本科生土建施工組織設(shè)計(jì)外文翻譯

1、 畢業(yè)設(shè)計(jì)譯文及原稿譯文題目：施工項(xiàng)目成本上升的因素原稿題目：construction project cost escalation factors原稿出處：engrg. volume 25, issue 4, pp. 221-229 (october 2009)浙江工業(yè)大學(xué)之江學(xué)院畢業(yè)設(shè)計(jì)（論文） 外文翻譯施工項(xiàng)目成本上升的因素j. mgmt.文摘：私人和公共的建設(shè)項(xiàng)目，一直以來(lái)有成本增長(zhǎng)的問(wèn)題。交通運(yùn)輸項(xiàng)目，在計(jì)劃和建設(shè)過(guò)程中具有典型的較長(zhǎng)生產(chǎn)前置時(shí)間，這在歷史上是被低估的。如圖所示，通過(guò)對(duì)荷蘭隧道建設(shè)的經(jīng)驗(yàn)回顧增長(zhǎng)的成本。在美國(guó)，大約50%的現(xiàn)役的大型運(yùn)輸項(xiàng)目都超出他們的最初的預(yù)算。大

2、量的研究和研究項(xiàng)目已經(jīng)確認(rèn)個(gè)體因素導(dǎo)致增加的工程造價(jià)。雖然這個(gè)因素能影響私人資助項(xiàng)目鑒定效果，但是對(duì)公共資助的項(xiàng)目尤其不利。公共基金用于一些項(xiàng)目的建設(shè)效果是有限的，并且有積累的重要的基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施的需要。因此，如果任何項(xiàng)目超過(guò)預(yù)算，其他項(xiàng)目被從這個(gè)計(jì)劃刪除或降低范圍以提供必要資金來(lái)抵消成本的增長(zhǎng)。這樣的行為會(huì)加劇惡化的一個(gè)國(guó)家的運(yùn)輸基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施。這項(xiàng)研究是通過(guò)對(duì)個(gè)人作品集的深入了解，來(lái)分門別類的鑒定費(fèi)用增長(zhǎng)因素。通過(guò)超過(guò)20個(gè)州際公路機(jī)構(gòu)的驗(yàn)證，這18種分門別類的基本影響因素對(duì)各類建設(shè)項(xiàng)目的成本影響都適用。這些因素描繪了有據(jù)可依成本超支問(wèn)題的原因。工程師在估計(jì)未來(lái)項(xiàng)目的成本因素，尋求減少它們的方法時(shí)考慮

3、這些影響因素可以，提高他們的成本估算和項(xiàng)目預(yù)算的準(zhǔn)確性。介紹：歷史的大型建筑工程已經(jīng)飽受成本和時(shí)間超支的困擾（flyvbjerg李瑋2002）。在很多情況下，最后的項(xiàng)目成本一直高于估計(jì)的成本，發(fā)布時(shí)間可能在最初工程計(jì)劃時(shí)，最終設(shè)計(jì)時(shí)，抑或在開(kāi)始建設(shè)時(shí)“mega項(xiàng)目需要更多的前提研究來(lái)避免成本超支?！?（2002）早期的項(xiàng)目成本估計(jì)與最終報(bào)價(jià)結(jié)果或最終工程成本可以存在顯著差異。在這個(gè)時(shí)間跨度里，項(xiàng)目啟動(dòng)發(fā)展概念和最終結(jié)束之間，許多因素會(huì)影響施工項(xiàng)目最終成本。這段時(shí)期通常持續(xù)幾年，但對(duì)于高度復(fù)雜和技術(shù)挑戰(zhàn)性的項(xiàng)目可以輕易超過(guò)10年。組織面臨重大挑戰(zhàn)的項(xiàng)目預(yù)算控制的時(shí)間跨度將從開(kāi)始一直持續(xù)到完成的項(xiàng)

4、目建設(shè)。開(kāi)發(fā)成本估計(jì)準(zhǔn)確反映工程范圍、經(jīng)濟(jì)條件、社會(huì)利益協(xié)調(diào)和宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)條件提供基線成本管理，可以用來(lái)傳遞學(xué)科的設(shè)計(jì)過(guò)程。項(xiàng)目可以兌現(xiàn)預(yù)算，但需要一個(gè)好的開(kāi)始，一個(gè)估算成本超支因素的意識(shí)，及項(xiàng)目管理法則。當(dāng)缺少法則的時(shí)候，在一個(gè)項(xiàng)目上顯著的成本增長(zhǎng)會(huì)毀壞整體計(jì)劃，因?yàn)榻?jīng)費(fèi)將不適應(yīng)未來(lái)項(xiàng)目的建設(shè)。history-holland隧道的案例研究過(guò)去的歷史經(jīng)驗(yàn)，可以為建設(shè)一個(gè)優(yōu)質(zhì)項(xiàng)目的預(yù)算提供更好的理解。同樣使工程造價(jià)增長(zhǎng)的問(wèn)題和經(jīng)驗(yàn)都可以從過(guò)去的事實(shí)中學(xué)到。荷蘭隧道，當(dāng)它在1927年開(kāi)放時(shí)，是最長(zhǎng)的水下隧道，它也是人類建筑史第一個(gè)機(jī)械通氣的海底隧道。它的初始成本的估計(jì)是由著名的土木工程師george

5、washington goethals做出的?；仡櫤商m隧道工程，它突出反映了一個(gè)具有爭(zhēng)議性的問(wèn)題：關(guān)系到對(duì)復(fù)雜重大工程建設(shè)預(yù)算的估計(jì)和實(shí)際成本時(shí)，即使是最杰出的工程師也會(huì)在評(píng)估一個(gè)超過(guò)本身物理特性的工程的啟動(dòng)成本時(shí)遇到麻煩。許多次沒(méi)有認(rèn)識(shí)到工程外部物理配置的運(yùn)作成本問(wèn)題，紐約和新澤西委員會(huì)在1918年建設(shè)一個(gè)交通隧道在河里“敦促新隧道，哈德遜”，“讓國(guó)人共用去球衣的隧道。”汽車是為主導(dǎo)的交通方式,隧道被決定用于通車。正因如此,隧道會(huì)使用新通風(fēng)技術(shù)來(lái)凈化內(nèi)燃機(jī)所產(chǎn)生的廢氣。11項(xiàng)設(shè)計(jì)被考慮在隧道建設(shè)里，最值得注意的是，一個(gè)由工程師負(fù)責(zé)整理最近為完成巴拿馬運(yùn)河建設(shè)的george washingto

6、n goethals。他想像一個(gè)單一的、二層隧道與對(duì)方的交通每一層。goethals做出規(guī)劃項(xiàng)目成本估計(jì)1200萬(wàn)美元和3年建筑時(shí)間。第一次世界大戰(zhàn)已經(jīng)耗盡了很多國(guó)家的鋼鐵產(chǎn)品，所以他的設(shè)計(jì)，利用水泥街區(qū)為隧道結(jié)構(gòu)的外殼。他的設(shè)計(jì)是領(lǐng)先的計(jì)劃“赫德森車輛管?！保?919）。但他在別處有責(zé)任，并且不是這個(gè)項(xiàng)目的總設(shè)計(jì)師。他以荷蘭克利頭工程連同董事會(huì)的5號(hào)州際公路工程咨詢的名字。荷蘭帶著在構(gòu)建地鐵、隧道項(xiàng)目的豐富經(jīng)驗(yàn)來(lái)到在紐約的這個(gè)項(xiàng)目。“goethals”計(jì)劃的估計(jì)，這個(gè)項(xiàng)目的成本有120萬(wàn)美元。荷蘭基于他的研究分析，在1920年2月份發(fā)表了一份報(bào)告，報(bào)告中說(shuō)：他的發(fā)現(xiàn)并不是什么預(yù)期的好。荷蘭發(fā)

7、現(xiàn)：原來(lái)goethals報(bào)告中7.47米的寬度不能適應(yīng)車流。混凝土塊不能承受隧道結(jié)構(gòu)附件。goethals所需的施工方法的設(shè)計(jì)完全是未經(jīng)證實(shí)的。估計(jì)的建設(shè)成本是非常低的。工作不能在3年內(nèi)完成。咨詢工程師的一致支持了荷蘭的分析。提出了一個(gè)荷蘭自己的設(shè)計(jì)，支持的咨詢工程師一致通過(guò)。荷蘭的設(shè)計(jì)，這是一個(gè)大范圍的變化，稱為“雙鑄鐵管”。一個(gè)好處是將根據(jù)建設(shè)在東方河的隧道的經(jīng)驗(yàn)和比哈德遜河更進(jìn)一步。荷蘭估計(jì)費(fèi)用28,669,000美元，請(qǐng)求28,669,000美元的球衣試驗(yàn)，施工時(shí)間在三年多。討論了隧道的設(shè)計(jì)分歧已經(jīng)持續(xù)了超過(guò)一年，創(chuàng)造了紐約和新澤西的傭金和延緩工作一個(gè)時(shí)間表改變。一個(gè)合同授予了新澤西側(cè)

8、進(jìn)一步推遲啟動(dòng)建設(shè)和增加超過(guò)一半的100萬(wàn)美元的成本。在紐約的建設(shè)開(kāi)始于1920年10月之后，在1921年12月底，在新澤西的一部分隧道出價(jià)“允許球衣方式?！彼淼牢械目⒐と掌谑?926年12月31日。現(xiàn)在的施工進(jìn)度已增加到5年。估計(jì)項(xiàng)目成本在早年的施工的蠕變、進(jìn)度拖延、范圍和通貨膨脹上增加了多次。增加的交通量預(yù)測(cè)需要更大的出入口廣場(chǎng)和獲取更多的權(quán)利的方式“汽車隧道在增加”。然后材料和勞動(dòng)力成本將另一個(gè)600萬(wàn)美元增加到項(xiàng)目的通貨膨脹。在1924年，成本已經(jīng)提高1400萬(wàn)美元，車輛隧道費(fèi)用高達(dá)1400萬(wàn)美元。由于功能和美學(xué)的因素范圍蠕變，更復(fù)雜的道路設(shè)計(jì)方法，拓寬路面的途徑，增加了更多的成本建

9、筑治療范圍蠕變。重新設(shè)計(jì)的通風(fēng)系統(tǒng)加15.24公分的隧道直徑及4,422,000美元的支出。荷蘭也決定替代鑄鋼為鑄鐵增加強(qiáng)度和安全因素的多隧道范圍蠕變。最后，在新澤西的通風(fēng)井不得不重新設(shè)計(jì)相應(yīng)的基礎(chǔ)，隨著他們的付出的代價(jià)，因?yàn)橐庀氩坏?00,000美元的土地條件，所有的這些變化增加了42.5億美元，超過(guò)估計(jì)。新的資金撥款，它被認(rèn)為足以完成項(xiàng)目，但到了二月，另一項(xiàng)增加3,200,000美元，隧道申請(qǐng)另外3,200,000美元。委員會(huì)解釋說(shuō)，這是新的成本是由于增加成本挑戰(zhàn)勞動(dòng)和材料成本控制。這時(shí)荷蘭總工程師死于心臟衰竭，他的助手，milton h. freeman接替總工程師4個(gè)月后死于肺炎。ol

10、e singstad，設(shè)計(jì)通風(fēng)系統(tǒng)的設(shè)計(jì)師便成了總工程師并且把項(xiàng)目完成。有三個(gè)不同的總工程師，耗費(fèi)5個(gè)月是可以遇見(jiàn)混亂。1924年4月份，水從一個(gè)裂縫沖進(jìn)其中一個(gè)隧道，迫使工人匆忙逃跑的意外情況。最后一筆專用款項(xiàng)被使用在早期1927年工程，總造價(jià)48,400,000美元。1927年11月13日隧道正式投入使用。隧道建造工作開(kāi)始于7年前。方法論增長(zhǎng)的成本因素導(dǎo)致項(xiàng)目成本增長(zhǎng)已通過(guò)大樣本的研究記錄，研究證實(shí)了單獨(dú)或團(tuán)體。每個(gè)因子的概念，提出了一種挑戰(zhàn)，一個(gè)機(jī)構(gòu)對(duì)項(xiàng)目的成本估計(jì)準(zhǔn)確。作為一項(xiàng)大型研究試圖提高成本預(yù)算和成本管理的概念，從項(xiàng)目的投標(biāo)的一天，一個(gè)文獻(xiàn)進(jìn)行徹底的了鑒定費(fèi)用估計(jì)影響因素等（20

11、06）。文獻(xiàn)包括勘探研究報(bào)告、出版物、政府報(bào)告、新聞文章，和其他公開(kāi)來(lái)源?？⒐ず蟮奈墨I(xiàn)回顧的因素進(jìn)行了分析和分類的人員進(jìn)入成本因素所經(jīng)歷的交通建設(shè)項(xiàng)目的增加。這是由三角在多個(gè)調(diào)查者或資料來(lái)源暗示同一因素。這種分類方法把個(gè)人因素,在先前的研究已經(jīng)確定，并建立了全球框架，用于解決這個(gè)問(wèn)題的工程造價(jià)升級(jí)。在最后的分類的成本因素框架是通過(guò)驗(yàn)證升級(jí)的數(shù)據(jù)，從采訪了三角法等20多個(gè)國(guó)家shas公路部門先前的工程支持識(shí)別的因素包括電話采訪了50個(gè)沙斯黨等面談的準(zhǔn)備和測(cè)試儀器是最初在現(xiàn)場(chǎng)采訪兩個(gè)沙斯黨。修訂后的采訪樂(lè)器被送到了沙斯黨面談前，以便他們能準(zhǔn)備。在隨訪現(xiàn)場(chǎng)為五個(gè)人訪談和通過(guò)沙斯黨通過(guò)一組“同伴交流”

12、剩下的隨訪電話。在所有情況下，研究人員追蹤采訪的協(xié)議，以確保在數(shù)據(jù)采集。結(jié)果分類的成本因素可以幫助升級(jí)項(xiàng)目業(yè)主和工程專業(yè)人員將注意力集中在這個(gè)關(guān)鍵問(wèn)題，導(dǎo)致成本估算不精確。成本因素的分類升級(jí)從分析方法生成的已有研究成果的基礎(chǔ)上，認(rèn)為面談來(lái)創(chuàng)建一個(gè)分類的成本的原因的規(guī)模。一個(gè)更好的理解成本因素是理解升級(jí)的部隊(duì)各因素的驅(qū)動(dòng)因素或者來(lái)源。在這層了解可能的設(shè)計(jì)策略，為應(yīng)對(duì)這些成本升級(jí)的因素。這個(gè)因素影響的評(píng)估中，每一個(gè)項(xiàng)目都是由自然發(fā)展階段的內(nèi)部和外部的因素在起作用，控制成本升級(jí)的機(jī)構(gòu)/業(yè)主為內(nèi)部，而現(xiàn)有的直接控制的因素外，該機(jī)構(gòu)/業(yè)主分為外部。這個(gè)報(bào)告的因素為不應(yīng)被視為暗示一水平的影響并構(gòu)建提供了潛

13、在的因素。總結(jié)成邏輯劃分的因素，并幫助在可視化分類項(xiàng)目成本預(yù)算是如何影響。值得注意的一個(gè)因素，指出問(wèn)題勞動(dòng)和材料成本的估計(jì)，但是大部分的因素，是指出“影響項(xiàng)目范圍和影響”的時(shí)機(jī)。construction project cost escalation factors j. mgmt. abstract: construction projects, private and public alike, have a long history of cost escalation. transportation projects, which typically have long lead ti

14、mes between planning and construction, are historically underestimated, as shown through a review of the cost growth experienced with the holland tunnel. approximately 50% of the active large transportation projects in the united states have overrun their initial budgets. a large number of studies a

15、nd research projects have identified individual factors that lead to increased project cost. although the factors identified can influence privately funded projects the effects are particularly detrimental to publicly funded projects. the public funds available for a pool of projects are limited and

16、 there is a backlog of critical infrastructure needs. therefore, if any project exceeds its budget other projects are dropped from the program or the scope is reduced to provide the funds necessary to cover the cost growth. such actions exacerbate the deterioration of a states transportation infrast

17、ructure. this study is an anthology and categorization of individual cost increase factors that were identified through an in-depth literature review. this categorization of 18 primary factors which impact the cost of all types of construction projects was verified by interviews with over 20 state h

18、ighway agencies. these factors represent documented causes behind cost escalation problems. engineers who address these escalation factors when assessing future project cost and who seek to mitigate the influence of these factors can improve the accuracy of their cost estimates and program budgets i

19、ntroduction：historically large construction projects have been plagued by cost and schedule overruns flyvbjerg et al. 2002. in too many cases, the final project cost has been higher than the cost estimates prepared and released during initial planning, preliminary engineering, final design, or even

20、at the start of construction “mega projects need more study up front to avoid cost overruns.” the ramifications of differences between early project cost estimates and bid prices or the final cost of a project can be significant. over the time span between project initiation concept development and

21、the completion of construction many factors may influence the final project costs. this time span is normally several years in duration but for the highly complex and technologically challenging projects it can easily exceed 10 years. organizations face a major challenge in controlling project budge

22、ts over the time span between project initiation and the completion of construction. the development of cost estimates that accurately reflect project scope, economic conditions, and are attuned to community interest and the macroeconomic conditions provide a baseline cost that management can use to

23、 impart discipline into the design process. projects can be delivered on budget but that requires a good starting estimate, an awareness of factors that can cause cost escalation, and project management discipline. when discipline is lacking, significant cost growth on one project can raze the large

24、r program of projects because funds will not be available for future projects that are programmed for constructionhistoryholland tunnel case studya history of past project experiences can serve one well in understanding the challenges of delivering a quality project on budget. repeatedly, the same p

25、roblems cause project cost escalation and much wisdom can be gained by studying the past. the holland tunnel was, when it opened in 1927, the longest underwater tunnel ever constructed and it was also the first mechanically ventilated underwater tunnel. its initial cost estimate was made by the reno

26、wned civil engineer george washington goethals. a review of the holland tunnel project serves to highlight the critical issues associated with estimating the costs of large complex projects and the fact that even the most distinguished engineers have trouble assessing cost drivers beyond the physica

27、l characteristics of a project. many times there is no recognition of the cost drivers operating outside the projects physical configuration. a joint new york and new jersey commission in 1918 recommended a transportation tunnel under the river “urges new tunnel under the hudson.” 1918; “ask nation

28、to share in tunnel to jersey.” 1918. the automobile was emerging as the predominate means of transportation and it was decided that this tunnel should be for vehicular traffic. as a result the tunnel would employ new ventilation technologies to purge the exhaust gases produced by the internal combus

29、tion engine. eleven designs were considered for the tunnel, most notably, one by the engineer recently responsible for finishing the panama canal, george washington goethals. he envisioned a single, bilevel tunnel with opposing traffic on each level. goethals made a planning project cost estimate of

30、 $12 million and 3 years for construction. world war i had consumed much of the nations steel and iron production, so his design made use of cement blocks as the tunnels structural shell. his design was the frontrunning plan “hudson vehicle tube.” but he had responsibilities elsewhere and was not na

31、med chief engineer for the project. clifford m. holland was named to head the project along with a board of five consulting engineers “name interstate tunnel engineers.” 1919. holland came to the project with vast experience in constructing subways and tunnels in new york. the cost of the project wa

32、s taken to be $12 million, goethals planning estimate. holland produced a report in february of 1920 based on his analysis of the goethals design of the project. his findings were not what had been expected. holland found goethals width of 7.47 m would not accommodate the volume of traffic. concrete

33、 blocks would not withstand the structural loads exerted on the tunnel. the construction methods required by goethals design were completely untried. the estimated cost of construction was grossly low. the work could not be completed in 3 years.the board of consulting engineers gave unanimous suppor

34、t for hollands analysis. holland then presented a design of his own which was supported unanimously by the consulting engineers. hollands design, which was a major scope change, called for twin cast-iron tubes. one advantage was that construction would follow established methods of tunnel constructi

35、on that had been implemented for rail tunnels under the east river and further up the hudson. holland estimated the cost at $28,669,000 “asks $28,669,000 for jersey tube.” 1920 and construction time at 31/2 years.debate about the tunnel design continued for more than a year creating disagreements be

36、tween the new york and new jersey commissions and delaying the worka schedule change. a disagreement about awarding a contract on the new jersey side further delayed the start of construction and added over half of a million dollars in cost. construction started on the new york side in october of 19

37、20 and in late december 1921 the new jersey portion of the tunnel was bid “way all cleared for jersey tunnel.” the mandated completion date was december 31, 1926. the construction schedule had now grown to 5 years. estimated project cost increased multiple times throughout the early years of constru

38、ction as a result of scope creep, schedule delays, and inflation. increased traffic forecast necessitate larger entrance/exit plazas and acquisition of more right of way “vehicular tube is growing.” 1923. then increases in material and labor costs had added another $6 million to the project inflatio

39、n. by the beginning of 1924, reestimated costs had been increased by $14,000,000 “vehicular tunnel cost up $14,000,000.” 1924 due to functional and aesthetic factors scope creep. more intricate roadway designs for approaches, widening of the approach roadways, and architectural treatments increased

40、the costs more scope creep. redesign of the ventilation system added 15.24 cm to the tunnel diameter and $4,422,000. holland also decided to substitute cast-steel for castiron to increase the strength and safety factors of the tunnel more scope creep. last, the new jersey ventilation shafts had to b

41、e redesigned along with their corresponding foundations at a cost of $700,000 due to unexpected soil conditions unforeseen conditions. all of these changes increased the estimate to over $42.5 million. new funds were appropriated and it was believed that these were sufficient to complete the project

42、, but by february of 1926, there was another increase of $3,200,000 “$3,200,000 more asked for tunnel.” the commission explained that the new costs were due to increases in labor and material costs challenge in controlling cost. at this time holland died of heart failure and his assistant, milton h.

43、 freeman, took over as chief engineer only to die of pneumonia 4 months later. ole singstad, the designer of the ventilation system then became chief engineer and brought the project to completion. having three different chief engineers within 5 months created confusion unforeseen events. in april o

44、f 1924 water rushed into one of the tunnels from a leak forcing workers to make a hasty escape more unforeseen conditions. a final appropriation was requested in early 1927 brought the total project cost to $48,400,000. on november 13 of 1927 the tunnel officially opened “work on tunnel began 7 year

45、s ago.” methodologythe cost escalation factors that lead to project cost growth have been documented through a large number of studies. studies have identified factors individually or by groups. each factor presents a challenge to an agency seeking to produce accurate project cost estimates. as part

46、 of a larger study seeking to improve cost estimates and management of costs from project conception to bid day, a thorough literature review was conducted to identify factors that influence cost estimates anderson et al. 2006. the literature review included exploration of research reports and publi

47、cations, government reports, news articles, and other published sources. upon completion of the literature review the factors were analyzed and categorized by the researchers into factors that drive the cost increases experienced by transportation construction projects. this was accomplished by tria

48、ngulation where multiple investigators or data sources suggested the same factor. this categorization took the individual factors which had been identified in previous research and established a global framework for addressing the issue of project cost escalation. upon final categorization the cost

49、escalation factor framework was verified through triangulation of data from interviews with more than 20 state highway agencies shas around the nation . a previous project that supported identification of the factors had included telephone interviews with all 50 shas schexnayder et al. 2003 . an int

50、erview instrument was prepared and tested initially during onsite interview with two shas. the revised interview instrument was then sent to the shas before the interview so that they could prepare. the interviews were conducted onsite for five shas through individual interviews and through a group

51、“peer exchange.” the remaining interviews were conducted by telephone. in all cases, the researchers followed the interview protocol to ensure consistency in data collection. the resulting categorization of cost escalation factors can help project owners and engineering professionals focus their att

52、ention on the critical issues that lead to cost estimation inaccuracy.cost escalation factor classificationthe triangulation analysis considered methodologies from past studies and interviews to create a categorization for the causes of cost escalation. a better understanding of the cost escalation

53、factors is achieved through understanding the forces driving each factor or where the factor originates. with this understanding it is possible to design strategies for dealing with these cost escalation factors. the factors that affect the estimate in each project development phase are by nature in

54、ternal and external. factors that contribute to cost escalation and are controllable by the agency/owner are internal, while factors existing outside the direct control of the agency/owner are classified as external. the presentation order of the factors should not be taken as suggesting a level of

55、influence is constructed to provide an over arching summary of the factors. it summarizes the factors into logical divisions and classifications and helps in visualizing how project cost estimates are affected. it is important to note that one of the factors points to problems with estimation of lab

56、or and material cost, but most of the factors point to “influences” that impact project scope and timing.施工項(xiàng)目成本上升的誘因摘要：不管是私人的建設(shè)項(xiàng)目還是公共工程，一直以來(lái)成本都在不斷的增長(zhǎng)。交通運(yùn)輸建設(shè)項(xiàng)目，在計(jì)劃到建設(shè)過(guò)程中，具有典型的較長(zhǎng)生產(chǎn)前置時(shí)間。然而，這些問(wèn)題往往被歷史性的低估。如圖所示，荷蘭隧道建設(shè)成本的增長(zhǎng)就是一次很好的回顧。在美國(guó)，大約有50%的現(xiàn)役的大型運(yùn)輸項(xiàng)目都超出他們的最初的預(yù)算。大量的研究和研究項(xiàng)目已經(jīng)證實(shí)個(gè)體因素導(dǎo)致工程造價(jià)的增長(zhǎng)。雖然這個(gè)因素能影響私人資助項(xiàng)

57、目鑒定效果，但是對(duì)公共資助的項(xiàng)目尤其不利。公共基金用于一些項(xiàng)目的建設(shè)是有限的，而且有些基金是用于一些重要的基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施，以備不時(shí)之需。因此，如果任何項(xiàng)目超過(guò)預(yù)算，其他項(xiàng)目被從這個(gè)計(jì)劃刪除或降低范圍以提供必要資金來(lái)抵消成本的增長(zhǎng)。這樣的措施會(huì)惡化的一個(gè)國(guó)家的運(yùn)輸基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施，形成了一個(gè)惡性循環(huán)。這項(xiàng)研究是通過(guò)對(duì)個(gè)人作品集的深入了解，來(lái)分門別類的分析費(fèi)用增長(zhǎng)的因素。通過(guò)對(duì)20多個(gè)州際公路機(jī)構(gòu)的驗(yàn)證，這18種分門別類的主要影響因素對(duì)各類建設(shè)項(xiàng)目的成本影響都適用。這些因素聲明了有據(jù)可依成本超支問(wèn)題的原因。工程師在估計(jì)未來(lái)項(xiàng)目的成本因素，解決這些成本增長(zhǎng)問(wèn)題；尋求減少它們的影響因素,可以提高他們的成本估算的準(zhǔn)確

58、性和項(xiàng)目預(yù)算。介紹：歷史性的大型建筑工程已經(jīng)飽受成本和時(shí)間超支的困擾（flyvbjerg李瑋2002）。在很多情況下，最后項(xiàng)目的成本已高于在最初的規(guī)劃編制和發(fā)布的成本，初步工程，最終設(shè)計(jì)，抑或在開(kāi)始建設(shè)時(shí)“mega項(xiàng)目需要更多的前提研究來(lái)避免成本超支。”早期項(xiàng)目之間的成本估算和投標(biāo)價(jià)格或最后一個(gè)項(xiàng)目的成本差異所帶來(lái)的影響可能會(huì)很大。在項(xiàng)目啟動(dòng)之間概念的發(fā)展和建設(shè)的完成，時(shí)間跨度諸多因素可能會(huì)影響到最后的項(xiàng)目費(fèi)用。這段時(shí)期通常持續(xù)幾年，但對(duì)于高度復(fù)雜和技術(shù)挑戰(zhàn)性的項(xiàng)目甚至可以超過(guò)10年。組織面臨重大挑戰(zhàn)的項(xiàng)目預(yù)算控制的時(shí)間跨度將從開(kāi)始一直持續(xù)到完成的項(xiàng)目建設(shè)。成本估計(jì)，準(zhǔn)確地反映項(xiàng)目的范圍，經(jīng)濟(jì)狀況，并切合社會(huì)的利益和宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)條件的發(fā)展提供了一個(gè)基線成本管理，可以用來(lái)傳遞到設(shè)計(jì)工藝原則。項(xiàng)目可以兌現(xiàn)預(yù)算，但需要一個(gè)好的開(kāi)始，一個(gè)估算成本超支因素的意識(shí)，及項(xiàng)目管理法則。當(dāng)缺少法則的時(shí)候，在一個(gè)項(xiàng)目上顯著的成本增長(zhǎng)會(huì)毀壞整體計(jì)劃，因?yàn)榻?jīng)費(fèi)將不夠用于未來(lái)的項(xiàng)目建設(shè)。history-holland隧道的案例研究對(duì)以往的項(xiàng)目經(jīng)驗(yàn)，可以為建設(shè)一個(gè)優(yōu)質(zhì)項(xiàng)目的預(yù)算提供更好的理解。同樣使工程造價(jià)增長(zhǎng)的問(wèn)題和經(jīng)驗(yàn)都可以從過(guò)去的事實(shí)中學(xué)到。荷蘭隧道，當(dāng)它在1927年開(kāi)放時(shí)，是最長(zhǎng)的水下隧道，它也是人