天津大學模板ppt課件

1、1,目錄,1. Introduction 2. Literature Review 3. Model 3.1 Repair Process and Inventory Policy 3.2 Cost Structure 3.3 Information Structure 3.4 Contract Types and Payoffs 3.5 Signaling Game 4. Benchmark: First-Best Under Complete Information 5. Signaling with Verifiable Inventory 5.1 Resource-Based Cont

2、ract 5.2 Performance-Based Contract 6. Signaling with Unverifiable Inventory 6.1 Resource-Based Contract 6.2 Performance-Based Contract 7. Extensions: Efficiency Enhancement Strategies 7.1 Endogenizing Inventory Verifiability 7.2 Pooling Inventory Across Multiple Buyers 8. Conclusions,2,1. Introduct

3、ion,供貨商,買方,產(chǎn)品,PBC,RBC,可靠性 私有信息,使用,備用庫存,維護,背景介紹,3,文獻回顧,2. Literature Review,PBC for outsourced services asymmetric information in operations management the use of warranties as a signaling mechanism,4,建模,3. Model,3.1 Repair Process and Inventory Policy N: identical copies; B: inventory backorder; s:

4、inventory; The expected backorders in steady state is Availability is equal to,5,建模,3.2 Cost Structure Each time a product failure occurs, the buyer incurs a fixed cost r 0. The buyers expected cost is equal to The vendors expected cost is equal to,6,建模,3.3 Information Structure We assume that the p

5、roduct offered by the vendor is one of two possible types, L or H, where L denotes low reliability and H denotes high reliability. Hazard rate ordering（危險率序）: Excess wealth ordering（剩余財富序）:,7,建模,3.4 Contract Types and Payoffs We can write the buyers expected payoff as The vendors expected payoff is

6、given by RBC: PBC:,8,建模,3.5 Signaling Game We assume that the vendor, who possesses private information about the reliability of a newly developed product, chooses contract terms and proposes them to the buyer. The buyer then accepts the contract terms if his expected payoff exceeds an outside optio

7、n valued at . We seek a perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) that is also renegotiation-proof.,9,建模,4. Benchmark: First-Best Under Complete Information,Given the vendor type , the first-best outcome is obtained by solving the optimization problem.,10,建模,5. Signaling with Verifiable Inventory,We now co

8、nsider the setting in which the vendor possesses private information about product reliability.,5.1 Resource-Based Contract The value of set by the vendor in her contract may relay information about whether or not the product is reliable.,11,建模,5.1 Resource-Based Contract,In summary, successful sign

9、aling by the reliable vendor is possible under RBC when her inventory choice is verifiable, but it comes at a cost since the vendor has to leave positive surplus to the buyer.,12,建模,5.2 Performance-Based Contract,Therefore, successful signaling by the reliable vendor can be done under both RBC and P

10、BC when the inventory is verifiable. However, PBC presents an advantage because its risk sharing mechanism is more amenable to signaling than that of RBC.,13,建模,6. Signaling with Unverifiable Inventory,6.1 Resource-Based Contract With inventory no longer verifiable, the payoff functions for the vend

11、or and the buyer under RBC remain the same as those of the verifiable inventory case. An underinvestment in inventory causes economic inefficiency.,14,建模,6.2 Performance-Based Contract The reliable vendor overinvests in inventory in equilibrium. Overall, we find that the interaction between the vend

12、ors discretionary inventory choice and her signaling incentive creates subtle dynamics that impact the relative efficiency of after-sales service contracts in nontrivial ways.,15,建模,Which contract type will the reliable vendor prefer? Thus, the reliable vendor finds that the ability to signal her ty

13、pe with PBC more than compensates for the cost associated with overinvestment in inventory and any benefit presented by RBC, which does not improve upon a pooling outcome.,16,擴展,7. Extensions: Efficiency Enhancement Strategies,Endogenizing Inventory Verifiability Pooling Inventory Across Multiple Buyers,17,結論,8. Conclusions,Suggestions: The key to br