公共管理國際會議論文排版要求及格式樣張

公共管理國際會議論文排版要求及格式樣張(1.LANHua2.ZHAOShu-rong1SchoolofManagement,HarbinInstituteofTechnology,P.R.China,1500012SchoolofPoliticalScienceandPublicAdministration,UniversityofElectronicScienceandTechnologyofChina,Chengdu,P.R.China,611731摘要：這份說明給出了公共管理國際會議論文投稿的基本要求。向會議提交的論文為5-7頁，且必須應用此格式，您可以到會議的網站上下載（）。摘要不得少于120個英文單詞，關鍵詞不得少于4個，用逗號隔開。每個關鍵詞第一個單詞的首字母大寫，其余小寫。關鍵詞：字體，格式，頁邊距引言請將您的論文用紙設置為 210mm 297mm的A4紙，全篇論文請在“段落”選項中將“行距”設置為“單倍行距”，每段首行縮進2字符。一級標題要上空一行，二級標題不需要上空。所有的圖形、表格和公式都必須包括在您的論文中，請不要鏈接到外部的文件。方法論2.1格式在“頁面設置”的“頁邊距”選項中：“上”頁邊距設置為41mm，“下”頁邊距為41mm，“左右”頁邊距都為32mm，“距邊界”中“頁眉”設置13mm，“頁腳”設置為20mm?！拔臋n網格”選“無網格”。正文采用一欄式，在“格式”的“分欄”選項中，“欄數(shù)”設置為1。2.2字號大小和字體樣式請按照Tab.1中所注明的字體和字號大小進行排版，全篇論文選用TimesNewRoman字體，Table1論文排版字體與字號大小一覽表字號字體樣式大小TimesNewRomanTimesNewRoman加粗9圖、表格圖題、表題正文、公式、參考文獻作者姓名10摘要二級標題關鍵詞三級標題小一級標題四四論文題目號正文部分選用10號字。論文題目字體選TimesNewRoman加粗，字號為四號，其中每個實詞的首字母大寫；作者姓名選10號字，姓大寫，名字的第一個單詞首字母大寫，名字之間用短線連對于基金資助請放在第一頁的腳注處,并統(tǒng)一用格式“Financedby+資助項目”。也請您翻譯準確資助的項目名稱。接，作者之間空兩個空格，作者排名序號請用數(shù)字標在姓名前面；作者單位選 10號字，單位前面加序號（假如作者都同在一個單位的，則在單位名稱前不需加序號） ，后面請寫“哪個城市的英文，P.R.China,郵政編碼”；一級標題和二級標題中第一個單詞的首字母大寫，其余小寫，字體選TimesNewRoman加粗，一級標題選小四號字，加粗，二級標題選 10號字，加粗。結果3.1表格和圖圖和表格的文字請用小五號字，圖題和表題請加粗，且第一個單詞的首字母大寫，其余小寫。表題與上面文字之間空一行，表題置于表格上方，用“ Table”表示，如“Table1”，文中需要提到該表時也請用“ Table1”。請盡量采用 Word中的繪圖工具繪圖，如果有些圖無法用 Word中的繪圖工具繪制，請不要將圖題放在您繪制的圖中，必須用 Word單獨排版。為了保證您論文中圖的清晰度，請不要用顏色和灰度圖來區(qū)分圖中的不同含義，因為是單色印刷，且灰度圖印制出的效果非常不好，故建議不要采用。圖題應放在圖的下方，用“Figure”表示圖，如“Figure1”，文中提到該圖時也請用“Figure1”，圖題與下面文字之間空一行。Figure1Magnetizationasafunctionofappliedfield3.2參考文獻 （引用的參考文獻不得少于 8篇）引用的參考文獻應用連續(xù)的數(shù)字在方括號中標出，參考文獻在文中用 上角標標注，該句的標點符號跟在方括號之后 ，參考文獻的順序應按在文中出現(xiàn)的順序排列。請注意本說明最后的參考文獻格式是標準格式，也是我們希望您能在論文中應用的格式。除非作者人數(shù)在 6人或6人以上，否則您應該列出所有作者的名字， 而不能用“etal”代替。作者姓名起首的大寫字母之間要用一個空格隔開，除專有名詞和元素符號外，被引用文獻的題目需第一個實詞的首字母大寫，其余小寫。對于非英文參考文獻，請用英文表示， 然后在該文獻題目之后用圓括號注明原語種 ,如(inChinese)，(inJapanese)等等。3.3縮寫即使在摘要里已經進行了定義，當縮寫詞第一次在論文中出現(xiàn)時，應對其進行定義，但像IEEE、SI、MKS、CGS、ac、dc和rms之類的縮寫就無需定義。由幾個首字母合并起來并含有句點的縮寫無需在句點和字母中間加空格，如：“C.N.R.S.”就不應寫成“C.N.R.S.”。盡量避免在題目中出現(xiàn)縮寫。3.4公式公式排版請用公式編輯器編排，公式需要用圓括號加數(shù)字進行連續(xù)編號，并使編號與每欄的右邊線對齊，參見(1)，如A+B=C

(1)注意公式中的符號要事先定義或緊接在公式下給出定義。公式中的變量須用斜體。3.5其他當小數(shù)點前的數(shù)字為零時，不要寫“

.25”而要寫成“

0.25”，“cm3”不要寫成“

cc”，表示樣本面積時應使用“ 0.1cm 0.2cm”，不要寫成“ 0.1 0.2cm2”。結論最后，您應該對您的語言負責，因為審稿專家和編輯們不會再對文章中的語言作核對和改動。當您完成論文時，請檢查其中的拼寫和語法，請盡量找一位專業(yè)的審稿人員幫您檢查。像“non”、“sub”、“micro”、“multi”和“ultra”之類的前綴不是獨立的單詞，它們應該與所修飾的單詞一起使用，且不用連字符。對于基金資助請放在第一頁的腳注處,并統(tǒng)一用格式“Financedby+資助項目”。也請您翻譯準確資助的項目名稱。（見首頁格式）格式范文：GovernmentGovernanceandPoliticalTrustinTransitionChina:AnEmpiricalAnalysisMENGTian-guangSchoolofGovernment,PekingUniversity,Beijing,P.R.China,100871AbstractRecently,buildingaservice-orientedgovernmentandpursuinggoodgovernancehavebecomeindispensablechoicesforChinesegovernmenttopromotesocio-economicdevelopment.Asthetiebetweenindividualcitizenandvariousgovernmentinstitutions,politicaltrustisnotonlyregardedasanimportantindicatorofpoliticallegitimacyembodyingcitizens’portsupforgovernment,butalsotreatedasscarceresourcewhichishelpfultoenhancegovernanceperformance.Basedon2008ChinesePublicAttitudestowardsCitizenshipNationalSurveyandrelevantmacrodata,thispapertriestoexplorequantitativelythecomplexrelationshipbetweengovernmentgovernanceandpoliticaltrustintransitionChina,especiallytheeffectofeconomicdevelopment,socialwelfareandpurepublicgoodssupplyonpoliticaltrust.OLSmodelshowsthatthereisasignificantrelationshipbetweenthepositiveretrospectiveandprospectiveassessmentofeconomicdevelopment,socialwelfareandpublicgoodssupplyandhighlevelofpoliticaltrust,andyetretrospectiveassessmentshavemoreexplanatorypowerthanprospectiveones. ..Key wordsGovernmentgovernance,Politicaltrust,Economicdevelopment,Socialwelfare,Purepublicgoods1IntroductionSince21stcentury,Chinesegovernmenthasbeensparingnoefforttobuildaharmonioussociety.Theconstructionofservice-orientedgovernmentandenhancingthegovernmentgovernancelevel,therefore,becometheindispensablewaytofulfillthisstrategicaim.“Economicdevelopmentasthecentreofcountrydevelopment”hasnotbeentheonlygovernancemodeafter2003,andChinesegovernmentgraduallyimplementthe“multiplegovernancemodeofsocial,economicandinstitutionaldevelopment”aroundthecountry.Indetail,governmentisnotonlyconcernedabouttherapidgrowthofeconomy,butalsoinvestshugehumanandmaterialresourcesintheareaofeducation,health,socialsecurity,andotheraspectsofsocialwelfare.Moreover,purepublicgoodssupply,suchassocialgovernance,publicsafetyandinstitutionconstruction,alsoattainmuchmoreattentionthanever..2Theoreticalframeworkandresearchhypothesis2.1PoliticaltrustTheliteraturesonpoliticaltrusthavealongacademichistory.Forexample,Almend,VerbaandEaston,threemostfamouspoliticalscientistshasdonemuchtoexplorepoliticaltrust,itshouldbeadmittedthatAlmendandVerbastartedtheempiricaltraditiontoresearchpoliticaltrust(AlmendandVerba,1963[1])..2.2ApproachestoexplainpoliticaltrustManymodelshavebeenexploredtoexplainpoliticaltrustanditsrecentdeclineinadvancedindustrialcountries.Usingcrossnationaldata,NewtonandNorristestedthreecompetitiveexplanations:socialpsychologicalmodel,socialandculturalmodel,governmentperformanceandpoliticalinstitutionsmodel(NewtonandNorris,1997[7]).AccordingtoMishlerandRose,mostresearchescanbeattributedtotwoapproaches:institutionalexplanationsandculturalexplanations(MishlerandRose,2001[8];Newton,2001[9]).2.3GovernmentgovernanceandpoliticaltrustThestudiesofhowgovernmentperformanceaffectspoliticaltrusthavegrownrapidlyduringthe[14][15]2.4ResearchhypothesisGovernanceassessmenthypothesis:thehigherthecitizens’assessmentofgovernance,thehigherthepoliticaltrust.(2)Retrospective-prospectivehypothesis:comparedwithprospectiveassessments,citizens’retrospectiveassessmentsofgovernancehavestrongerinfluenceonpoliticaltrust.Economicdevelopment-socialwelfare-purepublicgoodssupplyhypothesis:comparedwitheconomicdevelopment,citizens’assessmentofpurepublicgoodssupplyandsocialwelfarehavestrongerinfluenceonpoliticaltrust.Countygovernanceperformancehypothesis:percapitaGDPandpercapitawelfarefiscalexpenditureatcountylevelhelptoimproveaveragepoliticaltrustatcountylevel.Besides,bothcountyunemploymentrateandGinicoefficienthaveanegativeinfluenceonaveragepoliticaltrustatcountylevel.3ResearchdesignResearchershaveconductedafewstudiesonpoliticaltrustintransitionChina;however,mostofliteraturesarebasedonnormativeorqualitativeresearch,quantitativepapersusingsurveydataarestillrare.Asaresult,wehavenoideaaboutitsrepresentativenessandobjectivity.Thispapertriestoempiricallytestresearchhypothesisaboveusingquantitativemethod.Quantitativeresearch,notonlyovercometheproblemsofrepresentativenessandobjectivity,butalsolookintotheneteffectofindependentvariablesondependentvariables,aftercontrollingothervariables.3.1DataThedataincludestwosources:individualleveldatacomefrom2008ChinesePublicAttitudestowardsCitizenshipNationalSurvey;countyleveldataisderivedfromgovernmentinformationsource,suchas“ChinaStatisticalYearbookforRegionalEconomy(2008)ChinaCounty”Social,“EconomicStatisticalYearbook(2008)”andgovernmentwebsites. .3.2VariablesDependentvariablePoliticaltrustreferstocitizens ’trustdegreetokindsofpoliticalinstitutions.Indetail,itofrespondent’strustdegreeninetokindsofpoliticalinstitutions,includingcentralgovernment,courts,people’congress,village/neighborhoodcommittees,CCP,procuratorates,county/citygovernment,mediaandpublicsecurityorgans.Theseriesofvariablesindicateexcellentreliabilitybeforebeingsummedup(Cronbach’sAlpha=0.903).Figure1 PoliticaltrustintransitionChina(percent,%)AlthoughonlyseveralstudieshaveconductedquantitativemeasureonpoliticaltrustintransitionChina,almostalltheresultsindicateChinesehavehighpoliticaltrust(ShiTianjian,2001;MaDeyong,2007).Figure1showthedistributionofpoliticaltrust.Generally,thelevelofpoliticaltrustisveryhigh,mostpeople(72.84%)haveapoliticaltrustscoreshigherthan27andonlyfew(1.12%)respondentsreportscoreslowerthan18.IndependentvariablesThere’retwocategoriesofindependentvariables:controlvariablesandexplanatoryvariables.Controlvariablesincludedemographicfactors(ageandsex),socio-economicfactors(education,incomeandmigrantpopulation),politicalinterest,socialtrust,happinessTable1 CitizensassessmentongovernmentgovernanceintransitionChina(percent,%)VerygoodRathergoodNotgoodNotgoodatallEconomyperformance31.2060.237.890.68Economyexpectation80.5015.073.600.84Welfareperformance20.9155.9820.132.98Welfareexpectation17.1063.1118.960.84Publicperformance11.3154.1527.736.81Publicexpectation14.5271.4627.550.99Similarlytopoliticaltrust,Chinesecitizens’assessmenttogovernmentgovernanceisrelativelyhigh.Table1indicatesChinesecitizensretrospective’andprospectiveassessmenttothreekindsofgovernmentgovernance.Citizensreportlowerscoresonretrospectiveassessmentthanprospectiveassessment,whichsuggestscitizenshaveoptimisticattitudeonthesocio-economicdevelopmentinthefuture.Specifically,nomatterretrospectiveorprospectiveassessment,citizens reportthehighestscoreoneconomicdevelopment,91.43%ofthemsatisfiedwithcurrenteconomicdevelopmentand95.57%ofthemhaving confidenceonChina’futureseconomicdevelopment; followed bysocialwelfare,76.89%ofthemsatisfiedwiththecurrentstatus,and80.21%believingtherewillbeimprovementonsocialwelfareinthefuturefiveyears;finallypurepublicgoodssupply,85.98%ofthecitizensagreegovernment will achieve improvement on the supply of such pure publicgoods .Figure2 GDPpercapitain73samplecountiesFigure3UnemploymentrateandGinicoefficientin73samplecountiesUnemploymentrate(Unemp):thepercentageofunemploymentpopulationin2007;Ginicoefficient(Gini):Ginicoefficientiscalculatedfromindividualleveldata;UnemploymentrateandGinicoefficientareanothertwoimportantindexestoassesstheleveloflocalgovernance.Figure3displaysthedistributionofunemploymentrateandGinicoefficientin73counties.Unemploymentratesaregenerallylow,50.68%countieswithratelowerthan0.5%andonly12.33%withratehigherthan1%;however,theGinicoefficients arehigher.Thereare55counties(75.34%)withGinihigherthan0.4andeven16counties(21.92%)withGinihigherthanModelGenerallyspeaking,therearetwomainmethodstoexploretherelationshipbetweengovernmentperformanceandpoliticaltrust:(1)researchtherelationshipbetweencountry’historygovernanceperformanceandpoliticaltrustutilizingtimeseriesdata;(2)researchtherelationshipbetweensubjectiveassessmenttogovernanceperformanceatindividuallevelandpoliticaltrustusingthecross-sectiondata.However,bothofthemdonotdealwithmethodologyproblemappropriately.Thefirstoneneglectscitizen,whoisthesubjectofpoliticaltrust;thesecondonereplacesobjectivegovernanceperformancewithsubjectiveassessmentandthusconfusesgovernmentgovernanceitselfandcitizens’assessment.Basedonthesereasons,subjectiveassessmenttogovernanceperformanceatindividuallevelandobjectivegovernanceperformanceatcountylevelwillbeanalyzedatthesametimeinthispaper .4SubjectivegovernanceassessmentandpoliticaltrustinindividuallevelAsanexploratorystudy,thispaperfirstlyutilizesOLSmodeltofitthedatainindividuallevel.Thismodeltreatage,sex,education,income,migrant,socialtrust,politicalinterestandsenseofhappinessascontrolvariables,andsetupretrospective/prospectiveassessmentofeconomicdevelopment,retrospective/prospectiveassessmentofsocialwelfareandretrospective/prospectiveassessmentofpurepublicgoodsupplyasexplanatoryvariables.Table2showstheresultofOLS.5ObjectivegovernmentgovernanceandpoliticaltrustOnlytheeffectofsubjectiveassessmentofgovernanceperformanceonpoliticaltrustcannotverifythehypothesisthatgovernmentgovernancehasaneffectonpoliticaltrust.Governance,akindofgovernmentactivitiesforthepurposetofulfillsomepolicyaim,anditsperformancecanbemeasuredbyaseriesofobjectiveindex,isobjectiveitself.Its’Infact,limitedbyinformationandeconomicrationality,citizensareusuallynotabletoreachpreciseanduniformjudgeforobjectivegovernance.Evensocitizensassessments’arestillanimportantmeasurementforgovernanceperformance,justnotequaltotheobjectivegovernmentgovernance6ConclusionThestatisticalmodelatindividuallevelshows,citizenspositive’retrospectiveandprospectiveassessmentsoneconomicdevelopment,socialwelfareandpurepublicgoodssupply,significantlypromotethelevelofpoliticaltrust.Besides,therearetwonotablepointsasfollowing:(1)attheindividuallevel,theinfluencesofretrospectiveassessmentsaregenerallystrongerthanprospectiveassessment,whichsuggestsChinesecitizensarerationalinthisissueaswhentheyexpresspoliticalsupportforthegovernment,theypaymoreattentionongovernment’spastperformance;(2)nomatterretrospectiveorprospectiveassessment,purepublicgoodssupplyhasthestrongestpoweronpoliticaltrust,thelessoneiseconomicdevelopment,andtheleastoneissocialwelfare.Thisresultdoesn’taccordwiththeresultsforeignresearchersfindinadvancedindustrialcountriesandpostcommunistcountries.ThisprobablyresultsfromtheuniquesituationintransitionChina:hugeeconomicdevelopmenthashappenedintransitionChina,butthepurepublicgoodssupply,suchaspublicsafety,environmentprotectionandinstitutionconstruction,stillrelativelylagfarbehind.ReferencesAlmondG.AandVerbaS.TheCivicCulture:politicalAttitudesandDemocracyinFiveNations,Princeton,NJ[M].PrincetonUniversityPress,1963Easton,D.ASystemsAnalysisofPoliticalLife.NewYork:JohnWileyandSons,1965Lane,RE.PoliticalLife[M].NewYork:FreePress,1959:164[4]Putnam,R.D..TuningIn,Tuning 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CapitalinAmerica.PoliticalScienceReview,1995(28):664-683Easton,D.AReassessmentoftheConceptofPoliticalSupport[J].BritishJournalofPoliticalScience,1975(5):435-457KennethNewtonandPippaNorris.ConfidenceinPublicInstitutions:Faith,Culture,orPerformance?InSusan,J.RharrandRobert,D.Putnam,DisaffectedDemocracies,Princeton[M].Mishler,W.andRose,R.WhataretheoriginsofPoliticalTrust?TestingInstitutionalandCulturalTheoriesinPost-communistSocieties.ComparativePoliticalStudies,BeverlyHills:Feb2001(34):30-62Newton,K..Trust,SocialCapital,CivilSocietyandDemocracy.InternationalPoliticalScienceReview,2001(22):201-214Inglehart,R..PostmateralistValuesandtheErosionofInstitutionalAuthority.InNye,J.S,Zelikow,P.PandKing,D.D.Eds,WhyPeopleDon'tTrustGovernment[M].London,England;Cambridge,Massachusetts:HarvardUniversityPress,1997:217-236ShiTian-jian.CulturalValuesandPoliticalTrust:AComparisonofthePeople’RepublicsofChinaandTaiwan,ComparativePolitics,Jul.,2001(33):401-419JacekKochanowicz.Trust,Confidence,andSocialCapitalinPoland:AHistoricalPerspective.InBoRothesteinEds,SocialTrapsandtheProblemofTrust[M].Cambridge,UK:CambridgeUnivers