英文【世界銀行】生產(chǎn)性長(zhǎng)壽

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ProductiveLongevity:WhatCANTHE

WorldBankdotofosterlongerandmore

productiveworkinglives?

PublicDisclosureAuthorized

▲

5+

2050

RethinkSocialProtectionandJobsinanActivelyAgingWorld

WORLDBANKGROUP

socialprotection&Jobs

WhatisProductiveLongevity?Productivelongevityreferstotheproductiveparticipationofolder(“mature”)workersineconomicactivity.Globally,populationagingisraisingpressuresoncountriestodeveloppolicytoincreaseandsustainwelfarethroughoutandbeyondthedemographictransitionfromyoungtoold.Allelseequal,anolderpopulationwillincreasedependencyratesandlowereconomicgrowth.Tostemthisimpact,itwillbeimportanttoincreasetheproductivityandparticipationofallpotentialworkersacrossthelifecycle,includingolderworkers.Productivelongevitymayalsodirectlybenefitolderpeople’smentalandphysicalhealthbykeepingthemsociallyandintellectuallyengaged,inadditiontoprovidingincome.

Whyshouldpolicymakerscare?Lowandmiddle-incomecountries(L/MICs)willseerapidlyincreasingold-agepopulationsinthecomingdecades.ManyL/MICsarenow“gettingoldbeforegettingrich,”andthetransitionsarehappeningfast.Matureworkerscan,andinmanycasesalreadydo,continuetomakesignificantcontributionsasworkersandentrepreneursinthemoderncontextofrapidlyshiftingskillsneeds.Increasinglifeexpectancycanpotentiallyincreasetheincentivesandabilityofpeopletoretainorincreasetheirproductivityandremainactivelonger.Harnessingthisproductivitycanhavesignificantpositiveimpactsongrowthandotherareasincludingpensionsustainabilityandhealthandcareservices.Thiswillrequirepoliciesthatincentivizeworkerstoremainactiveandemployerstoretainandhirethem,andencourageinvestmenttoenhancetheirproductivityfurther.Tappingintothelaborpotentialofmatureworkersshouldformpartofabroad-basedagendathatalsopromotesyouthandwomen’sproductiveparticipation.Youngercountries,forwhomthisagendaislessurgent,maystilllearnfromothercountries’sometimespainfulexperiencesinbuildinglifelonglearningandsocialprotectionsystemsthatfosterfiscallysustainableandgrowth-friendlytransitions.

Whatdoesthisnotecover?RecognizingthatthisagendaspansvirtuallyalloftheWorldBank’spolicyareas,thisbrieffocusesonpoliciesunderthepurviewoftheWorldBank’sSocialProtectionandJobs(SPJ)agenda,especiallythoserelatedtoemploymentandskillsdevelopment.WithintheBank,theproductivelongevityagendaisnascent.AlthoughL/MICsareexperiencingsignificantandrapiddemographicchanges,albeitatdifferentstages,thepolicyagendaisstilllargelybeingshapedinhigh-incomecountries(HICs)andtheevidencebaseforL/MICsisthin.ThebriefoutlinesimplicationsfortheSPJagenda,bothintermsofclosingthediagnosticsandevidencegapandmainstreamingaginginoperationalwork.

Contents

ProductiveLongevity:WhatCantheWorldBankDotoFosterLongerandMoreProductiveWorkingLives?1

Agingandlabormarketsindevelopinganddevelopedcountries2

Fosteringproductivelongevity–what’stheproblem,andwhatcouldwork?5

Constraintsandpoliciesforproductivelongevity–aframework6

Motivatingmatureworkersandentrepreneurstoremainactiveinlabormarketsandinvest

intheirhealthandskills7

Motivatingfirmstoretain,hire,andinvestinmatureworkers10

Fivetakeawaysforproductiveaging13

WhatdoesthisimplyfortheWorldBank’sworkinthisarea?14

WhatistheWorldBank(SPJ)doingtohelpcountriesfosterproductivelongevity?14

WhatcouldtheWorldBankbedoing?17

References18

ANNEX1:

RecentWorldBankAdvisoryservicesandanalyticsonaging:anoverview22

ANNEX2:

Listofprojectsreviewed24

▲

ProductiveLongevity:

WhatCANTHEWorldBank

dotofosterlongerandmore

productiveworkinglives?1

Theglobalpopulationisagingandatanacceleratingspeed.By2050,oneinsixpeopleoftheworld’spopulationwillbeatleast65yearsofage,resultingfromrapidlydecliningfertilityratesandincreasinglifeexpectancy.Nearlyfouroutoffiveoftheseolderpeoplewillbelivinginwhatarecurrentlylow-andmiddle-incomecountries(L/MICs)(UnitedNations,2019).Allelseequal,moreolderpeopleimpliesfewerworkers,moredependents,andadditionalpublicandprivateexpendituresonpensions,health,andlong-termcare.WhilemanyL/MICsarecurrentlyexperiencingpopulationdividends,thesewindowsofopportunityarerapidlynarrowing.AgingL/MICsrisk“gettingoldbeforegettingrich,”raisingpressuresforpolicyreformsthatcansustaingrowthandwelfareacrossgenerations.

Thisnotefocusesonemploymentandrelatedpolicyinterventions—atthecoreoftheWorldBank’sSocialProtectionandJobs(SPJ)agenda—aimedatfosteringproductiveworkamong“matureworkers”,looselydefinedasadultsabove55.Agingwillrequirereformacrossavastrangeofareas,includingpoliciesrelatingtolabormarkets,skillsinvestments,andsocialprotection.Inparallel,othermega-trendssuchasglobalization,climatechange,andfast-movingtechnologicalchange,arealsofosteringrapidlyshiftingskillsdemand,whichwillrequirecontinuousup-andreskilling,openingopportunitiesandraisingchallengesforanagingworkforce.Tosustaingrowth,increasingthe“effectiveworkforce”withhigherproductivityand,wherepossible,employmentrateswillbecritical.ThistranslatesintoanSPJagendafocused

1ThisbriefwasauthoredbySaraJohanssonDeSilvaandYangHuangandisadeliverableundertheGlobalSocial

Protection&JobsAgingworkinggroup’sactivitiesledbyHimanshiJain.Thepolicysectionsdrawsignificantlyona

backgroundpaperpreparedfortheWorldBank’sHealthyLongevityInitiative(JohanssondeSilvaandSantos,2023).ThesebriefswereproducedundertheguidanceofLoliArribasBanos,PracticeManager,GlobalSocialProtection&Jobsteam,andGustavoDemarco,Pensions&SIlead.WethankthepeerreviewersProf.ShereenHussein,PhilipO’Keefe,MatteoMorgandi,andJohnGilesfortheirfeedback,includinghelpfulinputstodraftversionsofthenote.OurthanksalsotoAgastyaYeachuriwhoprovidedresearchassistance.

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onraisinghumancapitalinallgenerations,supportinglabormarketengagementacrossthepoolofpotentialworkers,andprovidingsocialprotectionacrossthelifecycle.

Reformsshouldincludepoliciesthatcanextendproductiveworkinglivesandincreaselaborforceparticipationandproductivityofmatureworkers—herereferredtoas“productivelongevity.”Theagendadoesnotaimtoincreaseemploymentratesacrossallolderworkers

buttostimulatelongerworkingliveswherepossibleandretainproductivitytowardtheend

ofworkinglives.Thegainsfromcapitalizingonimprovedmatureworkerlaborcontributionscanbesignificant:projectionsforOECDcountriessuggestincreasesinGDPtothetuneof0.4percentagepointsperyear,asidefromotherimpactsonpensionsustainabilityandhealth,amongothers(Kotschy&Bloom,2023).

Engagingoldergenerationsdoesnotcrowdoutworkforyoungergenerations.Policymakersmayworryoverthe“l(fā)umpoflaborfallacy”—thenotionthatextendingworkingliveswillreduceopportunitiesforotheragegroups(Worthingtonetal.,2018).Inhigh-incomecountries(HICs),employmentratesforyoungandoldercohortsarepositivelylinked,however(B?heim,2019;Gruberetal.,2009;Munnell&Wu,2012).Thecostofinactionmayinfactbehighacrossgenerations,leadingtoaggregatejoblosses,workerandskillsgaps,worsenedhealthandincomes,highfiscalpressures,andsuboptimalproductivityandcompetitiveness.

Agingprovidesopportunitiesforindividuals,firms,andeconomies.Firmswithage-diverseworkforcesreapproductivitypayoffs(OECD,2020).Withbetterhealthandlongevity,moreworkersmaywishtoremainactive,andsocialandcognitivestimulationofferedbyworkmayhelpthemremainhealthyevenlonger.Policyandprogramsshouldensurethattheyhavetheflexibilityandincentivestodosoandthatallworkersrealizetheirproductivepotential(WorldBank,2022).The“silvereconomy”—economicactivitiesservingolderpeople’sneeds—presentslargeandrapidlygrowingmarketopportunities(Worthingtonetal.,2018).

Thisnotepresentssomestylizedfactsaboutworkinoldageandaconceptualframeworkforidentifyingconstraintsandpolicyinterventionsthatcanhelpfosterproductivelongevity.Onthisbasis,itsummarizesthe,admittedlylimited,policyevidenceavailableandoutlinestheimplicationsforWorldBankwork.

Agingandlabormarketsindevelopinganddevelopedcountries

Thecontextforagingandemploymentisdiverseacrossandwithincountries.Nonetheless,afewsalientfeaturesofmatureworkers’productiveparticipationinlabormarketscanbesummarizedasfollows.

1.Matureworkersarelesslikelytobeemployedthanprime-ageworkers.Laborforceparticipationislowerasworkersreachage55anddropssignificantlyatage65+andabove.Thelifecyclepatterngenerallyholdswhethertheyliveinlow-incomecountries(LICs),lowermiddle-incomecountries(LMICs),uppermiddle-incomecountries(UMICs),orHICs,althoughthelevelofparticipationdifferssignificantlyacrossthesegroups(Figure1).

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2.Womenlivelongerbutarelessengagedin(paid)workthanmen.Only17percentoftheglobalfemaleworkforceisactiveatage65+,comparedto31percentofmales.Yetwomenoutlivemen(byfiveyearsonaverage)andhaveashighorhigherlevelsofhumancapital.2

3.Matureworkersinpoorercountriesaremorelikelytoworkthanthoseinwealthiercountries.Theaveragelaborforceparticipationrateof65+inLICsis42percent,whilethatofHICsis14percent,showingthat,lackingpensionsandwithlimitedsavingscapacity,olderindividualsmustcontinuetosupportthemselvesinLICs,whereassomeworkersin

richercountriescanaffordtoleavelabormarkets.3Aprotectionandproductivityagenda

isthereforemoreurgentforL/MICs.

Figure1:Laborforceparticipationratesbyage,gender,andcountryincomegroup.

Laborforceparticipationrate(%)

90

87

92

83

74

78

73

20

70

66

58

61

55

54

46

50

34

46

44

43

45

45

37

40

36

31

32

31

73

16

9

21

15-2425-5455-6465+

LIC

15-2425-5455-6465+

LMIC

15-2425-5455-6465+

UMIC

15-2425-5455-6465+HIC

MaleFemale

Source:EstimatesbasedonILOSTAT2020

4.Thereissignificantdiversityinmatureworkerparticipation,evenwithindevelopingcountries.Chinaisagoodexample:atage60-64,80percentofurbanwomen,likelyworkingintheformalsector,withpensionsandpossiblysomefinancialresources,haveretired,comparedto30percentofruralwomenandfewerthan20percentofruralmen(Gilesetal.,2023).

5.Thosewiththehighestlongevityleaveworkearlier.AcorollaryofthepreviouspointsisthatfemalesinHICsenjoythehighestlifeexpectancyrate(83years)butaretheleastlikelytoworkatolderages(participationratesat9percentatage65+).Again,Chinaillustrateswithin-countrydiscrepancies.Chinesewomenoutlivemenbynearlysixyearsonaverage,4andlifeexpectancyissignificantlyhigherinurbanthanruralareasbuturbanwomendropouttheearliest.

2Inmiddle-incomecountriessuchasChile,Malaysia,MexicoandTurkey,thegendergapinlaborforceparticipationforworkersaged55-64isabove30percentagepoints,comparedtoaround11percentinEU27countries(OECDolderworkerscoreboard).

3EstimatesbasedonILOSTAT2020.

4EstimatesbasedonUnitedNations,D.o.E.a.S.A.,PopulationDivision.(2022).WorldPopulationProspects2022,OnlineEdition.

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6.Matureworkersaremorelikelytobeself-employedandworkinformally(Figure2,aandb).Self-employmentratesincreasewithage.Informalityratesarealsohigherformatureworkersthanothergroups(inLICs,atparwithyouth).Adesiretouseskillsandtobecomeentrepreneurscanmotivatematureworkerstotakeupindependentwork.“Push”factorslikelyalsoplayaroleifregulatoryordiscriminatoryconstraintsrenderself-employmenttheonlyoptiontoremainactive(Holmquist&Sundin,2022).RapidlyexpandingeducationsystemsinL/MICshavealsoincreasedthehumancapitalgapbetweenolderandyoungercohorts,partlyexcludingtheformerfromwageopportunitiesinthemodernurbansector(Morozetal.,2021).

Figure2:Self-employmentandinformalityratesbyageandcountryincomegroup

Self-employmentasshareoftotal

a.

Self-employmentasshareoftotalemployment

85

79

68

79

73

73

employment(%)

66

52

48

43

46

30

26

20

14

8

15-2425-5455-6465+

LICLMICUMICHIC

b.Shareofinformalemploymentintotalemployment

Informalityasshareoftotal

88

75

88

82

71

81

84

72

employment(%)

65

46

50

38

19

30

12

14

15-2425-5455-6465+

LICLMICUMICHIC

Source:EstimatesbasedonILOSTAT2020.

7.Thereisnoclearevidenceregardingtherelativeproductivityofolderworkers.Agingwillatsomepointinvolvecognitivedecline,buttheonsetandspeedofdescentvariessignificantlyacrossindividuals.Someabilitiesimproveupuntilhighage(Veríssimoetal.,2022),andolderworkersoftencompensateforcognitivespeedwithexperienceorimportantsocioemotionalcompetenciesthatareinhighdemand(Doerwaldetal.,2016).Whetherfocusedonestablishmentproductivityorindividualproductivity,studiesofworkerproductivityandagedonotconsistentlyidentifyanegativecorrelation,andsomeinfactpointtomaintainedorevenincreasedproductivity,especiallyformoredemandingtasks(B?rsch-Supanetal.,2021;Vivianietal.,2021).Fromapolicyperspective,akeyconclusionisthatage-relateddeclinesinabilitiescanbeinfluencedwithinvestmentinphysicalandmentalhealthandskills(Desjardins&Warnke,2012;InstituteofMedicine,2012).

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Thesefindingsindicateamultiprongedpolicyagenda.Thoseaged65andabovearelesslikelythanprime-ageworkerstobeworking.However,inpoorercountries,manydoremainactive,perhapsevenlongerthantheyshould.Workersinhigher-incomecountriesandhigher-incomegroups(typicallytheurbanformalsector)aremorelikelytobeabletoaffordretirement,butthesearealsopotentiallygroupsforwhichextendingworkinglivesmaymakethemostsense.Matureworkersappearalsotohavesignificantproductivitypotential,atleastuntilhigherages.Overtheforeseeablefuture,mostoftheworld’sactivematureworkerswillbeself-employedindevelopingcountries.Raisingtheirproductivityandprotectingthemfromoldagepovertyneedstobeakeypriority.

Fosteringproductivelongevity–what’stheproblem,andwhatcouldwork?

Policyshouldfocusonraisingbothproductivityandparticipationamongmatureworkers.

Effectivepolicyinterventionswillidentifythemostbindingconstraintsforlongevityanduseeffectiveapproachestoaddressthem.Thissectionpresentsaframeworkfortheseconstraintsandeffectivepolicyoptions,butwithtwocaveats.

First,theevidenceofwhatworkstopromoteproductivelongevityisthin,especiallyinLMICs.

Relativelysolidevidenceonconstraintsisnotmatchedbyresearchevidenceongoodpolicypractices.KnowledgegapsonimpactareespeciallywideforL/MICsforwhomthisagendaisbeginningtotakeshape.Whatisavailablegenerallyreflectsreformsaffectingworkerswhoarepartofsomesocialprotectionschemesandotherregulatorysystems(althougheventhere,labormarketimpactisnotsystematicallystudied)andeffortstoincreasehiringratesintheformalsector.HowtofosterproductiveaginginL/MICcontextswithhighinformality,wherethe“employer”sideismissing,remainsanunderstudiedarea.

Second,thispolicyagendawillhavelimitedreach,especiallyinpoorerandyoungercountries.Incountrieswhereolderpopulationshavelowlevelsofhumancapital(andwhereyoungerpopulationshavebenefitedfrommoreschoolingandbetterhealth),raisingtheolderpopulation’sproductivitymorethanmarginallyischallenging.Sincemanyolderpeoplearealreadyworkingmerelytosurvive,andofteninphysicallyandmentallystrenuousoccupations,policycannotincreaseemploymentratesmuchfurther.Otherpolicyoptions,suchasraisingwomen’sandyouth’saccesstoproductiveopportunities,maybemuchmorecost-effectiveandpoliticallypalatableinyouthfulcountries.

Thelackofaninstitutionalhomeforthismultisectoralagendawilllikelylimitprogress.Evenwhereagingismoreurgent,centralpolicyareas,includinglifelonglearning,arefragmentedacrossmanydifferentgovernmentandprivatesectorstakeholders.Withoutaclearvisionofwhichministry/governmentagencyhasthemandateforinvestinginthehumancapitalofmatureworkers(countrypracticesvary),itisdifficulttooperationalizestrategies.

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Constraintsandpoliciesforproductivelongevity–aframework

Matureworkers’participationinproductivework,whetherasself-employedoremployees,isconstrainedbydifferentbarriersanddisincentives.Figure3providesaconceptualframeworkpresentingbroadcategoriesofpolicyinterventionsthatcanaddresssupplyanddemand-sideconstraintsandhelpmatchworkerswithadequatejobsandopportunities.Theframeworkisananalyticaltoolanddoesnotpurporttopresentanexhaustivelistofconstraintsorpolicyinterventions;someconstraintsarealsobindingforbothworkersandemployers.Foreachbucketofconstraints,regulatoryrestrictions,formalandinformalinstitutions,andsocialnormsinfluencematureworkers’incentivesandcapacitytoaccessproductiveopportunitiesandfirms’capacityandwillingnesstoemployolderworkersandinvestintheirhumancapital.Therefore,differentregulatoryandotherpolicyreformsandinterventionscanhelpremovebarriersandcreatetherightincentives.

Figure3:Constraintstoproductivelongevityandpossiblepolicysolutions

CONSTRAINTS

DEMAND

?Barrierstohiring

?Underinvestmentin

health,skills,

complementaryassets

MATCHING

?Ine代cientmatchingofmatureworkersand

productivework

SUPPLY

?Barriersto

participation

?Barrierstoproductive

?assetsandmarkets

?Underinvestmentinhealth,skills

DEMAND

Removebarriersandraiseincentivestohireandinvestinmatureworkersandtheirbusinesses

?Reformregulations

?Addressageism

?Promotehumancapital

?andcomplementary

?investments

?Fostermarketaccess

MATCHING

Raiseaccesstotargetedservices

?Includeandtarget

?matureworkers

?RaisecapacityofPublic

?EmploymentServices

?Developcomprehensive

?approacheswithprivate

?sector

SUPPLY

Removebarriersandraiseincentivestoworkand

investinproductivity

?Reformregulations

?Provideaccesstoservices

?Provideaccesstoinputs

?Promotehumancapitalinvestments

?Addressbehaviouralconstraints

POLICY

▲

Source:Adaptedfrom(JohanssondeSilva&Santos,2023)

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Supply-sidebarrierslimitmatureworkersfromaccessingproductiveopportunitiesasemployeesorentrepreneurs.Theyincludedirectregulatorybarrierstowork,suchasmandatoryretirement,ordisincentives,suchashightaxationoflaborincomeatolderages.Entrepreneursmayfacespecificage-relatedbarrierstoproductiveassetsormarkets,suchasdiscriminationfromfinancialinstitutionsorclients.Declininghumancapital,duetoskillsobsolescenceorworseninghealth,risksreducingproductivitylevels.Behaviorallimitationsincludinginternalized“ageism”—perceptionsandbiasesaroundolderpeople’scharacteristicsandcapabilities—canpreventolderworkersfrompursuingopportunitiesorinvestinginmaintainingorincreasingtheirownproductivity.

Demand-sidebarriersreducethehiringrateofandinvestmentinmatureworkersinfirms.

Employersaresimilarlyaffectedbyregulatoryconstraintsrelatedtopensionsandemploymentlegislation.Formalandinformalinstitutionalconstraints,e.g.,socialcontributionsandso-called“senioritywages”,mayincreasematureworkers’costsabovetheirproductivitylevels.Finally,ageismcanreduceemployers’willingnesstoretainorhirematureworkersorinvestintheirproductivecapacity.

Whetherprivateorpublic,jobmatchingandcareerguidanceservicesareoftennotadaptedtomatureworkers’needsandconstraints.Asaresult,vacancieswithjobsrelevantformatureworkersmayco-existwithhighunemploymentorinvoluntaryinactivityamongmatureworkers.

Theframeworkcentersontheideathatsuboptimalinvestmentinthehumancapitalofmatureworkersisacriticalconstrainttotheiremployabilityandcapacitytocontributetotheirownandothers’welfare.Matureworkersunderinvestintheirhumancapital—theirhealthandskills—dueto,amongotherthings,norms,lackofaffordableopportunities,orinformationgaps.Thesameisoftentruefortheircurrentorpotentialemployers.Humancapitalinvestmentovertheentirelifecycleiscrucialintherapidlychangingskillsdemand.

Motivatingmatureworkersandentrepreneurstoremainactiveinlabor

marketsandinvestintheirhealthandskills

Onthelaborsupplyside,policiesmayfocusonremovingbarriersandincreasingincentivestoworkandinvestinproductivity,whetherasemployeesorentrepreneurs.Thisrequiresreformstoinstitutionalframeworks(pensions,othersocialwelfareprograms,taxation)thatfacilitatecontinuedparticipation,societalnormsthatpromoteparticipation,andcontinuedinvestmentinhealthandskills.

BARRIERSTOPARTICIPATION

Regulatorybarriersoutrightprohibitormakeittoocostlyformatureworkerstocontinueworking.Institutionalconstraintsaffectformalsectorworkers.Forexample,formalsectorretirementagesarelowinmanyEastAsiaandPacificcountriesdespitehighandincreasinglifeexpectancy(WorldBank,2016).InChina,retirementismandatoryatage60formenand55forwomen(OECD,2019b).Implicittaxratesonwork,incombinationwithpensionandsecond-earnedincome,areoftenhigh(Butricaetal.,2006).ThereissignificantevidencefromCentralEurope,theWesternBalkans,andSouthAfricathatreceivingpensionincome,evenwithlow

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adequacy,lowersincentivestoremainactive(Bairdetal.,2018;Bussoloetal.,2015;Gragnolatietal.,2011).Moreflexibleworkarrangements,e.g.,fixed-termcontracts,arelegallylimitedinmanydevelopingcountries.5

Reformscanfocusonincentive-compatiblesocialinsurancesystemsandlabortaxation.

EvidencefromAustriaandGermanyshowsthatraisingretirementagescanpostponeretirementandincreaseparticipation,butcomplementaryreformsmaybeneededtocloseparallelloopholestoearlylabormarketexitthroughunemploymentordisabilityprograms(Lorenzetal.,2020).GovernmentsinEuropeandelsewherehavelearnedthatpensionreformsarecomplexandpoliticallycostlytoimplementandsustain(Fouejieuetal.,2021).However,L/MICscanlearnfromthesemistakeswhenbuildingtheirsocialprotectionsystems.TaxcreditsrelatedtopensionincomehavebeencarriedoutinOECDcountries(e.g.,Sweden)withapositiveimpactonparticipation(Laun,2017).Abalancecanbestruckbetweengivingindividualchoiceandpromotingproductivelongevitybygivingindividualsthechoicetoretireatanearlyageorlaterinlifewithactuarialadjustmentstotheirpensionbenefitsdependingontheageatwhichtheychoosetoretire.

Lackofaffordablequalitychildandlong-termcareservicesisasignificantbarriertopaidemploymentformanyintheoldergeneration,whoprovidecareservicesintheirhouseholds.

Acrosstheglobe,theoldergenerationisengagedinunpaidwork;women,inparticular,careforgrandchildren,elderlyparents,orevenspouses6(Ferrannaetal.,2022).Inmanydevelopingcountries,earlyfamilyformationmeansthatmanybecomegrandparentscomparativelyearlyinlifewithdecadesofpotentiallyproductiveworkingyearsaheadofthem.7Wherecareservicesarenotaccessible,thereisoftenatrade-offbetweengrandparents’andmothers’work,8whichreducestheparticipationoftheoldergeneration.9Lowerphysicalstaminaandhighervulnerabilitytocrimeandviolencearesignificantconstraintsforwomen’sparticipationinlabormarketsandsimilarlyaffectmatureworkers(ILO,2017;NCST,2011).

Accesstoqualitycareservicesisanessentialandpotentiallywin-winpolicyapproach.

Subsidizedchild-andlong-termcareserviceshelpreduceunpaidworkthatfallsonmatureworkers.EvidencefromBrazilandSpainshowsthatprovidingaffordablechildcarehelpsincreasegrandparents’employmentandearnings(Attanasioetal.,2017)andcanmotivatethemtodelayretirement(Costa-Font&Vilaplana-Prieto,2022).Otherformsofpubliclyfunded

5Accordingtothe

WBemployingworkers’database

,halfoftheworld’scountrieshavelimitsonfixedtermcontracts.

6Astudyofti