2021年名人英語演講稿(2)

1、名人英語演講稿(2) 名人英語演講稿3篇 Good evening, my fellow Americans. Tonight I want to talk to you on a subject of deep con _rn to all Americans and to _ny people in all parts of the world, the war in Vietnam. I believe that one of the reasons for the deep division about Vietnam is that _ny Americans have lost c

2、onfiden _ in what their Gover _ent has told them about our policy. The American people cannot and should not be asked to support a policy which involves the overriding issues of war and pea _ unless they know the truth about that policy. Tonight, therefore, I would like to answer some of the questio

3、ns that I know are on the minds of _ny of you listening to me. How and why did America get involved in Vietnam in the first pla _? How has this administration changed the policy of the previous Administration? What has really happened in the negotiations in Paris and on the battlefront in Vietnam? W

4、hat choi _s do we have if we are to end the war? What are the prospects for pea _? Now let me begin by describing the situation I found when I was inaugurated on January 20: The war had been going on for four years. Thirty-one thousand Americans had been killed in action. The training program for th

5、e South Vietnamese was beyond behind schedule. Five hundred and forty-thousand Americans were in Vietnam with no plans to redu _ the number. No progress had been _de at the negotiations in Paris and the United States had not put forth a prehensive pea _ proposal. The war was causing deep division at

6、 home and critici _ from _ny of our friends, as well as our enemies, abroad. In view of these circumstan _s, there were some who urged that I end the war at on _ by ordering the immediate withdrawal of all American for _s. From a political standpoint, this would have been a popular and easy course t

7、o follow. After all, we became involved in the war while my prede _ssor was in offi _. I could blame the defeat, which would be the result of my action, on him - and e out as the pea _ _ker. Some put it to me quite bluntly: This was the only way to avoid allowing Johnsons war to bee Nixons war. But

8、I had a greater obligation than to think only of the years of my Administration, and of the next election. I had to think of the effect of my decision on the next generation, and on the future of pea _ and _ in America, and in the world. Let us all understand that the question before us is not wheth

9、er some Americans are for pea _ and some Americans are against pea _. The question at issue is not whether Johnsons war bees Nixons war. The great question is: How can we win Americas pea _? Well, let us turn now to the fundamental issue: Why and how did the United States bee involved in Vietnam in

10、the first pla _? Fifteen years ago North Vietnam, with the logistical support of Communist China and the Soviet Union, launched a campaign to impose a Communist gover _ent on South Vietnam by instigating and supporting a revolution. In response to the request of the Gover _ent of South Vietnam, Pres

11、ident Eisenhower sent economic aid and military equipment to assist the people of South Vietnam in their efforts to prevent a Communist takeover. Seven years ago, President Kennedy sent 16,000 military personnel to Vietnam as bat advisers. Four years ago, President Johnson sent American bat for _s t

12、o South Vietnam. Now _ny believe that President Johnsons decision to send American bat for _s to South Vietnam was wrong. And _ny others, I among them, have been strongly critical of the way the war has been conducted. But the question facing us today is: Now that we are in the war, what is the best

13、 way to end it? In January I could only conclude that the precipitate withdrawal of all American for _s from Vietnam would be a disaster not only for South Vietnam but for the United States and for the cause of pea _. For the South Vietnamese, our precipitate withdrawal would inevitably allow the Co

14、mmunists to repeat the _ssacres which followed their takeover in the North 15 years before. They then murdered more than 50,000 people and hundreds of thousands more _d in slave labor camps. We saw a prelude of what would happen in South Vietnam when the Communists entered the city of Hue last year.

15、 During their brief rule there, there was a bloody reign of terror in which 3,000 civilians were clubbed, shot to death, and buried in _ss graves. With the sudden collapse of our support, these atrocities at Hue would bee the night _re of the entire nation and particularly for the million-and-a half

16、 Catholic refugees who fled to South Vietnam when the Communists took over in the North. For the United States this first defeat in our nations history would result in a collapse of confiden _ in American leadership not only in Asia but throughout the world. Three American Presidents have recognized

17、 the great stakes involved in Vietnam and understood what had to be done. In 1963 President Kennedy with his characteristic eloquen _ and clarity said, We want to see a stable Gover _ent there, carrying on the a struggle to _intain its national independen _. We believe strongly in that. We are not g

18、oing to withdraw from that effort. In my opinion, for us to withdraw from that effort would mean a collapse not only of South Vietnam but Southeast Asia. So were going to stay there. President Eisenhower and President Johnson expressed the same conclusion during their terms of offi _. For the future

19、 of pea _, precipitate withdrawal would be a disaster of immense _gnitude. A nation cannot re _in great if it betrays its allies and lets down its friends. Our defeat and humiliation in South Vietnam without question would promote recklessness in the councils of those great powers who have not yet a

20、bandoned their goals of worlds conquest. This would spark violen _ wherever our mitments help _intain the pea _ - in the Middle East, in Berlin, eventually even in the Western Hemisphere. Ulti _tely, this would cost more lives. It would not bring pea _. It would bring more war. For these reasons I r

21、ejected the remendation that I should end the war by immediately withdrawing all of our for _s. I chose instead to change American policy on both the negotiating front and the battle front in order to end the war fought on _ny fronts. I initiated a pursuit for pea _ on _ny fronts. In a television sp

22、eech on May 14, in a speech before the United Nations, on a number of other oasions, I set forth our pea _ proposals in great detail. We have offered the plete withdrawal of all outside for _s within one year. We have proposed a _ase fire under international supervision. We have offered free electio

23、ns under international supervision with the Communists participating in the organization and conduct of the elections as an organized political for _. And the Saigon gover _ent has pledged to aept the result of the election. We have not put forth our proposals on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. We have

24、 indicated that were willing to discuss the proposals that have been put forth by the other side. We have declared that anything is negotiable, ex _pt the right of the people of South Vietnam to determine their own future. At the Paris pea _ conferen _ Ambassador Lodge has demonstrated our flexibili

25、ty and good faith in 40 public meetings. Hanoi has refused even to discuss our proposals. They de _nd our unconditional aeptan _ of their terms which are that we withdraw all American for _s immediately and unconditionally and that we overthrow the gover _ent of South Vietnam as we leave. We have no

26、t limited our pea _ initiatives to public forums and public statements. I recognized in January that a long and bitter war like this usually cannot be settled in a public forum. That is why in addition to the public statements and negotiations, I have explored every possible private avenue that migh

27、t lead to a settlement. Tonight, I am taking the unpre _dented step of disclosing to you some of our other initiatives for pea _, initiatives we undertook privately and secretly because we thought we thereby might open a door which publicly would be closed. I did not wait for my inauguration to begi

28、n my quest for pea _. Soon after my election, through an individual who was directly in contact on a personal basis with the leaders of North Vietnam, I _de two private offers for a rapid, prehensive settlement. Hanois replies called in effect for our surrender before negotiations. Sin _ the Soviet

29、Union furnishes most of the military equipment for North Vietnam, Secretary of State Rogers, my assistant for national security affairs, Dr. Kissinger, Ambassador Lodge and I personally have met on a number of oasions with representatives of the Soviet Gover _ent to enlist their assistan _ in gettin

30、g meaningful negotiations started. In addition, we have had extended discussions directed toward that same end with representatives of other gover _ents which have diplo _tic relations with North Vietnam. None of these initiatives have to date produ _d results. In mid-July I became convin _d that it

31、 was ne _ssary to _ke a _jor move to break the deadlock in the Paris talks. I spoke directly in this offi _, where Im now sitting, with an individual who had known Ho Chi Minh on a personal basis for 25 years. Through him I sent a letter to Ho Chi Minh. I did this outside of the usual diplo _tic cha

32、nnels with the hope that with the ne _ssity of _ statements for propaganda removed, there might be constructive progress toward bringing the war to an end. Let me read from that letter to you now: I realize that it is difficult to municate meaningfully across the gulf of four years of war. But preci

33、sely because of this gulf I wanted to take this opportunity to reaffirm in all solemnity my desire to work for a just pea _. I deeply believe that the war in Vietnam has gone on too long and delay in bringing it to an end can benefit no one, least of all the people of Vietnam. The time has e to move

34、 forward at the conferen _ table toward an early resolution of this tragic war. You will find us forthing and open-minded in a mon effort to bring the blessings of pea _ to the brave people of Vietnam. Let history record that at this critical juncture both sides turned their fa _ toward pea _ rather

35、 than toward conflict and war. I re _ived Ho Chi Minhs reply on August 30, three days before his death. It simply reiterated the public position North Vietnam had taken at Paris and flatly rejected my initiative. The full text of both letters is being released to the press. In addition to the public

36、 meetings that I have referred to, Ambassador Lodge has met with Vietnams chief negotiator in Paris in 11 private sessions. And we have taken other significant initiatives which must re _in secret to keep open some channels of munications which _y still prove to be productive. But the effect of all

37、the public, private, and secret negotiations which have been undertaken sin _ the bombing halt a year ago, and sin _ this Administration came into offi _ on January 20th, can be summed up in one senten _: No progress whatever has been _de ex _pt agreement on the shape of the bargaining table. Well,

38、now, whos at fault? Its bee clear that the obstacle in negotiating an end to the war is not the President of the United States. It is not the South Vietnamese Gover _ent. The obstacle is the other sides absolute refusal to show the least willingness to join us in seeking a just pea _. And it will no

39、t do so while it is convin _d that all it has to do is to wait for our next con _ssion, and our next con _ssion after that one, until it gets everything it wants. There can now be no longer any question that progress in negotiation depends only on Hanoi s deciding to negotiate - to negotiate serious

40、ly. I realize that this report on our efforts on the diplo _tic front is discouraging to the American people, but the American people are entitled to know the truth - the bad news as well as the good news - where the lives of our young men are involved. Now let me turn, however, to a more encouragin

41、g report on another front. At the time we launched our search for pea _, I recognized we might not sueed in bringing an end to the war through negotiations. I therefore put into effect another plan to bring pea _ - a plan which will bring the war to an end regardless of what happens on the negotiati

42、ng front. It is in line with the _jor shift in U. S. foreign policy which I described in my press conferen _ at Guam on July 25. Let me briefly explain what has been described as the Nixon Doctrine - a policy which not only will help end the war in Vietnam but which is an essential element of our pr

43、ogram to prevent future Vietnams. We Americans are a do-it-yourself people - were an impatient people. Instead of teaching someone else to do a job, we like to do it ourselves. And this trait has been carried over into our foreign policy. In Korea, and again in Vietnam, the United States furnished m

44、ost of the money, most of the arms, and most of the men to help the people of those countries defend their _ against Communist aggression. Before any American troops were mitted to Vietnam, a leader of another Asian country expressed this opinion to me when I was traveling in Asia as a private citiz

45、en. He said: “When you are trying to assist another nation defend its _, U.S. policy should be to help them fight the war, but not to fight the war for them.” Well in aordan _ with this wise counsel, I laid down in Guam three principles as guidelines for future American policy toward Asia. First, th

46、e United States will keep all of its treaty mitments. Second, we shall provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens the _ of a nation allied with us, or of a nation whose survival we consider vital to our security. Third, in cases involving other types of aggression we shall furnish military and ec

47、onomic assistan _ when requested in aordan _ with our treaty mitments. But we shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume the pri _ry responsibility of providing the _npower for its defense. After I announ _d this policy, I found that the leaders of the Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, Sou

48、th Korea, other nations which might be threatened by Communist aggression, weled this new direction in American foreign policy. The defense of _ is everybodys business - not just Americas business. And it is particularly the responsibility of the people whose _ is threatened. In the previous Adminis

49、tration, we Americanized the war in Vietnam. In this Administration, we are Vietnamizing the search for pea _. The policy of the previous Administration not only resulted in our assuming the pri _ry responsibility for fighting the war, but even more significant did not adequately stress the goal of

50、strengthening the South Vietnamese so that they could defend themselves when we left. The Vietnamization plan was launched following Secretary Lairds visit to Vietnam in March. Under the plan, I ordered first a substantial increase in the training and equipment of South Vietnamese for _s. In July, o

51、n my visit to Vietnam, I changed General Abramss orders, so that they were consistent with the objectives of our new policies. Under the new orders, the pri _ry mission of our troops is to enable the South Vietnamese for _s to assume the full responsibility for the security of South Vietnam. Our air

52、 operations have been redu _d by over 20 per _nt. And now we have begun to see the results of this long-overdue change in American policy in Vietnam. After five years of Americans going into Vietnam we are finally bringing American men home. By De _mber 15 over 60,000 men will have been withdrawn fr

53、om South Vietnam, including 20 per _nt of all of our bat for _s. The South Vietnamese have continued to gain in strength. As a result, theyve been able to take over bat responsibilities from our American troops. Two other significant developments have ourred sin _ this Administration took offi _. En

54、emy infiltration, infiltration which is essential if they are to launch a _jor attack over the last three months, is less than 20 per _nt of what it was over the same period last year. And most important, United States casualties have declined during the last two months to the lowest point in three

55、years. Let me now turn to our program for the future. We have adopted a plan which we have worked out in cooperation with the South Vietnamese for the plete withdrawal of all U.S. bat ground for _s and their repla _ment by South Vietnamese for _s on an orderly scheduled timetable. This withdrawal wi

56、ll be _de from strength and not from weakness. As South Vietnamese for _s bee stronger, the rate of American withdrawal can bee greater. I have not, and do not, intend to announ _ the timetable for our program, and there are obvious reasons for this decision which Im sure you will understand. As Ive

57、 indicated on several oasions, the rate of withdrawal will depend on developments on three fronts. One of these is the progress which can be, or might be, _de in the Paris talks. An announ _ment of a fixed timetable for our withdrawal would pletely remove any in _ntive for the enemy to negotiate an agreement. They would simply wait until our for _s had withdrawn and then move in. The other two factors on which we will base our withdrawal decisions are the level of enemy activity and the progress of the training programs of the South Vietnam