營業(yè)稅改征增值稅外文文獻

-z.本科畢業(yè)論文外文文獻及譯文文獻、資料題目：paringtheValue-AddedTa*totheRetailSalesTa*文獻、資料來源：JournalofPublicEconomics文獻、資料發(fā)表〔出版〕日期：2011.4院〔部〕：商學院專業(yè)：會計學班級：會計092姓名：苑苑學號：2009091213指導教師：園園翻譯日期：-z.外文文獻：paringtheValue-AddedTa*totheRetailSalesTa*ForRichardF.Dye,ThereseJ.McGuireJournalofPublicEconomicsApril2011OverviewofVATMorethan130countriesuseVATasakeysourceofgovernmentrevenue.VATisageneral,broad-basedconsumptionta*assessedonthevalueaddedtogoodsandservices.VATisgenerallyleviedonvalueaddedateverystageofproduction,withamechanismallowingthesellersacreditfortheta*theyhavepaidontheirownpurchasesofgoodsandservices(inputta*)againsttheta*escollectedontheirsalesofgoodsandservice(outputta*).Generally,VATis:Ageneralta*thatappliestoallmercialactivitiesinvolvingtheproductionanddistributionofgoodsandtheprovisionofservices;Aconsumptionta*ultimatelybornebytheconsumer;Anindirectta*leviedontheconsumeraspartofthepriceofgoodsorservices;Amultistageta*visibleateachstageoftheproductionanddistributionchain;andAfractionallycollectedta*thatusesasystemofpartialpaymentswherebyasellerchargesVATonallofitssaleswithacorrespondingclaimofcreditforVATthatithasbeenchargedonallofitspurchases.TherearethreemethodsofcalculatingVATliability:thecredit-invoicemethod,thesubtractionmethod,andtheadditionmethod.Thiscolumndealswithonlythecredit-invoicemethod,whichisthemostwidelyused.Thecredit-invoicemethodhighlightstheVATdefiningfeature:theuseofoutputta*(ta*collectedonsales)andinputta*(ta*paidonpurchases).Ata*payergenerallyputesitsVATliabilityasthedifferencebetweentheVATchargedonta*ablesalesandtheVATpaidonta*ablepurchases.ThismethodrequirestheuseofaninvoicethatseparatelyliststheVATponentofallta*ablesales.Thesalesinvoiceforthesellerbeesthepurchaseinvoiceofthebuyer.Thesalesinvoiceshowstheoutputta*collectedandthepurchaseinvoiceshowstheinputta*paid.Tosummarize,ta*payersusethecredit-invoicemethodtocalculatetheamountofVATtoberemittedtotheta*ingauthoritiesinthefollowingmanner:AggregatetheVATshowninthesalesinvoices(outputta*);AggregatetheVATshowninthepurchaseinvoices(inputta*);Subtracttheinputta*fromtheoutputta*andremitanybalancetothegovernment;andIntheeventtheinputta*isgreaterthantheoutputta*.TheUnitedStatesistheonlymemberoftheOrganizationofEconomicCooperationandDevelopmentthatdoesnotlevyaVATonanationallevel;however,VAThasbeewidelyrecognizedasanimportantoptioninfederalta*reformdebates.Indirectta*essuchasvalueaddedta*es(VAT)generateasubstantialpartofta*revenueinmanycountries.Infact,VATsystemsgenerateaquarteroftheworld’sta*revenue.Nearly130countriesnowhaveaVATsystem(withover70countrieshavingadoptedthesystemduringthelast10years)(KeenandMintz2004).Morefocusoninternationallymobileta*baseshasdrawnattentiontodirectingmoreoftheta*burdentoindirectta*essuchasconsumptionta*esorVATsystems,andlesstoineta*es,especiallycapitaline(GordonandNielsen1997).DuringtheharmonizationofEUta*es,indirectta*es,andVATsystemsreceivedmuchattention(Fehretal.1995).AgeneralVATlawcoveringallprivategoodsandservicescharacterizesthecurrentEUsystem,buttherearestillmanye*emptionsfromthisgeneralinstruction.SuchaVATsystemalsoe*istsinNorwayasaconsequenceoftheNorwegianVATreformin2001.ThereformintroducedageneralVATlawonservices,butmanye*emptionsarestillspeci?ed.ThereareseveralargumentsinfavorofageneralanduniformVATsystem,paredwithimperfect,nonuniform(andnongeneral)systems.Suchasystemmayimproveeconomicef?ciencyandreduceadministrationcosts,rent-seekingandfraudactivitiesbyindustriesthatlobbyforlowerratesandzeroratings(KeenandSmith2006).AgeneralanduniformVATsystemequalsauniformconsumerta*onallgoodsandservices.Suchasystemalsoimpliesthattheproducers’netVATrateonmaterialinputsequalszero,irrespectiveoftheratestructure.Thisisoptimalaccordingtotheproductionef?ciencytheorem(DiamondandMirrlees1971a,1971b).AVATsystemwithe*emptionsviolatestheproductionef?ciencytheorembecauseta*ationofintermediateswilldifferbetweenindustries.Ontheotherhand,industriesthatarecoveredbytheVATsystembuthavelowerratesorzeroratingsontheirsalesarefavoredbecausetheycanwithdrawe*penditurestoVATonintermediatesatfullratesandonlylevyreducedorzeroratesontheirsales.AgeneralanduniformVATsystemmayalsohavepositiveeffectsonthedistributionofwelfareamonghouseholds.IftheinitialsituationischaracterizedbyaVATonmostgoodsbutonlyonafewservices,theintroductionofauniformrateonallgoodsandservicesmayimprovethedistributionofwelfarebecauseservices’shareofconsumptionincreaseswithine.Keen(2007)pointstothelackofinterestinvalueaddedta*ationfromthetheoreticalsecond-bestliteratureinspiteoftheVAT’spopularityinpracticalta*policy.Asmentionedabove,VATsystemsareingeneralnotuniform.Theoreticalanalysesdemandrelativelysimplemodelsandsimpleta*structurestobeanalyticallytractable.Inpracticalpolicies,thestructuresoftheeconomyandtheta*systemsarequiteple*,andthereisaneedfordetailednumericalmodelsinordertoanalyzetheeffectsofdifferentVATsystems.Thispapercontributestotheliteraturebyanalyzingthewelfareeffectsofanimperfecte*tensionofanonuniformVATsystem,andparingdifferentimperfect,nonuniformVATsystemswithauniformandgeneralVATsystemwithinanempiricallybaseddynamicputablegeneralequilibrium(CGE)modelforasmallopeneconomy.Thismodelmirrorsarealeconomy,Norway,anddiffersinmanyrespectsfromthemoresimpletheoreticalmodelsthatful?lltheassumptionsofnormativeta*theoryandremenduniformmodityta*es,binedwithnoinputta*ation.Inouranalyses,weaskthefollowingquestions.CantheintroductionofanonuniformVATsystemincludingonlysomeservicesmaketheeconomyworseoffthanhavingaVATsystemonlycoveringgoodsandinthatcase,why?SuchreformscharacterizeboththeNorwegianVATreformof2001andtheEUVATreformfromthelate1990-ties.Willanadditionale*tensiontoauniformandgeneralVATsystembewelfaresuperiortothenonuniform(andnongeneral)VATsystemsandwhatareimportantpreconditions?Aswillbee*plainedbelow,onecannotonpurelytheoreticalgroundsestablishthewelfarerankingsofsuchVATsystemswhentherearepree*istingdistortionsasta*wedgesandmarketpowerintheeconomy.ThebaselineVATsystemisanonuniformVATsystemmainlycoveringgoods.ThisbaselineVATsystemisthenparedwith(1)thee*tendednonuniformNorwegianVATreformof2001,and(2)ageneralVATsystemcharacterizedbyauniformVATrateonallgoodsandservices,includingpublicgoodsandservices.TheNorwegianVATreformof2001wasastepinthedirectionofageneralVATsystembyincludingmanyservices,buttherearestillmanye*emptions,zeroratingsandlowerrates.Inparticular,theVATrateonfoodandnonalcoholicbeveragesishalfthegeneralVATrate.Thepolicyreformsaremadepublicrevenueneutral,andchangesinlumpsumtransfersaswellasinthesystemspeci?cVATratearestudied.Witharevenue-neutralchangeinthesystem-speci?cVATrate,theVATsystemscanberankedwithrespecttowelfareeffects.Ballardetal.(1987)andGottfriedandWiegard(1991)analyzethewelfareeffectsofdifferentVATsystemsincludingta*e*emptionsandzeroratingsinstaticCGEmodels.TheseparabilityandhomogeneityassumptionsintheirconsumerdemandmodelsfavorauniformVATsystem,whichissupportedintheirpolicysimulations.Incontrast,ourmodelisanintertemporalCGEmodelforasmallopeneconomywithoutstricthomogeneityassumptionsinconsumerdemand.OurmodeliswelldesignedforanalyzingVATreformsbecauseitdistinguishesbetweenmanyindustries,inputfactorsandconsumergoodsandservices.Themodelingandparametersintheconsumerdemandsystemandtheproductiontechnologyarealltheresultsofprehensivemicro-andmacroeconometricanalysesofNorwegiandata.ThemodelhasadetaileddescriptionoftheNorwegiansystemofdirectandindirectta*es.Speci?cally,netVATratesontheinputfactorsandgrossVATratesontheconsumergoodsandservicesareincludedinthemodel.Wedisregardtheeffectsoncostsofadministration,rent-seekinganddistributionofwelfareamonghouseholds.Themodelemphasizesthesmallopeneconomycharacteristicsbyusinggivenworldmarketpricesandinterestrates.Imperfectpetitionispresentinthedomesticmarkets.AuniformandgeneralVATsystemisnotapriorithemostef?cientinourmodel.WhenparingthetwodifferentnonuniformVATsystems,ouranalysisshowsthatanimperfecte*tensionoftheVATsystemtocovermoreservicesiswelfareinferiortothebaselinenonuniformVATsystemonlycoveringgoods.Obtainingef?ciencyinproductionisempiricallyimportantforthewelfareeffectsofthedifferentVATsystems.Animperfecte*tensionoftheVATsystemreducesef?ciencyinproductionbecauseintermediateswillbeta*eddifferentlyfordifferentindustries.Consumeref?ciencyisalsoreducedduetolowerVAToninelasticgoodsandhigherVATonelasticservices.IntroducingageneralanduniformVATsystemisnotobviouslywelfaresuperiorinadistortedeconomy,butwe?ndthatsuchasystemimproveswelfareparedtotheotherimperfectregimes.Asigni?cantempiricaladvantageofthegeneralanduniformsystem,whichisrevealedbytheputations,isalsoitsabilitytoreduceinitialwedgesindeliveriestothee*portanddomesticmarkets.GeneralVATputationToseeVATinaction,considerE*hibit1onp.612,whichprovidesasimpleillustrationofhowVATisimplementedintheproductionofbread.Afarmergrowsandsellswheattoamiller,whogrindsthewheatintoflour.Themillersellstheflour2toabaker,whomakesthedoughandbakesthebread.Thebreadisthensoldtothegrocer,whosellsthebreadtothefinalconsumer.Ineachstageofbreadproduction,valueisaddedbytheseller,andVATisleviedonthatamount.ToensurethatVATisleviedonlyonthevalueaddedbytheproducer,VATusesthecredit-invoicemechanism.Thus,onsellingthebreadtothegrocer,thebakercollects$30inVATandclaimsaninputcreditof$15,theVATpaidwhenthebakerpurchasedflourfromthemiller.ThebakerendsupremittinganetVATliabilityof$15totheta*authorities.ThetotalrevenuecreatedbyVATisthesumofVATliabilitycollectedineachstageofbreadproduction,inthiscase$50.AlthoughVATisabroad-basedgeneralconsumptionta*(i.e.,itappliestoallfinalconsumption),thereareinstanceswhentheapplicationofVATisavoided.Fore*ample,inapureVATstate,theta*basewouldtheoreticallyincludeservicesrenderedbythegovernment,isolatedsalesofone'spersonaleffects,andsalesofpersonalservices;however,nonationemploysaVATwiththista*baseforadministrative,political,orsocialreasons(SchenkandOldmanat46).Thus,VATprovidese*emptionsorapplieszerota*ratingtocertaintransactions."E*emption"meansthatthetraderdoesnotcollectVATonitssalesanddoesnotreceivecreditsforVATpaidonitspurchasesofinputs."Zerorating"meansthatatraderisliableforanactualrateofVAT,whichhappenstobezero,andreceivescreditforinputVATpaid.Liketransactions,potentialta*payerscanbee*emptorzerorated.Ane*empttraderisnotpartoftheVATsystemandisinsteadtreatedasafinalpurchaser.Azero-ratedbusinessdoesnotcollectVATonsalesbutispensatedforanyinputVATitpays.However,ifthee*emptionoccursatthelaststageofproduction,thereisacorrespondingdecreaseinVATrevenuebecausethereisnoshiftingandincreaseofta*burden;thevalueaddedatthefinalstagesimplyescapesfromVAT.AsshowninE*hibit3,e*emptingthegrocerfromVATmeansthegrocerwouldnotcollectVATandwouldnotbeabletoclaimcreditfortheta*itpaidonitspurchase.Thee*emptionatthelaststagemeansthatthegrocerwouldbeethefinalconsumerofthebread.Asafinalconsumer,thegrocerwouldpaytheVATaspartofthepurchaseprice.Noshiftingandincreaseofta*burdenwouldoccurbecausethegrocerwouldnotbeabletopassontheta*itpaidfromitsinput.Ane*emptionoccurringatthelaststageofproductionmeansthatthechainofinputcreditswouldceaseatthestagepriortothelaststage.Anyvalueaddedafterthebaker'sstagewouldsimplyescapetheVAT,resultinginadecreaseingovernmentrevenueduetothee*emption.OverviewofRetailSalesandUseTa*BeforeconsideringsomeofthesimilaritiesanddifferencesbetweenVATandtheretailsalesta*(RST),thiscolumnne*tconsidersatypicalretailsalesta*system.Theretailsalesanduseta*imposedbyU.S.statesisgenerallyleviedonallretailsalesoftangiblepersonalpropertythatarenote*plicitlye*empted.Forservices,onlythosee*plicitlyenumeratedareta*able(Warren,GorhamandLamont1998)).Theta*isgenerallystatedonthesalesreceiptandiscollectedfromtheconsumeratthepointofsale.Theretailerisresponsibleforremittingtheta*collectedtotheta*authorities.In3theory,retailsalesta*isasingle-stageta*imposedontheultimateconsumer,whichmeansthattheta*shouldapplyonlytofinalsalesforpersonaluseandconsumption.Accordingly,intermediatetransactionsintheeconomicprocessaree*cludedfromthescopeofthesalesta*.Usingthesamebreadproductione*ampleabove,salesta*wouldbeimposedonlyonthefinalstageofproductionasthegrocerissellingthebreadtotheultimateconsumer.However,undertheU.S.salesta*system,thegeneralsalesta*isnotconfinedtotransferstoultimateconsumersoffinalproductsmanufacturedintheeconomicprocess.Fore*ample,absentane*emption,salesta*isimposedonthebaker'spurchasesofsuppliesforthetrucksitusestodeliverthebreadtothegrocer.Thereasonbehindtheta*ationisthatthetrucksuppliesdonotformpartofthebreadandthebakerisconsideredtheultimateconsumerofthesupplies.However,toachievesomesemblanceofabalancedretailsalesta*,manystates'salesta*ese*cludeore*emptmanyintermediatetransactions.The1994Ta*SharingReformThefiscalreformof1994wasafairlyprehensivepackageofmeasuresdesignedtoaddressthreeareasofconcern:tostemthefiscaldeclineandprovideadequaterevenuesforgovernment,especiallycentralgovernment;eliminatethedistortionaryelementsoftheta*structureandincreaseitstransparency;andrevampcentral-localrevenuesharingarrangements.Amongitskeyprovisionswasamajorreforminindirectta*esthate*tendedthevalue-addedta*(VAT)toallturnover,eliminatingtheproductta*andreplacingthebusinessta*inmanyservices.Itsimplifiedtheta*structureandunifiedtreatmentofta*payersforsometa*es.ThecenterpieceofthepackagewasintroductionoftheTa*SharingSystem(fenshuizhi),whichfundamentallychangedthewayrevenuesaresharedbetweenthecentralandprovincialgovernments.UndertheTa*SharingSystem(TSS),ta*eswerereassignedbetweenthecentralandlocalgovernments.Centralta*es(or"centralfi*edines")includecustomsduties,theconsumptionta*,VATrevenuescollectedbycustoms,ineta*esfromcentralenterprises,banksandnonbankfinancialintermediaries;theremittedprofits,ineta*es,businessta*es,andurbanconstructionandmaintenanceta*esoftherailroad,bankheadquartersandinsurancepanies;andresourceta*esonoffshoreoile*traction.Localta*es(or"localfi*edines")consistofbusinessta*es(e*cludingthosenamedaboveascentralfi*edines),ineta*esandprofitremittancesoflocalenterprises,urbanlanduseta*es,personalineta*es,thefi*edassetinvestmentorientationta*,urbanconstructionandmaintenanceta*,realestateta*es,vehicleutilizationta*,thestampta*,animalslaughterta*,agriculturalta*es,titleta*,capitalgainsta*onland,statelandsalesrevenues,resourceta*esderivedfromland-basedresources,andthesecuritiestradingta*.OnlytheVATisshared,atthefi*edrateof75percentforthecentralgovernment,and25percentforlocalgovernments.Thesecondimportantchangeunderthe1994reformwasthattoavoidtheproblemofpoorlocaleffortincollectingcentralgovernmentta*es,ta*administrationwasalsoreformed,withtheestablishmentofanationalta*system(NTS)tocollectcentralgovernmentrevenues,andalocalta*systemtocollectlocalta*es.Thiswasachievedbysplittingthee*istingta*bureausintonationalandlocalta*offices.ThemainresponsibilityoftheNTSisthecollectionofVATandconsumptionta*--theycollectallofbothta*esandthentransfer25percentoftheVATrevenuetothelocalgovernment.Inmostlocalitiesthesplitwasachievedbyreassigningstaffaccordingtotheircurrentfunctions:thoseinchargeofturnoverta*eswereassignedtotheNTS,andthoseassignedtolocalta*eswenttothelocalta*bureaus.ChinawillnotoveretheregionaldisparitiesinservicedeliverywithoutfurtherrevisionofTSS.The1994reformsdidtoolittletoredistributeresourcesacrossprovinces,andthissituationwilllikelypersistforalongtimeunlesstherulesarechanged.Toreducehorizontaldisparitiesmorequickly,thecentralgovernmentmustbeabletouseanincreasingshareoftheta*refundsforequalizationinordertofinanceimprovementsinservicedeliveryinpoorerprovinces.中文譯文：比擬增值稅與零售稅理查德費冉，泰蕾茲德麥圭爾公共經(jīng)濟學雜志2011年4月

增值稅概述作為政府收入的主要來源的增值稅正在被130多個國家所使用。增值稅是一個普遍的，根底廣泛的消費稅，增加商品和效勞的價值評估上。增值稅是在生產(chǎn)的每一個階段普遍征收的附加值，一個讓賣方為他們對自己購置的商品和效勞〔進項稅額〕支付其銷售的商品和效勞上收集到的稅種的稅收信貸機制〔銷項稅額〕。一般而言，增值稅有以下幾層含義：一個普通稅適用于所有涉及生產(chǎn)和銷售商品和提供效勞的商業(yè)活動；消費稅最終由消費者承當；是間接征收消費的商品或效勞價格的一局部；在每個階段的生產(chǎn)和分配階段間接稅可見多級稅收征收消費的商品或效勞價格；一個小幅收稅款，已被控在其所有的采購系統(tǒng)，它采用的是由賣方收取了相應的信貸索賠其所有銷售的增值稅或增值稅的局部付款。

增值稅納稅義務的計算方法有三種：信貸發(fā)票的方法—加減法，和另外的兩種方法。只有信用發(fā)票的方法是相對使用廣泛的，這種方法涉及此列。信貸發(fā)票的方法，突出了增值稅的定義功能：使用銷項稅〔收集銷售稅〕和進項稅〔采購繳納的稅款〕。一般納稅人收取的增值稅應稅銷售額和應稅采購所支付的增值稅之間的差額作為計算其增值稅納稅義務。這種方法需要使用發(fā)票，分別列出了所有應稅銷售額的增值稅局部。銷售發(fā)票的賣方成為買方的購貨發(fā)票。銷售發(fā)票顯示，收取的銷項稅額和購貨發(fā)票顯示支付的進項稅額?？傊?，納稅人使用發(fā)票抵免的計算方法以以下方式匯到稅務機關的增值稅額如下：骨料的銷售發(fā)票中的增值稅〔銷項稅額〕；聚合在購貨發(fā)票所示的增值稅〔進項稅額〕；減去進項稅額從銷項稅額和任何余額匯給政府；在事件的進項稅大于銷項稅一般需退款。美國是唯一的不征收增值稅國家層次上的經(jīng)濟合作與開展組織的成員，然而，增值稅已經(jīng)成為廣泛認可的聯(lián)邦稅收改革的辯論中的重要選項。一般增值稅計算分析正在實施的增值稅，它提供了一個簡單的例子說明如何在面包生產(chǎn)實施增值稅。此例為：一個農(nóng)民的增長和銷售小麥到米勒，研磨成面粉的小麥。米勒銷售的面粉，面包師，使面團和烤面包。面包，然后出售給雜貨店，賣面包給最終消費者。在面包生產(chǎn)的每個階段，由賣方增加值，增值稅征收的數(shù)額。為了確保增值稅，僅在由生產(chǎn)者增加的價值征收，增值稅使用發(fā)票信貸機制。因此，賣面包的雜貨店，面包店收集增值稅30元，并聲稱輸入信用15元，支付的增值稅

時，貝克購置面粉。貝克完畢了減免增值稅凈額15美元到稅務機關的責任。由增值稅創(chuàng)立的總收入的是面包生產(chǎn)的每個階段，在這種情況下為50美元，為收集增值稅納稅義務的總和。雖然增值稅是一個根底廣泛的一般消費稅〔即，它適用于所有的最終消費〕，也有增值稅的應用程序時防止實例。還有，純增值稅狀態(tài)，例如，稅基將理論上包括由政府提供的效勞，一個人的個人影響的銷售，及個人效勞業(yè)的銷售；然而，沒有一個國家采用這個基地增值稅，或社會經(jīng)濟的其他原因。因此，增值稅提供豁免或*些交易適用零稅率等級?！盎砻猕暿侵附灰渍卟⒉皇占P于其銷售的增值稅，并沒有收到用于支付其購置的投入增值稅的學分?！傲愣惵狮暿侵附灰渍叱挟?shù)脑鲋刀?，這恰好是零的實際利率，并接收輸入繳納的增值稅信貸。交易一樣，潛在的納稅人可以免稅或零稅率。不獲豁免交易商的增值稅制度的一局部，而不是作為最終買方承當。一個零稅率的企業(yè)不收取銷售的增值稅，但為它支付任何進項稅額補償。然而，如果在生產(chǎn)的最后階段出現(xiàn)的豁免，增值稅收入就會相應減少，因為沒有轉移和增加稅收相應的負擔;在最后階段的增加價值，只能夠從增值稅中逃脫?；砻庠鲋刀惖碾s貨店不征收增值稅，將無法要求支付其購置的稅收信貸。在最后階段的豁免意味著雜貨商將成為面包的最終消費者。作為最終消費者，雜貨店將支付的增值稅作為購置價格的一局部。沒有轉移和增加稅收負擔會發(fā)生，因為雜貨商將無法通過稅收從輸入支付。在生產(chǎn)的最后階段發(fā)生的豁免是指輸入學分鏈將停頓在舞臺前的最后階段。貝克的舞臺后添加任何價值，只會逃避的增值稅，有些豁免也可能是由于政府收入減少造成的。間接稅如價外稅〔增值稅〕是占許多國家產(chǎn)生的很大一局部的稅種。在實踐中，增值稅系統(tǒng)的特點往往是免稅的，降低利率的。一個不均勻增值稅系統(tǒng)可能會產(chǎn)生效率損失和鼓勵尋租和騙稅活動。而且它還具有較高的行政本錢。我們使用經(jīng)歷為根底的可計算一般均衡模型為計算模型，開放的經(jīng)濟體，比方挪威，對直接稅和間接稅的進展了詳細的描述。比擬三個增值稅系統(tǒng)，兩個不同的的實施者和不均勻增值稅系統(tǒng)由前任和現(xiàn)任挪威增值稅制度為例，一般及統(tǒng)一的增值稅制度。我們的分析說明，擴大增值稅制度不完善的地方，覆蓋更多的，但并非所有的效勞是福利下的基線不均勻增值稅制度只涵蓋貨物。然而，通用和統(tǒng)一的覆蓋所有的商品和效勞的增值稅制度是福利優(yōu)越的增值稅制度不完善。存在許多贊成的一般及統(tǒng)一的增值稅制度，不完善的，不均勻的實施者系統(tǒng)的幾個參數(shù)。這樣的系統(tǒng)可以提高經(jīng)濟效率和降低行政本錢，尋租和欺詐活動大廳較低的利率和零評級〔Keen和2006年史密斯〕行業(yè)。一般的和統(tǒng)一的增值稅制度等于所有商品和效勞的一個統(tǒng)一的消費稅。這樣的系統(tǒng)也意味著，生產(chǎn)者的凈物質(zhì)投入的增值稅稅率為零，不管稅率構造。這是最正確的生產(chǎn)效率定理〔鉆石和米爾利斯〕?；砻庠鲋刀愊到y(tǒng)違反了生產(chǎn)效率定理，因為稅務中間體產(chǎn)業(yè)之間的不同。另一方面，行業(yè)所涵蓋的增值稅制度，但有較低的稅率或零稅率，以及他們的銷售的青睞，因為他們可以撤回支出利率中間體的增值稅，只征收減少或零利率對他們的銷售。一般的和統(tǒng)一的增值稅制度也可能有正面影響戶之間的福利分配。如果初始形勢的特點是大局部商品的增值稅，但僅限于一些效勞的所有商品和效勞的統(tǒng)一稅率可能會提高引進的福利分配，因為效勞消費隨收入的份額變化了。熱衷缺乏價值利益點〔2007年〕從理論的角度出發(fā)討論了這一觀點，盡管在實際的稅收政策以及增值稅的普及增加了稅收。正如上面所提到的，增值稅系統(tǒng)一般不統(tǒng)一。理論分析要求相對簡單的模型和簡單的稅制構造分析的實際政策，經(jīng)濟和稅收制度的構造是非常復雜的，需要有一個詳細的數(shù)值模型，以分析不同增值稅的影響系統(tǒng)。本文有助于擴大的不均勻增值稅系統(tǒng)不完善的福利效應，通過分析和比擬不同的不完善，不均勻增值稅系統(tǒng)的一個統(tǒng)一的以增值稅體系的經(jīng)歷為根底的動態(tài)可計算一般均衡模型〔CGE〕的小型開放經(jīng)濟。該模型反映了實體經(jīng)濟，挪威，并在許多方面有所不同，從更簡單的理論模型，滿足規(guī)稅收理論的假設，并建議統(tǒng)一的商品稅，