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REPORT
2024StateofthePhish
Riskyactions,real-worldthreatsanduserresilienceinanageofhuman-centriccybersecurity
2024STATEOFTHEPHISH\REPORT
INTRODUCTION
Imagineasuccessfulcyberattackagainstyourorganization.Whatdoesitlooklike?Maybeitinvolvesafiendishlycleverpieceofsocialengineering—aconvincinglurethatcatchestherecipientoffguard.Ormaybeitwouldtakeasmarttechnicalexploittogetpastyourdefenses.Butinreality,threatactorsdon’talwayshavetotrythathard.
Often,theeasiestwaytobreachsecurityistoexploitthehumanfactor.Peopleareakeypartofanygooddefense,buttheycanalsobethemostvulnerable.Theymaymakemistakes,fallforscamsorsimplyignoresecuritybestpractices.Accordingtothisyear’sStateofthePhishsurvey,71%ofworkingadultsadmittedtotakingariskyaction,suchasreusingorsharingapassword,clickingonlinksfromunknownsenders,orgivingcredentialstoanuntrustworthysource.And96%ofthemdidsoknowingthattheyweretakingarisk.
Whenobligedtochoosebetweenconvenienceandsecurity,userspicktheformeralmosteverytime.So,whatcanorganizationsdotochangethis?Inthisreportwe’lltakeacloserlookathowattitudestowardssecuritymanifestinreal-worldbehavior,andhowthreatactorsarefindingnewwaystotakeadvantageofourpreferenceforspeedandexpedience.We’llalsoexaminethecurrentstateofsecurityawarenessinitiatives,aswellasbenchmarkingtheresilienceofpeopleandorganizationsagainstattack.
Thefoundationofthisreportisasurveyof7,500endusersand1,050securityprofessionals,conductedacross15countries.ItalsoincludesProofpointdataderivedfromourproductsandthreatresearch,aswellasfindingsfrom183millionsimulatedphishingmessagessentbyourcustomersovera12-monthperiodandmorethan24millionemailsreportedbyourcustomers’endusersoverthesameperiod.
2
2024STATEOFTHEPHISH\REPORT
TABLEOFCONTENTS
4KeyFindings
6SecurityBehaviorsandAttitudes
6 End-userbehaviorandattitudes
10SecurityAwarenessTrends
10 Currentstateofsecurityawareness
12 Areasforimprovement
14TheThreatLandscape
Threatprevalence
Growingthreats:TOAD,MFA-Bypass,QRcodesandgenerativeAI
BECattacksbenefitfromAI
Microsoftremainsmost-abusedbrand
Ransomwarestillamajorconcern
Attackconsequences
20OrganizationalBenchmarks
21 Industryfailurerate
27Conclusion
3
2024STATEOFTHEPHISH\REPORT
KEYFINDINGS
Over1million
attacksarelaunchedwithMFA-bypassframeworkEvilProxyeverymonth,but89%ofsecurityprofessionalsstillbelieveMFAprovidescompleteprotectionagainstaccounttakeover.
71 and 96
ofuserstooka
riskyaction
ofthemknewtheywere
doingsomethingrisky
66million
BECattacksweredetectedandblockedonaveragepermonthbyProofpoint.
oforganizationswereinfectedbyransomware.
69
4
2024STATEOFTHEPHISH\REPORT
85
ofsecurityprofessionalssaidthatmostemployeesknowtheyareresponsibleforsecurity,but
10million
59
Microsoftcontinuestobethe
mostabusedbrand,with
68million
ofuserseitherweren’tsureorclaimedthatthey’renotresponsibleatall.
TOADmessagesaresenteverymonth.
maliciousmessagesassociatedwiththebrandoritsproducts.
58
ofuserswhotookriskyactionsengagedinbehaviorthatwouldhavemadethemvulnerabletocommonsocialengineeringtactics.
5
SecurityBehaviorsandAttitudes
Eventhebesttechnicaldefensescanbeunderminedifusersdon’tdothebasics,suchasavoidingsuspiciouslinks,verifyingthesender’sidentityandsettingastrongpasswordandkeepingittothemselves.However,manyusersfailtofollowthesesimplerules,puttingthemselvesandtheirorganizationsatrisk.
End-userbehaviorandattitudes
Accordingtooursurvey,71%ofuserssaidtheytookariskyactionandalmostallofthem—96%—didsoknowingly.Amongthatgroup,73%saidthey’dtakentwoormoreriskyactions.Andmorethanathirdoftheriskstheytookwereratedbythoseusersaseither“extremelyrisky”or“veryrisky.”
RiskyActionsTaken
29%
26%
26%
24%
20%
19%
16%
13%
11%
10%
9%
29%
Useworkdeviceforpersonalactivities
Reuseorsharepassword
ConnectwithoutusingVPNatapublicplace
Respondtoamessage(emailorSMStext)fromsomeoneIdon’tknow
Accessinappropriatewebsite
ClickonlinksordownloadattachmentsfromsomeoneIdon’tknow
Shareworkdevicewithfriendsorfamily
Callanunfamiliarphonenumberinanurgentemail
Tailgating:allowotherstoentertheofficewithoutbadgingin
Uploadsensitivedatatounproventhird-partycloud
Givecredentialstountrustworthysource
Havenevertakenariskyaction
30% 25% 20% 15% 10% 5% 0%
Userstookriskyactionsforavarietyofreasons:convenience,timesavingandurgencybeingthemostcommonanswers.Butasmallcohortof2.5%tookriskyactionspurelyoutofcuriosity.Eitherway,themessageisclear:peoplearen’ttakingriskyactionsbecausetheylacksecurityawareness.Often,usersknowwhattheyaredoingwhentheytakerisksandarequitewillingtogamblewithorganizationalsecurity.
WhyRiskyActionisTaken
44%
Itisconvenient
24%
Tomeetanurgentdeadline
11%
Toachievearevenuetarget
5%
Other,pleasespecify
Tosavetime
19%
39%
Tosavemoney
10%
Tomeetotherperformanceobjectives
Nobodyknowsthisbetterthantheworld’scybercriminals.Theyunderstandthatpeoplecanbeexploited,eitherthroughnegligence,obliviousnessor—inrareinstances—malice.Socialengineeringisapartofalmosteveryemailthreatanalyzedbyourresearchers.And58%ofuserswhotookariskyactionsaid
theyengagedinbehaviorthatwouldputthematriskofbasicsocialengineeringtactics,suchasclickingonunknownlinks,respondingtounfamiliarsendersandsharingcredentialswithuntrustworthysources.Theseactionscanleadtoransomwareinfection,malware,databreachorfinancialloss.
Oneofthereasonsuserstaketheserisksisalackofconsensusaboutaccountabilityandresponsibility.Only41%ofuserssaidtheyknowthattheybearresponsibilityforcybersecurityattheirworkplace.About7%claimedthattheyaren’tresponsibleatall,whilethemajority(52%)weren’tsure.
PerceptiononSecurityResponsibility
41vs.85
7vs.13
52vs.2
Yes–Employeesthinktheyareresponsibleforsecurity
No–Employeesbelievesecurityisnottheirresponsibility
Notsure
Employees
SecurityProfessionals
63
ofsecurityprofessionals
rateduserswithaccesstocriticalbusinessdataasthetopcybersecurityrisk
Thiscontrastswiththeviewamongsecurityprofessionals,85%ofwhomsaythatmostemployeesknowtheyareresponsibleforsecurity.Thisgapbetweenperceptionandrealitysuggeststhatthereisaneedforclearercommunicationaboutsharedresponsibility,ratherthanjustmoretrainingonsecuritybestpracticesandpolicies.
Theprofessionalview
Securityprofessionalsunderstandablyhaveadifferentperspectiveonsecurityriskstoendusers.Theyaremoreawareofthethreatlandscapeandtheconsequencesofabreach.Andtheyhave
amorenuancedunderstandingofthechallengesthatgointosecuringcomplexanddynamicenvironments.Theyalsohavetheunenviabletaskoffindingwaystobalancetheneedforsecuritywiththeneedforunhinderedproductivityandefficiency.
Accordingtooursurveyofsecurityprofessionals,theyrateuserswithaccesstobusiness-criticaldataasthebiggestsecurityrisk(63%)—agroupthatisinevitablyhardtomanage,asmuchofthataccessisnecessary.Butclick-happy
usersandthosewhodon’tcompletesecurityawarenesstrainingareclosebehindinjointsecondplace(56%each).Thesecategoriesofuserwereallconsideredsignificantlymoreriskythanexecutives/VIPs(34%),despitethelattergroupoftenhavingbroadaccesstovaluabledata.
UsersWhoRepresentRisk
Userswhohavebusinessprivilegeandaccesstocriticaldata
Userswhoareclickhappy
Userswhoconsistentlyfailtocompletetrainingassignment
Suppliersorbusinesspartners
Peoplewhoareleaving
42%
VIPs,executives
34%
49%
56%
56%
63%
Unfortunately,oursurveyrevealssignificantoverlapbetweentheriskiestbehaviorsidentifiedbysecurityprofessionalsandthemostcommonriskyactionstakenbyendusers.Reusingpasswords,usingworkdevicesforpersonalactivitiesandaccessinginappropriatewebsitesareamongbehaviorsconsideredthemostunsafe;allofthemappearedinthetopactionstakenbyusers.
Rank
TopRisksConsideredbyInfosec
TopRiskyActionsTakenbyUsers
1
ClickonlinksordownloadattachmentsfromsomeoneIdon’tknow
Useworkdeviceforpersonalactivities
2
Reuseorsharepassword
Reuseorsharepassword
3
Accessinappropriatewebsite
ConnectwithoutusingVPNatapublicplace
4
Uploadsensitivedatatounproventhird-partycloud
Respondtoamessage(emailorSMStext)fromsomeoneIdon’tknow
5
Useworkdeviceforpersonalactivities
Accessinappropriatewebsite
Thisoverlapsuggeststhatusersmaybetakingsomeoftheseactionsbecausetheyareunawareofjusthowriskytheyareconsideredbysecurityteams.
SecurityAwarenessTrends
Whiletrainingaloneisn’tenoughtochangeunsafebehavior,teamsthatlackbasicsecurityawarenesstoolsandknowledgearestillmuchmorelikelytofallpreytocybercriminals.But
asnewsocialengineeringluresandtechniquesappearonthethreatlandscape,awarenessprogramsmustbeagileandbroad-basedtoremainrelevant.
Currentstateofsecurityawareness
Firstsomepositivenews:99%ofrespondentssaidtheyhaveasecurityawarenessprogramofsomesortupandrunning.Butwhilethebasicsmayalreadybeinplace,manyarestrugglingtodriverealbehavioralchange.Apossiblereasonforthisisthatonly53%saytheytraineveryoneintheorganization(downfrom56%lastyear).Thismeansthatsomeusersmaybeleftoutoftheloopormayreceiveinadequateoroutdatedtraining.
SecurityAwarenessActivitiesAssignment
Everyoneintheorganization
28%
Onlyspecificdepartmentsandroles
6%
Onlyspecificindividuals
Notsure 1%
1%
15%
41%
2023
53%
2022
56%
Anotherchallengeisthecoverageandrelevanceoftrainingtopics.Securityprofessionalsagreethatremotework,passwordhygieneandinternetsafetyarecritical,butlessthanathirdofsecurityawarenessprogramscoverallthese
topics.Thetoptrainingtopicscitedbyrespondentsweremalware,Wi-Fisecurity,ransomwareandemailphishing,whichareallimportant,butnotsufficient
toaddressthefullspectrumofrisks.Andaswe’llseelaterwhenweexaminethelatestcybercriminaltacticsandtechniques,emergingthreatscanquicklybecomecommonplace,takingunpreparedusersbysurprise.
41 from28
Thepercentageoforganizations
thattrainedspecificrolesjumpedyearoveryear
Onthepositiveside,thesurveyshowssomesignsofimprovementandinnovationinsecurityawarenesstactics.Yearoveryear,trainingofspecificrolesanddepartmentshasrisensignificantly(41%from28%),indicatingamoretailoredandtargetedapproach.Timeallocatedtousereducationhasalsoincreasedyearoveryear,withmorerespondentsdedicatingoverthreehoursperyeartoawarenesstraining.Overall,theaverageamountoftimededicatedtoawarenesstraininghasincreasedforthefirsttimeinthreeyears.
TimeAllocatedforSecurityAwarenessActivities
6 25
17 37
15
30minutesorless31–59minutes
1–2hours
3–4hours
Morethan4hours
Cybersecurity-basedcontestsandprizes
33%
Smishingandvishingsimulations
33%
SimulatedUSBdrops
23%
Internalcybersecuritychatchannel
30%
Internalwiki
23%
Mycompanydoesnothaveasecurityawarenessprogram
1%
Thetypesoftacticsbeingusedareevolving,too,witha23%increaseintheuseofcontestsandprizestogamifyandincentivizeattention.Thischangecanhelpincreaseuserengagementandmotivation,whilealsocreatingapositiveandfunlearningenvironment.Computer-basedtrainingremainsthemostcommonformat(45%),butothermethodssuchassimulatedUSBdrops,videos,postersandnewslettersarealsobeingused.
In-persontrainingsessions
37%
Virtual,instructor-ledtraining
34%
Computer-basedtraining
45%
Simulatedphishingattacks
34%
Awarenesspostersandvideos
31%
Newslettersandemails
38%
However,only34%ofrespondentssaytheyperformsimulatedphishingattacks,despitethehighvolumeofmaliciousemailseeninthethreatlandscape.Thissuggeststhatthereisstillroomforimprovementinthecompositionofmostsecurityawarenesstrainingsyllabuses.
83
ofsurveyedsecurity
professionalsimplementmoretrainingtodrivebehaviorchange
81
implementmorecontrols
orrestrictions
Areasforimprovement
Securityisnotonlyatechnicalissue,butalsoaculturalandorganizationalone.Itrequiresthecollaborationandcommitmentofallstakeholders,fromsecurityprofessionalstoendusers.However,thereisoftenagapbetweenwhatsecurityprofessionalsthinkiseffectiveandwhatenduserssaywouldmotivatethemtoprioritizesecurity
Accordingtooursurvey,securityprofessionalsbelievethatmoretraining,tightercontrols,closerbusinessalignment,betterrewardsandstrongerchampioningofsecurityinitiativeswouldallbeeffectiveinimprovingsecurity.
However,fewerthanathirdoforganizationsrewardpositiveuserbehaviorsorchampionsecurityinitiatives.Theseareimportantwaystorecognizeandreinforcegoodsecuritypractices,andtoensurethatallemployeesareinvestedincreatingasecurity-awareculture.
Rank
ActionsTakenbySecurityPros
UserMotivation
1
Providemoretraining
Makingsecurityeasierforme
2
Implementmoresecuritycontrolsorrestrictions
Usingrewardsandrecognition
3
Alignsecurityinitiativeswithbusinesspriorities
Increasedengagementwithleadershipandsecurityteams
Incontrast,usersoverwhelminglysaythattheywantsecuritytobemadeeasier.Theywantprocessestobemoreuser-friendly,convenientandtransparent,andtheywanttohavemorecommunicationandfeedbackfromsecurityexperts.Usersoverwhelminglyagree(94%)thatimprovingeaseofusewouldmotivatethemtobemoreattentivetosecurity.Thesedisparitiesbetweensecurityteamactionsandusermotivationsclearlydemonstratetheneedforopencommunicationbetweensecurityteamsandendusers.
Makingsecurityeasierforme
Usingrewardsorrecognition
Increasedengagementfromleadershiporsecurityteam
Moretrainingordifferent
stylesoftraining
Punishment,suchasreductioninpay,bonusremoval,jobtermination
WhatPoliciesMotivateUserstoPrioritizeCybersecurity
94%
6%
89%
11%
87%
13%
85%
15%
71%
29%
Motivating NotMotivating
Inkeepingwithtrendswe’veobservedoverthepastfewyears,punishingunwantedbehaviorwasconsideredtheleasteffectiveapproachbysecurityprofessionals.Fortunately,itwasalsotheleastimplemented.Punishmentcanhavenegativeeffects,suchascreatingfear,resentmentanddistrust,andreducingmotivationandmorale.Itcanalsodiscourageusersfromreportingincidentsorseekinghelp,whichcanseriouslyincreasetheriskofsecuritybreaches.Punishmentwasalsotheleastmotivatingresponseamongendusers,though71%stillagreedthatthiswouldbeanincentiveforthem.Thissuggeststhatsomeusersmaybewillingtocomplywithsecurityrulestoavoidnegativeconsequences,thoughitisunlikelythatcompelledparticipationwillleadtoenduringbehaviorchange.
2024STATEOFTHEPHISH\REPORT
TheThreatLandscape
Cybersecurityisaconstantlyevolvingfieldascybercriminalsdevisenewandsophisticatedwaystoattackpeopleandbreachorganizations.Userswhotakerisks,suchasclickingonsuspiciouslinks,openingunknownattachmentsorusingweakpasswords,faceanincreasingvarietyofreal-worldthreatsfromattackers.
Threatprevalence
Someofthemostcommonformsofattackreportedbysurveyparticipantswerephishing,businessemailcompromise(BEC)andransomware.Whileeachofthesetechniquesisdistinct,securityteamswilloftenencounterthemasindividualcomponentsofanextendedattackchain,withphishingleadingtoransomware,orasupplychainattackleadingtoBEC.
PrevalenceofAttacks
76%
BulkPhishing USBDrop
SpearPhishing
BEC
Ransomware
74%
74%
73%
75%
85%
SociaMedia
SupplyChainRisk
DataLossviaExternalAttacker
%
60%
65
72%
74%
69%
69%
Smishing
67%
71%
Vishing
77%
76%
75%
76%
DataLossviaInsider
TOAD(CallbackPhishing)
66%
68%
64%
66%
67%
2023 2022
However,thesearen’ttheonlythreatsthatusersandorganizationsneedtobeawareof.Accordingtoourowndata,manynovelattacktypesarebecomingincreasinglyprominent.
14
2024STATEOFTHEPHISH\REPORT
Growingthreats:
TOAD,MFA-Bypass,QRcodesandgenerativeAI
Intelephone-orientedattackdelivery(TOAD),themaliciousmessageoftenappearstobecompletelybenign,containingnothingmorethanaphonenumberandsomeerroneousinformation.Itisn’tuntiltheunsuspectingvictimcallsthelistednumberforhelpthattheattackchainisactivated.Cybercriminalcallcentersareoperatingaroundtheworld,guidingvictimsintograntingremoteaccess,revealingsensitiveinformationandcredentials,oreveninfectingthemselveswithmalware.Ourdatarevealsthatanaverageof10millionTOADmessagesaresenteverymonth.
13million
Proofpointsawover13M
TOADattacksatpeakinAugust2023
89
Anotherincreasinglypopularattackmethodinvolvesusingadvancedtechniquestobypassmultifactorauthentication(MFA),whichisnowastandardpartofcorporatecybersecurity.TheseattackstypicallyuseproxyserverstointerceptMFAtokens,allowingattackerstocircumventtheadditionallayerofsecurityprovidedbyone-timecodesandbiometrics.Severaloff-the-shelfphishkitsnowincludeMFAbypassfunctionality,allowingevenrelativelyunsophisticatedattackerstobenefit.Weseearound1millionphishingthreatsusingthepopularEvilProxyframeworkeverymonth.Thisisofparticularconcern,as89%ofsecurityprofessionalsstillconsiderMFAtobeasilverbulletforprotectionagainstaccounttakeover,with84%ofrespondentssayingtheirorganizationsuseMFAtopreventaccounttakeover.
DoesMFAProvideCompleteProtectionAgainstAccountTakeover?
Completelyagree
ofsecurityprosbelievethatMFA 9
canprotectagainstaccount 1
compromisecompletely 2
42
47
Somewhatagree
NeitheragreeordisagreeSomewhatdisagreeCompletelydisagree
Andwithintheparadigmoftraditionalphishing,attackersarefindingnewwaystoembedmaliciouscontent.Inrecentmonthswe’veseenanincreaseintheuseofQRcodesasanalternativetolinksorattachments.Thistechniqueisparticularlydangerous,asitbothattemptstoevadeautomateddetectionwhilepresentinguserswithafamiliarformatinacontexttheymaynothaveseenbefore.ItisalsoimpossibletotelljustbylookingifaQRcodeleadstoaphishingsiteormalwaredownload.UnfamiliarusersscanningaQRcodemaynotevenbeawarethatthey’veengagedwithapieceofmaliciouscontentuntilit’stoolate.
15
It’salsoworthnotingthateventheleastcommontypeofattack—USBdrop—wasstillreportedby60%ofrespondents.Thisshowsthatcybercriminalsarewillingtotryanytactic,oldornew,iftheythinkitwillgivethemachancetoexploitanunsuspectingvictim.
Despitethegrowingprominenceandsophisticationofthesethreats,manyorganizationsarenotadequatelypreparedortrainedtodealwiththem.Only23%oforganizationstraintheirusersonhowtorecognizeandpreventTOADattacks,andonly23%educatetheirusersongenerativeAIsafety.
GenerativeAIisatechnologythatcancreaterealisticandconvincingcontent—suchasimages,videosortext—basedonagivenpromptordatainput.Thistechnologypromisestoenhancesocialengineeringforallmessaging-basedattacks,asattackerscanuseittoimprovethequalityoftheirlure,particularlywhentargetingotherlanguages.Moreover,generativeAIalsoposesariskofdataloss,asthereiscurrentlylittletransparencyoverwhathappenstodatathatisuploadedtoservicessuchasChatGPTandGoogleBard.
BECattacksbenefitfromAI
BECattacksalsocontinuetoposeaseriousthreat,especiallyinnon-English-speakingcountries.FewerorganizationsreportedBECattemptsglobally,butattackscontinuetogrowinprevalenceamongcountriessuchasJapan(35%year-over-yearincrease),Korea(31%jump),andUAE(29%jump).These
countriesmayhavepreviouslyseenfewerBECattacksduetolanguagebarriers,culturaldifferencesorlackofvisibility.ButthereisnowalikelylinkbetweenBECandgenerativeAI,asattackerscanusethelattertocreatemoreconvincingandpersonalizedemailsinmultiplelanguages.Ourowndatashowsanaverageof66milliontargetedBECattackseverymonth.
68million
maliciousmessagesincluded
referencestoMicrosoftand/orMicrosoftproductsin2023,makingthesoftwaregianttheworld’smostabusedbrand
Microsoftremainsmost-abusedbrand
Brandabuseisafavoritetacticforphishingandmalwaredelivery,asattackersexploitthetrustandfamiliaritythatusershavewithcertainbrands.Morethan68millionmessageswereassociatedwithMicrosoftproductsandbrandin2023,makingitthemostabusedbrandbycybercriminals.AdobeandDHLroundedoutthetopthree,butatfewerthan10millionmessageseach.
68
9.4
8.8
6.1
BrandAbuseThreats(Millions)
20million
Office365wasthemostabused
Microsoftproductinmaliciousemail,withover20millionemailthreatsusingthebrand
4.4
3.5
3.1
Microsof
t
Adobe
DHL
AOL
DocuSign
Amazon
Ransomwarestillamajorconcern
Thepercentageoforganizationsthatfacedaransomwareattackrose5percentagepointsto69%.Almost60%oforganizationsreportedfourormoreseparateransomwareincidentsinayear,indicatingthatransomwareisstillapersistentandlucrativeformofattack.
RansomwarebytheNumbers
39
3 38
5
15
1–3separateincidents
4–6separateincidents
7–9separateincidents
10ormoreseparateincidentsUnsure
Oneofthewaysthatorganizationstrytomitigatetheriskandimpactofcyberattacksisbypurchasingcyberinsurance,whichcoversthecostsanddamagesassociatedwithacybersecurityincident.Amongthosethathadexperiencedaransomwareincident,96%nowhavecyberinsurance.Mostinsurers(91%)helpedwithransompayments,upfrom82%theyearbefore.However,globally,therateofpaymenttoransomwareattackershasdeclinedfrom64%to54%.
InfectedOrganizationsThatAgreedtoPayRansom
54%
58%
64%
2023 2022 2021
Thenumberofrespondentswhoregainedaccesstotheirdataafterpayingalsodeclined,withthenumberwhoregainedaccessafterasinglepaymentseeingthelargestdecline.Thismaybeoneexplanationforthedropinpayments.Anotherpossiblereasonisthatorganizationsarebecomingmoreawareofthedrawbacksandrisksofpayingransoms,suchasencouragingmoreattacks,fundingcriminalactivitiesorreceivingcorruptedorincompletedata.
15
oforganizationsrefusedtopay
morethanoneransomaftertheirfirstpaymentdidn’tgettheirdataback,upfromjust6%in2022
RansomwareInfections:WhatHappensAfterPayment
41%
Regainedaccesstodataafterfirstpayment
41%
Paidadditionalransomdemand(s)andeventually
Refusedtopayaddtionalransomdemand(s)andwalked
6%
15%
43%
52%
Nevergotaccesstodataevenafterpayingransoms
1%
1% 2023
2022
Attackconsequences
Theimpactofphishingattacksonorganizationscanbedevastating,bothfinanciallyandreputationally.71%oforganizationsexperiencedatleastonesuccessfulphishingattackin2023,downfrom84%in2022.However,whiletheincidenceofsuccessfulphishingattackshasdeclined,someofthenegativeconsequenceshavesoared.Yearonyear,wesawa144%increaseinreportsoffinancialpenalties,suchasregulatoryfines,anda50%increaseinreportsofreputationaldamageduetophishingincidents.
73
oforganizationsreported
aBECattack,butonly
29
teachusersabout
BECattacks
ResultsofSuccessfulPhishingAttacks
Lossofdata/intellectualproperty
32%
33%
32%
Ransomwareinfection*
43%
29%
Breachofcustomer/clientdata
44%
27%
Credential/accountcompromise
Advancedpersistentthreat
23%
21%
22%
Directfinancialloss**
30%
Financialpenalty***
9%
22%
22%
Othermalwareinfection(s)
Reputationaldamage
18%
27%
36%
Zero-dayexploit
20%
20%
28%
Widespreadnetworkoutage/downtime
25%
26%
I’mnotsure
0%
2%
*malwarewasdeliveredviaemail
**wiretransferorinvoicefraud
***regulatoryfine
2023
2022
Thethreatlandscapeisconstantlyevolving,ascybercriminalsemploynewtacticsandtechniquesintheirquesttogainanadvantage.Thisiswhyit’skeytoequippeoplewiththeknowledgetheyneedtoidentifyandresistattacks;afterall,assophisticatedasthesetechniquesarebecoming,peopleremaintheirprimarytarget.Mostorganizationssaytheyusereal-worldthreatintelligencetoshapetheirsecurityawarenessprogram,howeverthereare
somemajordisparities.Forexample,73%oforganizationsexperiencedaBECattack,butonly29%trainusersspecificallyonBECthreats.Similarly,only23%oforganizationsprovidetrainingonTOADattacks,despitetheirubiquity.Thethreatlandscapemovesprettyfast;ifyoudon’tstopandupdateyourprogramonceinawhileyoucouldmisssomething.
2024STATEOFTHEPHISH\REPORT
OrganizationalBenchmarks
Oneofthewaysthatorganizationscanmeasureandimprovetheircybersecurityawarenessandresilienceisbyconductingphishingsimulations.Proofpointphishingsimulationsmimicreal-worldphishingscenariosandassesshowusersrespondtothem.Ourcustomersconducted183millionphishingsimulationsovera12-monthperiod.Ofthese,link-basedtestswerethemostcommon,accountingfor59%ofallsimulations,followedbydata-entrytests(30%)andattachment-basedtests(10%).However,attachment-basedtestshadthehighestfailurerateoverall,at17%.Failureratesforalltypesofsimulationswerewithin1percentagepointoflastyear’sresults.
SimulationTypeandFailureRate
66%
59%
2023frequenc
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