高新技術(shù)產(chǎn)品出口翻譯

1、高新技術(shù)產(chǎn)品出口，是發(fā)展中國(guó)家的技術(shù)突破的標(biāo)志還是數(shù)據(jù)上的虛像？【資料來(lái)源】：該文章為隆德大學(xué) DIME WP 2.3 工作室的“產(chǎn)業(yè)創(chuàng)新動(dòng)態(tài)和知識(shí)的特點(diǎn)”而準(zhǔn)備， 2006年4月26日至27日?！咀髡摺浚篗artin Srholec，奧斯陸大學(xué)創(chuàng)新和文化技術(shù)中心。摘要： 高科技產(chǎn)品的專(zhuān)業(yè)化經(jīng)常用于加大技術(shù)出口的力度，而發(fā)展中國(guó)家正日益成為這些產(chǎn)品的出口商，有的甚至成為高新技術(shù)產(chǎn)品出口中最為專(zhuān)門(mén)化的國(guó)家。這篇文章仔細(xì)研究了根據(jù)技術(shù)密集性進(jìn)行出口歸類(lèi)的分類(lèi)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的相關(guān)性。結(jié)果表明，高新技術(shù)產(chǎn)品出口的專(zhuān)業(yè)化通常不會(huì)與發(fā)展中國(guó)家的本土技術(shù)能力同步發(fā)展。而據(jù)國(guó)內(nèi)進(jìn)口產(chǎn)品的分析表明，大比例的高新技術(shù)產(chǎn)品出

2、口實(shí)際上可以歸因于日益國(guó)際化的電子生產(chǎn)系統(tǒng)的分散性對(duì)于貿(mào)易統(tǒng)計(jì)有深刻的影響。計(jì)量經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)的構(gòu)架證實(shí)國(guó)內(nèi)的技術(shù)能力與電子產(chǎn)品的出口性能相關(guān)，正是由于對(duì)電子元件的進(jìn)口傾向使得迄今為止國(guó)內(nèi)各地在電子產(chǎn)品的進(jìn)口專(zhuān)業(yè)化方面有如此大的差異。本文將以一些關(guān)于政策和未來(lái)研究方面的啟示作為總結(jié)。高新技術(shù)產(chǎn)品出口方面的專(zhuān)業(yè)化趨勢(shì)：什么樣的指示？在學(xué)術(shù)界，眾所周知經(jīng)濟(jì)的發(fā)展需要結(jié)構(gòu)性的變化，因此在研究中分析結(jié)構(gòu)性的轉(zhuǎn)變也是非常重要的一個(gè)方面。由于經(jīng)濟(jì)的規(guī)模和范圍的擴(kuò)大、出口的多樣化以及與基于剝削自然資源的出口相比通常具備更高的技能和技術(shù)強(qiáng)度這些原因，我們可以理所當(dāng)然地認(rèn)為進(jìn)入到制造業(yè)出口的時(shí)代將會(huì)給我們帶來(lái)更大的發(fā)展

3、機(jī)遇。雖然初級(jí)資源型貿(mào)易和加工貿(mào)易之間的區(qū)別相對(duì)容易辨別，但是加工貿(mào)易的技術(shù)強(qiáng)度之間的區(qū)分卻變得復(fù)雜得多。 如上所述，習(xí)慣上來(lái)說(shuō)，通過(guò)比較各個(gè)國(guó)家的高科技產(chǎn)品專(zhuān)業(yè)化之間的比較，我們就可以捕捉到技術(shù)的出口力度。圖一提供了一個(gè)關(guān)于各個(gè)國(guó)家相關(guān)的可用數(shù)據(jù)之間的比較（在2003年的108個(gè)國(guó)家的樣本）。圖中垂直軸繪制的是商品出口中的高科技產(chǎn)品比例，而水平先則表示電子產(chǎn)品出口中的專(zhuān)業(yè)化。虛線則表示樣本的平均數(shù)，它把整個(gè)圖表分為四個(gè)象限，即沿著兩個(gè)方向分為以下/以上的平均系數(shù)，以此表明這些國(guó)家的產(chǎn)品在出口中的專(zhuān)業(yè)化程度。 圖一 2003年高新技術(shù)產(chǎn)品與電子產(chǎn)品的專(zhuān)業(yè)化高新技術(shù)產(chǎn)品出口的數(shù)據(jù)是以世界發(fā)展指標(biāo)

4、數(shù)據(jù)集（世界銀行，2005）為基礎(chǔ)的，它指高研發(fā)強(qiáng)度的產(chǎn)品，諸如航空航天，計(jì)算機(jī)，醫(yī)藥，科學(xué)儀器和電氣機(jī)械等。這與經(jīng)合組織的分類(lèi)定義是一致的，而且與基于Pavitt的分類(lèi)科學(xué)并得到普遍認(rèn)可的出口行業(yè)相當(dāng)接近。電子產(chǎn)品出口可以COMTRADE數(shù)據(jù)庫(kù)（聯(lián)合國(guó)2005年）中獲得，它并覆蓋了以下產(chǎn)品的相關(guān)貿(mào)易：辦公、會(huì)計(jì)和計(jì)算機(jī)械（75）；電臺(tái)、電視和通訊設(shè)備（76）；電氣機(jī)械（77）；以及醫(yī)療、精密和光學(xué)儀器（87，881，884和885）。所有的代碼都是根據(jù)SITC, rev. 3而來(lái)。 大多數(shù)國(guó)家在高科技產(chǎn)品出口的份額上一直保持低于平均水平，而大部分的低收入國(guó)家的高新技術(shù)產(chǎn)品出口報(bào)告甚至可以忽略

5、不計(jì)，即使高新技術(shù)產(chǎn)品出口的專(zhuān)業(yè)化絕不是最先進(jìn)的國(guó)家的特權(quán)。然而，最引人注目的事實(shí)是專(zhuān)門(mén)從事高科技產(chǎn)品出口的國(guó)家是菲律賓。在那里，幾乎有三分之二的出口都屬于高科技類(lèi)。其他高新技術(shù)產(chǎn)品出口專(zhuān)業(yè)化的國(guó)家還包括馬耳他、新加坡、馬來(lái)西亞和臺(tái)灣，其中超過(guò)三分之一的出口都是高新技術(shù)產(chǎn)品。此外還有幾個(gè)隨手可得的關(guān)于發(fā)展中國(guó)家或新興國(guó)家的典型例子，如中國(guó)、泰國(guó)、哥斯達(dá)黎加、墨西哥、匈牙利、韓國(guó)等在高科技領(lǐng)域也表現(xiàn)的相當(dāng)出色。在仔細(xì)觀察其結(jié)構(gòu)之后就可發(fā)現(xiàn)，在大多數(shù)國(guó)家的高新技術(shù)產(chǎn)品出口中，電子產(chǎn)品占大部分的比重，且這種匹配關(guān)系在專(zhuān)業(yè)化程度高的國(guó)家表現(xiàn)的尤其明顯。這些國(guó)家通常以有限范圍內(nèi)的電子產(chǎn)品為主要的高新技術(shù)

6、出口產(chǎn)品。高科技產(chǎn)品出口的專(zhuān)業(yè)化與電子產(chǎn)品出口的整體相關(guān)性非常高。圖1顯示，這些指標(biāo)在全國(guó)各地的差異超過(guò)了80%，如果排除一些重要的出色者的話那么差異會(huì)更大。因此，在下面的章節(jié)中，我們將會(huì)集中分析狹義上的電子貿(mào)易，以此作為一個(gè)具有廣泛代表性的高新技術(shù)產(chǎn)品出口分析。這些到底是什么意思呢？它告訴我們什么呢？?jī)H就高新技術(shù)產(chǎn)品出口的角度看，人們會(huì)認(rèn)為很多發(fā)展中國(guó)家在科技發(fā)展這個(gè)層面已經(jīng)取得了很大成就。如果從高新技術(shù)產(chǎn)品出口的統(tǒng)計(jì)數(shù)字上看，甚至?xí)腥苏J(rèn)為這些國(guó)家在經(jīng)濟(jì)技術(shù)上已經(jīng)超越了日本、美國(guó)、歐盟。Srholec通過(guò)舉例的方式直接比較了經(jīng)合組織地區(qū)的國(guó)家高科技領(lǐng)域的研發(fā)力度。通過(guò)比較產(chǎn)生的數(shù)據(jù)顯示，經(jīng)

7、合組織成員國(guó)中的那些收入比較低的國(guó)家例如墨西哥、波蘭、斯洛伐克、匈牙利和捷克共和國(guó)等國(guó)家，他們?cè)诋a(chǎn)品科技研究發(fā)展強(qiáng)度仍然比那些通過(guò)對(duì)高科技產(chǎn)品和其他制造業(yè)實(shí)施差異稅額征收的手段來(lái)限制高新科技企業(yè)發(fā)展的發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家的科技研究發(fā)展水平要低得多。這些都讓我們很難認(rèn)為這些國(guó)家都屬于高科技發(fā)展的國(guó)家。盡管發(fā)展中國(guó)家在高科技產(chǎn)品的研究發(fā)展上的投入還很低，但是對(duì)于那些非經(jīng)合組織成員國(guó)關(guān)于高科技研究發(fā)展數(shù)據(jù)也是可以進(jìn)行比較的。高新技術(shù)產(chǎn)品出口的發(fā)展和科技發(fā)展的支出的經(jīng)濟(jì)力度并不是成比例的。貧富懸殊是菲律賓、馬耳他和馬來(lái)西亞最引人注目的地方，這些國(guó)家的另一個(gè)比較特殊的地方在于這些國(guó)家在高新科技領(lǐng)域的出口占到總出口的

8、45%，在那些高新科技領(lǐng)域出口所占比例稍微低點(diǎn)的國(guó)家例如哥斯達(dá)黎加、泰國(guó)和墨西哥，他們的高科技研究發(fā)展的支出費(fèi)用仍地遠(yuǎn)低于GDP的1%。因此，這些實(shí)例能夠證明，國(guó)家高速發(fā)展的高新技術(shù)出口或許不是因?yàn)槠渚哂邢冗M(jìn)的技術(shù)能力。這些都證明了這樣的假設(shè)：高新技術(shù)的發(fā)展已經(jīng)把國(guó)際生產(chǎn)分散，一個(gè)科技發(fā)展落后的國(guó)家仍然可以制造出具有高科技含量的產(chǎn)品。隨著外資企業(yè)的增多，東亞地區(qū)已經(jīng)發(fā)展成為高科技制造業(yè)的集聚地，但是在這一地區(qū)，定位在“第一梯隊(duì)”的新型工業(yè)化國(guó)家和其他地區(qū)的相關(guān)科技能力還存在一定的差距。亞洲的一些高收入國(guó)家例如新加坡、臺(tái)灣、韓國(guó)和日本，他們的高新技術(shù)出口和研發(fā)強(qiáng)度都排在全球前15位，其他的亞洲國(guó)

9、家的科技能力則遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)落后于他們。由于擁有龐大的市場(chǎng)規(guī)模和獨(dú)特的發(fā)展軌跡，中國(guó)在科技研發(fā)方面則屬于一個(gè)特殊情況。在高科技產(chǎn)品研究發(fā)展強(qiáng)度方面，中國(guó)已經(jīng)超越了一些高收入國(guó)家例如愛(ài)爾蘭和南歐的一些國(guó)家。由于經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)達(dá)地區(qū)和偏遠(yuǎn)地區(qū)的地區(qū)之間存在差異，中國(guó)的一些地區(qū)可能保持著高于全國(guó)平均水平的高科技產(chǎn)品研究發(fā)展強(qiáng)度，甚至接近發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家的研究發(fā)展水平。正如前面提到的，日益發(fā)展的高新技術(shù)產(chǎn)品出口和當(dāng)?shù)氐目萍寄芰薮蟛町惐澈箅[藏著的是當(dāng)今科技發(fā)展和相關(guān)制造業(yè)發(fā)展的分離。相關(guān)事實(shí)似乎證明高科技研發(fā)活動(dòng)高度依附于空間，并且最終會(huì)形成地區(qū)化。雖然目前在世界范圍內(nèi)對(duì)于高科技研發(fā)的海外投資日益增加，但是這些投資主要都來(lái)自于

10、發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家。對(duì)企業(yè)數(shù)據(jù)的分析表明，在那些企業(yè)技術(shù)落后于世界科學(xué)技術(shù)發(fā)展前沿的國(guó)家，例如捷克共和國(guó)，相比較于內(nèi)資企業(yè)，外資企業(yè)更不太愿意冒險(xiǎn)對(duì)高科技研發(fā)活動(dòng)進(jìn)行投資。在許多發(fā)展中國(guó)家，盡管?chē)?guó)家吸引了主要以制造業(yè)為基礎(chǔ)的全球生產(chǎn)商的生產(chǎn)資料的進(jìn)入，高新技術(shù)產(chǎn)品出口激增，但是高新技術(shù)依然集中在別的國(guó)家。這種現(xiàn)象的產(chǎn)生并不讓我們感到奇怪。雖然高新技術(shù)產(chǎn)品出口對(duì)于發(fā)展中國(guó)家當(dāng)?shù)乜萍寄芰Φ陌l(fā)展的幫助很小，但是很多人認(rèn)為高新技術(shù)產(chǎn)業(yè)仍然能夠憑借其潛在的溢出效應(yīng)對(duì)當(dāng)?shù)氐陌l(fā)展有所助益。然而，知識(shí)溢出效應(yīng)的涉及范圍到底有多大，我們?nèi)匀徊荒茴A(yù)測(cè)。正如先進(jìn)的文獻(xiàn)資料所言，溢出效應(yīng)的范圍應(yīng)當(dāng)限于當(dāng)?shù)?，因?yàn)橹R(shí)是隱形的對(duì)空

11、間具有高度依附性的。我們需要有適當(dāng)?shù)奈漳芰?，從溢出效?yīng)中收益。技術(shù)的價(jià)值不僅僅在于能夠提供生產(chǎn)，更在于它具有可傳播性；當(dāng)然，當(dāng)技術(shù)越是復(fù)雜時(shí)，技術(shù)在地區(qū)間的傳播就越發(fā)困難。由于基于科技而產(chǎn)生的知識(shí)外溢是具有界限的(國(guó)家邊界或者是其他有關(guān)的界限)并且受到當(dāng)?shù)氐奈漳芰χ萍s，因此最終決定知識(shí)外溢效果的因素是在當(dāng)?shù)亻_(kāi)展活動(dòng)的實(shí)際技術(shù)水平而不是一般行業(yè)的技術(shù)強(qiáng)度。High-tech exports from developing countries: A symptom of technology spurts or statistical illusion? Martin SrholecCentr

12、e for Technology, Innovation and Culture (TIK), University of OsloPaper for the DIME WP 2.3 workshop on “Industrial innovation dynamics and knowledge characteristics, 26-27 April 2006, Lund University Abstract Specialization in high-tech products is frequently used to capture technology intensity of

13、 exports. Developing countries are increasingly becoming exporters of these products, and some may even be among the most deeply specialized countries in the high-tech exports. The paper scrutinizes the relevance of the taxonomies that classify exports by technological intensity. It is shown that sp

14、ecialization in high-tech exports typically does not appear in tandem with indigenous technological capabilities in developing countries. The analysis of intra-product imports suggests that the bulk of high-tech exports can actually be attributed to the effect of increasingly international fragmenta

15、tion of production systems in electronics on trade statistics. It is confirmed in an econometric framework that while domestic technological capabilities are associated with export performance in electronics, it is the propensity to import electronics components that accounts for by far the largest

16、proportion of cross-country differences in specialization in electronics exports. The paper concludes with some implications for policy and future research. Specialization in high-tech exports: The indicator of what? It is well established in the literature that economic development requires structu

17、ral change, so it is important to analyse structural shifts along the way. It is also rightly argued that moving into manufacturing exports entails greater development opportunities because of economies of scale and scope, export diversification and typically higher skills and technological intensit

18、y, compared with exports based on exploitation of natural endowments. Although a broad distinction between primary, resource-based and manufacturing trade is relatively straightforward, it is far more complicated to differentiate technological intensity of manufacturing trade. As noted above, it is

19、customary to capture technological intensity of exports by comparing specialization in products perceived as high-tech across countries. Figure 1 provides a comparison for all countries for which the relevant data is available (a sample of 108 countries in 2003). The share of high-tech products in m

20、erchandise exports is plotted on the vertical axis against specialization in exports of electronics on the horizontal axis. The dotted lines show sample averages, which divide the figure into four quadrants with below/above average scores along the two dimensions to indicate countries specialized in

21、 exports of these products. The data for high-tech exports are based on the World Development Indicators dataset (World Bank 2005), which according to the source refers to “products with high R&D intensity, such as in aerospace, computers, pharmaceuticals, scientific instruments, and electrical mach

22、inery”. This is in line with the definition of the OECD taxonomy and is fairly close to exports of industries generally viewed as science-based in Pavitts taxonomy. Exports of electronics have been obtained from the Comtrade Database (United Nations 2005) and cover trade in the following products: o

23、ffice, accounting and computing machinery (75); radio, television and communications equipment (76), electrical machinery (77) and medical, precision and optical instruments (87, 881, 884 and 885) - all codes according to SITC, rev. 3. A majority of countries maintain a below-average share of high-t

24、ech product in exports. Most low-income countries report negligible high-tech exports, although specialization in high-tech exports is by no means a privilege of the most advanced countries. Striking is the fact that the country specializing the most in high-tech exports is the Philippines, where al

25、most two-thirds of exports fall into the high-tech category. Other outliers include Malta, Singapore, Malaysia and Taiwan, where high-tech products account for more than a third of exports. A handful of typical examples of developing (or emerging) countries, such as China, Thailand, Costa Rica, Mexi

26、co, Hungary and Korea also perform quite well in the high-tech area. A closer look at the structure reveals that electronics accounts for the bulk of high-tech exports in most countries. The match is particularly strong for the most specialized countries, where high-tech exports are typically domina

27、ted by a limited range of electronic products. Overall correlation between the specialization in exports of high-tech products and electronics is extremely high. Figure1 shows that these indicators share more than 80% of cross-country variance, and even more if important outliers are excluded. 3 The

28、refore, in the following sections, we focus narrowly on the analysis of trade in electronics as a broad representation of high-tech exports. What does it mean? What does it tell us? Looking solely at the specialization in high-tech (or electronics) exports, one could easily conclude that a number of

29、 developing countries have been extremely successful in technological catching up. If taken literally, the figure might be interpreted to suggest that these countries have even overtaken the United States, Japan and the EU in terms of the technological intensity of their economies. Srholec (2006) di

30、rectly compares R&D intensity of the high-tech sectors in the OECD area. It is shown that some countries with a relatively low income compared with the advanced OECD members, such as Mexico, Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and the Czech Republic, maintain vastly lower R&D intensity in high-tech electronic

31、s compared with the threshold that draws a cut-off point in the taxonomy between high-tech and the rest of manufacturing (around 20% of R&D in relation to value added according to OECD 2003, p. 156). It makes it truly problematic to use any high-tech labels in the context of these countries. Althoug

32、h R&D data for developing countries is scarce, a limited comparison at least at the aggregate level can be made also for non-OECD members. Specialization in high-tech exports does not match the intensity of the economy on R&D expenditure in many areas. The disparity is most striking in the Philippin

33、es, Malta, Malaysia, which have more than 45% of exports in the high-tech fields, and to a lesser extent in Costa Rica, Thailand and Mexico, also with significant high-tech exports, but in all of these countries spending on R&D remains well below 1% of GDP. Hence the fundamentals of specialization p

34、atterns of these countries are probably not based on sophisticated technological capabilities. This confirms the expectation that production systems in the high-tech fields became internationally fragmented to the extent that countries can export large amounts of high-tech products while actually ma

35、stering very limited technological capabilities themselves. The East Asian region clearly emerges as an important cluster for the manufacturing of high-tech products, but there seems to be a fairly strong divide in localization of related technological capabilities in the “first tier” of the newly i

36、ndustrialized countries and the rest of the region. A group of high-income Asian countries, namely Singapore, Taiwan, Korea and Japan, is among the top 15 countries in the world in both specialization in high-tech exports and R&D intensity, while the others fall well behind in technological capabili

37、ties. As a consequence of its sheer size and unique development trajectory, China is arguably a special case in this context. In terms of R&D intensity, China has already overtaken some of the high-income countries such as Ireland and some southern European countries. Regional differences between gr

38、avitational centres of business activity and other mainly rural areas suggest that some Chinese regions probably maintain R&D intensity substantially above the national average and even closer to that of developed countries. As suggested, the phenomenon behind the contrast between specialization in

39、high-tech exports and indigenous technology capabilities is the increasing fragmentation of value chains, particularly the separation of technological development from related manufacturing activities. The available empirical evidence seems to confirm the fact that technologically intensive activiti

40、es are sticky, highly concentrated in space and remain localized in the home areas of large multinational corporations (Patel and Pavitt 1991, Cantwell and Iammarino 1998, Pavitt and Patel 1999, Verspagen and Schoenmakers 2003). Foreign direct investment in R&D is increasing worldwide, but it is hig

41、hly concentrated among developed countries (Le Bas and Sierra 2002). Analyses of firm level data even suggest that foreign affiliates are less likely to venture into R&D activity compared to domestic owned firms in countries behind the technology frontier, such as the Czech Republic (Srholec 2005). It is therefore not surprising that R&D intensity remains