國際事務(wù)研究院-概念化歐盟外交政策的多角色特征（英）-2021.10-35正式版

JOINTResearchPapersNo.2October2021ConceptualisingtheMulti-ActorCharacterofEU(rope)’sForeignPolicyPernilleRiekerandMathildeTomineEriksdatterGiskeThisprojecthasreceivedfundingfromtheEuropeanUnion’sHorizon2020researchandinnovationprogrammeundergrantagreementN.959143.Thispublicationre?ectsonlytheviewoftheauthor(s)andtheEuropeanCommissionisnotresponsibleforanyusethatmaybemadeoftheinformationitcontains.ConceptualisingtheMulti-ActorCharacterofEU(rope)’sForeignPolicyPernilleRiekerandMathildeTomineEriksdatterGiske*AbstractWhilethereexistsaplethoraoftheoriesaimingtomakesenseoftheEuropeanUnionanditsforeignpolicy,nosingleexistingtheoryhasyetmanagedtocapturethemulti-actornessofwhatcanbereferredtoas“thebroaderareaofEUandEuropeanforeignandsecuritypolicy”.Aconceptualframeworkbuildingonthecurrentliteratureofdifferentiatedintegration,whichhasbecomeapermanentfeatureofEuropeanintegration,may?llthatgap.BasedonaholisticapproachtoEUforeignandsecuritypolicy,lookingatbothformalandinformalprocesses,suchaframeworkexplainsthemulti-actorcharacteroftheEU,whileintroducing?veroles–leaders,followers,laggards,disruptorsorleavers–thatactorscanplayintheintegrationprocess,eithertobringitforwardorhaltit.*PernielleRiekerisResearchProfessorattheNorwegianInstituteofInternationalAffairs(NUPI).MathildeTomineEriksdatterGiskeworksasJuniorResearchFellowintheResearchGrouponSecurityandDefenceatNUPI.JOINTResearchPapersNo.22IntroductionSincetheTreatyofMaastricht(1993),foreignandsecuritypolicyhasbeenaformalpartoftheEuropeanUnion(EU).TheEU’sinvolvementinforeignandsecuritypolicy,conventionallythebusinessofsovereignstates,hascontinuedtoconfoundscholarsofEuropeanintegration,inparticularsupportersoftraditionaltheoriesofinternationalrelations.1

CentraltothedebateoftheEUasaforeignpolicyactorishowEUforeignpolicyrelatestotheforeignpoliciesofitsmemberstates.TheattimestenserelationshipbetweenthevariousmemberstatesandbetweenmemberstatesandEUinstitutionshasmadetheUnionunabletoforgecommonpointsofviewonquestionsregardingforeignpolicyandsecurityinaworldcontinuallyrackedbycrises.2

Additionally,thelinesbetweeninternalandexternalsecurityintheEUhavebecomeincreasinglyblurred,astheUnionincreasinglystressestheneedforamorejoined-upapproachwhereexternalandinternalpoliciesarereconciled.3Thispaperseekstounpackandconceptualisethemulti-actorcharacteroftheEuropeanUnionForeignandSecurityPolicy(EUFSP),abroadconceptencompassingallexternaldimensionsofpolicies(includinginternalpolicies)andextendingtoactionstakenbymemberstatesoutsidetheformalproceduresoftheCommonForeignandSecurityPolicy(CFSP)andtheCommonSecurityandDefencePolicy(CSDP).Itidenti?esagapintheliteratureandarguesthatexistingtheories–eithertheonesthatseetheEUasnothingmorethanthesumofitsparts(thevariousrealistapproaches)ortheonesthatseetheEUassomethingmore(liberalintergovernmentalists,neo-functionalistsandconstructivists)–havebeenunabletocapturethemulti-actornessthathasbecomeapermanentfeatureofthebroaderareaofEUandEuropeanforeignandsecuritypolicy.1HylkeDijkstraandSophieVanhoonacker-Kormoss,“TheCommonForeignandSecurityPolicy”,inOxfordResearchEncyclopediaofPolitics,25January2017,/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.155.2AlexanderReichwein,“RealismandEuropeanForeignPolicy:PromisesandShortcomings”,inKnudE.J?rgensenetal.(eds),TheSAGEHandbookofEuropeanForeignPolicy,London,Sage,2015,p.99-120.3ThisapproachisexploredindetailbyKristinaKausch’spaper“CollateralDamage:HowEUInternalPoliciesAffectCon?ictAbroad”(forthcoming).3

-ConceptualisingtheMulti-ActorCharacterofEU(rope)’sForeignPolicyInthispaper,weproposeaframeworkthattakesaholisticapproachtoEUforeignandsecuritypolicy.Theframeworkisusedanalytically,withoutanynormativeconnotations,asithelpsusbetterunderstandtheactualfunctioningofEU(ropean)foreignpolicy.Whileitbuildsoninstitutionalapproaches,suchasthemulti-levelgovernance(MLG)literatureandtheliteratureofdifferentiatedintegration(DI),ourframeworkaddsanewdimensionbyapplyingabroadde?nitionofEuropeanforeignandsecuritypolicy.Asmentionedabove,thisencompassesactionsindifferentpolicyareas,attimescarriedoutbyactorsandinstitutionsatdifferentlevels.ItalsoincludesprocessesinitiatedbymemberstatesoutsideoftheUnion’straditionalframework,butstillcloselylinkedtoit,aswellasareaswhicharetraditionallyorformallynotpartoftheEUFSP.Finally,theframeworkalsounderlinestheroleofagency,conceptualising?verolesthatthevariousactorstakeinanintegrationprocess,eithertohelpintegrationforwardortohaltit–thatasleaders,followers,laggards,disruptors,orleavers.Weconcludethatsuchaframeworkismoresuitabletocapturethedynamicsoftoday’sincreasinglycomplexEuropeanintegrationprocess,characterisedbyopt-outsandopt-ins,formalandinformalprocesses,enhancedcooperationandvariousformsofgovernanceledbyactorsatdifferentlevels.41.ThelimitsofmainstreamtheoriesThemainstreamtheoriesofEuropeanintegrationandInternationalRelations(IR)havedeeplyinformedtheacademicdebatesurroundingtheEUforeignandsecuritypolicy.5Sofar,however,noexistingtheoryhasbeenabletofullycapturethemulti-actornessofthis?eld.WecandistinguishbetweenapproachesthatseeEUforeignandsecuritypolicyasnothingmorethanthesumofitspartsandaseriesofapproachesthatarguethatEUforeignandsecuritypolicyismorethanthat.Intheformergroupwemostly?ndthinkersfromrealistschoolsofthought,whereasinthelattergroupwe?ndliberal,neo-functionalistandconstructivisttheorists,as4ThispartofthepaperbuildsonPernilleRieker,“DifferentiatedIntegrationandEurope’sGlobalRole:AConceptualFramework”,inEuropeanForeignAffairsReview,Vol.26,SpecialIssue(August2021),p.1-14.5MaciejWilgaandIreneuszPawe?Karolewski,NewApproachestoEUForeignPolicy,London/NewYork,Routledge,2014.4

-ConceptualisingtheMulti-ActorCharacterofEU(rope)’sForeignPolicywellasproponentsofapproachesthatputemphasisonthefunctioningoftheEUasamulti-levelordifferentiatedforeignpolicyactororsystem.InthissectionwepresentanoverviewofwhatthedifferenttheoreticalapproacheshavecontributedtoEuropeanintegrationstudiesinthe?eldofforeignandsecuritypolicy.Asthisoverviewsuggests,mostofthetraditionaltheoriesofEuropeanintegrationtendtofocusonwhyintegrationtakesplacebuthavelesstosayabouthowtheEUanditsdifferentpolicy?eldsfunction.Tocompensateforthis,wefollowupbyarguingthatapproachesfocusedontheprocessofEuropeandifferentiatedintegrationaremoreusefultoinvestigateEUforeignandsecuritypolicy.1.1EUforeignandsecuritypolicyasthesumofitspartsTraditionally,ithasbeendif?culttocombinerealismwithEuropeanintegrationingeneral,asIRandEUscholarsviewrealism,notleastduetoitsover-emphasisonforeignandsecuritypolicy,asatheoryofnon-integration.6StanleyHoffman’sdistinctionbetween“high”and“l(fā)ow”politicsmadeiteasytoexplainwhytheEUforalongtimewasabsentinthe?eldofforeignpolicy.7“High”politics,whichincludeexternalrelations,istraditionallythebusinessofsovereignstates,whichareextremelyreluctanttosurrenderauthoritytoasupranationalinstitutioninthispolicydomain.However,astherealistblochasbranchedoffindifferentdirections,theapparentincompatibilitybetweenrealismandEUforeignandsecurityintegrationshouldnotbeoverstated.8Followingtheoreticaladditionstotherealisttradition,thegapbetweenEuropeanintegrationandrealismhas(atleastpartially)beenbridged,andtheusefulnessofthetheorytothestudyoftheEUhasbeenacknowledged.Accordingtoneo-realism,thebehaviourofstatesistheresultoftheirrelativepowerandpositioninthestructurallyanarchicalinternationalsystem,whichisinturnlargelyde?nedbythegreatpowers.Consequently,thetransformationof6LorenzoCladiandAndreaLocatelli,“Bandwagoning,NotBalancing:WhyEuropeConfoundsRealism”,inContemporarySecurityPolicy,Vol.33,No.2(2012),p.264-288;SimonCollard-Wexler,“IntegrationUnderAnarchy:NeorealismandtheEuropeanUnion”,inEuropeanJournalofInternationalRelations,Vol.12,No.3(September2006),p.397-423.7HylkeDijkstraandSophieVanhoonacker-Kormoss,“TheCommonForeignandSecurityPolicy”,cit.AlexanderReichwein,“RealismandEuropeanForeignPolicy:PromisesandShortcomings”,cit.85

-ConceptualisingtheMulti-ActorCharacterofEU(rope)’sForeignPolicytheEuropeanspaceintoarule-basedinterstatesystemhaspuzzledneo-realists.9Revisionsmadetoneo-realisttheoryduringthe1990sand2000swerenecessarytoexplaincooperationinEurope,whichresultedinthecreationoftheCFSP.BasedonKennethN.Waltz’stheoryonthebalanceofpower,10thecreationoftheCFSPhasbeenlinkedtothememberstates’desiretoactasacounterbalancetotheUnitedStates,aswellasanattempttobalanceoffoneanother.11Therevisedneo-realistfocusonEuropeanintegrationwasshort-lived,however.Asaconsequence,theEUremainsunder-theorisedinneo-realistthought.Assumptionsmadebyneo-realistspredictthat,theEUisstructurallypronetoeventuallybreakdown,asthememberstates’incentivetocooperateasaformofmutualcounterbalancingorasawaytobalanceoffagainstexternalpowersmaychangeovertime.12Thusfar,collapsehasbeenaverted,whichshowsthatrealisttheoriesmayhavemorelimitedpredictioncapacitythantheyclaim.Inaddition,themainfocusofrealismhasremainedonthenationstateandthecooperation(orlackthereof)ofsovereignactors,neglectingthevaluesandinterestsoftheEUasawhole.Asaresult,realismisincapableofthinkingofEUforeignandsecuritypolicyasamulti-actorsystem.Forrealiststhemulti-characterofEUFSP,sooftenfoundintheempiricalreality,isacontradictioninterms.1.2EUforeignandsecuritypolicyasmorethanthesumofitspartsRealistapproachesseeEUforeignpolicyasnothingmorethanthecombinedeffortofthememberstates’foreignpolicies,withEUinstitutionsonlyabletodeliver9AdrianHyde-Price,“Interests,InstitutionsandIdentitiesintheStudyofEuropeanForeignPolicy”,inBenTonraandThomasChristiansen(eds),RethinkingEuropeanUnionForeignPolicy,Manchester,ManchesterUniversityPress,2004,p.99-113,/10.7765/9781526137647.00012;JonathanJoseph,“RealismandNeorealisminInternationalRelationsTheory”,inMichaelT.Gibbons(ed.),TheEncyclopediaofPoliticalThought,Chichester,WileyBlackwell,2015.10KennethN.Waltz,TheoryofInternationalPolitics,Reading,Addison-Wesley,1979.11AlexanderReichwein,“RealismandEuropeanForeignPolicy:PromisesandShortcomings”,cit.12MarianneRiddervold,JarleTrondalandAkasemiNewsome,“EuropeanUnionCrisis:AnIntroduction”,inMarianneRiddervold,JarleTrondalandAkasemiNewsome(eds),ThePalgraveHandbookofEUCrises,Cham,PalgraveMacmillan,2021,p.3-47;NeilMacFarlaneandAnandMenon,“TheEUandUkraine”,inSurvival,Vol.56,No.3(2014),p.95-101;JohnJ.Mearsheimer,“WhytheUkraineCrisisistheWest’sFault”,inForeignAffairs,Vol.93,No.5(September/October2014),p.77-89;BarryR.Posen,“Ukraine:PartofAmerica’s‘VitalInterests’?”,inTheNationalInterest,12May2014,/node/17585;StephenM.Walt,“WouldYouDieforThatCountry?”,inForeignPolicy,24March2014,https:///2014/03/24/would-you-die-for-that-country.6

-ConceptualisingtheMulti-ActorCharacterofEU(rope)’sForeignPolicycommondenominator-basedpolicies.Bycontrast,institutionalistapproachesviewinstitutionsascentraltointernationalcooperation.Institutionalistsdisagreewiththerealistassumptionthatinstitutionsarebasedontheinterestsofthegreatpowers,thattheyre?ectglobalpower-distributionandlacktheabilitytodirectlyaffectstatesandstatebehaviour.AccordingMichaelE.Smith,forinstance,theprocessofinstitutionalisationdevelopedinEuropesincethe1970sisthemaincauseforEUcooperationinthe?eldofforeignandsecuritypolicy.13

Institutionalapproachessuggestthatwhenfacedwithacrisis,theEUhastraditionallyrespondedwithinitiativesaimedatgreaterintegrationratherthanbreakingdown,asrealistsofanysortwouldhaveit.TheEUtendstoreacttoshocksbyintensifyingexchangeswithinitsinstitutionalsettingsforcooperation.Crisesmakeinstitutionsstrongerratherthanweaker.14

Governancesystemstendtohandleturbulencebystrengtheningalreadyexistingcooperationpractices,arrangementsandmethods,followingthelogicofpathdependency.15

Institutionsmayalsoimprovise,adaptandcreatenovelwaysofemployingexistingmechanisms.16

Thismayinturntriggermoreintegration,astheexperiencedturbulencemaycauseinstitutionalsoul-searchingandadaptationofexistingstructures.17

However,thisdoesnotexplainwhysomememberstatesbecomemoreintegratedthanothers.Thegrandtheoryofneo-functionalism,developedbyErnstHaas,makes“generalisationsabouttheprocessesbywhichpoliticalcommunitiesareformed13

MichaelE.Smith,“Institutionalization,PolicyAdaptationandEuropeanForeignPolicyCooperation”,inEuropeanJournalofInternationalRelations,Vol.10,No.1(March2004),p.95-136.14

MarianneRiddervold,JarleTrondalandAkasemiNewsome,“EuropeanUnionCrisis:AnIntroduction”,cit.15

JamesG.MarchandJohanP.Olsen,“TheInstitutionalDynamicsofInternationalPoliticalOrders”,inInternationalOrganization,Vol.52,No.4(Autumn1998),p.943-969;JohanP.Olsen,“ChangeandContinuity:AnInstitutionalApproachtoInstitutionsofDemocraticGovernment”,inEuropeanPoliticalScienceReview,Vol.1,No.1(March2009),p.3-32;PaulPierson,PoliticsinTime.History,Institutions,andSocialAnalysis,Princeton,PrincetonUniversityPress,2004;StephenSkowronek,BuildingaNewAmericanState:TheExpansionofNationalAdministrativeCapacities,1877-1920,Cambridge,CambridgeUniversityPress,1982.16

ChristopherAnsell,“Institutionalism”,inMarianneRiddervold,JarleTrondalandAkasemiNewsome(eds),ThePalgraveHandbookofEUCrises,Cham,PalgraveMacmillan,2021,p.135-152;ChristopherAnsell,JarleTrondalandMorten?g?rd(eds),GovernanceinTurbulentTimes,Oxford,OxfordUniversityPress,2017.17

YvesEmeryandDavidGiauque,“TheHybridUniverseofPublicAdministrationinthe21stCentury”,inInternationalReviewofAdministrativeSciences,Vol.80,No.1(March2014),p.23-32;JohnW.Kingdon,Agendas,AlternativesandPublicPolicies,Boston,LittleBrown,1984;MartinC.LodgeandKaiWegrich(eds),ExecutivePoliciesinTimesofCrisis,Basingstoke,PalgraveMacmillan,2012.7

-ConceptualisingtheMulti-ActorCharacterofEU(rope)’sForeignPolicyamongsovereignstates”.18

Questioningrealism,Haaswasamongthe?rsttoarguethat(atthetime,Western)Europecouldbetransformedbymakingthecross-border?owofmoneyandpeopleeasier.Ratherthanseeingstatesasunitaryandtheonlyrelevantplayers,neofunctionalismemphasisedregionalintegrationmarkedbymultiple,diverseandchangingactors(politicalparties,economicoperators,civilsocietyorganisations,etc.)thatinteractinspiteofnationalborders.19

Theseplayerscreatefunctionallinksbydevelopingaregionalnetworkacrossstateborders.Thenetworkprovidesthedemandforfunctionallyspeci?cregionalinstitutionsdealingwithnon-existentialmatters.Throughthespillovereffect,cooperationfunctionallyspreadstootherareas,leadingtotheeventualdeclineofnationalsovereigntyandtheriseofsupranationalinstitutions.20Neo-functionalismpresumeschangesinexpectationsoftheparticipatingactors,suchaselitegroupsandcitizens.21

Ascitizensplacemoreoftheirexpectationsontheregionratherthanthenationstate,governmentswouldbepressuredtogivemoreauthoritytotheregionalorganisationstheythemselveshavecreated.This,inturn,createsaself-sustainingprocessofcooperationandspill-over,whichthenevolvesintocloserpoliticalintegration.22

Nationalgovernmentsrespondtothesedevelopmentseitherbyacceptingandadaptingtothem,orbyignoringorsabotagingtheattemptstointegratemadebytheregionalinstitutions.23

Bythe1970s,neo-functionalismeventuallyfelloutoffavour,inpartbecauseofitslackofpredictiveabilities,asEuropeanintegrationhadostensiblynotadvancedasmuchasthetheoryassumeditwould.2418

ErnstB.Haas,TheUnitingofEurope.Political,SocialandEconomicalForces,1950-1957,Stanford,StanfordUniversityPress,1958,p.xxxi.19

ErnstB.Haas,“Technocracy,PluralismandtheNewEurope”,inStephenR.Graubard(ed.),ANewEurope?,Boston,HoughtonMif?in,1964,p.62-88;ArneNiemann,“Neofunctionalism”,inMarianneRiddervold,JarleTrondalandAkasemiNewsome(eds),ThePalgraveHandbookofEUCrises,Cham,PalgraveMacmillan,2021,p.115-133.20

JohnMcCormick,EuropeanUnionPolitics,2nded,Basingstoke,PalgraveMacmillan,2015.21

ArneNiemann,“Neofunctionalism”,cit.22

JohnGerardRuggieetal.,“TransformationsinWorldPolitics:TheIntellectualContributionsofErnstB.Haas”,inAnnualReviewofPoliticalScience,Vol.8(2005),p.271-296,/10.1146/annurev.polisci.8.082103.104843.23

WalterMattli,TheLogicofRegionalIntegration.EuropeandBeyond,Cambridge,CambridgeUniversityPress,1999.24

JohnMcCormick,EuropeanUnionPolitics,cit.8

-ConceptualisingtheMulti-ActorCharacterofEU(rope)’sForeignPolicyOneofthemostin?uentialtheoriesinthestudyofEuropeanintegration,andananswertoneo-functionalism,isliberalintergovernmentalism(LI),developedbyAndrewMoravcsikinthe1990s.25

Followingaliberalintergovernmentalistperspective,thedegreeofEUintegrationisdecidedbythepreferencesandrelativebargainingpowerofthememberstatesratherthanspilloverfromonepolicytoanother.Inareassuchasforeignandsecuritypolicy,memberstatesmaychoosetointegratefurtherinordertominimisethepotentiallynegativecostsofnon-integration,eitherthroughtreatychangesorthroughlessformalarrangements.Theoutcomesofbargainingprocessesusuallymirrorthepre-existingpreferencesofthememberstates,especiallythemembersmostlikelytoremainrelativelyunaffected.26

LIthuspositsatwo-levelgame,whereintergovernmentalbargainsareestablishedbasedonpressuresformedatthedomesticlevel.Thedemandsfrominterestgroups,voters,partiesandbureaucracies,whichmemberstates’governmentsfaceathome,determinetheirpositionsininternationalnegotiations.EuropeanintegrationmovesforwardasgovernmentsusetheinformationavailabletotheminnegotiationsattheEUleveltoreachagreementswhichtheyinturnwillpromotetoaudiencesathome.27

BecauseLIexplainstheinterplaybetweenmemberstatesandEUinstitutionsasfundamentallyaone-wayprocesswherebythelatterareinvariablytheresultoftheformer’spreferences,itstrugglestoaccommodatewithinitstheoreticalperimeterthenotionthatEUFSPisamulti-actorsysteminwhichinteractionbetweenmemberstatesandEUinstitutionsisnotalwayslinearandone-directional.Finally,constructivismchallengestheideathatmaterialinterestsaresuf?cienttoexplainEuropeanintegrationmoreextensivelyandresolutelythaneitherneo-functionalismorLI.Accordingtoconstructivists,thehistoricalandsocialoriginsofpoliticalstructuresultimatelyplayafundamentalroleintheintegrationprocess.2825

AndrewMoravcsik,“PreferencesandPowerintheEuropeanCommunity:ALiberalIntergovernmentalistApproach”,inJournalofCommonMarketStudies,Vol.31,No.4(December1993),p.473-524;AndrewMoravcsik,TheChoiceforEurope:SocialPurposeandStatePowerfromMessinatoMaastricht,Ithaca,CornellUniversityPress,1998.26

AndrewMoravcsikandFrankSchimmelfennig,“LiberalIntergovernmentalism”,inAntjeWienerandThomasDiez(eds),EuropeanIntegrationTheory,Oxford,OxfordUniversityPress,2009,p.67-87;FrankSchimmelfennig,“LiberalIntergovernmentalism”,inMarianneRiddervold,JarleTrondalandAkasemiNewsome(eds),ThePalgraveHandbookofEUCrises,Switzerland,PalgraveMacmillan,2021,p.61-78.27

JohnMcCormick,EuropeanUnionPolitics,cit.28

Ibid.9

-ConceptualisingtheMulti-ActorCharacterofEU(rope)’sForeignPolicyRatherthanarguingforcounterbalancingoreconomicinterdependenceastheonlydriversforintegration,constructivistscholarshaveclaimedthatidentityandnormsarekeyfactorsinEUintegration,andshouldthereforenotbeoverlooked.29CentraltoconstructivistapproachesistheideathattheEUiscrucialwhenitcomestosharingandspreadingnorms,ideasandbeliefsamongbothmemberandnon-memberstates,whileplacingemphasisontheimportanceofsocialinteractions.Contrarytothepreviouslydiscussedtheories,constructivistapproachesmaintainthatmembershipintheEUhasadeepimpactonmemberstates’self-representationasinternationalactors.Followingconstructivism,theEU’scommonforeignandsecuritypolicyismadepossiblethroughdiscourseandcommunication,whichtricklesdowntothelevelofthememberstates,effectivelyrede?ningtheirinterests.30Integrationisexplainedthroughthecreationofacommonidentity.2.Theaddedvalueofmulti-levelgovernanceanddifferentiatedintegrationWhiletheoriespreviouslydiscussedstudythedriversofintegration,suchassecurity,interdependence,normativecommonalities,someofthenewertheoreticalframeworks,attimesreferredtowiththerathergeneralterm“post-functionalist”approaches,focusontheroleofinstitutionsanddescribetheirimportanceinpolitical,socialandeconomiclife.3129TanjaA.B?rzelandThomasRisse,“FromtheEurototheSchengenCrises:EuropeanIntegrationTheories,Politicization,andIdentityPolitics”,inJournalofEuropeanPublicPolicy,Vol.25,No.1(2018),p.83-108;LiesbetHoogheandGaryMarks,“DoesIdentityorEconomicRationalityDrivePublicOpiniononEuropeanIntegration?”,inPS:PoliticalScienceandPolitics,Vol.37,No.3(July2004),p.415-420;TheresaKuhn,“GrandTheoriesofEuropeanIntegrationRevisited:DoesIdentityPoliticsShapetheCourseofEuropeanIntegration?”,inJournalofEuropeanPublicPolicy,Vol.26,No.8(2019),p.1213-1230,/10.1080/13501763.2019.1622588;UlrikeLiebert,“EuropeanIdentityFormationin(the)Crisis”,inHubertZimmermannandAndreasDür(eds),KeyControversiesinEuropeanIntegration,2nded.,Basingstoke,PalgraveMacmillan,2016,p.98-106.30MichaelE.Smith,“Institutionalization,PolicyAdaptationandEuropeanForeignPolicyCooperation,cit.31ChristopherAnsell,“Institutionalism”,cit.;JamesG.MarchandJohanP.Olsen,“TheNewInstitutionalism:OrganizationalFactorsinPoliticalLife”,inAmericanPoliticalScienceReview,Vol.78,No.3(December1983),p.734-749;MarkA.Pollack,“TheNewInstitutionalismsandEuropeanIntegration”,inAntjeWienerandThomasDiez(eds),EuropeanIntegrationTheory,Oxford,OxfordUniversityPress,2009,p.125-143;WalterW.PowellandPaulJ.DiMaggio,TheNewInstitutionalism10

-ConceptualisingtheMulti-ActorCharacterofEU(rope)’sForeignPolicyOneofthemostsuccessfulattemptsofcapturingtheEuropeanpoliticalorderisprovidedbyLiesbetHoogheandGaryMarks.32

Theirclaimisthat,asEuropeanintegrationhasmovedintocoreareasofnationalstatesovereignty,publicopinionhasbecomemorescepticaloftheintegrationproject.Asaresult,whereEU-friendlyelitespreviouslyfacedageneralconsensus,theynowfacemorewidespreaddissent.33

Consequently,forthe?rsttime,disintegrationbecomesapossibility,makingscholarsquestionhowintegrationworks,ratherthanjustwhyittakesplace.34

HoogheandMarks’multi-levelgovernance(MLG)approachreferstotheinterconnectednessoftheEUlevelandthenationallevel.35

Multi-levelgovernanceseesthepoliticalorderasacomplexsystem,“consistingofapatchworkofseparatebutinterconnectedpoliticalinstitutionsatdifferentlevelsofauthority”.36

Theapproachexplorestherelationshipbetweenthevariouslevelsandpolicyareasinvolved,aswellashowtheinterplaybetweendifferentlevelsproducespolicies.37

Multi-levelgovernanceisadirectresultoftheirregularpaceofEuropeanintegration,whichhasaffectedcertainareasmorethanothers.Thisprocesshasgraduallybecomemoreentrenchedandevenstructural,totheextentthattheoristshavefeltcompelledtointroduceDifferentiatedIntegration(DI)asainOrganizationalAnalysis,Chicago,UniversityofChicagoPress,1991;KathleenThelen,“HistoricalInstitutionalisminComparativePolitics”,inAnnualReviewofPoliticalScience,Vol.2(1999),p.369-404,/10.1146/annurev.polisci.2.1.369.32

LiesbetHoogheandGaryMarks,MultilevelGovernanceandEuropeanIntegration,Lanham,Rowman&Little?eld,2001.33

LiesbetHoogheandGaryMarks,“APostfunctionalistTheoryofEuropeanIntegration:FromPermissiveConsensustoConstrainingDissensus”,inBritishJournalofPoliticalScience,Vol.39,No.1(January2009),p.1-23;FrankSchimmelfennig,“TheorisingCrisisinEuropeanIntegration”,inDesmondDinan,NeillNugentandWilliamE.Paterson(eds),TheEuropeanUnioninCrisis,London,PalgraveMacmillanEducation,2017,p.316-335.34

LiesbetHoogheandGaryMarks,“GrandTheoriesofEuropeanIntegrationintheTwenty-FirstCentury”,inJournalofEuropeanPublicPolicy,Vol.26,No.8(2019),p.1113-1133,/10.1080/13501763.2019.1569711.35

Fortheoret