比較商事組織法講義

LawsonBusinessOrganizations:AComparativeStudyDr.Prof.DingDINGSchoolofLawUniversityofInternationalBusinessandEconomics(UIBE)ding0118@1比較商事組織法

法律碩士課程(法學(xué))2BibliographyAnyTextbooksyoustudiedbeforeAresearchpaperonanyCorporateLawissuesRobertaRomano,FoundationsofCorporateLaw[公司法基礎(chǔ)(影印本)],法律出版社,北京,2005年3月第一版.BrianR.Cheffins,CompanyLaw:Theory,StructureandOperation[林華偉等譯],法律出版社,北京,2001年4月第一版.3Content·TheoryoftheFirmandCapitalMarket·LegalCharacteristicsoftheCorporation:LimitedLiability·TheProductionandStructureofCorporationLaws·FinancingtheCorporation·InternalGovernanceStructures·ExternalGovernanceStructures:TheMarketforCorporateControl·SecuritiesRegulation4WhatIExpectfromyou…

ClasspresentationanddiscussionOff-classPreviewandReviewOpen-minded…5<國(guó)家中長(zhǎng)期教育改革和發(fā)展規(guī)劃綱要>(2010-2020)[公開(kāi)征求意見(jiàn)稿]豐田汽車(chē)召回香港華懋集團(tuán)前董事局主席龔如心遺產(chǎn)案AVATAR6TheoryoftheFirmandCapitalMarkets(1)為什么有企業(yè)/廠商?[交易\市場(chǎng)和企業(yè)/廠商]它們?cè)谫Y本市場(chǎng)的地位和作用代理成本和交易成本(為什么代理成本在現(xiàn)代企業(yè)不可避免?)1929年,Berle和Means的調(diào)查表明,當(dāng)時(shí)美國(guó)200個(gè)最大的公司中,88個(gè)是由管理人員控制的.Berle和Means認(rèn)為,股東對(duì)于代理成本的監(jiān)督是無(wú)能為力的,你是否同意這一看法?授權(quán)機(jī)制的優(yōu)勢(shì)和弊端7TheoryoftheFirmandCapitalMarkets(2)為什么股東被稱(chēng)為“剩余財(cái)產(chǎn)的所有者”(ResidualOwners)?股東表決權(quán)----→集體行為----→監(jiān)督成本----→信息取得的代價(jià)(在股權(quán)分散的情況下,為什么股東都愿意做消極股東,搭便車(chē)-FreeRiders會(huì)很普遍?)如何約束代理人的機(jī)會(huì)主義行為?(代理成本是所有和控制分離的代價(jià),第7頁(yè))8TheoryoftheFirmandCapitalMarkets(2)股價(jià)能否反映公司管理人員的懈怠或其他機(jī)會(huì)主義行為?監(jiān)督機(jī)制包括哪些方面?9TheoryoftheFirmandCapitalMarkets(3)經(jīng)理和股東存在利益沖突,代理成本不可能為零;所有者是代理成本的最終承擔(dān)者,增加代理成本則可以使經(jīng)理單方面受益,這里就出現(xiàn)了需要法律敢于的現(xiàn)象----成本轉(zhuǎn)嫁(Externality),也界定了法律干預(yù)的目標(biāo)----減少代理成本.因此,檢驗(yàn)公司法的合理性,重要的是看它是否減少了代理成本.方流芳:序言,第3頁(yè).[Jensen&Meckling]

！結(jié)合我國(guó)<公司法>,你如何理解我國(guó)法律是否減少了代理成本,請(qǐng)舉例說(shuō)明.10TheoryoftheFirmandCapitalMarkets(4)企業(yè)業(yè)正正是是針針對(duì)對(duì)機(jī)機(jī)會(huì)會(huì)主主義義\交交易易成成本本和和合合同同不不完完備備的的回回應(yīng)應(yīng)(p.10).當(dāng)當(dāng)合合同同一一方方是是““交交易易專(zhuān)專(zhuān)用用財(cái)財(cái)產(chǎn)產(chǎn)””(trade-specificassets)的的所所有有者者時(shí)時(shí),交交易易雙雙方方組組建建企企業(yè)業(yè)比比簽簽定定合合同同更更有有效效率率(pp.11-15)OliverWilliamson11TheoryoftheFirmandCapitalMarkets(5)HenryHansmann----權(quán)權(quán)衡衡締締約約成成本本和和所所有有權(quán)權(quán)成成本本企業(yè)業(yè)所所有有權(quán)權(quán)類(lèi)類(lèi)型型和和所所有有權(quán)權(quán)成成本本存存在在相相關(guān)關(guān)性性.→投資資者所所有→雇員員所有有→所有有者缺缺位當(dāng)所有有權(quán)成成本過(guò)過(guò)高的的時(shí)候候,沒(méi)沒(méi)有所所有者者比““產(chǎn)產(chǎn)權(quán)清清晰””更重重要.12TheoryoftheFirmandCapitalMarkets(6)以保險(xiǎn)險(xiǎn)公司司與投投保人人的關(guān)關(guān)系為為例,說(shuō)明明公司司股東東與管管理者者的關(guān)關(guān)系.SoleOwnership-----PartialOwnershipPecuniaryBenefits-----Non-pecuniaryBenefits13TheoryoftheFirmandCapitalMarkets(7)在了解解代理理成本本的存存在之之后,你的的投資資選擇擇是什什么?在放棄棄全部部所有有權(quán)歸歸自己己所有有的企企業(yè)形形式后后,投投資者者會(huì)面面臨哪哪些合合同關(guān)關(guān)系?[NexusofContracts]作為投資資者,你你希望公公司法或或者公司司章程加加入企業(yè)業(yè)社會(huì)責(zé)責(zé)任的內(nèi)內(nèi)容嗎?14TheoryoftheFirmandCapitalMarkets(8)Question8atpp.24-25.RonaldCoase,TheNatureoftheFirm,4Economics386,1937.[中文文譯本???]15InstitutionalArrangements在交易成成本為零零的條件件下,制制度的選選擇不會(huì)會(huì)影響經(jīng)經(jīng)濟(jì)活動(dòng)動(dòng)的最終終效益.在交易易成本不不為零的的現(xiàn)實(shí)世世界里,制度的的安排會(huì)會(huì)在不同同程度上上影響交交易的效效益.郁光華:<公司司法的本本質(zhì)>,法律出出版社2006年版,第38頁(yè).RonaldCoase,TheProblemofSocialCost,3JournalofLawandEconomics1,1960.16FurtherReadingMaterialsRobertaRomano,pp.26-60.17LegalCharacteristicsoftheCorporation:LimitedLiabilityWhatfeaturesacorporation?Pleaseprovideyourunderstandingandobservations.18ReadingMaterialsLimitedLiabilityandtheCorporationLimitedLiabilityintheTheoryoftheFirmTowardUnlimitedShareholderLiabilityforCorporateTorts19FourCharacteristicLimitedLiabilityforInvestorsFreeTransferabilityofSharesPerpetualLifeCentralizedManagement[SeetheTextbook]20CloseCorporationvs.

PublicCorporationWhyisLimitedLiabilitycrucialtoamoderncorporation?LimitedliabilityCorporationShareholderCreditor21有限責(zé)任的形形成代表性論文如如下：*PaulL.Davis,GowerandDavis’PrinciplesofModernCompanyLaw,40-46(6thEd,1997).*PhillipBlumburg,LimitedLiabilityandCorporateGroup,11JournalofCorporateLaw573(1986).22對(duì)于公司法法人人格與與股東有限限責(zé)任合并并意義的思思考公司法人人人格----積極的的資產(chǎn)區(qū)分分/公司財(cái)財(cái)產(chǎn)成為公公司債權(quán)人人的擔(dān)保財(cái)財(cái)產(chǎn)，為公公司債權(quán)人人設(shè)定優(yōu)先先于股東或或者公司經(jīng)經(jīng)營(yíng)者的債債權(quán)人受償償?shù)母?dòng)擔(dān)擔(dān)保（floatingcharge），公公司債權(quán)人人在評(píng)估公公司財(cái)產(chǎn)時(shí)時(shí)具有比較較優(yōu)勢(shì)股東東有有限限責(zé)責(zé)任任----消消極極的的資資產(chǎn)產(chǎn)區(qū)區(qū)分分/股股東東的的個(gè)個(gè)人人財(cái)財(cái)產(chǎn)產(chǎn)成成為為股股東東的的債債權(quán)權(quán)人人的的擔(dān)擔(dān)保保財(cái)財(cái)產(chǎn)產(chǎn)，，降降低低了了公公司司破破產(chǎn)產(chǎn)時(shí)時(shí)的的債債權(quán)權(quán)追追討討成成本本，，簡(jiǎn)簡(jiǎn)化化并并實(shí)實(shí)質(zhì)質(zhì)性性地地穩(wěn)穩(wěn)定定了了股股票票的的定定價(jià)價(jià)過(guò)過(guò)程程總體體意意義義----便便利利交交易易另另一一方方明明確確交交易易對(duì)對(duì)象象，，區(qū)區(qū)分分公公司司與與其其股股東東，，公公司司及及其其股股東東的的總總體體融融資資成成本本得得以以降降低低23對(duì)交易另另一方的的提示----來(lái)自公公司法人人人格與與股東有有限責(zé)任任原則的的適用共擔(dān)和轉(zhuǎn)轉(zhuǎn)嫁交易易風(fēng)險(xiǎn)----債權(quán)人人參與監(jiān)監(jiān)督公司司經(jīng)營(yíng)者者隔離公司司的不同同經(jīng)營(yíng)活活動(dòng)與監(jiān)監(jiān)督成本本的增加加——信信息不對(duì)對(duì)稱(chēng)（InformationAsymmetry））參見(jiàn)：：HenryHansmann&ReinierKraakman,TheEssentialRoleofOrganizationalLaw,110YaleLawJournal387(2000).24LimitedLiabilityDoyouagreethatLimitedLiabilityeliminatestheriskofbusinessfailure?-作為為有限限責(zé)任任的對(duì)對(duì)價(jià),應(yīng)當(dāng)當(dāng)要求求公司司服從從政府府管制制\為為顧客客,雇雇員和和相鄰鄰社區(qū)區(qū)的利利益考考慮而而決策策和行行事.Whatdoes““externalizationofrisk””meaninthecontextofLimitedLiability?25WhyLimitedLiability:SomeTheoriesLimitedLiabilityandTheoryofFirmsLimitedLiabilityandCorporateCapitalInformationandCostsInsurance:ASubstitute26LimitedLiabilityreducescosts“[W]eknowfromthesurvivaloflargecorporationsthatthecostsgeneratedbyagencyrelationsareoutweighedbythegainsfromseparationandspecializationoffunction.Limitedliabilityreducesthecostsofthisseparationandspecialization.”FrankH.Easterbrook&DanielR.Fischel,LimitedLiabilityandtheCorporation,52UniversityofChicagoLawReview,89,1985,SeetheTextbookp.63.27LimitedLiabilityinacontextofdiversifiedshareholdingHowtoreducethecostsofmoralhazard?[FrankH.Easterbrook(美國(guó)國(guó)第七巡回回上訴法院院法官)&DanielR.Fischel(芝加哥哥大學(xué)法學(xué)學(xué)院教授)],TheEconomicStructureofCorporateLaw(公司法的的經(jīng)濟(jì)結(jié)構(gòu)構(gòu)-張建偉偉&羅羅培新譯譯),LawPress,2005,pp.66-69.28LiftingtheCorporateVeil法院為了平平衡有限責(zé)責(zé)任的成本本和收益的的嘗試29LimitedLiabilityPiercingtheCorporateVeil:Analternativeforreducingthecostsofmoralhazard.-PiercingtheCorporateVeil-MinimumRegisteredCapital-MandatoryInsurance-DutiesofManagement-ExternalRegulation(fromthegovernment)請(qǐng)用法經(jīng)濟(jì)濟(jì)學(xué)的方法法分析上述述各種方法法的效率.30PiercingtheCorporateVeilCloseCorporationsv.PublicCorporationsCorporateShareholdersv.PersonalShareholdersContractsv.TortsVoluntaryCreditorsv.InvoluntaryCreditors(Seetheabovetopic)InadequateCapitalInvestment31Contractsv.TortsPiercingtheCorporateVeil[SeetheNoteNo.7,Textbook,pp.80-81]32TheProductionofCorporationLawsRobertaRomano,StateCompetitionforCorporateChartersJonathanR.Mace&GeoffreyP.Miller,TowardanInterestGroupTheoryofDelawareCorporateLawFrankH.Easterbrook&DanielR.Fischel,TheCorporateContractJeffreyN.Gordon,TheMandatoryStructureofCorporateLawJohnC.Coffee,Jr.,TheMandatory/EnablingBalanceinCorporateLaw:AnEssayontheJudicialRole33WhatConcerned:USAFederalism?Mandatory?+Enabling?+DefaultRules?34StateCompetitionAllparticipantsinthedebatebelievethattheincomeproducedbythecharteringbusinessspursstatestoenactlawsthatfirmsdesire.Howdoprinciples----theshareholders----ensurethattheiragents----themanagers----behavefaithfully?35Whynotfederaldomain?Cary’sArguments…Winter’sresponse…Romano’sfurtherobservation…36ATransactionalCostExplanationFranchisetaxrevenueConstitutionalsupermajorityrequirementInvestmentsinlegalcapital37TowardanInterestGroupTheoryofDelawareCorporateLawTaxpayersDelawarebar38EnablingLaws…TheCorporateCodeinalmosteverystateisan“enabling”statute…….Thehandiworkofmanagersisfinalinallbutexceptionalortrivialinstances……EasterbrookandFischel,pp.96-97.Doyouthinkitistheinvestorswhochoosewhethertoorganizeasacorporation,trust,partnership,mutualorcooperative?39AnInvisibleHandHowdoestheinvisiblehandtakeaneffectontheself-interestedmanagers?40Whyisitamandatorystructureofcorporatelaw?InvestorProtectionHypothesisUncertaintyHypothesisPublicGoodHypothesisInnovationHypothesisOpportunisticAmendmentHypothesis41Mandatory/EnablingBalanceinCorporateLawJudicialRole42WhatConcerned:China??????43WhattoCompromise?EUShouldweexpecttheemergenceofaEuropean““Delaware”withtheEuropeanCommunity’seconomicintegration?Romano,p.96.44WhatLearned:Japan公司形式的調(diào)調(diào)整派生訴訟45WhatLearned:ChinaPiercingtheCorporateVeilDerivateSuits46FutureTrends:ConvergenceandCompromise???47FinancingtheCorporationCliffordW.Smith,Jr.&JeroldB.Warner,OnFinancialContracting:AnAnalysisofBondCovenants,pp.121-128KennethLehn&AnnettePoulsen,ContractualResolutionofBondholder-StockholderConflictsinLeveragedBuyouts,pp.128-130MichaelC.Jensen,ActiveInvestors,LBOsandthePrivatizationofBankruptcy,pp.130-13248Cont’’dWilliamA.Sahlman,TheStructureandGovernanceofVentureCapitalOrganization,pp.132-138FrankH.Easterbrook,TwoAgency-CostExplanationsofDividends,pp.138-13949TwoMechanismtoRaiseCapitalIssuingEquityIssuingDebt50AgencyCostsAgencycostofoutsideequityAgencycostofdebt51AStudyonCorporateBondMaturity:PerspectivefromTransactionCostsandAgencyCosts發(fā)行長(zhǎng)期期債券可可以降低低交易成成本，但但債券期期限越長(zhǎng)長(zhǎng)，代理理成本就就越高。。企業(yè)在在發(fā)行新新債券時(shí)時(shí)必須對(duì)對(duì)交易成成本和代代理成本本進(jìn)行權(quán)權(quán)衡，尋尋求最優(yōu)優(yōu)債券期期限結(jié)構(gòu)構(gòu)。模型型證明，，發(fā)行企企業(yè)債券券時(shí)運(yùn)用用提前贖贖回條款款、賣(mài)回回條款、、償債基基金條款款和轉(zhuǎn)換換權(quán)等債債券契約約條款可可以同時(shí)時(shí)達(dá)到降降低發(fā)債債總成本本和延長(zhǎng)長(zhǎng)企業(yè)債債券融資資期限的的目的。。Transactioncostsassociatedwithbondissuescanbereducedbyissuingbondswithlongertermstomaturity.However,thelongerthetermtomaturity,thehighertheagencycostsassociatedwiththeissue.Firmsthatpursuingoptimalbondmaturitystructuremustweightransactionandagencycostsofanewcorporatebondissue.Modelsinthepaperindicatethatfirmscanmakeuseofbondcovenantssuchasthecallprovision,theputprovision,thesinkingfundprovisionandconvertibilitytoincreasethetermtomaturityofabondissueandatthesametimereducetheaggregateoftheagencycostsandtransactioncostsassociatedwithit.Xiao-kunZHOU(周孝坤坤),““企業(yè)債券券期限結(jié)構(gòu)構(gòu)研究―基基于交易成成本和代理理成本視角角”,<生態(tài)經(jīng)濟(jì)濟(jì)>,2007/01,pp.75-77.52公司的債權(quán)權(quán)人交易債權(quán)人人機(jī)構(gòu)貸款人人持有公司發(fā)發(fā)出的付款款證明的人人53Examplesinpp.119-120Example1----ChoiceofShareholder----ProjectLExample2----ChoiceofBondholder----ProjectLExample3----withLeveragedEffect+LimitedLiabilityConcernedforShareholder----ProjectH54Whynot100percentdebt-financedfirms?P.120,Textbook.55MajorSourcesofConflictbetweenBondholdersandStockholdersDividendPaymentClaimDilutionAssetSubstitutionUnderinvestment56BondCovenantsRestrictionsontheFirm’’sProduction/InvestmentPolicyRestrictingthePaymentofDividendsRestrictingSubsequentFinancingPolicyCovenantsSpecifyBondingActivitiesbytheFirmTheRoleoftheTrustIndentureandtheTrustee57RestrictionsontheFirm’’sProduction/InvestmentPolicyRestrictionsonInvestmentsSecuredDebtsRestrictionsonMergers58RestrictingthePaymentofDividendsPp.124-12559RestrictingSubsequentFinancingPolicyLimitationsonDebtandPrioritySinkingFundsConvertibilityProvisions60SinkingFunds償債基金為為確保債債券能干到到期日有足足夠的資金金以償還債債權(quán)人的本本金，發(fā)行行公司于債債券未到期期前預(yù)先按按期提存的的基金。償償債基金通通常是存入入選定的一一家銀行作作為信托管管理人，由由信托管理理人利用這這筆基金進(jìn)進(jìn)行各種投投資，投資資收益則增增加償債基基金。由此此可見(jiàn)，償償債基金相相當(dāng)于一筆筆專(zhuān)用基金金存款。由由于償債基基金不在債債券發(fā)行公公司掌握中中，其性質(zhì)質(zhì)是由受托托人管理的的公司債券券持有人的的資金，但但在實(shí)際償償還本金之之前，并不不抵消債券券發(fā)行公司司的債務(wù)。。債券發(fā)行公公司應(yīng)按券券契約的規(guī)規(guī)定提存償償債，每年年提存償債債基金的終終值應(yīng)等于于債券的本本金。每年年年終應(yīng)根根據(jù)信托管管理人關(guān)于于償債基金金的收支報(bào)報(bào)告，確認(rèn)認(rèn)應(yīng)有投資資收益或投投資損失。。如果償債債基金不足足以清償券券本金，則則就首先從從一般存款款戶補(bǔ)足，，然后作清清償全部公公司債的會(huì)會(huì)計(jì)處理。。公司償債債基金應(yīng)作作為一項(xiàng)長(zhǎng)長(zhǎng)期投資反反映在年末末資產(chǎn)負(fù)債債表上，償償債基金投投資收益或或損失則應(yīng)應(yīng)作為其他他項(xiàng)目列入入當(dāng)年的損損益表。61CovenantsSpecifyBondingActivitiesbytheFirmTheRequiredPurchaseofInsurance62TheRoleoftheTrustIndentureandtheTrusteePp.127-128信托擔(dān)保協(xié)協(xié)議Awrittenagreementbetweentheuserofabondandhis/herbondholders,usuallydecifyinginterestrate,maturitydate,convertibility,andotherterms.Alsocalledindenture.指一張張明確記載載債券持有有人與發(fā)行行公司雙方方所擁有的的權(quán)利和義義務(wù)的法律律文件。由由發(fā)行人和和債券所有有人達(dá)成的的，通常標(biāo)標(biāo)明利率、、期日、兌兌換性和其其他項(xiàng)目的的書(shū)面協(xié)議議，也叫契契約63債權(quán)人的考考量期限回報(bào)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)----違約風(fēng)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)控制利益沖突談判64InternalGovernanceStructureBoardofDirectorsShareholdersVotingRightsFiduciaryDutiesExecutiveCompensationBlock-holders(OutsideShareholders)65Readings(A)OliverE.Williamson,CorporateGovernance,pp.148-155.CliffordW.Smith,Jr.&BossL.Watts,IncentiveandTaxEffectsofExecutiveCompensationPlans,pp.155-162.RobertaRomano,TheShareholderSuit:LitigationWithoutFoundation?JohnC.Coffee,Jr.,Does“Unlawful”Mean“Criminal”?:ReflectionsontheDisappearingTort/CrimeDistinctioninAmericanLaw,pp.172-179.66Reading…MainPointsinEachArticles……67OliverE.WilliamsonWhatisCorporateGovernancefor?WhoaretheBODresponsiblefor?ShareholdersandotherConstituencies?OutsideShareholders’’Role?Managersthemselves?68CliffordW.Smith,Jr.&

BossL.WattsManagementIncentivesandCorporateGovernance:proorcon?69RobertaRomanoDerivativeSuits:SomeObservationswithEmpiricalStudiesPlaintiffs’counselsasshareholders’’agents?70JohnC.Coffee,Jr.TortsandCriminalLaws:Convergence?Benefits/Advantagesv.DisadvantagesWhy?71FiduciaryDutiesWhyFiduciaryDutiesinCorporateLaw?HowaboutnormalContracts?ResidualOwnersandMarginalRisks訂立內(nèi)容詳詳細(xì)的合同同意味著極極高的成本本,信義義義務(wù)成為不不完備合同同的補(bǔ)充規(guī)規(guī)則.72BJRDeferentialApproach(順從路路徑)Incentive-compatibleContracts73DerivativeSuitsWhyanditsRole……74Readings(B)FrankH.Easterbrook&DanielR.Fischel,VotinginCorporateLaw,pp.187-192.JeffreyN.Gordon,TiesthatBond:DualClassCommonStockandtheProblemofShareholderChoice,pp.192-197.JohnPound,ProxyContextsandtheEfficiencyofShareholderOversight,pp.197-206.MarkJ.Roe,APoliticalTheoryofAmericanCorporateFinance,pp.206-209.BernardS.Black,AgentsWatchingAgents:ThePromiseofInstitutionalInvestorVoice,pp.210-213.MichaelC.Jensen,ActiveInvestors,LBOs,andthePrivatizationofBankruptcy,pp.213-214.75FrankH.Easterbrook&DanielR.FischelFrankH.Easterbrook&DanielR.Fischel,VotinginCorporateLaw,pp.187-192.DoyouthinkVotingisakeyroleincorporategovernance?76JeffreyN.GordonJeffreyN.Gordon,TiesthatBond:DualClassCommonStockandtheProblemofShareholderChoice,pp.192-197.WhydoAmericanCorporationsintroduceDualClassCommonStock?Howdoyoucommentonitsrelationshipwithcorporategovernance?77JohnPoundJohnPound,ProxyContextsandtheEfficiencyofShareholderOversight,pp.197-206.WhatisProxyMechanism?Didtheauthorconcludethatproxycontextfacilitatedtheefficiencyofcorporategovernance?78MarkJ.RoeMarkJ.Roe,APoliticalTheoryofAmericanCorporateFinance,pp.206-209.HowwouldyouunderstandtheagencyprobleminAmericancorporategovernance?79BernardS.BlackBernardS.Black,AgentsWatchingAgents:ThePromiseofInstitutionalInvestorVoice,pp.210-213.WhowatchesWhom?80VI.ExternalGovernanceStructure:TheMarketforCorporateControl81CasesParamountCommunications,Inc.v.TimeInc.,571A.2d1140(Del.1990).Revlon,Inc.v.MacAndrews&ForbesHoldings,Inc.,506A.2d173(Del.1986).Moranv.HouseholdInternational.Inc.,500A.2d1346(Del.Ch.1988).UnocalCorp.v.MesaPetroleumCo.,493A.2d1049(Del.1988).CityCapitalAssociatesv.IntercoInc.,551A.2d787(Del.Ch.1988).82AdditionalReadingMaterials…RonaldJ.GilsonandReinierKraakman,Delaware’sIntermediateStandardforDefensiveTactics:IsThereSubstancetoProportionalityReview,44BusinessLawyer247(1989).83VI.ExternalGovernanceStructure:TheMarketforCorporateControl(A)TheoriesandEvidence反接管條例:向底競(jìng)爭(zhēng)爭(zhēng)還是力爭(zhēng)上上游的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)?接管是最大化化了個(gè)人(目目標(biāo)公司股東東)的權(quán)益,它是否同時(shí)時(shí)可以最大化化社會(huì)效益?84代理成本和要要約收購(gòu)并購(gòu)是降低代代理成本的有有效方式?當(dāng)當(dāng)公司的代理理成本過(guò)高時(shí)時(shí),要約收購(gòu)購(gòu)行為給股東東開(kāi)除管理層層的機(jī)會(huì).兼并與敵意要要約收購(gòu):哪哪個(gè)成本更大大?公司管理層應(yīng)應(yīng)當(dāng)聽(tīng)任股東東和相互競(jìng)爭(zhēng)爭(zhēng)的要約收購(gòu)購(gòu)者對(duì)投標(biāo)行行為自由博弈弈?85WilliamsAct任何人持有公公眾公司5%以上的股份份時(shí),必須提提交報(bào)告,披披露其持股比比例和意圖;而且,要約約收購(gòu)者必須須就其財(cái)務(wù)狀狀況和計(jì)劃，，提交更為詳詳細(xì)的報(bào)告,同時(shí),必須須向公眾開(kāi)放放其收購(gòu)要約約一個(gè)月.要約收購(gòu)者在在要約期內(nèi)不不得向市場(chǎng)另另行購(gòu)買(mǎi)股票票,另外,必須以最高高的交割按比比例買(mǎi)超額售售出的股份.86A.TheoriesandEvidenceHenryG.Manne,MergersandtheMarketforCorporateControl,pp.223-224.WhydoesaCorporate-controlmarketneeded?87A.TheoriesandEvidenceMichaelC.Jensen,Takeovers:TheirCausesandConsequences,pp.225-228.FreeCashFlowTheoryTheRoleofDebtinMotivatingOrganizationalEfficiencyLeveragedBuyoutsandFreeCashFlowTheory88A.TheoriesandEvidenceAndreiShleiferandLawrenceH.Summers,BreachofTrustinHostileTakeovers,pp.228-232.Whatdidtheauthorsdemonstrateinthearticleviathreeexamples?Anexusoflong-termcontractsbetweenshareholdersandstakeholders89A.TheoriesandEvidenceYakovAmihudandBaruchLev,RiskReductionasaManagerialMotiveforConglomerateMergers,pp.232-233.Whatdrivesasubstantialnumberoffirmstoengageinconglomeratemergers?90A.TheoriesandEvidenceRichardRoll,TheHubrisHypothesisofCorporateTakeovers,pp.233-235.91A.TheoriesandEvidenceMichaelC.JensenandRichardS.Ruback,TheMarketforCorporateControl:TheScientificEvidence,pp.235-242.92A.TheoriesandEvidenceGreggA.Jarrell,JamesA.BrickleyandJeffryM.Netter,TheMarketforCorporateControl:TheEmpiricalEvidenceSince1980,pp.242-245.93A.TheoriesandEvidenceSanjaiBhagat,AndreiShleiferandRobertW.Vishny,HostileTakeoversinthe1980s:TheReturntoCorporateSpecialization,pp.245-248.94州法:反接接管條例第一代反接管管條例:對(duì)對(duì)本州公司,州官員有出出價(jià)否決權(quán)第二代反接管管條例:只適適用于本州公公司,“控控股條例”或或者“公平平價(jià)格條例””第三代接管條條例:“企企業(yè)聯(lián)合條例例”大約有40個(gè)個(gè)州制定有不不同的接管條條例95VI.ExternalGovernanceStructure:TheMarketforCorporateControl(B)TheProperRoleofaTarget’’sManagementinRespondingtoaTenderOffer,pp.258-261.969798GoodLuck!!!ding0118@999、靜靜夜夜四四無(wú)無(wú)鄰鄰，，荒荒居居舊舊業(yè)業(yè)貧貧。。。。12月月-2212月月-22Sunday,December25,202210、雨雨中中黃黃葉葉樹(shù)樹(shù)，，燈燈下下白白頭頭人人。。。。01:36:5801:36:5801:3612/25/20221:36:58AM11、以我我獨(dú)沈沈久，，愧君君相見(jiàn)見(jiàn)頻。。。12月月-2201:36:5801:36Dec-2225-Dec-2212、故人人江海海別，，幾度度隔山山川。。。01:36:5801:36:5801:36Sunday,December25,202213、乍見(jiàn)翻翻疑夢(mèng)，，相悲各各問(wèn)年。。。12月-2212月-2201:36:5801:36:58December25,202214、他鄉(xiāng)生生白發(fā)，，舊國(guó)見(jiàn)見(jiàn)青山。。。25十十二月20221:36:58上午午01:36:5812月-2215、比不了了得就不不比，得得不到的的就不要要。。。。十二月221:36上午午12月-2201:36December25,202216、行動(dòng)出出成果，，工作出出財(cái)富。。。2022/12/251:36:5801:36:5825December202217、做