小額貸款機構(gòu)外匯風(fēng)險管理和小額信貸投資基金

1、原文：The Management of Foreign Exchange Risk by Microfinance Institutions and Microfinance Investment Funds The term “MFI is used broadly in this chapter to encompass institutions that provide small-scale financial services, such as loans, savings, insurance, remittances and other services (generally

2、in amounts less than 250 % of GNP per capita). The term encompasses a wide variety of organizations: NGOs, credit unions, non-bank financial intermediaries, rural banks, etc. Most microfinance investment funds (MFIFs) and other funders such as official development agencies finance their activities i

3、n US dollars (USD) or Euros (EUR), which may be called “hard currencies.However, most microfinance institutions (MFIs) operate in nondollarised or non-Euro-based economies and lend local currency to their clients.Funding in one currency and lending in another, and the probability that the relative v

4、alues of the two currencies will alter, creates foreign exchange (FX) risk. Volatile currency exchange rate fluctuations in many countries where MFIs operate make FX risk a serious issue, but one that has often been accorded little urgency in microfinance. The accelerated development of microfinance

5、 through access to capital markets makes it imperative that foreign exchange be managed in ways that are consistent with best practice in finance. Until this is widely achieved, access to capital markets for the benefit of microfinance will be retarded. Foreign exchange risk is one of many risks tha

6、t MFIFs face. Interest rate risk is an additional risk that is related to FX risk. As currency values change, interest expense or income will also change. And, spreads between interest rates on both sides of the balance sheet may change, that is, interest rates on money borrowed in one currency by a

7、 microfinance institution, for example, may diverge from interest rates on money loaned to micro entrepreneurs by the MFI. Each of these effects has implications for MFIF and MFI profitability. For purposes of economy, these second order exchange risks are not discussed further here in. This chapter

8、 explores the nature of FX risk in debt funding by focusing on which party is likely to bear the risk of exchange rate fluctuations in different situations at different points in a funding transaction. The importance of hedging is noted, and mechanisms are listed that MFIFs and MFIs use to address t

9、heir respective FX risks. The relationships between currency and risk described below apply to equity funds, while in the case of guarantee funds the situation is reversed. Equity investments, as capital, are always in the currency of the MFI. For the foreign equity investor, “foreign exchange risk

10、becomes one of several risks associated with an investment rather than a central factor in making a loan.Equity and guarantee funds, while not the focus of this chapter, are included in the Appendices with examples to identify when they face a currency risk and the hedging mechanisms they use. The m

11、ost common foreign exchange risk possibilities are summarized in Table. These combinations involve positions in Euros (EUR) and local currency, US dollars (USD) and local currency, and between EUR and USD, that comprise the currencies in which assets and liabilities are held by MFIs and MFIFs. Gener

12、alizing, we assume that before the MFI receives funding, it has no currency mismatch. Its “operating currency, the currency in which its assets are denominated, is the same as its “funding currency, which is the currency in which its liabilities are denominated. The example of change in value of the

13、 EUR against the USD is an interesting one to examine. Over a 2-year period, the EUR gained close to 40% of its value against USD. This large change in the relative values of two “hard currencies was underestimated by many MFIs and MFIFs. The EUR was launched in 2002 at USD 1.17, and subsequently fe

14、ll to less than USD 0.90. Recently, however, the EUR has appreciated considerably against the USD, and many European MFIFs operating in EUR and lending in USD in dollarizsed countries in Latin America have incurred significant losses from the transactions. The sharp appreciation of the EUR against t

15、he USD has created significant exchange losses on the EUR loans of many MFIs, which in some cases will require restructuring. The ASN-Novib Fonds is an example. It is an MFIF in the Netherlands that lends in hard currency (both USD and EUR), with most of its portfolio concentrated in Latin America.

16、It is seeking opportunities in Asia and Africa if the foreign exchange risks can be hedged. In the past, the ASN-Novib Fonds made EUR loans to MFIs operating in dollarised economies, but the lack of hedging by its client MFIs and subsequent losses have forced ASN-Novib Fonds to discontinue unhedged

17、EUR funding, which it considers too risky for the MFIs. On the other hand, MFIs borrowing in USD and on-lending in EUR have experienced currency gains their Euro-equivalent USD repayments of principal and interest have diminished considerably. Regardless of who bears the direct currency risk (i. e.,

18、 direct losses from currency fluctuations), both parties are at risk for indirect losses resulting from currency risk. For example, if an MFIF suffers losses and downscales operations or changes the allocation of countries in which it invests, client MFIs may lose access to a funder that has been he

19、lpful in the past. On the other hand, MFIFs face increased credit risk (i. e., an indirect currency risk in this case), when MFIs have not hedged their currency risk and suffer subsequent losses that affect their profitability and long term viability. In this sense, some dimensions of currency risk

20、are always shared between the MFIF and the MFI, regardless of which bears the direct risk, as portrayed in the examples above.Because of direct and indirect FX risks, MFIFs and MFIs are working together to develop hedging mechanisms in countries where the capital markets may offer few of the hedging

21、 options that are available in developed countries. To mitigate indirect currency risks, most MFIFs try to assess whether it is reasonable for their client MFIs to borrow in a certain currency. They examine their funding and operating currencies and monitor their overall foreign currency exposure on

22、 a regular basis as part of their due diligence process. MFIFs that have adopted these procedures include BIO, Cordaid, Etimos, Incofin, Luxmint-ADA, Rabobank and Triodos. Exposure analysis varies, and is not used in every case. Informal cross-checking among MFIFs also helps raise their awareness of

23、 the foreign exchange exposure of their affiliates. Some MFIFs such as ASN-Novib Fonds have changed their policies to reduce MFI currency risks.Interviews conducted by ADA, CGAP, and The MIX for the KfW symposium in 2004 shed some light on MFIFs perceptions of FX risk. The study found that perceptio

24、ns of the degree of risk linked to currency fluctuations depend largely on direct currency exposure, although most MFIFs interviewed expressed great concern for the larger issue whether or not they directly faced a riskbecause of the potential repercussions of a loss incurred by MFIs as a result of

25、transactions with an MFIF.When asked: “Is foreign exchange risk a big issue for the MFIs that you invest in?, MFIFs were almost unanimous in saying that foreign exchange risk is a major issue in lending to MFIs because it increases the risk of losses, regardless of who assumes the risk. MFIFs that s

26、hared this view included BIO, Cordaid, Luxmint-ADA, Rabobank, and Triodos. Some MFIFs, including BIO, Cordaid, and PlaNet Fund, were nevertheless willing to assume greater FX risk, or were generally less concerned about it, for several reasons: The potential currency losses linked to currency risk d

27、iscussed previously contrast with the responses regarding risk mitigation. While levels of risk vary, not enough is being done from the perspectives of both MFIFs and MFIs. Many MFIFs and MFIs that should hedge because of the level of their exposure do not have hedging mechanisms in place, for a var

28、iety of reasons explored below. Of the 64 MFIFs analyzed for the KfW symposium and through The MIX Market, 49 provided the currency breakdown of their microfinance investment portfolios. Of these, 46 provided information about their hedging policies or lack thereof. Only a little over 40% (19) of th

29、e MFIFs that gave details of their hedging policies indicated that they had a hedging policy in place. As noted previously, not all MFIFs need to hedge. MFIFs that offer funding in their currency of operations have no FX risk and therefore do not have hedging policies in place. Excepting the 7 MFIFs

30、 that were not exposed to direct currency risk, 20 MFIFs, about 50% of the 39 that faced exposure from currency risk, did not have hedging mechanisms in place, as illustrated in Table . Failures to hedge adequately created losses for several of the MFIFs studied, including many European microfinance

31、 investors, such as NOVIB (on local currency loans and participations in Ethiopia, Kenya, Mexico, Mozambique, Peru, Senegal, Sri Lanka, Tanzania and Uganda), Cordaid (on loans in Bangladesh, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Morocco, Peru, Phi

32、lippines, etc, and others. How are exchange rate losses treated in accounting information? Some MFIFs show returns prior to exchange rate losses while others show returns after exchange rate losses. Lack of standardisation produces important differences in the overall return, often turning a positiv

33、e return into a negative one. This difference should be taken into consideration when examining the financial statements of MFIFs. A forthcoming edition of the MicroBanking Bulletin, focusing on the supply side of MFI funding, will provide more details of issues arising from the lack of standardisat

34、ion and transparency in MFIF reporting. MFIFs that reported having hedging mechanisms in place indicated differences in their degree of hedging: some fully hedged currency risk, while many hedged hard currency risk but not their local currency exposure. The most common reason for not hedging currenc

35、y risk is that MFIFs are willing to assume the risk. MFIFs that had not hedged their currency exposure are identified in Appendix 5. Other MFIFs that were not hedging simply because they did not face direct currency risk are listed in Appendix 6. Some MFIFs also chose to bear the FX risk and not hed

36、ge, in order not to increase the costs of their loans and face the risk of losing potential customers. Appendix 3 indicates that a few investment funds, primarily social funds, are willing to assume direct currency risk by offering local currency loans to MFIs. However, most MFIFs invest in MFIs in

37、hard currency, passing the FX risk to the MFIs, which then bear the responsibility for hedging by obtaining a hard currency guarantee or buying a derivative security that neutralises their risk. A number of MFIFs are lending in hard currencies, sometimes recklessly, in countries where the devaluatio

38、n risk is high and MFIs do not hedge. Similar to the MFIFs, MFIs face varying levels of risk that depend not only on the mix of currencies they borrow and on-lend to their clients, but also on the volume of funds borrowed and/or on-lent in different currencies.A recent survey conducted by CGAP and T

39、he MIX identified the funding structure and future funding projections of MFIs.Of the 216 MFIs that responded to the survey, 80 indicated that they were currently using hard currency funding (USD or EUR) and indicated the amount.Of these 80 MFIs, 8 operated in dollarised economies (Ecuador and El Sa

40、lvador) or in Euros (Kosovo). The remaining 72 were exposed to either USD or EUR currency risk: 61 had an average exposure of USD 2.6 million and 11 had an average exposure of EUR 3.8 million. An average of 48% of USD loans and an average of 36% of EUR loans were hedged. Nevertheless, these averages

41、 hide important differences in hedging practices amongst MFIs. More interesting is the distribution of hedging (Table 4).In either USD or EUR exposures, 72 MFIs should have hedged: 54% were not hedging at all, while 24% were fully hedged. The remaining 16 MFIs (or 22%) partially hedged their currenc

42、y risk. For more details on exposures and the percentage of hedging by the MFIs in the survey that were operating in a non-USD or non-EUR country, see Appendices 9, 10 and11. Most of the 216 surveyed MFIs had some exposure to currency risk through their transactions with an average of one foreign le

43、nder, and/or desired to increase their funding from foreign sources. In addition, 68 (or 31%) of the 216 MFIs surveyed indicated that foreign funders did not want to assume foreign exchange risk and that this was a challenge in obtaining foreign loans and equity. In addition, the sample results sugg

44、est that there is a high probability that MFIs that have access to foreign loans are not hedging properly. The hedging issue is therefore important: helping MFIs reduce currency risk will increase their interest in obtaining foreign lending and reducing FX losses. Similar to the MFIFs, the performan

45、ce of MFIs is affected not only by the actual gains or losses incurred from foreign exchange, but also in the way these are accounted for. Adjustment methods used by external analysts such as rating agencies also contain considerable differences. It is important to examine the specific accounting tr

46、eatments when comparing the performance of MFIs. Although FX risk occurs in almost every transaction between microfinance investors (especially foreign investors) and MFIs, too many MFIFs and MFIs are not hedging appropriately. Hedging is seldom used because common hedging mechanisms are not availab

47、le in the countries where MFIs operate, or prohibitively costly for the small amounts of the transactions involved. While hedging increases transaction costs, lack of hedging results in losses that can be significant, especially for MFIs and MFIFs that do not have well diversified portfolios.In addi

48、tion, MFIFs often compensate for FX risk by increasing their interest rates to MFIs to cover potential losses. FX risk therefore increases the lending costs for the MFIs (and ultimately, for their clients), regardless of whether or not they have access to local currency loans. Unless MFIFs are able

49、to assume more of the FX risk linked to their lending to MFIs, other funding instruments such as guarantees may be more appropriate for MFIs that face small margins.“Best practices for hedging by MFIFs should include strategies of when to hedge, how much to hedge, how to hedge. Sharing experiences w

50、ith successful and innovative hedging mechanisms, such as FX insurance funds, would greatly encourage MFIFs to absorb more of the FX risk that MFIs are so ill equipped to address, reducing costs for MFIFs and MFIs.Source: IsabelleBarres. "MFI Demand for Funding". Harvard business review, 2

51、0048:P56-58.譯文：小額貸款機構(gòu)外匯風(fēng)險管理和小額信貸投資基金術(shù)語“多邊投資框架在這一章中使用廣泛，包括機構(gòu)一般金額小于人均國民生產(chǎn)總值250提供的小規(guī)模金融效勞，如貸款，儲蓄，保險，匯款和其他效勞。這個術(shù)語包括了各種組織：非政府組織，信用合作社，非銀行金融中介機構(gòu)，農(nóng)村銀行等。大多數(shù)小額信貸投資基金MFIFs和機構(gòu)或者其他出資者的官方融資傾向于美元或歐元，可能稱這些貨幣為“硬貨幣。然而，大多數(shù)小額信貸機構(gòu)卻在經(jīng)營非美元或者非歐元為根底的經(jīng)濟和本地貨幣貸款的客戶。資金的貨幣和貸款隨著利率的改變相對價值也將改變，造成外匯FX的風(fēng)險。揮發(fā)性是許多國家的貨幣兌換匯率波動引起的，也是小額信貸

52、機構(gòu)經(jīng)營面臨的嚴重外匯風(fēng)險問題，而且經(jīng)常給予小額信貸緊迫性。小額信貸進入資本市場的加速開展迫切需要好的外匯方式，最好的做法是一致的金融管理。直到這個被廣泛實現(xiàn)，準(zhǔn)入，有利于資本市場的小額信貸就將受到阻礙。外匯風(fēng)險是 MFIFs 面對的很多風(fēng)險之一。利率風(fēng)險是一個額外的，與其相關(guān)的外匯風(fēng)險。由于貨幣價值的變化，利息支出或收入也將發(fā)生變化。而且，由于利差，資產(chǎn)負債表可能也會改變。也就是由小額貸款機構(gòu)借入一種貨幣利率，脫離有關(guān)錢的利率跟由MFI所作的微企業(yè)家貸款。這些效果對 MFIF 和 MFI 的贏利有暗示性。出于經(jīng)濟目的，這些二階匯率風(fēng)險在這里不進一步討論。本章探討的重點放在：資金在一個交易的不

53、同點的匯率波動風(fēng)險，在不同情況下的外匯債務(wù)融資風(fēng)險的性質(zhì)。套期保值的重要性指出，使用機制和小額信貸機構(gòu)列出的MFIFs外匯，以解決它們各自的風(fēng)險。貨幣和風(fēng)險之間的關(guān)系如下所述，適用于股票基金，對基金而言，情況正好相反。股權(quán)投資，資本，總是小額信貸機構(gòu)MFI投資的貨幣。對于外國投資者的權(quán)益，“外匯風(fēng)險成為與投資有關(guān)，而不是在作出貸款時出現(xiàn)的風(fēng)險因素之一公平與擔(dān)保資金，不是本章的重點，而是在包含的例子中確定當(dāng)他們面對貨幣風(fēng)險的對沖機制和他們使用的回避機制。最常見的外匯風(fēng)險是Table.These組合中涉及歐元和當(dāng)?shù)刎泿诺木植浚涝猆SD和當(dāng)?shù)刎泿?，歐元和美元之間的關(guān)系，這其中包括貨幣資產(chǎn)和負債通過

54、小額信貸機構(gòu)和MFIFs反映。概括地說，我們假設(shè)小額信貸機構(gòu)獲得資金之前，它沒有任何的貨幣配置，其“經(jīng)營貨幣的是其資產(chǎn)的計價貨幣，是作為其“融資的貨幣，負債均與貨幣相同。歐元兌美元價值變化的例子是一個有趣的研究。通過2年期間，歐元上漲近40，其兌美元的價值。這兩種“硬貨幣的相對估值的大變化是由許多小額信貸機構(gòu)和MFIFs發(fā)現(xiàn)的。歐元在2002年發(fā)起了1.17美元，其后跌幅超過缺乏0.90美元。然而，最近歐元對美元大幅升值，許多歐洲MFIFs歐元營運和在拉丁美洲美元化的國家美元貸款已經(jīng)發(fā)生了的重大交易損失。歐元兌美元大幅升值創(chuàng)造了許多小額信貸機構(gòu)對歐元的貸款，這在某些情況下需要重組重大匯兌損失。

55、ASN - Novib全宗就是一個例子。這是一個在荷蘭MFIF的例子，在硬通貨包括美元和歐元出現(xiàn)與拉丁美洲最集中的投資組合。它正在尋求如果外匯風(fēng)險可以對沖，在亞洲和非洲投資的時機。在過去的ASN - Novib Fonds的小額信貸機構(gòu)取得貸款，以歐元在美元化的市場上進行經(jīng)濟運作，但其客戶小額信貸機構(gòu)和由此造成的損失，迫使對沖缺乏的ASN - Novib全宗停止套期保值歐元的資金，因為他們認為這是很大的冒險小額信貸機構(gòu)。另一方面，小額信貸機構(gòu)以美元和歐元貸款的借款，相當(dāng)于歐元貨幣收益的本金和利息，歸還美元有大幅度減少。 無論誰承當(dāng)直接貨幣的風(fēng)險即，貨幣波動的直接損失，雙方都得承當(dāng)貨幣風(fēng)險造成的

56、間接損失。例如，如果一個MFIF遭受損失或許會改變它的國家投資，小額信貸機構(gòu)的分配可能會失去一個已經(jīng)在過去訪問過的客戶端或出資人。另一方面，MFIFs面臨更大的信用風(fēng)險即，在這種情況下的間接貨幣風(fēng)險時，微型金融機構(gòu)沒有對沖匯率風(fēng)險，并受到他們的影響其盈利能力和長期的生存能力由此造成損失。在這個意義上說，貨幣風(fēng)險的一些方面總是和小額信貸機構(gòu)與MFIF之間共享，無論誰有直接的風(fēng)險，正如上面的例子描繪的。因直接和間接外匯風(fēng)險，MFIFs和小額信貸機構(gòu)合作開發(fā)的國家機制在對沖資本市場可能提供的對沖期權(quán)是在興旺國家中的少數(shù)幾個。為了減輕間接貨幣風(fēng)險，MFIFs試圖借他們的客戶的一定貨幣評估它們是否是合理

57、的小額信貸機構(gòu)。他們以審視自己的資金，經(jīng)營貨幣和監(jiān)督作為其盡職調(diào)查過程的一局部。他們整理的定期外匯風(fēng)險，已通過MFIFs這些程序，包括生物，Cordaid，Etimos，Incofin，Luxmint，荷蘭合作銀行和Triodos。曝光的分析各不相同，并非在任何場合都能使用。非正式MFIFs之間相互檢查也有助于提高對他們的分支機構(gòu)外匯風(fēng)險的意識。如ASN - Novib全宗已經(jīng)改變其政策，以減少小額信貸機構(gòu)的一些MFIFs貨幣風(fēng)險。 由阿達和扶貧協(xié)商小組混合進行的專題討論會，在2004年德國復(fù)興信貸銀行采訪了一些對外匯研究的MFIFs，觀念主要是貨幣波動的風(fēng)險程度依賴于直接感知的貨幣風(fēng)險，雖然

58、大局部MFIFs采訪表示更關(guān)注他們是否直接面對風(fēng)險的損失，小額信貸機構(gòu)實施與MFIF交易可能產(chǎn)生的影響。當(dāng)問道：“外匯風(fēng)險，為什么是小額信貸機構(gòu)的大問題時，MFIFs表示，外匯風(fēng)險幾乎是一致的，是小額信貸機構(gòu)的貸款主要問題，因為它增加了虧損的風(fēng)險，不管是誰承當(dāng)風(fēng)險。MFIFs，共享這一觀點，包括生物，Cordaid，Luxmint，荷蘭合作銀行和Triodos。有些MFIFs，包括生物，Cordaid，基金和行星，但仍不愿意承當(dāng)更大的外匯風(fēng)險，或者是一般較少關(guān)注它。有以下幾個原因：與外幣掛鉤的潛在風(fēng)險損失和有關(guān)緩解貨幣風(fēng)險的討論。雖然風(fēng)險程度不同，但還不夠從MFIFs和小額信貸機構(gòu)兩方面說明觀點。許多MFIFs和微型金融機構(gòu)，并沒有由于其風(fēng)險水平對對沖機制做以下各種原因的探討。德國復(fù)興信貸銀行研討會，通過市場分析的MIX 提供了小額信貸投資組合的貨幣崩潰。其中，46條規(guī)定超過40的MFIFs有關(guān)其對沖政策信息，對沖政策細節(jié)說明，他們有一個適當(dāng)?shù)膶_政