【管理層股權(quán)激勵(lì)、盈余管理與會(huì)計(jì)信息質(zhì)量研究文獻(xiàn)綜述5600字】

管理層股權(quán)激勵(lì)、盈余管理與會(huì)計(jì)信息質(zhì)量研究文獻(xiàn)綜述目錄TOC\o"1-2"\h\u159891有關(guān)管理層股權(quán)激勵(lì)的文獻(xiàn)綜述 1125252有關(guān)盈余管理的文獻(xiàn)綜述 270523有關(guān)會(huì)計(jì)信息質(zhì)量的文獻(xiàn)綜述 4284254文獻(xiàn)評(píng)述 528215參考文獻(xiàn) 51有關(guān)管理層股權(quán)激勵(lì)的文獻(xiàn)綜述管理層股權(quán)激勵(lì)是近年來許多學(xué)者們?cè)谥攸c(diǎn)關(guān)注的政策。研究人員對(duì)管理層股權(quán)激勵(lì)與公司績(jī)效的關(guān)系做了很多的研究，但至今還沒有得出統(tǒng)一的結(jié)論。Griffith(1999)在研究中提到，當(dāng)管理層在公司所占有的股份在0%-15%區(qū)間時(shí)，實(shí)行股權(quán)激勵(lì)政策與公司績(jī)效成呈正相關(guān)關(guān)系；當(dāng)管理層在公司所占有的股份在15%-50%區(qū)間時(shí)，實(shí)行股權(quán)激勵(lì)政策與公司績(jī)效成呈負(fù)相關(guān)關(guān)系；當(dāng)管理層在公司所占有的股份大于50%時(shí)，實(shí)行股權(quán)激勵(lì)政策和企業(yè)績(jī)效成呈現(xiàn)出正相關(guān)關(guān)系，意味著研究證明了管理層持股比例與公司績(jī)效表現(xiàn)為U型關(guān)系A(chǔ)DDINEN.CITE<EndNote><Cite><Author>Griffith</Author><Year>1999</Year><RecNum>24</RecNum><DisplayText><styleface="superscript">[2]</style></DisplayText><record><rec-number>24</rec-number><foreign-keys><keyapp="EN"db-id="f5va2w5xt9vax4e0tvivd2ek0wpe9fdzwws0"timestamp="1618196421">24</key></foreign-keys><ref-typename="JournalArticle">17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author>JohnM.Griffith</author></authors></contributors><auth-address>SchoolofBusinessandEconomics,UniversityofMinnesota,Duluth,MN,USA;;21SchoolofBusiness,DepartmentofFinanceandMIS,UniversityofMinnesota,Duluth,MN55812‐2496,USA</auth-address><titles><title>CEOownershipandfirmvalue</title><secondary-title>ManagerialandDecisionEconomics</secondary-title></titles><periodical><full-title>ManagerialandDecisionEconomics</full-title></periodical><volume>20</volume><number>1</number><dates><year>1999</year></dates><isbn>0143-6570</isbn><urls></urls><remote-database-provider>Cnki</remote-database-provider></record></Cite></EndNote>[2]。但是Brick(2006)的研究認(rèn)為公司利潤與管理層持股比例呈負(fù)相關(guān)關(guān)系A(chǔ)DDINEN.CITE<EndNote><Cite><Author>Brick</Author><Year>2005</Year><RecNum>20</RecNum><DisplayText><styleface="superscript">[3]</style></DisplayText><record><rec-number>20</rec-number><foreign-keys><keyapp="EN"db-id="f5va2w5xt9vax4e0tvivd2ek0wpe9fdzwws0"timestamp="1618196421">20</key></foreign-keys><ref-typename="JournalArticle">17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author>IvanE.Brick</author><author>OdedPalmon</author><author>JohnK.Wald</author></authors></contributors><auth-address>DepartmentofFinanceandEconomics,RutgersBusinessSchool-NewarkandNewBrunswick,NewarkNJ07102-1820,UnitedStates;;SmealCollegeofBusiness,ThePennsylvaniaStateUniversity,UniversityPark,PA16802,UnitedStates</auth-address><titles><title>CEOcompensation,directorcompensation,andfirmperformance:Evidenceofcronyism?</title><secondary-title>JournalofCorporateFinance</secondary-title></titles><periodical><full-title>JournalofCorporateFinance</full-title></periodical><volume>12</volume><number>3</number><keywords><keyword>Directorcompensation</keyword><keyword>CEOcompensation</keyword><keyword>Firmperformance</keyword><keyword>Cronyism</keyword></keywords><dates><year>2005</year></dates><isbn>0929-1199</isbn><urls></urls><remote-database-provider>Cnki</remote-database-provider></record></Cite></EndNote>[3]。盧俠?。?000）認(rèn)為由于一些激勵(lì)政策的實(shí)施會(huì)導(dǎo)致上市公司管理層為了獲得個(gè)人利益而對(duì)企業(yè)進(jìn)行利潤操縱，為了緩和因?yàn)樗袡?quán)和經(jīng)營權(quán)分離產(chǎn)生的企業(yè)經(jīng)營矛盾，從而達(dá)成企業(yè)所有者和管理層利益最大化的共同目標(biāo)，保護(hù)廣大投資者的利益，阻止上市公司進(jìn)行利潤操控，實(shí)施管理層股權(quán)激勵(lì)機(jī)制是很有意義的ADDINEN.CITE<EndNote><Cite><Author>盧俠巍</Author><Year>2000</Year><RecNum>22</RecNum><DisplayText><styleface="superscript">[4]</style></DisplayText><record><rec-number>22</rec-number><foreign-keys><keyapp="EN"db-id="f5va2w5xt9vax4e0tvivd2ek0wpe9fdzwws0"timestamp="1618196421">22</key></foreign-keys><ref-typename="JournalArticle">17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author>盧俠巍</author></authors></contributors><auth-address>中國財(cái)政部財(cái)政科學(xué)研究所</auth-address><titles><title>關(guān)于我國上市公司高層經(jīng)理人員操縱會(huì)計(jì)盈余行為與長期激勵(lì)機(jī)制問題研究</title><secondary-title>前沿</secondary-title></titles><periodical><full-title>前沿</full-title></periodical><pages>26-29</pages><number>06</number><keywords><keyword>高層經(jīng)理</keyword><keyword>長期激勵(lì)機(jī)制</keyword><keyword>我國上市公司</keyword><keyword>股票期權(quán)計(jì)劃</keyword><keyword>會(huì)計(jì)盈余</keyword><keyword>配股權(quán)</keyword></keywords><dates><year>2000</year></dates><isbn>15-1142/C</isbn><call-num>15-1142/C</call-num><urls></urls><remote-database-provider>Cnki</remote-database-provider></record></Cite></EndNote>[4]。張暉明和陳志廣（2002）發(fā)現(xiàn)企業(yè)績(jī)效與管理人員的持股比例之間存在著正向關(guān)系A(chǔ)DDINEN.CITE<EndNote><Cite><Author>張暉明</Author><Year>2002</Year><RecNum>21</RecNum><DisplayText><styleface="superscript">[5]</style></DisplayText><record><rec-number>21</rec-number><foreign-keys><keyapp="EN"db-id="f5va2w5xt9vax4e0tvivd2ek0wpe9fdzwws0"timestamp="1618196421">21</key></foreign-keys><ref-typename="JournalArticle">17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author>張暉明</author><author>陳志廣</author></authors></contributors><auth-address>復(fù)旦大學(xué)企業(yè)研究所,復(fù)旦大學(xué)企業(yè)研究所上海,200433,上海,200433</auth-address><titles><title>高級(jí)管理人員激勵(lì)與企業(yè)績(jī)效——以滬市上市公司為樣本的實(shí)證研究</title><secondary-title>世界經(jīng)濟(jì)文匯</secondary-title></titles><periodical><full-title>世界經(jīng)濟(jì)文匯</full-title></periodical><pages>29-37</pages><number>04</number><keywords><keyword>高級(jí)管理人員</keyword><keyword>持股</keyword><keyword>企業(yè)績(jī)效</keyword></keywords><dates><year>2002</year></dates><call-num>31-1139/F</call-num><urls></urls><remote-database-provider>Cnki</remote-database-provider></record></Cite></EndNote>[5]。李增泉（2000）認(rèn)為我國管理層的持股比例比較低，針對(duì)上市公司來說，股權(quán)激勵(lì)并未對(duì)企業(yè)產(chǎn)生明顯影響ADDINEN.CITE<EndNote><Cite><Author>李增泉</Author><Year>2000</Year><RecNum>23</RecNum><DisplayText><styleface="superscript">[6]</style></DisplayText><record><rec-number>23</rec-number><foreign-keys><keyapp="EN"db-id="f5va2w5xt9vax4e0tvivd2ek0wpe9fdzwws0"timestamp="1618196421">23</key></foreign-keys><ref-typename="JournalArticle">17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author>李增泉</author></authors></contributors><auth-address>上海財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)會(huì)計(jì)學(xué)院!200083</auth-address><titles><title>激勵(lì)機(jī)制與企業(yè)績(jī)效——一項(xiàng)基于上市公司的實(shí)證研究</title><secondary-title>會(huì)計(jì)研究</secondary-title></titles><periodical><full-title>會(huì)計(jì)研究</full-title></periodical><pages>24-30</pages><number>01</number><keywords><keyword>持股比例</keyword><keyword>年度報(bào)酬</keyword><keyword>股票期權(quán)</keyword></keywords><dates><year>2000</year></dates><isbn>11-1078/F</isbn><call-num>11-1078/F</call-num><urls></urls><remote-database-provider>Cnki</remote-database-provider></record></Cite></EndNote>[6]。吳娓等（2006）通過對(duì)比股權(quán)激勵(lì)在其他國家的境遇，研究不同狀況下管理層對(duì)對(duì)外披露的信息質(zhì)量的態(tài)度；最終認(rèn)為當(dāng)企業(yè)正常經(jīng)營時(shí)，企業(yè)管理層并不會(huì)修改會(huì)計(jì)信息；當(dāng)企業(yè)的經(jīng)營狀況較差時(shí)，企業(yè)管理層會(huì)去修改對(duì)外披露的財(cái)務(wù)指標(biāo)ADDINEN.CITE<EndNote><Cite><Author>吳娓</Author><Year>2006</Year><RecNum>19</RecNum><DisplayText><styleface="superscript">[7]</style></DisplayText><record><rec-number>19</rec-number><foreign-keys><keyapp="EN"db-id="f5va2w5xt9vax4e0tvivd2ek0wpe9fdzwws0"timestamp="1618196421">19</key></foreign-keys><ref-typename="JournalArticle">17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author>吳娓</author><author>涂燕</author><author>付強(qiáng)</author></authors></contributors><auth-address>西南財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué),北京航空航天大學(xué)公共管理學(xué)院,西南民族大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)院四川成都610074,北京100083,四川成都610000</auth-address><titles><title>財(cái)務(wù)造假、盈余管理與管理層期權(quán)激勵(lì)</title><secondary-title>內(nèi)蒙古社會(huì)科學(xué)(漢文版)</secondary-title></titles><periodical><full-title>內(nèi)蒙古社會(huì)科學(xué)(漢文版)</full-title></periodical><pages>72-75</pages><number>03</number><keywords><keyword>股權(quán)激勵(lì)</keyword><keyword>財(cái)務(wù)造假</keyword><keyword>盈余管理</keyword></keywords><dates><year>2006</year></dates><isbn>1003-5281</isbn><call-num>15-1011</call-num><urls></urls><remote-database-provider>Cnki</remote-database-provider></record></Cite></EndNote>[7]。夏紀(jì)軍和張晏（2008）認(rèn)為上市公司的企業(yè)所有者與管理層存在著難以調(diào)節(jié)的矛盾，國有控股公司中的矛盾較民營控股公司中的矛盾明顯，規(guī)模擴(kuò)大速度快的公司中的矛盾較規(guī)模擴(kuò)大速度慢的公司中的矛盾明顯，即企業(yè)管理層股權(quán)激勵(lì)會(huì)對(duì)企業(yè)績(jī)效產(chǎn)生負(fù)作用ADDINEN.CITE<EndNote><Cite><Author>夏紀(jì)軍</Author><Year>2008</Year><RecNum>18</RecNum><DisplayText><styleface="superscript">[8]</style></DisplayText><record><rec-number>18</rec-number><foreign-keys><keyapp="EN"db-id="f5va2w5xt9vax4e0tvivd2ek0wpe9fdzwws0"timestamp="1618196421">18</key></foreign-keys><ref-typename="JournalArticle">17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author>夏紀(jì)軍</author><author>張晏</author></authors></contributors><auth-address>上海財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)院;復(fù)旦大學(xué)中國社會(huì)主義市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)研究中心;</auth-address><titles><title>控制權(quán)與激勵(lì)的沖突——兼對(duì)股權(quán)激勵(lì)有效性的實(shí)證分析</title><secondary-title>經(jīng)濟(jì)研究</secondary-title></titles><periodical><full-title>經(jīng)濟(jì)研究</full-title></periodical><pages>87-98</pages><number>03</number><keywords><keyword>大股東控制權(quán)</keyword><keyword>股權(quán)集中度</keyword><keyword>股權(quán)激勵(lì)</keyword><keyword>公司績(jī)效</keyword></keywords><dates><year>2008</year></dates><isbn>0577-9154</isbn><call-num>11-1081/F</call-num><urls></urls><remote-database-provider>Cnki</remote-database-provider></record></Cite></EndNote>[8]。周雪梅（2018）通過研究上交所和深交所兩所的A股上市公司數(shù)據(jù)，發(fā)現(xiàn)實(shí)行管理層股權(quán)激勵(lì)政策的公司對(duì)其真實(shí)活動(dòng)利潤管理產(chǎn)生反向作用ADDINEN.CITE<EndNote><Cite><Author>周雪梅</Author><Year>2018</Year><RecNum>17</RecNum><DisplayText><styleface="superscript">[9]</style></DisplayText><record><rec-number>17</rec-number><foreign-keys><keyapp="EN"db-id="f5va2w5xt9vax4e0tvivd2ek0wpe9fdzwws0"timestamp="1618196421">17</key></foreign-keys><ref-typename="JournalArticle">17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author>周雪梅</author></authors></contributors><auth-address>鄭州升達(dá)經(jīng)貿(mào)管理學(xué)院;</auth-address><titles><title>內(nèi)部控制質(zhì)量、高管激勵(lì)與盈余管理</title><secondary-title>財(cái)會(huì)通訊</secondary-title></titles><periodical><full-title>財(cái)會(huì)通訊</full-title></periodical><pages>49-53</pages><number>24</number><keywords><keyword>內(nèi)部控制質(zhì)量</keyword><keyword>高管激勵(lì)</keyword><keyword>盈余管理</keyword></keywords><dates><year>2018</year></dates><isbn>1002-8072</isbn><call-num>42-1103/F</call-num><urls></urls><remote-database-provider>Cnki</remote-database-provider></record></Cite></EndNote>[9]。研究企業(yè)實(shí)施管理層股權(quán)激勵(lì)政策和企業(yè)避稅問題的文獻(xiàn)較少，林兢、鄭晶（2017）通過對(duì)2018-2013年上交所和深交所A股上市公司的數(shù)據(jù)進(jìn)行研究得出管理層股權(quán)激勵(lì)政策可以達(dá)到減少企業(yè)避稅行為的發(fā)生ADDINEN.CITE<EndNote><Cite><Author>林兢</Author><Year>2017</Year><RecNum>288</RecNum><DisplayText><styleface="superscript">[10]</style></DisplayText><record><rec-number>288</rec-number><foreign-keys><keyapp="EN"db-id="f5va2w5xt9vax4e0tvivd2ek0wpe9fdzwws0"timestamp="1618383852">288</key></foreign-keys><ref-typename="JournalArticle">17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author>林兢</author><author>鄭晶晶</author></authors></contributors><auth-address>福州大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)與管理學(xué)院;</auth-address><titles><title>管理層持股、企業(yè)避稅與債務(wù)成本研究</title><secondary-title>財(cái)會(huì)通訊</secondary-title></titles><periodical><full-title>財(cái)會(huì)通訊</full-title></periodical><pages>93-98</pages><number>09</number><keywords><keyword>企業(yè)避稅</keyword><keyword>債務(wù)成本</keyword><keyword>管理層持股</keyword><keyword>信息不對(duì)稱</keyword></keywords><dates><year>2017</year></dates><isbn>1002-8072</isbn><call-num>42-1103/F</call-num><urls></urls><remote-database-provider>Cnki</remote-database-provider></record></Cite></EndNote>[10]。但是劉華、劉江、張?zhí)烀簦?010）卻認(rèn)為管理層股權(quán)激勵(lì)政策會(huì)刺激管理層為了提高公司利潤而產(chǎn)生避稅行為ADDINEN.CITE<EndNote><Cite><Author>劉華</Author><Year>2010</Year><RecNum>305</RecNum><DisplayText><styleface="superscript">[11]</style></DisplayText><record><rec-number>305</rec-number><foreign-keys><keyapp="EN"db-id="f5va2w5xt9vax4e0tvivd2ek0wpe9fdzwws0"timestamp="1618383852">305</key></foreign-keys><ref-typename="JournalArticle">17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author>劉華</author><author>劉江</author><author>張?zhí)烀?lt;/author></authors></contributors><auth-address>華中科技大學(xué)管理學(xué)院;</auth-address><titles><title>管理層股權(quán)激勵(lì)與企業(yè)避稅關(guān)聯(lián)關(guān)系的實(shí)證分析</title><secondary-title>涉外稅務(wù)</secondary-title></titles><periodical><full-title>涉外稅務(wù)</full-title></periodical><pages>37-40</pages><number>12</number><keywords><keyword>避稅</keyword><keyword>所得稅</keyword><keyword>股權(quán)激勵(lì)</keyword></keywords><dates><year>2010</year></dates><isbn>1006-3056</isbn><call-num>11-5647/F</call-num><urls></urls><remote-database-provider>Cnki</remote-database-provider></record></Cite></EndNote>[11]。近年來關(guān)于企業(yè)實(shí)行管理層股權(quán)激勵(lì)政策與會(huì)計(jì)信息質(zhì)量的文獻(xiàn)越來越多。韓丹等（2007）將審計(jì)意見作為因變量來衡量上市公司的會(huì)計(jì)信息質(zhì)量，并得出管理層的持股比例與會(huì)計(jì)信息質(zhì)量之間呈負(fù)相關(guān)關(guān)系A(chǔ)DDINEN.CITE<EndNote><Cite><Author>韓丹</Author><Year>2007</Year><RecNum>266</RecNum><DisplayText><styleface="superscript">[12]</style></DisplayText><record><rec-number>266</rec-number><foreign-keys><keyapp="EN"db-id="f5va2w5xt9vax4e0tvivd2ek0wpe9fdzwws0"timestamp="1618382923">266</key></foreign-keys><ref-typename="JournalArticle">17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author>韓丹</author><author>閔亮</author><author>陳婷</author></authors></contributors><auth-address>西安交通大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)與金融學(xué)院,浙江財(cái)經(jīng)學(xué)院會(huì)計(jì)學(xué)院,西安交通大學(xué)管理學(xué)院西安710049,杭州310018,西安710049</auth-address><titles><title>管理層股權(quán)激勵(lì)與上市公司會(huì)計(jì)造假相關(guān)性的實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)</title><secondary-title>統(tǒng)計(jì)與決策</secondary-title></titles><periodical><full-title>統(tǒng)計(jì)與決策</full-title></periodical><pages>69-72</pages><number>18</number><keywords><keyword>股權(quán)激勵(lì)</keyword><keyword>公司治理</keyword><keyword>會(huì)計(jì)造假</keyword></keywords><dates><year>2007</year></dates><isbn>1002-6487</isbn><call-num>42-1009/C</call-num><urls></urls><remote-database-provider>Cnki</remote-database-provider></record></Cite></EndNote>[12]。張程睿（2010）認(rèn)為企業(yè)管理層的持股比例和管理層自由度有正相關(guān)關(guān)系A(chǔ)DDINEN.CITE<EndNote><Cite><Author>張程睿</Author><Year>2010</Year><RecNum>256</RecNum><DisplayText><styleface="superscript">[13]</style></DisplayText><record><rec-number>256</rec-number><foreign-keys><keyapp="EN"db-id="f5va2w5xt9vax4e0tvivd2ek0wpe9fdzwws0"timestamp="1618382923">256</key></foreign-keys><ref-typename="JournalArticle">17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author>張程睿</author></authors></contributors><auth-address>華南師范大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)與管理學(xué)院;</auth-address><titles><title>內(nèi)部人動(dòng)機(jī)、公司治理與信息披露質(zhì)量——基于對(duì)深圳上市公司的實(shí)證分析</title><secondary-title>經(jīng)濟(jì)與管理研究</secondary-title></titles><periodical><full-title>經(jīng)濟(jì)與管理研究</full-title></periodical><pages>10-18</pages><number>05</number><keywords><keyword>投資者保護(hù)</keyword><keyword>信息披露質(zhì)量</keyword><keyword>內(nèi)部人動(dòng)機(jī)</keyword><keyword>公司治理</keyword></keywords><dates><year>2010</year></dates><isbn>1000-7636</isbn><call-num>11-1384/F</call-num><urls></urls><remote-database-provider>Cnki</remote-database-provider></record></Cite></EndNote>[13]。彭啟發(fā)和李彬（2010）研究得出將管理層持股比例提高的話，企業(yè)的會(huì)計(jì)信息質(zhì)量也會(huì)受到影響進(jìn)而相應(yīng)提高ADDINEN.CITE<EndNote><Cite><Author>彭啟發(fā)</Author><Year>2010</Year><RecNum>257</RecNum><DisplayText><styleface="superscript">[14]</style></DisplayText><record><rec-number>257</rec-number><foreign-keys><keyapp="EN"db-id="f5va2w5xt9vax4e0tvivd2ek0wpe9fdzwws0"timestamp="1618382923">257</key></foreign-keys><ref-typename="JournalArticle">17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author>彭啟發(fā)</author><author>李彬</author></authors></contributors><auth-address>重慶理工大學(xué)會(huì)計(jì)學(xué)院;</auth-address><titles><title>上市公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)對(duì)會(huì)計(jì)信息披露質(zhì)量影響的實(shí)證研究</title><secondary-title>財(cái)會(huì)通訊</secondary-title></titles><periodical><full-title>財(cái)會(huì)通訊</full-title></periodical><pages>91-93+98</pages><number>09</number><keywords><keyword>上市公司</keyword><keyword>治理結(jié)構(gòu)</keyword><keyword>信息披露質(zhì)量</keyword></keywords><dates><year>2010</year></dates><isbn>1002-8072</isbn><call-num>42-1103/F</call-num><urls></urls><remote-database-provider>Cnki</remote-database-provider></record></Cite></EndNote>[14]。肖淑芳等（2009）認(rèn)為進(jìn)行管理層股權(quán)激勵(lì)會(huì)產(chǎn)生盈余管理ADDINEN.CITE<EndNote><Cite><Author>肖淑芳</Author><Year>2009</Year><RecNum>260</RecNum><DisplayText><styleface="superscript">[15]</style></DisplayText><record><rec-number>260</rec-number><foreign-keys><keyapp="EN"db-id="f5va2w5xt9vax4e0tvivd2ek0wpe9fdzwws0"timestamp="1618382923">260</key></foreign-keys><ref-typename="JournalArticle">17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author>肖淑芳</author><author>張晨宇</author><author>張超</author><author>軒然</author></authors></contributors><auth-address>北京理工大學(xué)管理與經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)院;</auth-address><titles><title>股權(quán)激勵(lì)計(jì)劃公告前的盈余管理——來自中國上市公司的經(jīng)驗(yàn)證據(jù)</title><secondary-title>南開管理評(píng)論</secondary-title></titles><periodical><full-title>南開管理評(píng)論</full-title></periodical><pages>113-119+127</pages><volume>12</volume><number>04</number><keywords><keyword>股權(quán)激勵(lì)</keyword><keyword>盈余管理</keyword><keyword>操縱性應(yīng)計(jì)利潤</keyword><keyword>非經(jīng)常性損益</keyword></keywords><dates><year>2009</year></dates><isbn>1008-3448</isbn><call-num>12-1288/F</call-num><urls></urls><remote-database-provider>Cnki</remote-database-provider></record></Cite></EndNote>[15]。劉躍和彭春香（2013）主要是研究中小板上市公司的相關(guān)情況，他們得出中小板上市公司的管理層股權(quán)激勵(lì)對(duì)會(huì)計(jì)信息質(zhì)量有影響，并且該影響為正向影響的結(jié)論ADDINEN.CITE<EndNote><Cite><Author>劉躍</Author><Year>2013</Year><RecNum>248</RecNum><DisplayText><styleface="superscript">[16]</style></DisplayText><record><rec-number>248</rec-number><foreign-keys><keyapp="EN"db-id="f5va2w5xt9vax4e0tvivd2ek0wpe9fdzwws0"timestamp="1618382923">248</key></foreign-keys><ref-typename="JournalArticle">17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author>劉躍</author><author>彭春香</author></authors></contributors><auth-address>重慶郵電大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)管理學(xué)院;</auth-address><titles><title>信息披露質(zhì)量與管理層激勵(lì)實(shí)證研究——基于中小板上市公司數(shù)據(jù)</title><secondary-title>財(cái)會(huì)通訊</secondary-title></titles><periodical><full-title>財(cái)會(huì)通訊</full-title></periodical><pages>57-59</pages><number>36</number><keywords><keyword>委托代理</keyword><keyword>需求層次論</keyword><keyword>控制權(quán)激勵(lì)</keyword><keyword>混合回歸</keyword></keywords><dates><year>2013</year></dates><isbn>1002-8072</isbn><call-num>42-1103/F</call-num><urls></urls><remote-database-provider>Cnki</remote-database-provider></record></Cite></EndNote>[16]。謝振蓮（2011）ADDINEN.CITE<EndNote><Cite><Author>謝振蓮</Author><Year>2011</Year><RecNum>253</RecNum><DisplayText><styleface="superscript">[17]</style></DisplayText><record><rec-number>253</rec-number><foreign-keys><keyapp="EN"db-id="f5va2w5xt9vax4e0tvivd2ek0wpe9fdzwws0"timestamp="1618382923">253</key></foreign-keys><ref-typename="JournalArticle">17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author>謝振蓮</author><author>呂聰慧</author></authors></contributors><auth-address>河北經(jīng)貿(mào)大學(xué);石家莊郵電職業(yè)技術(shù)學(xué)院;</auth-address><titles><title>管理層股權(quán)激勵(lì)對(duì)盈余管理的影響研究</title><secondary-title>財(cái)政研究</secondary-title></titles><periodical><full-title>財(cái)政研究</full-title></periodical><pages>58-61</pages><number>06</number><keywords><keyword>股權(quán)激勵(lì)</keyword><keyword>盈余管理</keyword><keyword>管理層</keyword><keyword>控制權(quán)</keyword></keywords><dates><year>2011</year></dates><isbn>1003-2878</isbn><call-num>11-1077/F</call-num><urls></urls><remote-database-provider>Cnki</remote-database-provider></record></Cite></EndNote>[17]、張蕪（2015）ADDINEN.CITE<EndNote><Cite><Author>張芫</Author><Year>2015</Year><RecNum>242</RecNum><DisplayText><styleface="superscript">[18]</style></DisplayText><record><rec-number>242</rec-number><foreign-keys><keyapp="EN"db-id="f5va2w5xt9vax4e0tvivd2ek0wpe9fdzwws0"timestamp="1618382923">242</key></foreign-keys><ref-typename="JournalArticle">17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author>張芫</author><author>張建平</author></authors></contributors><auth-address>太原理工大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)管理學(xué)院;太原理工大學(xué)現(xiàn)代科技學(xué)院;</auth-address><titles><title>管理層激勵(lì)與盈余管理的實(shí)證研究——基于制造業(yè)上市公司的經(jīng)驗(yàn)數(shù)據(jù)</title><secondary-title>會(huì)計(jì)之友</secondary-title></titles><periodical><full-title>會(huì)計(jì)之友</full-title></periodical><pages>58-62</pages><number>15</number><keywords><keyword>貨幣性薪酬</keyword><keyword>股權(quán)激勵(lì)</keyword><keyword>盈余管理</keyword><keyword>制造業(yè)</keyword></keywords><dates><year>2015</year></dates><isbn>1004-5937</isbn><call-num>14-1063/F</call-num><urls></urls><remote-database-provider>Cnki</remote-database-provider></record></Cite></EndNote>[18]進(jìn)行實(shí)證分析指出在其研究期間，進(jìn)行管理層股權(quán)激勵(lì)政策的企業(yè)更傾向于進(jìn)行盈余管理行為。2有關(guān)盈余管理的文獻(xiàn)綜述在過去的時(shí)間里，企業(yè)一直采用應(yīng)計(jì)盈余管理來對(duì)企業(yè)利潤進(jìn)行調(diào)節(jié)。但有部分學(xué)者發(fā)現(xiàn)，企業(yè)還可以通過一些真實(shí)的交易對(duì)利潤進(jìn)行調(diào)節(jié)，但由于當(dāng)時(shí)真實(shí)盈余管理的概念還沒有被完整提出，所以學(xué)者們對(duì)企業(yè)通過真實(shí)盈余管理的研究較少。Roychowdhury（2006）對(duì)真實(shí)盈余管理做了完整的闡釋，受到廣大學(xué)者的認(rèn)可，并且提出了對(duì)真實(shí)盈余管理的計(jì)量研究方法ADDINEN.CITE<EndNote><Cite><Author>Roychowdhury</Author><Year>2006</Year><RecNum>30</RecNum><DisplayText><styleface="superscript">[19]</style></DisplayText><record><rec-number>30</rec-number><foreign-keys><keyapp="EN"db-id="f5va2w5xt9vax4e0tvivd2ek0wpe9fdzwws0"timestamp="1618198521">30</key></foreign-keys><ref-typename="JournalArticle">17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author>SugataRoychowdhury</author></authors></contributors><auth-address>SloanSchoolofManagement,MassachusettsInstituteofTechnology,Cambridge,MA02142,USA</auth-address><titles><title>Earningsmanagementthroughrealactivitiesmanipulation</title><secondary-title>JournalofAccountingandEconomics</secondary-title></titles><periodical><full-title>JournalofAccountingandEconomics</full-title></periodical><volume>42</volume><number>3</number><keywords><keyword>Capitalmarkets</keyword><keyword>Accountingchoice</keyword><keyword>Earningsmanipulation</keyword></keywords><dates><year>2006</year></dates><isbn>0165-4101</isbn><urls></urls><remote-database-provider>Cnki</remote-database-provider></record></Cite></EndNote>[19]。王福勝（2014）指出公司通過對(duì)真實(shí)的經(jīng)濟(jì)交易進(jìn)行盈余管理時(shí)會(huì)損害公司的業(yè)績(jī)和企業(yè)價(jià)值A(chǔ)DDINEN.CITE<EndNote><Cite><Author>王福勝</Author><Year>2014</Year><RecNum>27</RecNum><DisplayText><styleface="superscript">[20]</style></DisplayText><record><rec-number>27</rec-number><foreign-keys><keyapp="EN"db-id="f5va2w5xt9vax4e0tvivd2ek0wpe9fdzwws0"timestamp="1618198521">27</key></foreign-keys><ref-typename="JournalArticle">17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author>王福勝</author><author>吉姍姍</author><author>程富</author></authors></contributors><auth-address>哈爾濱工業(yè)大學(xué)管理學(xué)院;</auth-address><titles><title>盈余管理對(duì)上市公司未來經(jīng)營業(yè)績(jī)的影響研究——基于應(yīng)計(jì)盈余管理與真實(shí)盈余管理比較視角</title><secondary-title>南開管理評(píng)論</secondary-title></titles><periodical><full-title>南開管理評(píng)論</full-title></periodical><pages>95-106</pages><volume>17</volume><number>02</number><keywords><keyword>應(yīng)計(jì)盈余管理</keyword><keyword>真實(shí)盈余管理</keyword><keyword>未來經(jīng)營業(yè)績(jī)</keyword><keyword>盈余閾值</keyword><keyword>信號(hào)傳遞</keyword></keywords><dates><year>2014</year></dates><isbn>1008-3448</isbn><call-num>12-1288/F</call-num><urls></urls><remote-database-provider>Cnki</remote-database-provider></record></Cite></EndNote>[20]。當(dāng)真實(shí)盈余管理被提出之后，學(xué)者們首先想到的是對(duì)應(yīng)計(jì)盈余管理與真實(shí)盈余管理的關(guān)系進(jìn)行研究。李增福等(2011)認(rèn)為公司預(yù)期稅率的上升可能會(huì)導(dǎo)致企業(yè)進(jìn)行真實(shí)盈余管理ADDINEN.CITE<EndNote><Cite><Author>李增福</Author><Year>2011</Year><RecNum>211</RecNum><DisplayText><styleface="superscript">[21]</style></DisplayText><record><rec-number>211</rec-number><foreign-keys><keyapp="EN"db-id="f5va2w5xt9vax4e0tvivd2ek0wpe9fdzwws0"timestamp="1618381426">211</key></foreign-keys><ref-typename="JournalArticle">17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author>李增福</author><author>董志強(qiáng)</author><author>連玉君</author></authors></contributors><auth-address>華南師范大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)與管理學(xué)院;華南師范大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)與管理學(xué)院、華南市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)研究中心;中山大學(xué)嶺南學(xué)院金融系;中山大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)研究院;</auth-address><titles><title>應(yīng)計(jì)項(xiàng)目盈余管理還是真實(shí)活動(dòng)盈余管理?——基于我國2007年所得稅改革的研究</title><secondary-title>管理世界</secondary-title></titles><periodical><full-title>管理世界</full-title></periodical><pages>121-134</pages><number>01</number><keywords><keyword>所得稅改革</keyword><keyword>盈余管理</keyword><keyword>應(yīng)計(jì)項(xiàng)目操控</keyword><keyword>真實(shí)活動(dòng)操控</keyword></keywords><dates><year>2011</year></dates><isbn>1002-5502</isbn><call-num>11-1235/F</call-num><urls></urls><remote-database-provider>Cnki</remote-database-provider></record></Cite></EndNote>[21]。謝柳芳等（2013）認(rèn)為在創(chuàng)業(yè)板的退出股權(quán)市場(chǎng)的制度頒布后，公司進(jìn)行應(yīng)計(jì)盈余管理的動(dòng)機(jī)減小，進(jìn)行真實(shí)盈余管理的動(dòng)機(jī)變大ADDINEN.CITE<EndNote><Cite><Author>謝柳芳</Author><Year>2013</Year><RecNum>207</RecNum><DisplayText><styleface="superscript">[22]</style></DisplayText><record><rec-number>207</rec-number><foreign-keys><keyapp="EN"db-id="f5va2w5xt9vax4e0tvivd2ek0wpe9fdzwws0"timestamp="1618381426">207</key></foreign-keys><ref-typename="JournalArticle">17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author>謝柳芳</author><author>朱榮</author><author>何苦</author></authors></contributors><auth-address>西南財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)會(huì)計(jì)學(xué)院;成都紡織高等?？茖W(xué)校經(jīng)管學(xué)院;貴州大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)院;</auth-address><titles><title>退市制度對(duì)創(chuàng)業(yè)板上市公司盈余管理行為的影響——基于應(yīng)計(jì)與真實(shí)盈余管理的分析</title><secondary-title>審計(jì)研究</secondary-title></titles><periodical><full-title>審計(jì)研究</full-title></periodical><pages>95-102</pages><number>01</number><keywords><keyword>創(chuàng)業(yè)板</keyword><keyword>退市制度</keyword><keyword>應(yīng)計(jì)盈余管理</keyword><keyword>真實(shí)盈余管理</keyword></keywords><dates><year>2013</year></dates><isbn>1002-4239</isbn><call-num>11-1024/F</call-num><urls></urls><remote-database-provider>Cnki</remote-database-provider></record></Cite></EndNote>[22]。張攀（2012）根據(jù)博弈論的相關(guān)理論來研究?jī)煞N盈余管理的動(dòng)機(jī)，指出企業(yè)經(jīng)營者會(huì)根據(jù)實(shí)際情況來選擇盈余管理模式ADDINEN.CITE<EndNote><Cite><Author>張攀</Author><Year>2012</Year><RecNum>299</RecNum><DisplayText><styleface="superscript">[23]</style></DisplayText><record><rec-number>299</rec-number><foreign-keys><keyapp="EN"db-id="f5va2w5xt9vax4e0tvivd2ek0wpe9fdzwws0"timestamp="1618383852">299</key></foreign-keys><ref-typename="JournalArticle">17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author>張攀</author></authors></contributors><auth-address>西南財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)會(huì)計(jì)學(xué)院;</auth-address><titles><title>上市公司真實(shí)盈余管理與應(yīng)計(jì)盈余管理動(dòng)機(jī)異同——基于博弈視角</title><secondary-title>中國外資</secondary-title></titles><periodical><full-title>中國外資</full-title></periodical><pages>185</pages><number>06</number><keywords><keyword>真實(shí)盈余管理</keyword><keyword>應(yīng)計(jì)盈余管理</keyword><keyword>異同</keyword></keywords><dates><year>2012</year></dates><isbn>1004-8146</isbn><call-num>11-3073/F</call-num><urls></urls><remote-database-provider>Cnki</remote-database-provider></record></Cite></EndNote>[23]。劉啟亮等(2009)通過借鑒Cohen等(2008)ADDINEN.CITE<EndNote><Cite><Author>Cohen</Author><Year>2008</Year><RecNum>156</RecNum><DisplayText><styleface="superscript">[24]</style></DisplayText><record><rec-number>156</rec-number><foreign-keys><keyapp="EN"db-id="f5va2w5xt9vax4e0tvivd2ek0wpe9fdzwws0"timestamp="1618212113">156</key></foreign-keys><ref-typename="JournalArticle">17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author>DanielA.Cohen</author><author>AiyeshaDey</author><author>ThomasZ.Lys</author></authors></contributors><titles><title>RealandAccrual-BasedEarningsManagementinthePre-andPost-Sarbanes-OxleyPeriods</title><secondary-title>TheAccountingReview</secondary-title></titles><periodical><full-title>TheAccountingReview</full-title></periodical><volume>83</volume><number>3</number><dates><year>2008</year></dates><isbn>0001-4826</isbn><urls></urls><remote-database-provider>Cnki</remote-database-provider></record></Cite></EndNote>[24]的相關(guān)研究,將我國現(xiàn)在遵循的空間準(zhǔn)則作為背景指出企業(yè)實(shí)行應(yīng)計(jì)盈余管理時(shí)，會(huì)加入真實(shí)盈余管理降低利潤ADDINEN.CITE<EndNote><Cite><Author>劉啟亮</Author><Year>2009</Year><RecNum>217</RecNum><DisplayText><styleface="superscript">[25]</style></DisplayText><record><rec-number>217</rec-number><foreign-keys><keyapp="EN"db-id="f5va2w5xt9vax4e0tvivd2ek0wpe9fdzwws0"timestamp="1618381426">217</key></foreign-keys><ref-typename="ConferenceProceedings">10</ref-type><contributors><authors><author>劉啟亮</author><author>何威風(fēng)</author><author>羅樂</author></authors><subsidiary-authors><author>中國會(huì)計(jì)學(xué)會(huì)審計(jì)專業(yè)委員會(huì),</author></subsidiary-authors></contributors><auth-address>武漢大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)與管理學(xué)院;中南財(cái)經(jīng)政法大學(xué)會(huì)計(jì)學(xué)院;北京大學(xué)光華管理學(xué)院;</auth-address><titles><title>IFRS的強(qiáng)制采用、新法律實(shí)施與應(yīng)計(jì)及真實(shí)盈余管理</title><secondary-title>中國會(huì)計(jì)學(xué)會(huì)第八屆全國會(huì)計(jì)信息化年會(huì)</secondary-title></titles><pages>32</pages><keywords><keyword>新法律</keyword><keyword>新會(huì)計(jì)準(zhǔn)則</keyword><keyword>IFRS</keyword><keyword>應(yīng)計(jì)盈余管理</keyword><keyword>真實(shí)盈余管理</keyword></keywords><dates><year>2009</year></dates><pub-location>中國天津</pub-location><urls></urls><remote-database-provider>Cnki</remote-database-provider></record></Cite></EndNote>[25]。田莉等(2016)指出當(dāng)公司遵循嚴(yán)格的會(huì)計(jì)準(zhǔn)則時(shí)更偏向使用真實(shí)盈余管理對(duì)利潤進(jìn)行調(diào)整ADDINEN.CITE<EndNote><Cite><Author>田莉</Author><Year>2016</Year><RecNum>201</RecNum><DisplayText><styleface="superscript">[26]</style></DisplayText><record><rec-number>201</rec-number><foreign-keys><keyapp="EN"db-id="f5va2w5xt9vax4e0tvivd2ek0wpe9fdzwws0"timestamp="1618381426">201</key></foreign-keys><ref-typename="JournalArticle">17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author>田莉</author><author>李祎</author><author>劉啟亮</author></authors></contributors><auth-address>華中科技大學(xué)管理學(xué)院;武漢大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)與管理學(xué)院;</auth-address><titles><title>IFRS強(qiáng)制采用、投資者保護(hù)、應(yīng)計(jì)與真實(shí)盈余管理——基于28個(gè)國家和地區(qū)的研究</title><secondary-title>會(huì)計(jì)與經(jīng)濟(jì)研究</secondary-title></titles><periodical><full-title>會(huì)計(jì)與經(jīng)濟(jì)研究</full-title></periodical><pages>3-24</pages><volume>30</volume><number>04</number><keywords><keyword>投資者保護(hù)</keyword><keyword>IFRS強(qiáng)制采用</keyword><keyword>應(yīng)計(jì)盈余管理</keyword