創(chuàng)業(yè)融資[文獻(xiàn)翻譯]

1、本科畢業(yè)論文（設(shè)計(jì)）外 文 翻 譯題 目 大學(xué)生創(chuàng)業(yè)融資渠道研究 專 業(yè) 財(cái) 務(wù) 管 理 一、外文原文原文：entrepreneurial financing the financing of startups entails potentially extreme adverse selection costs given the absent track record of the firms seeking capital, and given the risky nature of the industries in which many of them operate. exacer

2、bating the problem, this scenario often involves an innovator who has extensive technical knowledge but has neither the accumulated reputation nor the bondable wealth necessary to convey this information credibly.barry characterizes venture capital as having evolved precisely to fill this startup fi

3、nancing niche:at the level of small, risky ventures, access to capital markets is restricted. not all entrepreneurs can self-finance their projects, and not all can find bankers or angels who will carry the shortfall. venture capitalists offer them a source of funds that is specifically designed for

4、 use in risky settings. the venture capitalists themselves perform due diligence prior to investing, and information gleaned in that process can greatly reduce the adverse selection problem.this outlook raises several questions. why is it assumed that banks cannot (or choose not to) perform the same

5、 level of due diligence as venture capitalists (vcs)? in what sense is venture capital “designed” for risky settings? the puzzle deepens when one notes that straight debt is typically advocated as a solution to the adverse selection problem whereas in practice vcs often hold convertible preferred eq

6、uity. indeed, a defining characteristic of the venture capital market is that contracts are fairly high-powered in the sense that expected payoffs come disproportionately from the equity component or “upside”.these questions can be addressed by reflecting upon the costly due diligence to which barry

7、 refers. by directly revealing the projects quality, due diligence reduces information asymmetry between entrepreneurs and the vc. by contrast, if quality were signaledthe traditional solution to the adverse selection problemcostly due diligence would be unnecessary since there would be no more info

8、rmation to convey. in otherwise, either signaling or costly due diligence can solve the adverse selection problem. the two mechanisms are substitutes; the question then becomes which is more cost-effective.the first contribution of the paper is to show that signaling can be prohibitively expensive i

9、n entrepreneurial financing markets, and so costly due diligence dominates. the “cost” of signaling is driven by the incentives of bad firms to pool. yet, for startups, if funding is not obtained then the firm may have almost no value. with such low reservation values, bad entrepreneurs attempt to p

10、ool at nearly any cost. as the analysis shows, securities is unattractive enough to drive out bad entrepreneursand thus to serve as a credible signaltend to be unattractive to good entrepreneurs as well. costly due diligence emerges as the preferred solution.as testament to the empirical importance

11、of due diligence costs in venture capital markets, fried and hans characterize the vc funding process as composed of six distinct, progressively rigorous stages of screening. this due diligence takes an average of 97 days to complete even before the first round of funding is initiated. the majority

12、of funding proposals do not successfully pass through the first screen, let alone subsequent screens, and the full process is described as “much more involved in bank loan reviews.the second contribution of the paper is to illustrate a link between costly due diligence and high-powered (or equity-li

13、ke) financial contracts. the intuition behind this link is simple. by definition, low-powered contracts are safe; i.e., expected payoffs vary little across firms. high-powered contracts magnify the differential in payoff between funding good and bad projects, and hence magnify the incentives to scre

14、en out bad projects. in effect, high-powered contracts make the vc bear the cost of choosing entrepreneurs unwisely. therefore high-powered contracts encourage due diligence.to summarize, this model is designed to make three simple points: (1) upside sharing is to be expected given costly evaluation

15、, (2) such costly evaluations serve as a substitute traditional solutions to the adverse selection problem, and (3) traditional solutions are dominated for parameterizations of the model that correspond to venture capital markets.following the path-breaking empirical work of saar, a theoretical lite

16、rature on vc contract design emerged. one common feature of these papers is that they rationalize the optimality of convertible securities. a second common feature of these models is the admission of agency costs. for example, vcs and entrepreneurs may have different preferences regarding project ri

17、sk or exit strategy.in part, the literatures reliance on agency costs owes to a widespread belief in their empirical relevance. it is also presumably related to the aforementioned consensus: since debt is considered the optimal response to adverse selection, non-debt securities must imply the presen

18、ce of another market friction. on the other hand, it is clear how agency costs could lead to equity-like securities. conflicts-of-interest over future actions are mitigated by granting both parties roughly symmetrical payoffs, which leads to upside-sharing. of course, the omission of agency problems

19、 from the current model is not intended to suggest that they are unimportant empirically. rather, the lesson is that agency costs are not a necessary condition for equity-like securities.perhaps surprisingly, the theoretical results most closely related to this paper are contained in analyses of pub

20、licly traded securities. assuming liquidity is exogenous and that prices are set by competitive market makers, boot and thakor show that splitting securities into an information-sensitive piece and a safer piece may either increase or decrease traders incentives to produce information. fulghieri and

21、 lukin study a similar environment but split the firms claims into a piece sold to outside investors and another piece that is retained, again analyzing the interaction between security design and information acquisition.two important distinctions set my results apart from these models of public tra

22、ding. first, their models exogenously rule out signaling, so it not possible to examine whether traditional solutions to adverse selection are dominated and, if so, under what conditions. second, it is not clear how the results of these public trading models might be extended to entrepreneurial fina

23、nce markets since the assumption that drives their resultslosses by liquidity traders with perfectly inelastic demandhas no obvious counterpart in an entrepreneurial finance setting.the economy consists of entrepreneurs with projects requiring capital investment k. the value of funded projects is 1

24、with probability , where g, b is an indicator of project quality, and 1 otherwise.funded projects have expected value vi = 1 + (1 ). it is assumed that k. otherwise the model would admit riskless debt, which would eliminate the adverse selection problem.entrepreneurs have reservation value v; that i

25、s, contracts are acceptable only if the residual claim has expected value v or higher. in a model of mature firm financing, v is most clearly interpreted as the value of assets-in-place, because this is the continuation value of the firm in the absence of new investment. such an interpretation is va

26、lid in entrepreneurial settings as well because without attracting financing the entrepreneur owns the existing assets outright. the key difference is one of magnitude. compared to models of mature firms, in entrepreneurial settings the value of assets-in-place is small relative to other parameters.

27、 the net present value of projects, v v k, is assumed to satisfyevg v k 0 evb v k. (1)equation (1) justifies the nomenclature “good” and “bad.” the net present value of a project is positive if and only if the project is good. finally, it is assumed that net present values satisfy(eg v k) + (1 )(eb

28、v k) 0, (2)where is the proportion of good projects in the economy. because net present values are positive (on average), the model admits pooling equilibrium.one source of capital is an uninformed investor who conducts a mechanical credit evaluation based on observable characteristics. this investo

29、r may be thought of as a proxy for the competitive commercial banking market. consistent with this interpretation, it will be shown that this investor takes debt in equilibrium. briefly, the intuition is that when one is uninformed, one solves the adverse selection problem in the traditional way. as

30、 mentioned in the introduction, this solution is debt.an alternative source of capital is an investor endowed with technology that can evaluate project quality. this investor is referred to as a vc. consistent with this identification, it will be shown that the vc takes high-powered contracts in equ

31、ilibrium. likewise, it needs to be shown that the vc actually employs the screening technology. a priori, this usage is not obvious. in particular, if the financial contract is very generous (if it leaves the vc with a large stake), then it may be profitable to forego the costly evaluation in favor

32、of funding all projects. such an outcome would benefit bad entrepreneurs, because they too would like to attract funding provided they can pool with good firms and thereby obtain mispriced financing. by limiting this pooling, costly due diligence effects a transfer from bad entrepreneurs to good ent

33、repreneurs, and in the process, directs real investment toward better projects.entrepreneurs seeking venture capital finance form a (randomly ordered) queue, and the vc sequentially evaluates them. for each entrepreneur, upon paying a cost c the vc receives a signal s g, b with prs = g | entrepreneu

34、r is bad = prs = b | entrepreneur is good = (3)the unconditional probability of a good signal is (1 ) + (1 ), so vcs expect to evaluate 1/(1 ) + (1 ) entrepreneurs before a good one is found. the financial contract must be sufficiently generous (ex ante) as to compensate the vc for both capital cont

35、ribution k and expected evaluation costs = c/(1 ) + (1 ) incurred in the process of obtaining each good signal.this game admits three types of bayesian nash equilibrium. in separating equilibrium, good entrepreneurs offer a security which bad entrepreneurs find too unpleasant to mimic (choosing inst

36、ead to receive reservation utility v). adverse selection in the queue becomes degenerate since only good firms are active. vc equilibrium serve as a second solution. in this scenario, the entrepreneurs contracts induce the investor to evaluate all firms in the queue. finally, pooling can be thought

37、of as the case in which good entrepreneurs find both of the aforementioned solutions to adverse selection too expensive.in this paper, i limit attention to debt and equity. earlier drafts considered arbitrary securities, with similar resulting intuition: high-powered securities promote due diligence

38、, whereas low-powered securities are more effective signaling devices. the restriction to standard securities simplifies the presentation, retains the crucial intuition, and facilitates comparison of my results with those of the existing literature.this paper argues that in entrepreneurial finance m

39、arkets, direct revelation of project quality (via the due diligence of vcs) is more cost-effective than signaling quality. this theme ties into an empirical literature showing that the due diligence process in those markets is quite extensive. indeed, due diligence is a defining feature of the vc ma

40、rket.several features of the model are quite strong and give the appearance that the mechanisms considered for resolving adverse selection are perfect substitutes. in a richer model, the two mechanisms could work as partial complements as well. generally, a role exists for both entrepreneurial signa

41、ling and vc due diligence. earlier drafts of the paper show complement may be motivated in multiple ways. for example, suppose entrepreneurs have noisy private information. then the optimal security may involve signaling, thus eliminating entrepreneurs with bad information. but to the extent that th

42、e pool has residual uncertainty even after this self-selection, costly due diligence may still add value.information acquisition occurs outside venture capital markets, of course. this model may shed light on the usage of unit ipos, which are bundles of stocks and warrants often used for particularl

43、y small, risky offerings. the inclusion of warrants is puzzling from an adverse selection perspective, since the existing literature argues that securities should emphasize payoffs in bad states. the logic of this paper suggests that these securities, which emphasize good states to an extreme, motiv

44、ate investors to evaluate projects and might be used when other mechanisms of dealing with adverse selection are too expensive.finally, the models conclusions are not tied to the assumption that good entrepreneurs choose the contract. a connection between information acquisition incentives and the s

45、hape of the security exists independently of the contracts origins. one could equivalently model a general partner in a venture capital fund raising money from limited partners, announcing what securities the fund intends to hold. the more equity-like the securities are, the stronger the general par

46、tners information acquisition incentives.source: chris yung. entrepreneurial financing and costly due diligence. the financial review, 2009(44),pp137-149.譯文：創(chuàng)業(yè)融資由于缺乏融資的信用記錄以及所經(jīng)營(yíng)公司存在的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)性，初創(chuàng)企業(yè)的融資通常情況下都需要很高的逆向選擇成本。更糟糕的是，通常情況下，創(chuàng)業(yè)者擁有豐富的科技知識(shí)，但是缺乏信用積累，也沒有渠道傳遞自己的信用。 巴里認(rèn)為風(fēng)險(xiǎn)資本正好填補(bǔ)了創(chuàng)業(yè)資本的空缺： 在小規(guī)模階段，風(fēng)險(xiǎn)資本進(jìn)入資本市場(chǎng)是受

47、限的。想必并不是所有創(chuàng)業(yè)者都能依靠自有資金創(chuàng)業(yè)，或是依靠銀行或者天使投資人填補(bǔ)空缺。風(fēng)險(xiǎn)資本家為他們提供了一項(xiàng)為在風(fēng)險(xiǎn)情境中使用而特意設(shè)計(jì)的資金。風(fēng)險(xiǎn)資本家們通過預(yù)先的嚴(yán)格評(píng)估以及此過程收集的信息可以大大降低逆向選擇成本。 按照巴里的說法，這些問題可以通過昂貴的盡職調(diào)查反映出來。通過直接揭示項(xiàng)目質(zhì)量，減少創(chuàng)業(yè)者和風(fēng)險(xiǎn)資本家之間的信息不對(duì)稱。另一方面，如果質(zhì)量是可以發(fā)出信喜的，那么昂貴的盡職調(diào)查就是不必要的。換而言之，盡職調(diào)查和發(fā)出信息都可以解決逆向選擇問題，這兩種方法是相互替代的，所以重點(diǎn)是誰(shuí)更具有性價(jià)比。 這種看法存在幾個(gè)問題。為什么假設(shè)銀行不能（或者不選擇）作為一個(gè)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資者進(jìn)行嚴(yán)格評(píng)估？

48、為風(fēng)險(xiǎn)情境“設(shè)計(jì)”風(fēng)險(xiǎn)資本是什么意思？當(dāng)人們注意到直接負(fù)債被作為逆向選擇問題的解決法案而實(shí)際上風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資家們卻經(jīng)常持有可轉(zhuǎn)換優(yōu)先股，人們會(huì)倍感疑惑。事實(shí)上，從預(yù)期收益與權(quán)益部分不成正比或者完全顛倒的意義上看，合約有強(qiáng)大的約束力。 像巴里指出的，這些問題可以通過高昂的嚴(yán)格的評(píng)估以反映解決。通過直接揭示項(xiàng)目的質(zhì)量，可以減少企業(yè)家與投資家的信息不對(duì)稱。相比之下，如果質(zhì)量是能夠被我們了解，那么昂貴的盡職調(diào)查是不必要的，因?yàn)槲覀儾槐亓私馄渌?。換而言之，無(wú)論是昂貴的盡職調(diào)查還是訊息都可以解決逆向選擇問題。這兩種機(jī)制是可以相互替代的；這樣問題就變成了哪個(gè)性價(jià)比更高。 論文的第一貢獻(xiàn)是證明在企業(yè)金融市場(chǎng)上消息是

49、昂貴的，盡職調(diào)查也是如此。然而，對(duì)于新創(chuàng)公司，如果籌集不到資金，那么公司可能幾乎沒有價(jià)值。不良企業(yè)家試圖在任何成本下聯(lián)營(yíng)。正如分析表明，證券的吸引力不足會(huì)使不良企業(yè)家轉(zhuǎn)而離開，事實(shí)上，證券對(duì)于優(yōu)秀的企業(yè)家也是如此沒有吸引力。昂貴的盡職調(diào)查便作為首選解決方案出現(xiàn)。 根據(jù)以往得知的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)資本市場(chǎng)上的盡職調(diào)查成本的重要性，弗瑞德和漢斯里奇把創(chuàng)業(yè)資本融資過程描述為六個(gè)逐步嚴(yán)格的階段。在第一輪資金啟動(dòng)前，這種盡職調(diào)查平均需要花費(fèi)97天的時(shí)間方能完成。大多數(shù)的資本方案無(wú)法成功通過第一階段審查，更別說后續(xù)審查了。完整的融資過程被描述成“比銀行貸款參與性更高”。 本文的第二個(gè)貢獻(xiàn)是在昂貴的盡職調(diào)查與高級(jí)(或股權(quán)

50、等)金融合同建立起聯(lián)系。這種聯(lián)系背后是簡(jiǎn)單的洞察力。根據(jù)定義，低級(jí)合同是安全的。也就是說，各公司的預(yù)期收益間差別不大。高級(jí)合同放大了投資的優(yōu)劣項(xiàng)目間在收益方面的差別，從而放大了篩選不良項(xiàng)目的激勵(lì)。實(shí)際上，高效的合同使得風(fēng)險(xiǎn)資本家能夠承擔(dān)選擇不良企業(yè)家的費(fèi)用。因此，高效的合同鼓勵(lì)盡職調(diào)查。總之，這個(gè)模型研究的有三點(diǎn)：（1）昂貴評(píng)價(jià)帶來的預(yù)期好處；（2）這種昂貴評(píng)價(jià)作為解決傳統(tǒng)逆向選擇問題的方案；（3）傳統(tǒng)解決方案是由與風(fēng)險(xiǎn)資本市場(chǎng)對(duì)應(yīng)的參數(shù)模型所主導(dǎo)的。繼薩爾曼開創(chuàng)性的工作之后，一種關(guān)于創(chuàng)業(yè)資本家合同設(shè)計(jì)的理論文獻(xiàn)出現(xiàn)了。這些論文的一個(gè)共同點(diǎn)是，他們使得可轉(zhuǎn)換債券最優(yōu)的觀點(diǎn)合理化。這個(gè)模型的第二

51、個(gè)共同點(diǎn)是代理成本的引入。例如，風(fēng)險(xiǎn)資本家和企業(yè)家對(duì)待項(xiàng)目風(fēng)險(xiǎn)以及退出戰(zhàn)略有不同的偏好。某種程度上，這篇文章對(duì)代理成本的依賴歸功于對(duì)他們的相關(guān)經(jīng)驗(yàn)充分信任。這大概也關(guān)系到上述共識(shí)：由于債務(wù)被認(rèn)為是對(duì)逆向選擇的最佳應(yīng)對(duì)，非債務(wù)證券必然意味著另一種市場(chǎng)摩擦的存在。另一方面，我們可以很清晰的知道權(quán)益資本如何導(dǎo)致權(quán)益類證券。通過給予雙方大致對(duì)稱的回報(bào)，關(guān)于未來行動(dòng)的利益沖突會(huì)被減輕。當(dāng)然，從目前的模型無(wú)意透漏的代理問題表明他們并不是重要的經(jīng)驗(yàn)。相反，教訓(xùn)是，代理成本不是權(quán)益類證券的必要條件。也許令人驚訝的是，與本文關(guān)系最密切的理論成果載于公開交易證券的分析。假設(shè)流動(dòng)性是外源的，價(jià)格有競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的市場(chǎng)決策者決

52、定，布特和薩克雷的研究表明：將證券分類成信息敏感類證券和安全類證券能夠增加或者減少經(jīng)營(yíng)者發(fā)布信息的激勵(lì)機(jī)制。弗朗哥和盧金研究了一種類似的環(huán)境，但是將公司權(quán)利分類成外售部分和保留部分，再次分析證券設(shè)計(jì)和信息采集的相互作用。兩個(gè)重要的區(qū)別決定了我的結(jié)果，除了這些公開交易的模型。首先，這些模型排除信號(hào)，所以它不可能審查傳統(tǒng)的逆向選擇解決方案是否是主要的，如果是這樣，那要看在什么樣的環(huán)境下。其次，目前還不清楚這些公開出售模型如何擴(kuò)展到創(chuàng)業(yè)資本市場(chǎng)，原因是驅(qū)動(dòng)其結(jié)果的假設(shè)，即完全無(wú)彈性的需求流動(dòng)性交易者的損失，無(wú)法與創(chuàng)業(yè)資本環(huán)境相適應(yīng)。資本投資是創(chuàng)業(yè)者不可缺少的一部分。投資項(xiàng)目的價(jià)值在1和之間，g, b，代表項(xiàng)目質(zhì)量，否則1.投資項(xiàng)目預(yù)期收益值v= i1 + (1 )，當(dāng) k時(shí)。否則，此模型也承認(rèn)無(wú)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)債務(wù)，這將消除不利選擇問題。創(chuàng)業(yè)者必須保證當(dāng)前資產(chǎn)的價(jià)值v，加上剩余索取權(quán)之后，若能夠達(dá)到預(yù)期價(jià)值，那么合同就是可以接受的。在一個(gè)成熟企業(yè)的融資模型里，v被定義為當(dāng)前資產(chǎn)的價(jià)值，因?yàn)檫@是在沒有新的投資情況下公司的價(jià)值。從創(chuàng)