行政管理 外文翻譯 外文文獻(xiàn) 英文文獻(xiàn) 全球媒體和政治：跨國(guó)溝通制度和公民文化

1、行政管理全球媒體和政治：跨國(guó)溝通制度和公民文化蘭斯班尼特摘要:有很多關(guān)于媒體市場(chǎng)放松管制以及由此產(chǎn)生的龐大的全球性媒體公司增長(zhǎng)的影響的爭(zhēng)論。一些觀察家認(rèn)為該放寬的壓力，破壞了公共服務(wù)廣播和媒體社會(huì)責(zé)任規(guī)范，導(dǎo)致在許多國(guó)家信息質(zhì)量的惡化和公民脫離與政治的接觸。其他先驅(qū)為擴(kuò)大信息的選擇，放寬趨勢(shì)，使公民能夠找到自己喜歡的水平參與政治。這項(xiàng)分析建議，我們了解全球媒體放寬限制的趨勢(shì)在一個(gè)跨國(guó)政治制度組成部分中，許多參與者和領(lǐng)域的體制等形成規(guī)范的媒體所有權(quán)，社會(huì)責(zé)任，和公民信息。參與者包括跨國(guó)公司，政黨，公眾官員，利益團(tuán)體，組織和公民。機(jī)構(gòu)設(shè)置包括國(guó)家立法機(jī)構(gòu)和監(jiān)管委員會(huì)以及國(guó)際貿(mào)易組織，歐洲聯(lián)盟委員會(huì)

2、和聯(lián)合國(guó)機(jī)構(gòu)。那個(gè)在這些處在不同體制水平中的參與者的競(jìng)賽結(jié)果影響所有權(quán)和解釋了國(guó)家怎樣從事與媒體放松管制和逐漸形成的民主公共生活內(nèi)容的市場(chǎng)力量的內(nèi)容政策規(guī)范性共識(shí)的程度。媒體公司：重新界定問題如果規(guī)范促進(jìn)新自由主義媒體放寬政策并沒有這么受歡迎，媒體巨頭將不會(huì)如此強(qiáng)勢(shì)，并在依據(jù)如此少量的公共問責(zé)制制作節(jié)目。這意味著，了解公司的規(guī)模較之了解他們所經(jīng)營(yíng)的規(guī)范性環(huán)境和產(chǎn)生于這些環(huán)境中的公共信息的質(zhì)量可能不太重要。盡管如此，不難看出為什么討論二線國(guó)家巨頭對(duì)全球媒體的傾向于企業(yè)數(shù)量的驚人的增長(zhǎng)和減少，以及掠奪性的模仿行為的。在本文寫作之時(shí)，全球媒體市場(chǎng)的主導(dǎo)力量只有7大公司，他們以驚人的增長(zhǎng)速度進(jìn)入縱向和

3、橫向的綜合龐然大物：迪斯尼（美國(guó)在線）時(shí)代華納，索尼，新聞集團(tuán)，維亞康姆，維旺迪環(huán)球和貝塔斯曼集團(tuán)（麥克切斯尼2001年） 。一個(gè)上市控股公司的摘要，將填補(bǔ)缺頁，并且這摘要將在這篇文章出版之前過時(shí)。一個(gè)用來跟蹤這些公司的增長(zhǎng)和辯論他們的影響力的來源，是媒體渠道。有些人認(rèn)為，謀求支配地位本身，就是值得擔(dān)憂的政治問題。例如，麥克切斯尼（ 2001 ）提供了一個(gè)簡(jiǎn)單的模型，即公司媒體行為帝國(guó)主義，涉及這些內(nèi)容： （ a ）競(jìng)爭(zhēng)以征服新領(lǐng)域（市場(chǎng)） ， （ b ）擺脫國(guó)家規(guī)章和鑒定，這使公司成為世界上半自治的權(quán)力機(jī)構(gòu)，（ c ）追求規(guī)?；蚍秶淠康氖鞘故袌?chǎng)遠(yuǎn)離替代性產(chǎn)品。雖然這似乎是一個(gè)很好的考慮到

4、企業(yè)的動(dòng)機(jī)，即使巨頭本身也談?wù)撍麄儯铱吹綆讉€(gè)問題，更注重帝國(guó)主義的動(dòng)機(jī)，而不是制度規(guī)范的沖突，這些制度規(guī)范將確定這些動(dòng)機(jī)在實(shí)踐中，在不同國(guó)家的工作情況。一個(gè)重點(diǎn)放在規(guī)模和范圍的問題是，企業(yè)的龐然大物根本不是能保持穩(wěn)定，且組織嚴(yán)密的機(jī)器（如帝國(guó)征服的概念所意味的） 。許多未能創(chuàng)造利潤(rùn)整合其龐大集團(tuán)，更不用說實(shí)現(xiàn)協(xié)同各產(chǎn)品線和交付機(jī)制，這些機(jī)制為競(jìng)爭(zhēng)添加染料使比賽擴(kuò)大（ 2002年經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)） 。事實(shí)上，在本文寫作之時(shí)，大多數(shù)上述上市公司正在剝離主要控股，消除分歧，或考慮集體解體。美國(guó)在線時(shí)代華納掙扎在內(nèi)部組織和對(duì)外形象的問題的角度考慮從公司名稱中取消“美國(guó)在線”，意味著在此記錄失敗的合并提供其承諾

5、的內(nèi)容和收斂媒體平臺(tái)。貝塔斯曼首席執(zhí)行官托馬斯middlehoff曾經(jīng)駁回對(duì)收購(gòu)了很大一部分美國(guó)圖書和音樂市場(chǎng)的擔(dān)心，他說貝塔斯曼已不再是一個(gè)德國(guó)公司;后來盈利的問題引起了關(guān)于首先進(jìn)入這些市場(chǎng)的問題。前維旺迪環(huán)球首席弗蘭克比昂迪播出的常規(guī)企業(yè)智慧，即“這些公司99 的成功，”將“在成功的境外執(zhí)行” 中被發(fā)現(xiàn)（麥克切斯尼2001年） 。在本文寫作之時(shí)，維旺迪正在試圖全部售出其既遙遠(yuǎn)又災(zāi)難性且無利可圖的世界媒體和娛樂資產(chǎn)?？傊?，帝國(guó)的動(dòng)機(jī)并不總能收獲成功的帝國(guó)。另一項(xiàng)對(duì)于媒體帝國(guó)主義的挑戰(zhàn)的論點(diǎn)是，當(dāng)被應(yīng)用于被設(shè)想為領(lǐng)土的通信領(lǐng)域時(shí)隱喻分解。被媒體巨頭征服的領(lǐng)土只是整體中的一部分（即消費(fèi)大眾統(tǒng)計(jì)學(xué)

6、） ?；蛟S媒體領(lǐng)土中更有趣的一部分是媒體傳輸能力和媒體接收能力，它的擴(kuò)大得益于技術(shù)在數(shù)字通信方面的創(chuàng)新。如果只有這么大的空間能夠征服，吞并的渠道和團(tuán)體可能會(huì)提出一個(gè)更大的問題。但是在一個(gè)不斷擴(kuò)大的宇宙中，大型企業(yè)的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)不僅必須在彼此間進(jìn)行，但往往在自己內(nèi)部進(jìn)行，導(dǎo)致在近幾年許多大型企業(yè)中的許多組織經(jīng)歷慘敗。（ compaigne 戈梅里， 2000年）。接下來的論點(diǎn)是，雖然跨國(guó)巨頭們可能會(huì)瓜分歐洲和北美市場(chǎng)，這些只不過是在全球市場(chǎng)中的兩個(gè)（盡管重要）地區(qū)。如上所述，其他國(guó)家和地區(qū)的媒體系統(tǒng)（例如，中國(guó)，伊斯蘭國(guó)家，俄羅斯及一些文化區(qū)域，如拉丁美洲 ，中東，和東南亞）生產(chǎn)的內(nèi)容，不僅有新自由方面

7、的，還有文化方面和不同程度上政治方面。其中的一些文化流動(dòng)甚至達(dá)到更廣泛的世界觀眾。低成本的傳輸和接收技術(shù)使編程從亞洲，拉丁美洲和中東地區(qū)的生產(chǎn)者向外流動(dòng)到周圍區(qū)域的觀眾社區(qū)，以及在歐洲和北美洲的大量移民社區(qū)（辛克萊等人。 1996年） 。最后，即使是跨國(guó)巨頭們可能會(huì)產(chǎn)生的新聞和內(nèi)容的圖像反映出對(duì)跨國(guó)政治活動(dòng)家網(wǎng)絡(luò)的關(guān)注（貝內(nèi)特2003年，凱克 sikkink 1998年 ） ，這似乎將被更多的公眾所關(guān)注。這些公眾通過各種媒體了解關(guān)于全球環(huán)境，經(jīng)濟(jì)，貿(mào)易，人權(quán)權(quán)利和勞工問題等方面的新聞。阿皮尤通過對(duì)44個(gè)國(guó)家的調(diào)查，發(fā)現(xiàn)了對(duì)全球化帶來的好處與對(duì)媒體霸權(quán)模式可能預(yù)測(cè)相比有更多多樣性的國(guó)家的意見（佩

8、尤研究中心2003年，第177 頁） 。此外對(duì)反對(duì)全球化示威者的優(yōu)點(diǎn)也有相當(dāng)大的意見和分歧（皮尤研究中心2003年，第187頁） 。伽漢姆表明，普通公眾對(duì)相互依存的世界體系的政治意識(shí)可能是一個(gè)媒體全球化的意外后果： “我認(rèn)為，歷史上經(jīng)濟(jì)和政治方面的制度的合理性，不僅成為全球性的，而且可以通過所占比例越來越大的世界人口理解為全球性的，部分恰恰是因?yàn)槿蛳到y(tǒng)的中介通信的生長(zhǎng)和擴(kuò)散 “ （伽漢姆1992年，第369頁）。這些對(duì)媒體帝國(guó)主義論點(diǎn)的挑戰(zhàn)鼓勵(lì)我們要在某種程度上更謹(jǐn)慎的思考媒體集團(tuán)實(shí)際上對(duì)實(shí)現(xiàn)這一跨國(guó)媒體制度所做出的貢獻(xiàn)。我建議，我們應(yīng)該往公司的經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)和公司的主導(dǎo)動(dòng)機(jī)之外更遠(yuǎn)的地方看并認(rèn)為

9、這些企業(yè)的操作者有著明顯的共同規(guī)范的政策議程，對(duì)此積極的促進(jìn)構(gòu)成了一極的政治制度。默多克（ 1990年）概述了這個(gè)議程方面的4個(gè)階段。這從企業(yè)操作者的角度來看被我們稱為制度的形成， “非國(guó)有化” （即公司的一些業(yè)務(wù)計(jì)劃，它們使公司從系統(tǒng)的國(guó)家管制或條例中脫離出來） ， “ 自由化 “ （即壓力，為了放松所有權(quán)和在各國(guó)間的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)規(guī)則的壓力），”商業(yè)化的公有部門“ （也即壓力，為了打破公共服務(wù)性的電視臺(tái)和廣播電臺(tái)的壟斷而通過對(duì)商業(yè)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的授權(quán)和減少公共資金的壓力，目的是迫使公共服務(wù)性的媒體公司采取商業(yè)贊助和發(fā)展以普及率為基礎(chǔ)的方案） ，以及“重新管制” （即政策措施，它們?cè)试S縱向和橫向，通過多種所有制

10、和生產(chǎn)，分配，發(fā)放許可證，并對(duì)多個(gè)控股提供內(nèi)容的收購(gòu)的方式的一體化） 。這些規(guī)范性指示，可以反映企業(yè)帝國(guó)的野心，但他們不會(huì)以統(tǒng)一的結(jié)果在不同的國(guó)家自動(dòng)迸發(fā)。把全球媒體的新自由主義制度理解為一個(gè)有活力的比賽，在其中規(guī)范企業(yè)的極受到其它制度操作者的爭(zhēng)議，這使我們的操作者占不到?jīng)Q定性成果，其中包括公司的失敗，各聯(lián)合國(guó)家抵制政治內(nèi)容的惡化的能力，以及增加人民抵抗和替代性的溝通渠道。接下來的一段內(nèi)容回顧了這些政治競(jìng)賽舉行的一些設(shè)置。global media and politics: transnationalcommunication regimes and civic culturesw. lanc

11、e bennettp131-134abstract:there is much debate about the effects of media market deregulation and the resulting growth of vast global media corporations. some observers argue that deregulatory pressures have undermined public service broadcasting and media social-responsibility norms, resulting in d

12、eterioration of information quality and politicaldisengagement of citizens in many nations. others herald deregulatory trends as expanding information choices and enabling citizens to find their preferred levels of political engagement. this analysis proposes that we understand global trends in medi

13、a deregulation as part of a transnational political regime in which many players and institutional arenas shape norms for media ownership, social responsibility, and citizen information. the players include multinational corporations, parties and public officials, interest associations, and citizen

14、advocacy organizations. the institutional settingsinclude national legislatures and regulatory commissions as well as international trade organizations, european union commissions, and united nations agencies. the outcomes of contests among these players at different institutional levels influence t

15、he degrees of normative consensus on ownership and content policies in the regime and explain how different nations engage with media deregulation and the market forces that increasingly shape the content of democratic public life.media corporations: redefining the issuesif norms promoting neolibera

16、l media deregulatory policies were not so popular,media giants would be less muscular, and surely less free to produce programming with so little public accountability. this means that the size of corporations may be less important to understand than the normative environments in which they operate

17、and the quality of public information produced within those environments. still, it is easy to see why discussions of the global media gravitate toward the breathtaking growth and shrinking number of corporations, along with the imitative predatory behaviors of second-tier national giants.at the tim

18、e of this writing, the global media market was dominated by as few as seven giant corporations that have grown at astonishing speed into vertically and horizontally integrated behemoths: disney, (aol) time warner, sony, news corporation, viacom, vivendi universal, and bertelsmann (mcchesney 2001). a

19、 summary listing of the holdings of these companies would fill pages,and it would be outdated before this article is published. a useful source for tracking the growth of these corporations and debating their impact is the media channel (/ownership). some argue that the que

20、st for dominance is, in itself, a political problem worth worrying about. for example, mcchesney (2001) offers a simple model of corporate media behavior as imperialistic, involving these elements: (a) the race to conquer new territories (markets), (b) the escape from national regulations and identi

21、fications that enables corporations to become semiautonomous world powers, and (c) the quest for size or scale, which aims at depriving markets of alternative sources of products.although this seems a good account of corporate motives, even as the moguls themselves talk about them, i see several pro

22、blems with focusing more on imperialistic motives than on the conflicts over regime norms that determine how those motives work, in practice, in different national contexts. one problem with the focus on size and scale is that the corporate behemoths are anything but stable, well-organized machines

23、(as the notion of imperial conquest would imply).many have failed to create profitable integrations of their vast holdings, much less achieve the synergies across product lines and delivery mechanisms that fuel the race for expansion (economist 2002). indeed, at the time of this writing, most of the

24、 giants listed above were divesting major holdings, eliminating divisions, or contemplating wholesale breakup. aol timewarner was struggling over internal organization and external image problems to the point of contemplating removal of “aol” from the company namesignaling the failure of this record

25、 merger to deliver its promised convergence of content and media platforms. bertelsmanns ceo thomas middlehoff once dismissed concerns about its acquisition of a large share of us book and music markets by saying that bertelsmann was no longer a german company; later profitability problems raised qu

26、estions about its entry into those markets in the first place. former vivendi universal chief frank biondi aired the conventional corporate wisdom that “99% of the success of these companies” would be found “in successful execution offshore” (mcchesney 2001). at the time of this writing, vivendi was

27、 trying to sell off its far-flung and disastrously unprofitable universal media and entertainment assets. in short, imperial motives do not always yield successful empires.another challenge to the media-imperialism argument is that the metaphor breaks down when applied to communication conceived as

28、territory. the territory being conquered by the media giants is only partly physical (i.e., consumer audience demographics). perhaps the more interesting part of media territory is the transmission and reception capacity, which is expanding thanks to technological innovation in digital communication

29、s. if there were only so much space to conquer, the gobbling up of channels and bands might present a larger problem. but in an expanding universe, large corporations must compete not only with each other but often within themselves, resulting in many of the organizational fiascoes witnessed in rece

30、nt years among the corporate behemoths (compaigne & gomery 2000).next comes the argument that although the global giants may be carving up the european and north american markets, these are merely two (albeit important) regions in the largerworld picture. as noted above, other national and regional

31、media systems (e.g., china, islamic states, russia, and cultural regions such as latin.america, the middle east, and southeast asia) produce content that is culturally and, to varying degrees, politically apart from the neoliberal.western media regime. some of these cultural flows even reach larger

32、world audiences. low-cost transmission and reception technologies enable programming to flow outward from asian, latin american, and middle eastern producers to audiences in regional neighborhoods, as well as to large immigrant communities in europe and north america (sinclair et al. 1996). finally,

33、 even the global giants may produce news and content images that echo the concerns of transnational political activist networks (bennett 2003a, keck & sikkink 1998), which appear to be surrounded by larger publics receiving news of global environmental, economic, trade, human rights, and labor probl

34、ems through various media. a pew survey of 44 nations found more diversity in national views on the benefits of globalization than a media hegemony model might predict (pew research center 2003, p. 177). there were also considerable differences of opinion about the merits of antiglobalization protes

35、ters (pew research center 2003, p. 187). garnham suggests that the general publics political awareness of world system interdependence may be an unintended consequence of media globalization:“i would argue that historically both the economic and political aspects of system rationality have not only

36、become global but are understood as global by a growing proportion of the worlds population, in part precisely because of the growth and spread of global systems of mediated communication” (garnham 1992,p. 369).these challenges to the media imperialism argument encourage us to be somewhat more caref

37、ul in thinking about what the media conglomerates actually contribute to this transnational media regime. i propose that we look beyond the growth and domination motives of the corporations and consider that these corporate players share a remarkably common normative policy agenda, the aggressive pr

38、omotion of which constitutes one political pole of the regime. murdock (1990) outlined this agenda in terms of four stages of what i would call regime formation from the standpoint of the corporate players: “denationalization” (corporate business plans that remove companies from systematic national contr