的表現(xiàn)，對于公司績效的影響具有舉足輕重的地位，很幸運的是與我們共事的是一群優(yōu)秀的經(jīng)理

52、 人。 Insurance Investments 保險事業(yè)的投資 During the past two years insurance investments at cost (excluding the investment in our affiliate, Blue Chip Stamps) have grown from $134.6 million to $252.8 million. Growth in insurance reserves, produced by our large gain in premium volume, plus retained earnings

53、, have accounted for this increase in marketable securities. In turn, net investment income of the Insurance Group has improved from $8.4 million pre-tax in 1975 to $12.3 million pre-tax in 1977. 過去兩年我們保險事業(yè)投入的資金成本(扣除對關(guān)系企業(yè)藍籌郵票的投資) 已從原先的 1.346 億美元成長到2.528 億美元，保險準備的成長，主要是由于保費收入的大幅增加，加上保留的盈余，是我們投資部位之所以大

54、幅增加的原因，也因此，我們整體保險事業(yè)因為投資而增加的凈收益也由1975 年稅前840 萬美元的利益成長 到 1977 年的 1,230 萬美元。 In addition to this income from dividends and interest, we realized capital gains of $6.9 million before tax, about one-quarter from bonds and the balance from stocks. Our unrealized gain in stocks at yearend 1977 was approxim

55、ately $74 million but this figure, like any other figure of a single date (we had an unrealized loss of $17 million at the end of 1974), should not be taken too seriously. Most of our large stock positions are going to be held for many years and the scorecard on our investment decisions will be prov

56、ided by business results over that period, and not by prices on any given day. Just as it would be foolish to focus unduly on short-term prospects when acquiring an entire company, we think it equally unsound to become mesmerized by prospective near term earnings or recent trends in earnings when pu

57、rchasing small pieces of a company; i.e., marketable common stocks. 除了股利與利息收入之外，我們還實現(xiàn)了稅前 690 萬美元的資本利得，四分之一來自債券，剩下的則來自股票， 至于 1977 年年底未實現(xiàn)的資本利得大約在 7,400 萬美元之譜，對于這個數(shù)字，就像任何單一日期的數(shù)字， (1974 年底帳上有 1,700 萬美元的未實現(xiàn)損失)大家不必看得太認真，因為我們持股部位比較大的投資，往往要持有很長一段時間，所以我們的投資績效依據(jù)的是這些被投資公司在這段期間的經(jīng)營表現(xiàn)，而不是特定時期的股票價格，就像我們認為買下一家公司卻只關(guān)

58、心他的短期狀況是件很傻的事，同樣地持有公司部份所有權(quán)-也就是股票，我們認為只關(guān)心短期盈余或 者是盈余短暫的變動也不應(yīng)該。 A little digression illustrating this point may be interesting. Berkshire Fine Spinning Associates and 離題一下，有一點很有趣足以說明上 述情況，伯克希爾紡紗與 Hathaway Hathaway Manufacturing were merged in 1955 to form 工業(yè)是在 1955 年合并成為伯克希爾Berkshire Hathaway Inc. In 1948, on a pro forma combined Hathaway 公司的，再將時間往回推到basis, they had earnings after tax of almost $18