中國人口現(xiàn)狀調(diào)研和分析報告（英文版）-2024年1月上傳培訓(xùn)課件

POLITICS

&

SOCIETYChina’s

declining

populationAOverview

report

on

theeconomic

challenges

ofanagingsociety

inChinaTable

of

contentsDemographic

realitiesSocial

securityChinaversusIndia679Fillinggapsinthe

social

securitynetImprovingsocialinsurance

fundingBuildingupsufficientelderly

care272931EastAsia’sshrinkingpopulationsChina’sfastdemographicchangeDemographic

prospectsChina'sthinreproductivebaseTheoldreplacetheyoungRegionaldisparitiesConclusion

andoutlook131516Economic

transformationIntegratinganagingworkforceKeepinglaborparticipationhighImprovingproductivity2022232China

isgrowing

oldExecutive

summaryIn2022,

China’s

population

declinedfor

the

firsttime

insixdecades.

Thedecreaseof

850,000

people

isareminder

of

thefundamentaldemographic

changethatisgoing

oninthecountry.

Whilethenumberofbirthsislow

andfurtherdeclining,lifeexpectancy

isincreasing,

and

thenumberof

older

people

is

growing

rapidly.China,which

was

once

known

foritsyoungandquicklygrowing

population,mightsoonbecome

anexample

oftheopposite:

arapidlyagingand

shrinking

society.?

Thegovernment

isleft

with

fewoptions

to

influence

demographic

development.Duetothe

large

sizeof

thepopulation,immigration

isnot

arealistic

way

tosignificantlystrengthen

thelaborforce.

Atthesame

time,thebirthrateispusheddown

bythehigheconomic

pressure

felt

byfamilies.?

Withthelaborforce

shrinking,economic

growth

canonly

befueled

byinnovation,increased

productivity,andgainsfrom

international

cooperation.Highgrowth

rates

areessential

forimproving

China’sabilityto

cope

withdemographic

change.ForChina’seconomy

and

society,

demographic

changeposes

huge

challenges.Inthepast,China’seconomic

ascendance

was

fueled

byitscheap

laborforce.Underthechanging

demographic

conditions,thisgrowth

model

needs

to

bealtered

fundamentally.?

China’ssocial

insurance

system

isstillunderdeveloped

andlacksadequatefunding.

Withthenumberofretired

people

growing

rapidly,providing

socialsecurity

will

become

increasingly

challenging.While

populationagingisanissuefacingmany

countries

aroundtheglobe,thesituationinChina

is

particularlychallenging:ThisOverview

report

looks

indetailatthedifferent

aspects

of

demographic?

Demographic

changeinChina

hashappenedcomparatively

fastasaresultof

asuddenchangefromhighto

low

fertility

inthe1970s.

Today,alargeboomer

generation

will

soon

retire,

while

fewer

young

people

are

entering

thelaborforce.changeinChina

and

outlines

howthisisgoingtoinfluencethecountry’sfutureeconomic

and

social

development.301Demographic

realities?

China

versus

India?

EastAsia’sshrinkingpopulations?

China’sfastdemographic

changeDemographic

realitiesIn2022,

China’s

population

declinedfor

the

firsttime

indecades.

Notlong

ago,theCompared

with

its

Asian

neighbors,

China’s

change

in

fertilityhappened

relativelycountry

was

known

foritsdramatic

demographic

growth.

Inthefuture,however,

its

fast.

The

fall

in

fertilitywasenhanced

by

political

decisions

and

the

initiation

of

birthpopulationis

expected

toshrinkatanequally

strikingpace.

Thiscontrastswith

thedevelopment

inIndia,which,according

tothe

United

Nations,overtook

China

asthe

most

populouscountry

in2023

andisexpected

to

grow

furtherbythe

secondhalfofthe21st

century.

Atthe

end

of

the

century,Indiamighteven

havetwice

asmany

inhabitants

as

China.control

measures

in

the1970s,

which

were

later

institutionalized

under

thewell-known

one-child

policy.

The

fast

change

in

fertilitywas,

however,

stillvery

similar

tonon-socialist

countries

of

that

world

region,

such

as

SouthKorea

or

Singapore.The

change

in

fertility

resulted

in

a

robust

downward

trend

in

China’s

populationgrowth

rate.

Since

the

1970s,

annual

growth

has

weakened

gradually,

declining

fromnearly

three

percent

to

lessthan

one

percent

at

the

turn

of

the

century.

Eventually,

in2022,

China’s

population

shrank

for

the

first

time

since

1961.

At

the

sametime,

lifeAmong

Eastand

Southeast

Asiannations,China’sdevelopment

isfarfrom

unique.Many

countries

inthatpartoftheworld

are

experiencing

asimilardemographicchange.

Inthe

firsthalfofthe20th

century,each

woman

gavebirthto

between

five

expectancy

increased

steadily,

pushing

the

median

age

to

38

yearsin

2022,andseven

children,but

fertility

rates

dropped

markedly

inthe

second

halfofthecentury

toaroundtwo

children

perwoman.

Thisdevelopment

took

placeduringtimes

ofrapideconomic

growth.

However,

itisnotonly

related

toeconomicdevelopment

but

alsoto

fundamentalsocial

and

political

changes.comparable

to

that

in

the

United

States.

In

the

upcoming

years,

the

median

age

inChina

is

projected

to

quickly

leave

the

U.S.

average

behind,

reaching

48

yearsby

2040.5China’s

population

has

started

decliningIndianowhastheworld’s

largest

populationTotalpopulationinmillionsAfterdecades

ofstrong

demographic

growth,

China’spopulationpeaked

at1.426

billion

in2021.

Thecountry’s

populationisexpected

to

decrease

nearly

asfastasitgrew,

falling

below

800

million

bytheendofthe

21st

century.1,8001,6001,4001,2001,000Incontrast,according

toUNestimates,

India

replacedChina

as

the

world’s

most

populouscountry

in2023.India’spopulation

isforecast

togrow

foranother

40years,

peaking

atnearly

1.7

billionpeople

around2060.

Attheendof

the

21st

century,Indiamighthavetwice

asmany

inhabitants

asChina.20238006004002000TheUnitedStatesisprojected

tohavesustainedpopulationgrowth

throughout

the

century.

However,thisisonly

theresult

oftheU.S.being

oneof

the

mostattractiveimmigration

countries

intheworld.1950

1960

1970

1980

1990

2000

2010

2020

2030

2040

2050

2060

2070

2080

2090

2100IndiaChinaEuropeUnitedStates6Notes:India,

China,

Europe,United

States;1950

to

2020;

figures

areprojections

according

to

amedian

variantSources:

UNDESAPopulations

are

peaking

in

East

AsiaChina’sdemographic

development

isclose

to

thatof

SouthKorea’sPopulationgrowth

(1950=100)In

East

Asia,

most

countries

and

territories

showstrong

similarities

in

their

demographic

development:rapid

population

growth

inthe

20th

century,

peaksinthe

early

21st

century,

and

an

expected

fast

decreasethereafter.

China

and

South

Korea

reached

theirpopulation

peaks

around

the

same

time

between2020

and

2021.

The

populations

of

South

Korea

andChina

both

grew

by

around

160

percent

between1950

and2020.350%300%250%200%2023150%100%50%Thissimilarity

canmainlybeattributedto

comparableeconomic

and

social

developments

across

EastAsiancountries

andstrong

economic

growth

patterns.

Inthecaseof

Japan,the

country’s

early

economic

maturitymightbethe

main

determinant

foritsslowerpopulationgrowth

inthesecond

half

of

the

20thcentury

andthe

population

sizepeaking

alreadybefore

2010.0%1950

1960

1970

1980

1990

2000

2010

2020

2030

2040

2050

2060

2070

2080

2090

2100ChinaSouthKoreaTaiwanJapanNorth

Korea7Notes:China,

South

Korea,Taiwan,

NorthKorea,Japan;

1950

to

2020;

figures

areprojections

according

to

amedian

variant;

growthrates

calculated

bySources:

UNDESA;Fertility

in

East

and

Southeast

Asia

has

changed

from

high

to

lowTotal

fertility

ratesare

strikinglysimilarTotalfertilityrateinbirthsperwomanAmong

East

Asian

and

Southeast

Asian

nations,

thereare

similarities

in

total

fertility

rates.

Most

countriesor

territories

transitioned

from

around

five

to

sixchildren

per

woman

in

the

first

half

of

the

20thcentury

toonly

one

or

two

children

atthebeginningof

the

21st

century.876543210Thisdevelopment

took

place

duringtimes

of

rapideconomic

growth

and

fundamental

changes

insocialnorms

andbehaviors.

Thetransformation

was

notbound

toa

special

political

system

or

population

size

–it

happened

in

China

and

Singapore,each

offering

verydifferent

stylesof

government.

InChina,

the

changefrom

high

tolow

fertility

happened

comparatively

fast,most

similar

to

SouthKorea

and

Thailand.192019301940ChinaThailand19501960197019801990200020102020JapanSouthKoreaVietnamSingaporeIndonesiaNorth

Korea8Notes:Asia;

1920

to

2020;

all

data

given

is

an

average

ofthe

preceding

five-year

periodSources:

UNDESA;GapminderThe

sudden

change

of

fertility

in

ChinaFertility

rates

dropped

sharply

inthe

1970sTotalfertilityrateinChinaChina’s

rapid

changefrom

high

tolow

fertilityhasastrong

political

background.Inthe

country’searly

years,high

fertilitywas

seen

as

positive,a

signof

itspower.However,

atthe

startof

the

1970s,

highfertility

wasincreasingly

viewed

asanobstacle

to

economicgrowth.

Subsequently,strict

birth

control

measureswere

implemented.

These

measures

wereinstitutionalizedunderthe

so-called

one-child

policyintroduced

in1979.6.36.16.25.55.55.45.35.25.04.9The

fertility

rate

dropped

below

the

replacement

levelof

around2.1

childrenper

woman

in

the

1990s.

Sincethen,

fertilityhasremained

ata

comparatively

low

leveldespitea

gradual

relaxation

of

the

one-child

policy.3.02.72.51.81.71.61.61.61.619301940195019601970198019902000201020209Notes:China;

1930

to2020Sources:

UNDESA;Gapminder;

ID

1033738Population

growth

in

China

has

slowed

over

the

decadesPopulation

growth

finallyturned

negativein2022Year-on-year

populationgrowth3.0%Today,China’sweak

populationgrowth

andagingsociety

result

fromthecountry’sfastchangetolow

fertility

inthe1970s

andvery

low

birthratessincethe

1990s.2.5%2.0%1.5%1.0%0.5%0.0%-0.5%In2022,

China’s

population

shrunkforthefirsttimeinmore

than

six

decades.

Thiswas

several

years

earlierthan

expected

bythe

Chinese

government

and

theUN.

Although

thedecline

ofthebirth

rate

inthe1970swas

initiatedbypoliticalmeasures,

itwas

latersupported

byfundamentalchangesintheeconomicandsocial

environment.

Aswill

bediscussed

inchaptertwo,

populationgrowth

will

very

likely

remainon

adownward

trajectory

inthe

near

future.-0.06%202219701980199020002010202010

Notes:China;

1970

to2022Sources:

National

BureauofStatistics

ofChina;

ID27012902Demographic

prospects?

China’sthin

reproductive

base?

Theoldreplace

the

young?

Regional

disparitiesDemographic

prospectsFaced

with

adeclining

and

agingpopulationandthe

negative

repercussions

on

theeconomy,

theChinesegovernment

took

stepsto

support

families

and

childbirth.Birth

control

measures

were

gradually

lifted.Theone-child

policy

was

changedtotwo

children

in2015,

threechildren

in2021,

andfinally,allsanctionswereabolished.

Incontrast

toexpectations,

however,

thepolicy

changehad

nomajorinfluenceon

the

birthrate,which

didnotimprove

significantly.Thelow

numberof

birthsiscontrasted

bythe

rapidly

increasing

number

ofolderpeople

inthecountry.

Theshare

ofthepopulationaged

65

and

older

isexpected

tonearly

double

from14

percent

in2022

to

26

percent

by2040,

according

totheUnited

Nations.

Thiswill

put

highpressure

ontheeconomy,

as

the

working-agepopulationis

projected

to

decrease

to

63

percent

atthe

same

time.The

influence

of

demographic

change

will

be

felt

differently

across

thecountry.Economically

successful

cities

attracted

many

people

from

other

regions

in

thepast

and

will

continue

to

do

so

–

albeit

to

a

lesser

extent

–

in

thefuture.

Thestrong

economic

basis

of

these

cities

helps

themto

cope

with

population

aging,Thisindicatesthatintoday’sChina,

thenumberof

children

thatcouples

want

ismost

prominently

constrained

byeconomic

and

social

factors:

costsandopportunity

costsforraising

children,diminished

career

opportunities

forwomen,limited

childcare

support,and

changedsocial

and

private

norms.

Inthisregard,

the

which

will

beanissueinurban

areas

where

thebirth

rateistraditionally

low.situationinChina

is

notvery

different

from

thatofdeveloped

countries.

Muchmore

political

supportforfamilies

will

benecessary

toprevent

the

birthratefromdroppingfurther.

Thisproblem

iseven

more

acuteasthe

number

ofwomen

ofchildbearing

ageisalready

muchlower

than

informer

generations,

therebystrongly

limiting

potential

births.Remote

regions

witha

less

competitive

economy,

however,

will

be

left

withdwindling

resources

due

to

a

rapidlyagingand

declining

population.

This

problemwill

beacuteinChina’s

industrial

northeast,

which

hasalready

suffered

frompopulation

decline

fora

few

years.12Will

the

birth

rate

increase

again?Thebirthratedropped

tonewlows

duringthe

COVID-19

pandemicNumberofbirthsperthousandinhabitantsTheChinesegovernment

gradually

liftedbirthcontrolmeasures

between

2015

and2021.

Thebirthratejumped

to

13.57

birthsper

1,000

people

in2016

buthassincefallen

year

afteryear,

hitting

anall-time

lowin2022.

Economic

andsocial

factorsare

constrainingbirthfiguresinChina

today,and

theireffect

wasunderestimated

bythe

government.

Strong

familysupportive

measures

will

benecessary

tohelpcouplesdecide

to

get

children.16141210813.572016Itmighteven

bemore

difficultto

stabilizethenumberof

birthsthan

the

birthratealone

suggests.

Theincreased

numberofbirthsinthe2010s

was,toacertain

degree,

due

tolarger

agecohorts

ofwomen

ofchildbearing

age,andthe

steep

dropsince

2020

wasnotonly

dueto

COVID-19

but

alsodueto

aquicklyshrinkingnumber

ofwomen

intheir20s

and

30s.6.77202264202000200520102015202013

Notes:China;

2000

to2022Sources:

National

BureauofStatistics

ofChina;

ID251045Fewer

young

women

means

fewer

potential

birthsPopulation

distributioninChina

in2021In2021,

the

populationstructure

ofChinashowedthere

was

amuch

smaller

share

ofwomen

enteringchildbearing

agethan

leaving

childbearing

age.

Thisimplies

thatthe

increase

inthebirth

rate

inthe2010saswell

asthe

drop

inthe

birthrateduringCOVID-19was

toalarge

degree

duetothe

different

numbers

ofwomen

of

childbearing

age.0-45-910-1415-19entering

childbearingageleavingchildbearingage20-2425-2930-3435-3940-4445-4950-5455-5960-6465-6970-7475-7980+Among

people

aged

fiveto

29

years,

thegenderimbalanceis

muchwider

than

inolder

generations(i.e.,there

are

farmore

boys/men

than

girls/women),thereby

furtherpushing

down

the

birthrate.

Underthese

circumstances,

thebirthratewill

remain

low,andstrong

familysupport

measures

will

benecessarytoprevent

itfrom

fallingfurtherinthenextdecades.0.0%1.0%2.0%Male3.0%4.0%Female14

Notes:China;

2021Sources:

National

BureauofStatistics

ofChina;

ID1244036China’s

demographic

turnTheoldreplace

the

youngThelow

birthrateisone

sideofChina’sdemographicdevelopment,

while

the

increase

inthe

number

ofolder

people

is

the

other.

While

the

share

ofthepopulationaged

0to14

isexpected

tofallto

around11

percent

inthe

2030s

(down

from

around

40percent

inthe

1970s),

theshareof

people

aged

65

andolder

isprojected

toreach

35

percent

in2060

(up

fromroughly

fivepercent

inthe

1970s).45%40%35%30%25%20%15%10%5%This

substantial

increase

in

the

shareof

people

ofretirement

age

will

put

highpressure

on

the

working-age

population,whichisforecast

to

shrink

to

one-halfof

the

population

by2060

(down

from

two-thirdstoday).

Themain

challenge

will

be

to

maintaineconomic

growth

andsocial

stability

intimes

ofincreasing

costs

anda

vanishing

demographicdividend.0%1950

1960

1970

1980

1990

2000

2010

2020

2030

2040

2050

2060

2070

2080

2090

2100Shareofpopulationaged0-14Shareofpopulationaged65and

older15

Notes:China;

1950

to2020;

figures

are

projections

according

toa

median

variantSources:

UNDESAWhere

population

decline

is

felt

firstWhen

theyoungleave,

theoldare

leftbehindPopulationchangebetween

2010

and2020Thechallenge

ofpopulation

aging

varies

across

China.Regions

thatcannotprovide

jobs

sufferthe

most

asyoung

people

migrate

to

urbanareas

seeking

work.Consequently,

the

populationsintheseregions

shrinkdueto

lower

birth

rates.

Furthermore,

theolderpeople

left

behindindepopulated

regions

finditdifficulttoaccess

supportandfeel

cutoff

fromtherest

of

society.25%20%15%10%5%China’seconomically

successful

coastal

areas

canstillattractmigrantsand

havetheeconomic

basistocopewith

populationaging,which

is

increasingly

felt

incitiessuchasBeijing

andShanghai.

Inthe

westernregions,

naturalpopulation

growth

isstillhigh.However,

remote

regions

–especially

the

northeasternrustbelt

–lackeconomic

competitiveness

andjobopportunities

and

are

losing

the

younger

generations.They

will

increasingly

feel

the

negative

impactof

agingandadwindlingworking

population.0%-5%-10%-15%-20%16

Notes:China;

2020Sources:

National

BureauofStatistics

ofChinaBig

cities

and

remoteregions

are

affected

differentlyEven

withinprovinces,

population

growth

may

vary

considerablyPopulationchangein

Jiangsuprovincebetween

2000

and2020Even

withinprosperous

Chineseprovinces,demographic

development

may

varyconsiderably.

InJiangsuprovince

nearShanghai,prefectures

southofthe

Yangtze

River,

which

haveaflourishingeconomy,increased

inpopulation

sizeby40

percent

or

morebetween

2000

and2020.

Regions

inthe

northern

orcentral

partsof

theprovince,

which

areless-40%Suzhou-20%0%20%40%60%80%100%89.2%NanjingWuxi53.8%47.0%41.7%ChangzhouZhenjiangNantongXuzhoucompetitive,

lost

inhabitants

or

roughly

kept

theirsize.13.1%Inoverlooked

and

neglected

regions,

rural

areas

willlikely

bemost

severely

affected

bypopulationdeclineandaging

inthefuture,followed

bycities.

Incontrast,citiesinprosperous

areas

will

havefarbetteroptionstocopewith

population

aging

as

theycanrely

on

astrong

productive

base.2.9%1.3%LianyungangYangzhouSuqian0.7%-0.3%-1.2%16.4%

TotalTaizhou-5.5%-9.4%-15.5%Huai'anYancheng17

Notes:China;

between

2000

and

2020Sources:

BureauofStatistics

ofJiangsu

Province03Economic

transformation?

Integratinganagingworkforce?

Keeping

laborparticipation

high?

Improving

productivityEconomic

transformationChina’srapideconomic

ascendence

inthefirsttwo

decades

ofthe21st

centurywas,

to

ahighdegree,

dependent

on

itscheap

and

abundant

laborforce.

Thedemographic

changethatis

happening

now

addspressure

to

theneed

foradifferent

growth

model.

Economic

growth

will

need

to

bebased

oninnovation,productivity

gains,ahighlyskilled

workforce,

andahigh

level

of

laborparticipationwith

betterintegration

ofolder

people

into

thelaborforce.When

theretirement

ageisincreased,

itbecomes

crucial

to

better

integrateolderpeople

intothe

workforce.

Thisdependson

improving

the

skillsof

older

employeesandlifelong

learning

aswell

aschangesinthe

attitudeof

employers

towards

age.Looking

overseas

couldbeanotherway

to

strengthen

the

laborforce.

However,dueto

itssize,

China

would

need

toattractlarge

numbers

offoreign

workers

toaddressshortages

–astrategy

mademore

challenging

bythe

country’s

unclearimmigration

policies.TheChinesegovernment

publishedanationalstrategy

to

actively

addresspopulationagingin2019,

outliningmajor

goalstoadjust

todemographic

changeby

Considering

the

general

shrinking

ofthelaborforce

inChina,

improving2035

and

2050.

Animportant

taskis

raisingthestatutoryretirement

age,one

ofthe

productivity

will

bethe

main

lever

to

achieve

economic

growth

inthe

future.

Thisislowest

inthe

world

at60

years

formen

and

between

50

and55

yearsfor

women–thispolicy

hasbeen

unchangedsince

the

1950s.

Althoughno

detailed

plans

havebeen

announced

yet,theurgentneed

to

increase

theretirement

ageis

officiallyone

oftheexplanationsforChina’smassive

support

ofinnovation

over

thepastdecade.

AsChina

isfirmly

integrated

into

global

valuechains,international

tensionswill

haveanegative

effect

on

itsabilityto

reach

highgrowth

rates.

Tomaintainacknowledged.

A

gradualincrease

to65years

forbothwomen

and

men

would

bea

strong

economic

growth,

however,

will

becrucial

forChina

tobeableto

cope

withlikely

scenario.

itsquicklygrowing

burdenof

anagingpopulation.19Keeping

an

aging

workforce

agileIntegratingolder

people

into

thelaborforce

will

beessentialEstimatedsizeofthepopulationaged15

to64

yearsinChina

from

1970

to2060

(inmillions)China’sworking-age

population(definedas

thoseaged15

to

64

years)

started

decreasing

around

2015,

andthe

decline

is

expected

toaccelerate

inthe2030s.

Atthe

same

time,

the

population

isagingquickly,andthemedian

ageisprojected

toincrease

byten

years

overthe

next

two

decades.1,000800600400Underthese

conditions,itisessential

forthe

Chinesegovernment

tokeep

laborforce

participationhighandimprove

the

integration

ofolder

generations

into

theworkforce.

Whilethegovernment

needs

to

supportthe

compatibility

ofwork

and

lifeforolder

people,companies

will

need

toadjust

theirrecruiting

routinestoinclude

older

candidates,and

employees

need

toembrace

lifelong

learning.Medianage

ofthe

populationinChinafrom1970

to2060

(in

years)6040200197019801990200020102020203020402050206020

Notes:China;

1970

to2020;

figures

are

projections

according

toa

median

variantSources:

UNDESA;National

BureauofStatistics

ofChina;

ID

1219212;

ID232265Raising

the

retirementage

is

inevitableAgradualincrease

ofthestatutoryretirement

ageisexpectedAsof

2023,

Chinastillhasoneof

the

lowest

statutory

retirement

agesinthe

world.Thepolicy

allows

men

to

retire

at60

andwomen

at55,

while

female

blue-collarworkers

canretire

asearly

as50.

TheChinesegovernment

hasforalongtimeplannedtoincrease

theretirement

age,but

theseplanshavemet

fierce

resistancefrom

the

population.unificationof

the

retirement

ageformen

andwomen,

increasing

to

65

years.However,

official

sources

emphasize

thatthere

will

beagradualimplementationwith

alongtransitional

period.

Furthermore,

thenew

retirement

agewill

mostprobably

beflexibleandmore

adjustabletothe

individual

needs

of

the

people.However,

there

were

reasons

beyond

demographic

factorswhy

China

could,untilrecently,

stillaffordarelatively

generous

pension

system:

young

contributors

wereway

more

productive

than

retirees;

numerous

older

people,

especially

inruralareas,

were

not

beneficiaries

of

the

pension

system;

andmanyretirees

took

overchildcare

responsibilities,

thereby

enablingparents,particularly

mothers,

to

keepworking.

These

factors

arealready

changingandadding

pressure

to

theexistingpension

regulations.TodayFutu