美聯(lián)儲-CBDC的宏觀經(jīng)濟含義：文獻綜述（英）-2022.11-65正式版

FinanceandEconomicsDiscussionSeriesFederalReserveBoard,Washington,D.C.ISSN1936-2854(Print)ISSN2767-3898(Online)TheMacroeconomicImplicationsofCBDC:AReviewoftheLiteratureSebastianInfante,KyungminKim,AnnaOrlik,AndreF.Silva,andRobertJ.Tetlow2022-076Pleasecitethispaperas:Infante,Sebastian,KyungminKim,AnnaOrlik,AndreF.Silva,andRobertJ.Tetlow(2022).\TheMacroeconomicImplicationsofCBDC:AReviewoftheLiterature,"FinanceandEconomicsDiscussionSeries2022-076.Washington:BoardofGovernorsoftheFederalReserveSystem,/10.17016/FEDS.2022.076.NOTE:StaworkingpapersintheFinanceandEconomicsDiscussionSeries(FEDS)arepreliminarymaterialscirculatedtostimulatediscussionandcriticalcomment.TheanalysisandconclusionssetfortharethoseoftheauthorsanddonotindicateconcurrencebyothermembersoftheresearchstaortheBoardofGovernors.ReferencesinpublicationstotheFinanceandEconomicsDiscussionSeries(otherthanacknowledgement)shouldbeclearedwiththeauthor(s)toprotectthetentativecharacterofthesepapers.TheMacroeconomicImplicationsofCBDC:AReviewoftheLiteratureSebastianInfante,KyungminKim,AnnaOrlik,AndréF.Silva,andRobertJ.Tetlow*October2022ThispaperprovidesanoverviewoftheliteratureexamininghowtheintroductionofaCBDCwouldaffectthebankingsector,financialstability,andtheimplementationandtransmissionofmonetarypolicyinadevelopedeconomysuchastheUnitedStates.ACBDChasthepotentialtoimprovewelfarebyreducingfinancialfrictionsindepositmarkets,byboostingfinancialinclusion,andbyimprovingthetransmissionofmonetarypolicy.However,aCBDCalsoentailsconsiderablerisks,includingthepossibilityofbankdisintermediationandassociatedcontractioninbankcredit,aswellaspotentialadverseeffectsonfinancialstability.ACBDCalsoraiseimportantquestionsregardingmonetarypolicyimplementationandthefootprintofcentralbanksinthefinancialsystem.Ultimately,theeffectsofaCBDCdependcriticallyonitsdesignfeatures,particularlyremuneration.DivisionofMonetaryAffairs,FederalReserveBoard,Washington,D.C.,20551,USA.Correspondingauthor:robert.j.tetlow@.WethankDavidAndolfatto,PaolaBoel,MarkCarlson,JamesClouse,RochelleEdge,EtienneGagnon,ChristopherGust,AntoineMartin,FranciscoVazquez-Grande,MinWei,PeterZimmerman,andRebeccaZarutskieforhelpfulcommentsonanearlierdraft.ThanksaswelltoDavidJenkinsforvaluableeditorialsuggestionsandtoJakeScottandConnorBrennanforassistancewithcitationsandreferences.Allremainingerrorsareours.TheinterpretationsoftheliteratureandopinionsexpressedhereinarestrictlythoseoftheauthorsandshouldnotbeattributedtotheFederalReserveBoardoranyofitsstaff.Thispageisintentionallyleftblank.1.IntroductionThepastdecadehasseenanexplosionofinterestindigitalassetsingeneralandcentralbankdigitalcurrencies(CBDCs)inparticular.Propelled,inpart,bythespreadofprivate-sectordigitalassetventuresthathavearisenoutofdistributedledgertechnologies,theacademicliteratureonCBDCisexpandingrapidlybut,toalargeextent,isstillinitsinfancy.1ThispaperevaluatestherangeofmacroeconomicimplicationsoftheintroductionofaCBDCinamoderneconomyliketheUnitedStates,asgleanedfromtheacademicliterature.Ourintentionisforthispapertoserveasaresourceforseniorstafforcentralbankers,providingthemwiththelatestthinkingtoaddressquestionsregardingthegeneraladvisabilityofCBDC,andhowthedesignfeaturesofanyprospectiveCBDCaffecttheirefficacyasdigitalassetsinthe21stcenturymacroeconomy.Tothisend,webeginbylayingoutaconceptualframeworkforwhatfollows,startingwithahigh-leveldescriptionofthepresentsituationintheabsenceofaCBDC.ThisprovidesafoundationforassessinghowthedesignfeaturesofCBDCwouldaffecteconomicfunctioningingeneral.Asnoted,ouranalysisismacroeconomicinnature.Evenso,themacroeconomyasitpertainstoCBDCcannotbedivorcedfromcriticalaspectsofthebankingsector,towhichwedevotemuchattention.This,inturn,meansweaddressimplicationsforfinancialstabilityandfortheimplementationandtransmissionofmonetarypolicy.Butweonlytouchonthepaymentssystembecauseitandothertopicssuchasbankregulationandsupervisionarenotafocusofourreview.2OuranalysisisalsoonwhattheliteraturecontributestoourunderstandingoftheeconomicsofCBDC,unconstrainedbypoliticalorlegalfeaturesorbyrestrictions.3Ingeneral,weviewtheinitialequilibriumasoneofalargeopeneconomywithfinancialfrictionsthatinhibitsavers—thosewithwealthbutwithoutmarketableprojectsoropportunitiesKosseandMattei(2022)reportthat90percentofthe81centralbankssurveyedbytheBankforInternationalSettlements(BIS)inthefallof2021hadprojectsunderwaystudyingthedesirabilityandviabilityofCBDC.HelpinthisareahascomefromoutsidecollaboratorssuchasMIT’sDigitalCurrencyInitiative.SeeCarapellaandFlemming(2020)forinformationonthepotentialimplicationsofCBDCforpaymentssystems.Waller(2021)andAndolfatto(2021b)arguethatongoingdevelopmentsinpaymentssystemsinthepublicsector(suchasFedNow)andtheprivatesector(suchastheAutomatedClearingHousenetwork)weakenthecasebasedonpaymentssystemgroundsfortheadoptionofaCBDCintheUnitedStates.Amongotherthings,thismeanswedonotadopttherestrictionsembeddedintheFederalReserveBoard’swhitepaper(FederalReserveBoard,2022),which,amongotherthings,wouldruleoutanon-intermediatedCBDC.1forinvestment—fromcontractingdirectlywithentrepreneurs—thosewithprojectsbutinsufficientwealthoftheirowntobringthoseprojectstomarket.Similarly,householdsfacealife-cyclepatternofincomethatmostlyrisesovertime,alongwithanobjectivetosmoothconsumption,whichspursborrowingearlyinlifeandsavinglateron.Finally,householdsandmostfirmshaveneedsforconductingtransactionssafelyandefficiently.Takentogether,theseconditionsimplyaroleformoneyasamediumofexchange,asastoreofvalue,andasaunitofaccount.TheyalsofurnishabusinesscasefortheAmericanfinancialstructurethatincludesbanks(andnonbankfinancialinstitutions)aswellascapitalmarkets.Banksplayacrucialroleincreatingliquiditythroughmaturitytransformation,acceptingshort-termdepositsandlendinginthelongtermintheformofriskyilliquidloanstobusinessesandhouseholds.4Creditmarketsarebesetwithasymmetricinformationandincompletemarkets,whichinturnmeansthatasapartoftheextensionofloans,banksalsoscreenandmonitorrisks.Theseriskshaveimplicationsforfinancialstability.Itistheexpertiseofbanksinassessingtheriskinessofborrowersinthepresenceofasymmetricinformation,alongwiththeirroleinfacilitatingmaturitytransformation,thatisperhapsthekeydistinctionbetweentherolesofbankingandcapitalmarketsinthefinancialsystem.Thesetofpre-existingmoniesisimportantforwhatweoutlinebelow.Theeconomyweconsideralreadyhascurrency,bothtoken(thatis,cash)andaccount-based(reserves).Thebankingsectorreliesonretailandwholesaledeposits;however,remuneratedreservesatthecentralbankareheldexclusivelybythebankingsector.5Exceptwhereotherwisenoted,weassumethatthebankingsectorisimperfectlycompetitiveandthateconomicrentsaccrueintheThisdescriptionofwhatbanksdois,bynecessity,asimplification.Banksobtainfundingfromriskywholesalefundingmarkets,aswellasrisklessretaildepositsthatareprotectedbygovernmentinsurance,andundercertainconditions,borrowfromcentralbanks.Theyalsoinvestinmorethanjusthouseholdandcommercialloans.Thatsaid,noneofthesedetailsisimportantforthepointswemakeinthispaperexceptinsofarastheavailabilityoffundingobtainedfromcentralbanksmaydifferdependingonwhetherconditionsinfinancialmarketsarenormalorstressed.Tobeprecise,intheU.S.casethereareentitiesotherthanbanksthatholdreserves,suchasfederalagencies,althoughtheseentitiesdonotreceiveremunerationontheirreservebalances.2supplyofbankingservices.6Inmostinstances,wewilltakeforgrantedthatthecentralbankimplementsmonetarypolicyusingafloorsystemwithamplereserves.7IntothisworldaCBDCisintroduced.OurreadingoftheliteraturehasidentifiedseveralavenuesthroughwhichtheintroductionofaCBDCcouldimprovewelfare.First,CBDCcouldamelioratesomeofthefinancialfrictionsindepositorloanmarkets.Partofthisimprovementwouldlikelycomefrommorecompetitivepricingofdeposits,loans,orboth.Second,itcouldenhancetheefficiencyofretailpaymentssystems,makingtransactionsfaster,safer,andlessexpensive.Third,aCBDCcouldfacilitateinternationaltransactionsandimprovefinancialinclusionamongtheunbanked.Fourth,inthefaceofthedeclininguseofcash,aCBDCcouldhelpensuretheexistenceofawidelyacceptedmeansofpaymentthat,ifitweredirectlyissuedandadministeredbythecentralbank,neednotdependonprivateintermediaries(Nicolaisen,2017;EngertandFung,2017).Fifth,aCBDCcouldserveasacatalystforprivate-sectortechnologicalinnovationsinbankingandpayments.Indeed,itissometimesarguedthat,dependingonthecircumstances,theadventofprivatedigitalassetsmightobligethecreationofapubliclyissueddigitalassettosupportthestabilityofnewpaymentplatforms.Andsixthandfinally,ithasatleastthepotentialtoimprovethetransmissionofmonetarypolicy.ButCBDCsalsocarryrisks.Therisksthattheliteraturehasoutlineddifferdependingondesignfeatures,butanoft-citedconcernisthepossibilityofbankdisintermediation.Disintermediation,andtheassociatedeasewithwhichaCBDCcouldfacilitaterapidchangesinfinancialholdings,couldaffecttheavailabilityofbankcreditorendangerfinancialstability.AndCBDCsraisefundamentalquestionsoftheproperroleofcentralbanks.Forexample,manyofthecontributionstotheliteratureenvisionanexpandedfootprintofcentralbanksinthefinancialsystem,insomecasesextendingtheirroleinliquidityprovision,amongotherareas.Thesepossibilitiesnotwithstanding,aswediscussinvaryingdetailbelow,whatshouldbeexpectedofCBDCdependscriticallyonitsdesignfeatures,ofwhichtherearemany.AWithahandfulofverylargebanksandthousandsofsmallones,thebestdescriptionofthestructureofU.S.bankingdependsonwhichmarketoneisreferencing,butitcanbefairlydescribedasimperfectlycompetitiveandinsomerespectsasanoligopolywithacompetitivefringe.SeePilloffandRhoades(2002)andVanHoose(2017)onthestructureofthebankingindustry.Thatsaid,wewillhavesomethingtosayabouttherelationshipbetweencentralbankreservemanagementtools,suchastheovernightreverserepofacilityorthestandingrepofacilityandCBDC.3CBDCcouldbetoken-basedoraccount-based.8ACBDCcouldbehelddirectlybyhouseholdsandnonfinancialfirms(“retail”CBDC)orintermediatedthroughbanksornonbankfinancialinstitutionssuchasfintechs(“intermediated”CBDC).HoldingCBDCcouldbeopentoeveryoneorrestrictedtosubgroupssuchasU.S.nationalsorhouseholdsandsmallbusinesses.CBDCcouldbeelasticallyandcontinuallysuppliedtoeligibleparties,oritcouldbelimitedbycaps,transfersize,ortransferfrequencyrestrictions.Finally,perhapsthemostimportantdesignfeatureofaCBDCisremuneration—thatis,whetherCBDCholdingswouldpayinterestandwhetheranysuchinterestwouldbeproportionalortieredasafunctionofthesizeofaholding.9ThedesignfeaturesaffectthelikelycompetitivenessofaCBDCincertainmarketsandtherolethataCBDCmightfulfill.Forexample,ifaCBDCpaysnointerest,itsuseasastoreofvalueiscircumscribed,atleastduringtimeswhenmarketinterestratesaresignificantlyabovetheeffectivelowerbound(ELB)onnominalinterestrates.Insuchcircumstances,CBDCismuchlikecash,anditsusagewouldbedeterminedbyhowmuchconvenienceitprovides,relativetoitsmoney-likerivals.And,indeed,theconvenienceyieldofCBDC—thatis,thenonpecuniarybenefitprovided,whichcandifferwiththeapplication—isarecurrentthemeintheliterature.10Moregenerally,theconnectionbetweenthedesignfeaturesofaCBDCandtake-upbystakeholdersisacomplexone,withtheprospectsforaCBDCinextricablyintertwinedwithcompetingpaymentsmechanismsandtechnologiesinmarketswithnetworkexternalities.11Theremainderofthisliteraturereviewisdividedintofivesections,plustwoappendixes,andproceedsasfollows.Insection2,weexaminetheimplicationsofCBDCforthebankingAnexampleofatoken-basedsystemisphysicalcurrencieswhilebankdepositsexemplifyanaccount-basedsystem.Conceptually,atoken-basedsystemrequiresverifyingthevalidityoftheobjectusedtopay,whileanaccount-basedsystemreliesonverifyingtheidentityofthepayer.Garrattetal.(2020)providesausefuldiscussionofthesedifferences.SeealsoDuffie(2019).Thislistofdesignfeaturesisnotexhaustive.SeveralothersrelatetohowCBDCsinterfacewithtechnology,interoperability,andgovernance,withtradeoffsbetweenaccountabilityandtransparencyversusprivacyandanonymity.OurexclusionoftheseaspectsofCBDCdesignreflectsourfocusandisnotintendedtodenytheimportanceofthesequestions.ThisnotionofconvenienceyieldappliesmorebroadlythanjusttoCBDCandisoftenassociatedwiththeadditionalbenefitfromholdingafinancialassetthatissafeormoney-likeorboth,suchasU.S.Treasurybillsorveryshort-termprivateliabilities.Itisoftenmeasuredasthedifferencebetweentherisk-freecostofcapitalandtheyieldonmoney-likeassets.Thisspreadcapturesinvestors’willingnesstoforfeithigherreturnstoreapthebenefitsofholdingsafe,money-likeassets.Networkexternalities,inthiscontext,referstothefactthattheconvenience(andvalue)ofapaymenttechnologyriseswiththenumberofpartieswhousethesametechnology.Thisimplieselementsofnaturalmonopolythatlimitthenumberofcompetingdigitalcurrenciesthatcancoexistinequilibrium.4sector.Buildingonwhatchangescouldbeexpectedinbanking,section3discussesthelikelyimpactonfinancialstability.Wethenpivottomonetarypolicy,firstlookingathowtheimplementationofmonetarypolicymightdiffer,insection4,andthenturningtohowtheintroductionanddesignofaCBDCcouldaffectthetransmissionofmonetarypolicy,insectionSomeconcludingremarksfollow.ThefirstoftheappendixesprovidesabriefcomparisonofCBDCtotheFederalReserve’sovernightreverserepurchaseagreement(ONRRP)facilityandassessesthelessonsthatcanbegleanedfromthatexperience.AppendixBdiscussestheinternationalexperiencewithCBDCs.2.ImplicationsforthebankingsectorBanksplayacrucialroleintoday’sfinancialsystem,inpartduetotheirabilitytocreateliquiditythroughmaturitytransformation—thatis,byfinancingilliquid,long-maturityassetsfundedbyliquid,short-termliabilities(DiamondandDybvig,1983).Byacceptingdeposits,bankscreateinsidemoney,providingasafeandstablestoreofvalueandameansofpayment.Byextendingloans,banksprovidefundingtoadiversesetofeconomicagents,usingtheirexpertisetoscreen,monitor,andsupportborrowers.Theeconomiesofscope—orsynergies—thatarisefromcombininglendinganddeposit-takingactivitiesgivesbanksanaturaladvantageoverotherfinancialinstitutionsinprovidingliquidity(AcharyaandMora,2015),protectingfirmsandhouseholdsagainstidiosyncraticandsystemicliquidityshocks(GatevandStrahan,2006;Kashyapetal.,2002),andpromotingeconomicgrowth(BencivengaandSmith,1991;BergerandSedunov,2017).12OneofthemostfrequentlyraisedconcernsintheCBDCdebateistheriskofbankdisintermediation.Indeed,aCBDCcouldrepresentasourceofcompetitionforfundingwithbanks,especiallyifremunerated,whichcouldincreasebanks’fundingcostsandadverselyaffectbanklending.WhilemanytypesofCBDCcouldbebenignintheirimplications,anewcentralbankliabilitycoulddisruptthecurrentfinancialstructure,muchofwhichisbuiltontheuniqueEganetal.(2022)showempiricallythatdepositproductivity—thatis,theabilitytoattractdepositswithoutbearingsubstantialoverheadcostssuchasbankbranches—explainsabouttwo-thirdsofthevalueofthemedianbank.Theyalsofindevidenceofsignificantsynergiesbetweendepositsandlending,suggestingthattheremaybenegativespillovereffectstotheextentthatCBDCcanluredepositsawayfrombanks.5wayinwhichbankshaveaccesstothecentralbankinmostjurisdictions.13Theextenttowhichanysuchdisintermediationwouldnegativelyaffectlendingdependsontheviabilityofalternativesourcesofcreditforhouseholdsandfirms.Itwouldalsodepend,atleastinpart,onhowCBDCarerecycledthroughtheeconomy—thatis,onhowthecentralbankrespondstoincreasesinCBDConitsbalancesheet.Inanyevent,thegrowingtheoreticalliteratureexaminingthepotentialeffectsofaCBDCondepositandlendingmarketsisnotyetconclusive,withconsiderableuncertaintyregardingthepreciseeffects.14Overall,theliteraturehasshownthatthelikelyeffectsofCBDConthebankingsectordependsonfourmainfactors:Competitivenessofthebankingsector.Totheextentthatbankshavemarketpowerinthedepositsmarket,theintroductionofaCBDCthatdirectlycompeteswithbankdepositscouldleadtoanincreaseindepositratesbutwouldnotnecessarilyresultinacontractioninthequantityofbankdepositsandlending.15CBDCremuneration.ACBDCcanleadtobankdisintermediationifitsinterestrateishighenough,butanon-interest-bearingCBDC,oraCBDCwitharatethatislow,mighthaveinsignificanteffectsonbankintermediation.AratepaidonCBDCthatliesinanintermediaterangecouldevenpromotebankintermediation,dependingonthecompetitivestructureofthebankingsector.IntheUnitedStates,therearemultiplewayseconomicagentshavedirectaccesstothecentralbank.Atoneextreme,thereisphysicalcash,whichisavailabletoeveryone.Attheotherextreme,thereareremuneratedcentralbankreserves,whichcanonlybeaccessedbydepositoryinstitutions.TotheextentthatCBDCprovidesanintermediatelevelofaccesstoothereconomicagents,itcanaffectthefinancialstructure—seesection4formoredetailsonCBDCimplementation.Studyingsimilareventsfrombankinghistorymayalsoprovideguidance.Grodecka-Messi(2019)analyzestheresponseofthebankingsectorinCanadatotheintroductionofthecentralbanknoteissuancemonopoly,bytheBankofCanada,establishedin1935.Noteissuancewasanimportantsourceofrevenueforprivatebanksandallowedthemtosmoothprofits.Consequently,thebanksconstrainedbynewissuancelimitsexperiencedhighervolatilityofreturnonequityintheshortrunandlowerreturnsonassetsinthelongrun.Theeffectonlendingwaseitherinsignificantorambiguous.Putintoperspective,theseestimateslikelyrepresentaworst-casescenariooftheeffectsontheincumbentprivatebanksofintroductionofanewformofcentralbankcurrency.Indeed,consumersnowadayshaveaccesstoseveralsubstitutesforcentralbankcurrency,whichwereunavailablethen.ThepublicinCanadawasmandatedbylaw,atthattime,toentirelyswitchfromcommercialbanknotestocentralbanknotes.Today,ifaCBDCweretobeintroducedsuchashiftwouldbevoluntary.ThedegreeofsubstitutabilitybetweenaCBDCanddepositsorotherbankliabilitiesisalsoimportantforbanks.Forexample,thedesignfeaturesofaCBDCmayaffectitsattractivenessacrossdifferentmoney-likeassets(e.g.,sharesinmoneymarketfunds),whichinturnwouldinfluencehowdirectlytheCBDCcouldcompetewithtraditionalbankdeposits.6Wholesalefunding.Totheextentthatbankscanreplaceanylostretaildepositswithwholesalefunding,aCBDCwouldhavearelativelysmallimpactonlending.Suchanoffsettingeffectisparticularlyrelevantforlargerbanks.CBDCaccountlimits.RestrictionsonthequantityofCBDCthatuserscanhold,transact,orearninterestoncouldlimittheextentofbankdisintermediation.162.1.CBDCandbankdisintermediation2.1.1.Banking-sectorcompetitionandCBDCremunerationAndolfatto(2021a)andKeisterandSanches(2022)considerpolarcasesofcompetitioninthebankingsectorwhenexaminingtheimplicationsofCBDConbankdisintermediation.Andolfatto(2021a)examinesthemonopolycase,showingthatintroducinganinterest-bearingCBDCcanleadtoanincreaseinbankdepositsandanincreaseindepositratesbyservingascompetitioninthemarketfordeposits.Inhismodel,CBDCpaysinterestataratethatissetindependentlyfromthepolicyrate.ThisallowstheCBDCinterestratetoactasafloorondepositrates,forcingbankstooffermorefavorabletermstodepositors.17Asaresult,introducingaCBDCreducesthemonopolydistortioninthebankingsectorandexpandsthesupplyofdepositsthroughbothhighersavingsofexistingdepositorsandtheinclusionofunbankedindividuals.Thus,aCBDCneednotleadtoacontractioninbanklending—indeed,itmayeveninduceanexpansioninlendingforbankswithabindingregulatoryliquidityconstraint.Incontrast,KeisterandSanches(2022)examinethecaseofaperfectlycompetitivebankingsector,embeddedwithinaLagosandWright(2005)NewMonetaristframework.18Inthissetting,bankdisintermediationisunavoidableiftheCBDCishighlycompetitivewithbankAswenotelater,suchrestrictionscanbeusedtocontaintake-upandlimitriskstofinancialstability,butatthepotentialcostofreducingthepositivebenefitsofCBDCintroduction.Themechanismismuchlikethatofamonopoly-fringemodelwheretheintroductionofaCBDCactslikeadownwardshiftinthecostfunctionofthefringe,shrinkingtheportionofthemarketthatthemonopolistcanclaim.TheNewMonetaristframeworkseeksafundamentalroleformoneyinaworldwhereinterest-bearingassetswouldotherwisedominatetheholdingofcash-likemoneyasastoreofvalue.Moneyintroducedintoanenvironmentofcostlysearchalleviatesthefamous“doublecoincidenceofwants”probleminexchange.SeeWilliamson(2017)forasummary.7deposits.TheeffectsofaCBDCdependonwhetheritfacilitatestransactionsthatwouldotherwiseberealizedwithcashorwithdeposits.Acash-likeCBDCwouldhavenodirectimpactonbankfundingbecauseitwouldmerelysubstituteoneformofmoneyforanother.Adeposit-likeCBDC,ontheotherhand,wouldbeasubstituteforbankdeposits,inducingbankstosethigherdepositinterestratesandacceptlowerlevelsofdepositsandlending.Thecrowdingoutofbankintermediationnotwithstanding,theauthorsfindthattheintroductionofaCBDCincreasestheaggregatestockofliquidassets,whichpromotesmoreefficientexchangeandultimatelyimprovessocialwelfare.19Andolfatto(2021a)andKeisterandSanches(2022)reachstarklydifferentconclusionsonhowtheaggregatedepositbasemaychangewiththeintroductionofaCBDC,largelybecauseoftheirdifferentassumptionsregardingthecompetitivenessofthebankingsector.Whilethisisanempiricalquestion,ourreadingoftheliteratureisthatthedegreeofcompetitioninthebankingsectorlikelyliesinbetweenthetwoextremecasestheseauthorsassume.Forexample,Drechsleretal.(2017)showthatU.S.bankshavemarketpowerindepositmarkets,withanincreaseinthefederalfundsratewideningthespreadbetweenpolicyratesanddepositsandreducingthequantityofdeposits.20Chiuetal.(2022)constructageneralequilibriummodelthatcapturesthecompletespectrumofbanking-sectorcompetition,calibratedtoU.S.data.Inthecalibration,theUnitedStateshasanimperfectlycompetitivebankingsector,implyingthataninterest-bearingCBDCcouldpromotebankintermediation,leadingtohigherdepositrates,moredepositsandlending,andlowerloanrates.21Nonetheless,improvedintermediationarisesonlyifremunerationonCBDCisinanintermediaterange—inthiscase,asinAndolfatto(2021a),aCBDCwouldactasathreattocapturebankdepositsandincentivizebankstooffermorefavorabletermstotheirWilliamson(2021)alsoemploysamodelofcompetitivebanking,similartoKeisterandSanches(2022),inwhichsafeassetsareindemandbybankstoserveascollateralowingtotheincentiveproblemassociatedwithasymmetricinformati