外文翻譯--公司的股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)、公司治理和資本結(jié)構(gòu)決策——來自加納的實證研究

1、外文翻譯一公司的股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)、公司治理和資本結(jié)構(gòu)決策一來自加納的實證研究本科畢業(yè)論文(設(shè)計)文翻譯外原文：OWnerShiP StrUCtUreJ COrPOrate governance and CaPitaI StrUCtUredecisions Of firmsEmPiriCaI evidence from Ghana1. IntrOdUCtionThe relevance Of CaPitaI StrUCtUre to firm VaIUe remains fairly established following the SeminaI article by MOdigliani and

2、Miller, 1958 (GrabOWSki and Mueller, 1972; McCabe, 1979; AnderSOn and Reeb, 2003) SeVeraI theories including the PeCking Order theory, the free CaSh flow, the CaPitaI SignaIingJ the trade-off, and market timing theories(WindOWS Of OPPOrtUnitieS) and the fact that CaPitaI StrUCtUre isVOIUntariIy ChOS

3、en by managers (Zwiebel, 1996) have been PrOPOUnded toexplain theChOiCe Of CaPitaI StrUCtUre Also, COnSiderabIe research attention has been Paid to the impact Of agency COStS On COrPOrate financing SinCe JenSen and MeCkling (1976) PUbIiShed their PaPerCrUtChIey and HanSen (1989) maintain that manage

4、rst ChOiCe Of StOCkOWnerShiPin the firm, the firm* S IniXtUre Of OUtSide debt and equity financing, and dividends aremeant to reduce the COStS Of agency COnfliCtS Bajaj et al(1998) SUggeSt that OWnerShiP is POSitiVeIy COrreIated With VariOUS measures Of the debt-equity ratio (IeVerage)J implying tha

5、t OWnerShiP StrUCtUre has a COrreIatiOn With financial StrUCtUre Of firms (Kinl and Sorensen, 1986; Mehran, 1992; BraiISfOrd et al., 2002) Friend and Lang (1988) find that debt ratio is negatively related to managerial OWnerShiP BraiISfOrd et al. (2002) SUggeSt that the relationship between manageri

6、al Share OWnerShiP and IeVerage may in fact be inverted U-ShaPedIn addition, BergIo?f (1990) SUggeStS that in COUntrieS in WhiCh firms are typically CIOSeIy held, debt finance PIayS a more PrOnlinent role than in COUntrieS CharaCteriZed by more dispersed OWnerShiP StrUCtUreS SUggeSting the impact Of

7、 insider SyStem Of COrPOrate governance On financing StrUCtUre Of firms ThOmSen and PederSen (2000) report empirical evidence SUPPOrting the hypothesis that the identity Of Iarge OWnerS -family, bank, and institutional investors - has important implications for financialStrUCtUre In particular, they

8、 ShOW that a more risk averse Or a more Patient entrepreneur issues IeSS debt and more equity GiVen that insider SySteIn Of COrPOrate governance is PraCtiCed among IiSted COmPanieS in Ghana (BOkPin, 2008) J this StUdy SeekS to document the impact Of OWnerShiP StrUCtUre On COrPOrate financing, a mark

9、 departure from AbOr (2007).CIaeSSenS et al. (2002) maintain that better COrPOrate governance frameworks benefit firms through greater access to financing, IOWer COSt Of capital, better PerfOrmanCe and more favourable treatment Of all StakehOlderS COrPOrate governance affects the development and fun

10、ctioning Of CaPitaI markets and exerts a StrOng influence On resource allocation. COrPOrate governance COrreIateS With the financing decisions and the CaPitaI StrUCtUre Of firms (Graham and HarVeyJ 2001: Litov, 2005; Abor, 2007). HOWeVerJ management incentives that include StOCk OPtiOnS introduces i

11、ssues for the alignment Of managerial and SharehOIder interests The QUeStiOn is WhiCh Way does managerial OWnerShiP affect CaPitaI StrUCtUre decisions Of firms? HOW does the form Of governance affect the ChOiCe Of financing? The empirical evidence ObSerVed in the IiteratUre is inconclusive With much

12、 focus On developed CaPitaI marketsUnlike AbOr (2007)J this PreSent StUdy COnSiderS a much broader COrPOrate governance index Of the impact Of OWnerShiP structure, managerial Share OWnerShiP and Other COrPOrate governance VariabIeS On CaPitaI StrUCtUre decisions Of firms On the Ghana StOCk EXChange

13、(GSE) Earlier StUdieS On the GSE have failed to COnSider the impact Of these factors On COrPOrate financing decisions Of firms (AbOagyeJ 1996; Boateng, 2004; AbOr and BiekPeJ 2005; Abor, 2007) implying that, these StUdieS invariably ignores a gamut Of Other relevant VariabIeS that are CentraI to Und

14、erStandingthe relationship among OWnerShiP structure, COrPOrate governance, and firms,financing decisions from a developing COUntry PerSPeCtiVe ASideJ the StUdy USeS more recent data from 2002 to 2007 WhiISt employing a PaneI data analysis The rest Of the PaPer is divided into four SeCtiOnS SeCtiOn

15、2 COnSiderS the IiteratUre review; SeCtiOn 3 discusses data USed in the StUdy and also details the model SPeCifiCatiOnS USed for the empirical analysis SeCtiOn 4 COntainS the discussion Of the results and SeCtiOn 5 SUmmariZeS and COnCIUdeS the PaPer2 LiteratUre review2 1 O¼rnership StrUCtUre an

16、d CaPitaI StrUCtUreThe relationship between OWnerShiP and CaPitaI StrUCtUreS has attracted a COnSiderabIe research attention OVer the IaSt COUPIe Of decades JenSen and MeCkling (1976) defined OWnerShiP StrUCtUre in terms Of CaPitaI COntribUtiOnS Thus, the authors SaW OWnerShiP StrUCtUre to COmPriSe

17、Of inside equity (managers)J OUtSide equity and debt, thus PrOPOSing an extension Of the form Of OWnerShiP StrUCtUre beyond the debt-holder and equity-holder View. Zheka (2005) UnIike the above authors COnStrUCtS OWnerShiP StrUCtUre USing VariabIeS including PrOPOrtiOn Of foreign Share OWnerShiPJ ma

18、nagerial OWnerShiP percentage, IargeSt institutional SharehOIder OWnerShip, IargeSt individual OWnerShiPJ and government Share OWnerShiP Bajaj et al(1998) SUggeSt that OWnerShiP is POSitiVeIy COrreIated With VariOUS measures Of the debt-equity ratio (IeVerage), implying that OWnerShiP StrUCtUre has

19、aCOrreIatiOn With financial StrUCtUre Of firms.Friend and Lang (1988) find that debt ratio is negatively related to managerial OWnerShiP BraiISfOrd et al(2002) SUggeSt that the relationship between managerial Share OWnerShiP and IeVerage may in fact be inverted U-ShaPed Thus, debt first increases Wi

20、th an increase in managerial Share OWnerShip; but beyond a CritiCaI IeVeI Of managerial Share OWnerShiP debt may fall because there COUId be OnIy a few agency related benefits by increasing debt further as the interests Of managers and OWnerS get Very StrOngIy aligned PindadO and de Ia TOrre (2005)

21、COnCIUde that insider OWnerShiP does not affect debt When the interest Of managers and OWnerS are aligned JenSen and MeCkling (1976)J in relating CaPitaI StrUCtUre to the IeVeI OfCOmPenSation for CEOS Came OUt With the findings that there is a POSitiVe COrreIatiOn between the two and this WaS SUPPOr

22、ted by LeIand and PyIe (1977) and Berger et al. (1997) WhO assert the CIainl that the COrreIatiOn between CEO COmPenSatiOn and CaPitaI StrUCtUre is a POSitiVe One HOWeVerJ Friend and Lang (1988)J Friend and HaSbrOUCk (1988) and Wen et al. (2002) found a negative COrreIatiOn between CEO COmPenSatiOn

23、and the financial IeVerage Of firmsMOrCk et al(1988) argue that family OWnerShiP may give rise to greater IeVerage than in the CaSe Of disperse OWnerShip, because Of the no-diIution Of entrenchment effects MiShra and MCCOnaUghy (1999) document empirical evidence that funding famiIy-COntrOlIed firms

24、USe IeSS debt than non-funding family COntrOlIed firms ThOmSen and PederSen (2000) report empirical evidence SUPPOrting the hypothesis that the identity Of Iarge OWnerS - family, bank, and institutional investors - hasimportant implications for financial StrUCtUre In particular, they ShOW that a mor

25、e risk averse Or a more Patient entrepreneur issues IeSS debt and more equity AnderSOn and Reeb (2003) further argue that family OWnerShiP reduces the COSt Of debt financingBergIo?f (1990) SUggeStS that in COUntrieS in WhiCh firms are typically CIOSeIy held, debt finance PIayS a more PrOminent role

26、than in COUntrieS CharaCteriZed by more dispersed OWnerShiP StrUCtUreS Berger et al(1997) found IeSS IeVerage in firms With no major StakehOlder LefOrt and WaIker (2000) COnCIUde that groups are effective in Obtaining external finance and that there are no SignifiCant CiifferenCeS in the CaPitaI Str

27、UCtUre Of groups Of different SiZeS BraiISfOrd et al. (2002) SUggeSt that firms With external block holders have IOW-debt ratios COnSiStent With Friend and Lang (1988)J WhO earlier On had indicated that firms With Iarge non-managerial investors have SignifiCantIy higher debt ratios than those WithOU

28、t non-managerial investors Cheng et al (2005) also indicates that the IeVerage increases as OWnerShiP COnCentratiOn increases following rights issuance DriffieId et al. (2005) argue that, higher OWnerShiP COnCentratiOn is associated With higher IeVerage irrespective Of Whether a firm is family OWned

29、 Or not PindadO and de Ia TOrre (2005) SUggeSt that there is a POSitiVe relationship between OWnerShiP COnCentratiOn and debt thus, all things being equal, OWnerShiP COnCentratiOn encourages debt financing HOWeVeiSthey find the POSitiVe effect Of OWnerShiP COnCentratiOn On debt to be SmalIer in CaSe

30、S Of high free CaSh flow. They also find that OWnerShiP COnCentratiOn does not moderate the relationship between insider OWnerShiP and debt; in COntraStJ the relationship between OWnerShiP COnCentratiOn and debt is affected by insider OWnerShiP Thus, the debt increments PrOmOted by OUtSide OWnerS ar

31、e Iarger When managers are entrenched2. 2 COrPOrate governance and CaPitaI StrUCtUreCOrPOrate governance COrreIateS With the financing decisions and theCaPitaI StrUCtUre Of firms (Grahanl and HarVeyJ 2001: Litov, 2005) JenSen (1986) POStUIateS that Iarge debt is associated With Iarger boards ThOUgh

32、Berger et al. (1997) COnCIUdeS On a Iater date that Iarger board SiZe is associated With IOW leverage; SeVeraI Other StUdieS COndUCted in recent times have refuted this COnCIUSiOn. Wen et al. (2002) POSit that Iarger board SiZe is associated With higher debt, either to improve the firm* S VaIUe Or b

33、ecause the Iarger SiZe PreVentS the board from reaching a COnSenSUS On decisions, indicating a Weak COrPOrate governance SyStem AnderSOn et al(2004) further indicate that Iarger board SiZe results in IOWer COSt Of debt, WhiCh SerVeS as a motivation for USing more debt, and this has been COnfirmed by

34、 AbOr (2007) WhO COnCIUdeS that CaPitaI StrUCtUre POSitiVeIy COrreIateS With board size, among Ghanaian IiSted firmsIn relation to the PreSenCe Of external directors On the board, Wen et al(2002) COnCIUde that the PreSenCe Of external directors On the board IeadS to IOWer leverage, USed by the firm,

35、 due to their SUPeriOr COntrO1 HOWeVerJ AbOr (2007) COnCIUdeS that CaPitaI StrUCtUre POSitiVeIy COrreIateS With BOard COmPOSitiOn among Ghanaian IiSted firms. And this is COnSiStent With JenSen (1986) and Berger et &1(1997) WhO had earlier On COnCIUded that firms With higher PerCentage Of extern

36、al ClireCtOrS UtiliZe more debt as COmPared to equityBerger et al. (1997) found IeSS IeVerage in firms run by CEOS With IOng tenure and this WaS COnfirmed by Wen et al(2002)， WhO COnCIUde that the tenure Of CEO is negatively related to leverage, to reduce the PreSSUreS associate With IeVerage Kayhan

37、 (2003) finds that entrenched managers achieve IOWer IeVerage through retaining morePrOfitS and issuing equity more OPPOrtUniStiCalIy. FUrtherJ LitOV (2005) SUPPOrtS this CIaiin that entrenched managers adopt IOWer IeVeIS Of debt AbOr (2007) also asserts that entrenched CEOS employ IOWer debt in Ord

38、er to reduce the PerfOrmanCe PreSSUreS associated With high-debt CaPita1. However, Bertrand and MUlIainathan (2003) refuted this fact by ShOWing in their StUdy that entrenched managers UenjOy the QUiet Iifev by engaging in risk-reducing PrOjeCtSJ indicating a POSitiVe relationship between managerial

39、 entrenchment and IeVerageFOSberg (2004) relates that firms With a two-tier IeaderShiP StrUCtUre have high-debt/equity ratios ThiS WaS SUPPOrted by AbOr (2007), WhO COnCIUdeS that CaPitaI StrUCtUre POSitiVeIy COrreIateS With CEO duality, WhiCh ShOWS that firms On the GSE USe more debt as the CEO dua

40、lity increases3 ReSearCh methodologyIn Order to gain the maximum POSSibIe ObSerVatiOnSJ POOIed PaneICrOSSed-SeCtiOn regression data are USed PaneI data analysis involves analysis With a SPatiaI and temporal dimension and facilitates identification Of effects that are SimPIy not detectable in PUre cr

41、osssection Or PUre time SerieS StUdieS Thus, degrees Of freedom are increased and COlIinearity among the explanatory VariabIeS is reduced and the efficiency Of economic estimates is improved The StUdy is therefore based On the OffiCiaI data PUbIiShed by the CrOSS-SeCtiOnaI firms for the VariOUS year

42、s COVering a PeriOd from 2002 to 2007.AnaIytiCaI frameworkThe general form Of the PaneI regression model is Stated as:,ititity= +X + i=l, , N;t=l, , TWhere SUbSCriPt i and t represent the firm and time, respectively. In this case, i represents the CrOSS-SeCtiOn dimension and t represents the time-se

43、ries COmPOnent Y is the dependable VariabIe WhiCh is a measure Of CaPitaI StrUCtUre is a scalar, isitK *1 and Xit is the ObSerVatiOn On K explanatory VariabIeS We assume that the follow a One-Way error COmPOnent model:itiit = + viwhere is time-invariant and accounts for any UnObSerVabIe itindividual

44、-specific effect that is not included in the regressionmode1. The term Vrepresents the remaining disturbance, and VarieS With the individual firms and timeSource: GOdfred A. BOkPin and AnaStaCia C Arko, 2009 "Ownership structure,COrPOrate governance and CaPitaI StrUCtUre decisions Of firms EmPi

45、riCaI evidence from Ghanan StUdieS in ECOnOnliCS and FinanCe VO1 26 No 4. pp. 246-256.譯文：公司的股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)、公司治理和資本結(jié)構(gòu)決策一一來自加納的實證研究一、引 -X-.繼利亞和米勒1958年開創(chuàng)性的文章（格拉博夫斯基和米勒，1972年；邁克， 1979年;安德森和力波，2003年）之后，公司價值與資本結(jié)構(gòu)相關(guān)性依然得到較大 的認可。一些理論，包括啄食順序理論、自由現(xiàn)金流、資本信號、權(quán)衡理論、市 場預測理論（窗口的機會），和經(jīng)理所選擇的資本結(jié)構(gòu)（茨威貝爾，1996年）的這一 事實已經(jīng)針對性地解釋了資本結(jié)構(gòu)的選擇

46、問題。此外，自詹森和梅克林（1976年） 發(fā)表他們的文章以來，相當多的研究關(guān)注已經(jīng)支付的代理成本對企業(yè)籌資的影響?？唆斊胬蜐h森（1989年）主張經(jīng)理人選擇在這家公司中的股權(quán)，或公司的外部 債務、股權(quán)融資和股息的結(jié)合，都是為了減少代理成本的沖突。布雷斯福德等 （1998年）認為所有權(quán)與負債率（杠桿）的各項措施正相關(guān)，意味著股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)與財務 結(jié)構(gòu)有關(guān)聯(lián)（金和瑟恩森，1986年，金融結(jié)構(gòu)的關(guān)系;邁赫蘭，1992年;布雷斯福德 等人，2002年）。弗蘭德和拉姆（1988）發(fā)現(xiàn)，負債率與管理所有權(quán)負相關(guān)。布雷斯 福德等人（2002年）認為股權(quán)管理與杠桿之間的關(guān)系實際上可能是倒U型的。另外，貝格爾夫（19

47、90年）表示比起在一些所有權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)越來越分散的國家的公司 里，在一些封閉國家的公司中債務融資發(fā)揮著更顯著的作用，這意味著對公司內(nèi)部 系統(tǒng)的治理在企業(yè)的融資結(jié)構(gòu)方面更具影響力。湯姆森和彼得森（2000年）的實證 證據(jù)支持這一假設(shè):大業(yè)主、家庭、銀行和機構(gòu)投資者已經(jīng)對融資結(jié)構(gòu)產(chǎn)生重要影 響。特別是，他們表明一個更好的風險規(guī)避者或更具耐心的企業(yè)家，發(fā)行更少的債 務和更多的權(quán)益。鑒于公司治理的內(nèi)幕交易系統(tǒng)是在加納上市公司實行的（博賓， 2008年），這項研究旨在從奧博（2007年）的文獻出發(fā)，研究所有權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)對企業(yè)融 資的影響?？死热耍?002年）主張通過獲取更多資金、降低更多資本成本、以更好的 性能

48、和更佳的待遇對待所有者，使公司擁有更好的公司治理框架。公司治理影響資 本市場的發(fā)展和運作，從而發(fā)揮著對資源配置的強大影響力。公司治理、公司決策 和企業(yè)的資本結(jié)構(gòu)相聯(lián)系（格拉漢姆和哈維，2001年，資本結(jié)構(gòu)與融資決策;利托 夫，2005年;奧博，2007年）。然而，包括股票期權(quán)在內(nèi)的管理層激勵措施引入了管理人員和股東利益的調(diào)整問題?，F(xiàn)在的問題是管理層持股 方式是否會影響公司資本結(jié)構(gòu)的決定，治理的形式是怎樣影響融資選擇的。實證結(jié) 果發(fā)現(xiàn)，文獻是以很多發(fā)達的資本市場為中心來定論的。與奧M（2007年）的研究不同的是:本研究認為在加納聯(lián)合交易所（GSE）公司治 理指數(shù)更廣泛地受所有制結(jié)構(gòu)、管理層持股和

49、其他在公司資本結(jié)構(gòu)決定方面的公司 治理變量的影響。較早對加納聯(lián)合交易所的研究沒有考慮到這些因素對企業(yè)融資決 策的影響（阿貝格,1996年;博阿滕,2004年;奧博和伯克,2003年;奧博,2007年）， 那些研究總是忽略其他相關(guān)的變量，而這些變量對從發(fā)展中國家的角度以外來理解 股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)、公司治理和企業(yè)融資決策之間的關(guān)系具有重要作用，該研究使用2002 到2007年面板數(shù)據(jù)分析中的最新數(shù)據(jù)。本文的其余部分分為四個部分。第二部分 為綜述;第三部分討論研究中使用的數(shù)據(jù)，并詳細介紹了用于實證分析的規(guī)格型 號。第四部分是對結(jié)果的討論，第五部分概括了這份文件的結(jié)論。二、文獻綜述（一）股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)和資本結(jié)構(gòu)所有

50、權(quán)與資本結(jié)構(gòu)之間的關(guān)系，已吸引了過去兒十年中相當多的研究的關(guān)注。 詹森和梅克林（1976年）從出資方面定義股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)。因此，作者認為股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)是山 內(nèi)部（經(jīng)理）股權(quán)、外部股票及債券構(gòu)成，從而提出了債券持有者和股票持有者角度 以外的股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)形式的延伸。契卡（2005年）與上述作者不同，他采用外國共享所 有權(quán)、管理所有權(quán)、最大的機構(gòu)股東擁有、最大的個人所有制，和政府共享所有權(quán) 的變量的比例組成所有權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)。巴賈杰等人（1998年）認為所有權(quán)與債權(quán)比例（杠 桿）的各項措施正相關(guān)，并暗示股權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)與公司的融資結(jié)構(gòu)有關(guān)聯(lián)。弗蘭德和拉姆（1988年）發(fā)現(xiàn)，負債比率與管理所有權(quán)負相關(guān)。布萊斯福徳等人 （2002年）

51、表明管理層股權(quán)和杠桿之間的關(guān)系實際上可能為倒U型。因此，當管理 層持股增加時，債務首先增加;但超出了股權(quán)債務的管理水平后可能下降。因為可 能只有兒個機構(gòu)相關(guān)利益者通過增加債務的方式進一步使管理人員和業(yè)主的利益得 到對齊。平達多和德拉托雷（2005年）得出的結(jié)論是當管理人員和股東的利益是一 致時，內(nèi)部人持股不影響債務水平。詹姆和梅克林（1977年）聯(lián)系資本結(jié)構(gòu)知識， 針對首席執(zhí)行官的補償水平這一問題得出結(jié)論，承認了 Ill利蘭、派爾（1977年）和伯杰等人（1997年）關(guān)于資本結(jié)構(gòu)和CEO報酬是正相關(guān)的 主張的事實。莫瑞可等人（1988年）認為比在分散的所有權(quán)惜況下，家庭制的所有權(quán)可能會有 更大

52、的影響力，因為非稀釋的壕溝效應。米什拉和麥康瑙希（1999年）的文章實證 證據(jù)表明，資金山家族控制的公司使用債務方式融資少于資金山非家族控制的公 司。湯姆森和彼得森（2000年）報告中的實證支持這一假設(shè):家族、銀行、機構(gòu)投 資者已對融資結(jié)構(gòu)產(chǎn)生重要影響。特別是他們認為一個更好的風險規(guī)避者和更具耐 心的企業(yè)家發(fā)行較少的債券和更多的股票。安德森和力波（2003年）進一步認為家 族所有權(quán)減少債務融資的成本。貝格爾夫（1990年）表明比起在一些所有權(quán)結(jié)構(gòu)分散的國家的公司里，在一些封 閉國家的公司中債務融資發(fā)揮更顯著的作用，這意味著企業(yè)的融資結(jié)構(gòu)對公司內(nèi)部 系統(tǒng)的治理更具影響力。伯杰等人（1997年）發(fā)現(xiàn)在沒有主要利益相關(guān)者的公司中 杠桿率較低。萊福特和沃克（2000年）的結(jié)論是能有效