外文翻譯--資本結(jié)構(gòu)影響因素的分析研究

中文 3160字 1 外文翻譯 原文 Capital structure influencing factor analysis research Material Source:Theory of Optimal Capital Structure Author : R. Barea Since the Modigliani and Miller (1958) since the academic structure of the capital a large number of theoretical and empirical research, trying to identify the potential impact of capital structure choice factors. A lot of literature suggests that the choice of capital structure by the asset structure, firm size, non-debt tax shields, growth, volatility, product uniqueness, profitability and other firm characteristics factors. In addition, the choice of capital structure is also affected by industry characteristics, macroeconomic and institutional environment factors. Harris and Raviv (1991) from the experience of many U.S. companies to sum up: leverage ratio of fixed assets, non-debt tax shields, growth and company size increases, with the volatility, advertising costs, bankruptcy the possibility of profitability and product uniqueness increases less. Chinese listed companies due to the particularity of the system, what factors determine the choice of capital structure? Characteristics of institutional factors influenced how the company capital structure choice? Experiences and things like that to be the model and empirical test. In recent years, researchers began to affect the capital structure of listed companies in an empirical study of factors, such as Lu Zhengfei, and Xin Yu (1998), Lishan Min and Su Yun (1999), Xiaozuo Ping and Wu Shinong (2002), and achieved certain results, However, most studies are using a simple regression technique factors on capital structure for empirical analysis. Titman and Wessels (1988) pointed out the shortcomings of this approach: First, there is no wish to measure the sole representative of the property; Second, it is difficult to find and other relevant property is not related to the measurement of a particular property; third, As can be observed variable is not perfectly representative of its properties should be measured, they are used in the regression analysis will lead to errors in variable problem; fourth, the agent variables and measurement error 2 may be explained by variables related to measurement error will produce false (Spurious) related. In this paper, two-stage multiple procedures, application of factor analysis-based model to reduce measurement error, to expand the capital structure of Chinese listed companies Empirical Study. Capital Structure To build the empirical model, the author according to the capital structure theory and relevant empirical research on factors affecting capital structure analysis, and gives a proxy variable to capture these factors. I, the asset structure Agency theory, balance theory and the theory of asymmetric information are considered assets for capital structure choice. According to agency theory, high-leverage the companys shareholders tend to sub-optimal investment (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Myers, 1977). The assets of the company secured an opportunity to limit such behavior. Therefore, the value of assets and leverage are related to security. Another problem comes from a proxy service managers tend to consumption. Assets can be secured with fewer companies more vulnerable to such agency costs, because these companies on the capital expenditure monitoring more difficult (Grossman and Hart, 1982). Companies can increase the level of debt as a monitoring tool to mitigate this problem. Therefore, security assets and leverage can be negative. Theory from the balance with debt secured creditors to reduce the potential loss of the debtors insolvency and, therefore, limit the amount of shareholder wealth, occupation of the debtor. Meanwhile, in bankruptcy the value of tangible assets higher than the value of intangible assets. Therefore, the value of assets and leverage are related to security. Under asymmetric information theory, tangible assets, more businesses will face less information asymmetry, therefore, should issue equity rather than debt. And the existence of asymmetric information, to the sale of secured debt had a negative because it reduces information premium. For asset structure, we use stock / total assets (INV) and fixed assets / total assets (FIX) two proxy variables. II, firm size Many studies suggest that large companies tend to diversify, with more stable cash flow, so low probability of bankruptcy. Warner (1997), Angclua and Meconnel (1982) study found that direct costs of financial distress and negatively related to firm size. Fama and Jensen (1983) that large corporations to smaller companies tend to provide more information on lenders. Therefore, less monitoring costs of large 3 companies, large companies than small companies with high borrowing capacity. Therefore, firm size should be positively correlated with leverage. And Rajan and Zingales (1995) that the large companies than small companies tend to provide more information to the public, may be related to internal investment company size and level of external investment in human negative correlation of asymmetric information. Under asymmetric information theory, large companies should be inclined to equity financing and therefore have lower leverage. The size of the company, we use the natural logarithm of total assets (LN (TA) and the main business income of the natural logarithm (LN (S) of two proxy variables. III, the tax That the use of tax-based model of the main benefits of debt financing is tax credits. According to tax-based theory, companies with higher marginal tax rates should use more debt to get the tax shield benefits. Therefore, the effective marginal tax rates should be positively correlated with leverage. Unable to obtain relevant data to calculate the marginal tax rate, we use the average tax rate (TAX) to analyze the tax impact of capital structure choice. IV, non-debt tax shield DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) that non-debt tax shield can be used as an alternative to debt financing, tax benefits, the same as in other cases, the non-debt tax shields have more companies should use less debt. Barton et al (1989), Prowse (1990), Wald (1999), Kim and Sorensen (1986) research shows that non-debt tax shields and leverage negative. In this paper, depreciation / total assets as non-debt tax shield (DEP) of the proxy variables. V. Growth According to agency theory, equity-controlled companies tend to sub-optimal investment will be deprived of their wealth came from the hands of creditors. For high growth companies, because of its future investment opportunities in the choice of greater flexibility, these companies may be more serious agency problems. Myers (1977) that high growth companies lower the future investment in growth companies have more options. If the high-growth companies need external equity financing options to implement in the future, then the company has a large debt may give up this opportunity, because such investment will transfer wealth from shareholders to creditors of the body, which produces the problem of insufficient investment. Therefore, growth should be negatively correlated with leverage. For growth, this growth rate with total assets (GRTA) and the equity value-added rate (GREQ) two 4 proxy variables. VI, volatility Regular payment of debt obligations involved, the highly leveraged company is more vulnerable to financial distress costs. Finance theory suggests that the risk of the company or bankrupt companies should not have a high probability of higher leverage. Therefore, the main business income volatility or commercial risk as the possibility of occurrence of financial distress proxy variables, which should be negatively correlated with leverage. Bradley et al (1984), Titman and Wesssels (1988), Wald (1999) and Booth et al (2001) and other studies have shown that volatility negatively correlated with leverage. In this paper, the main business of the standards slip (VOL) as a proxy for volatility. VII ability to generate internal resources Trade-off theory is that ability to generate internal resources to leverage a positive correlation, because a strong ability to generate internal resources, companies choose higher leverage to get more debt tax shield. Jensen (1986) pointed out that instead of borrowing to pay dividends to ensure that the management discipline empire method. The benefits of debt can improve the efficiency of managers and their organizations, which act as a control effect role. Therefore, the company has a large free cash flow should have higher debt to limit managements discretion. According to the Theory of Optimal Financing (Pecking order theory), because the existence of asymmetric information, the company follows the financial pecking order model: companies prefer internal resources, internal resources have been exhausted if the company was to issue debt, and finally the issue of equity. Therefore, the ability to generate internal resources, negatively correlated with leverage. The ability to generate internal resources, this paper, the cash rate of sale (NOCFS) and total assets of cash recovery rate (NOCFA) two proxy variables, but to test the Jensen (1986) free cash flow hypothesis proposed in this paper with a cash rate of sales / total Asset growth rate (FCFS) and total assets of cash recovery rate / total assets growth rate (FCFA), as free cash flow (Note: free cash flow is difficult to quantify, can not be obtained directly from the financial data, must be used in other empirical research cash flow concept, and in line with the growth of the company (such as TobinQ, growth rate of total assets), investment opportunities, free cash flow and other indicators in order to explain the problem.) proxy variables. VIII, product uniqueness 5 From the stakeholder theory of capital structure and product / factor market theory perspective, the company has a unique product should have less leverage. Titman and Wessels (1988) that, in liquidation, the production of unique or specialized products company, its customers, suppliers, workers will suffer from higher costs. Their workers and suppliers may have the skills and capital, job characteristics, and the customer service more difficult to find a replacement phase. From the agency cost perspective, the expected cost of employees looking for work products and services depends on whether there is unique. Employees working on the implementation of mass-specific work with respect to employees engaged in the former expected to find lower cost. Therefore, when other conditions being equal, and human-related costs for the agency to provide specialized products and services relative to the companies higher. Due to higher leverage will have higher agency costs and bankruptcy costs, so the uniqueness of products and services will affect the degree of capital structure choice. These companies promote their unique products will suffer more sales costs and advertising costs. In this paper, operating expenses / Income from principal operations (SEXP) as a proxy for product uniqueness. IX liquidity Current ratio of capital structure choice is mixed. On the one hand, high flow rate paid by the company short-term debt due ability. Therefore, liquidity should be positively correlated with leverage. On the other hand, companies with more liquid assets may use these assets to finance its investments. Therefore, the flow of state assets would negatively affect leverage. And, as Prowse (1990) points out, can be used to indicate the liquidity of the assets to creditors, the interests of shareholders to manipulate the expense of the extent of these assets. In this paper, the current ratio (CR) and the quick ratio (QR) as a proxy for liquidity. Ten, industry characteristics The asset risk, asset type, and the demand for external funds vary by industry, the average leverage will vary with the industry. Industry characteristics and capital structure characteristics of the fact that the leverage within the same industry in different sectors of the lever more than the similar, leverage levels to remain relatively the same industry (Bowen et al, 1982; Bradley et al 1984). Bradley et al (1984) studies have shown that regulated industries (telecommunications, electronics, utilities and aviation industry) with higher leverage. This article uses the industry dummy variables to control the impact of industry factors on the lever. 2、譯文 資本結(jié)構(gòu)影響因素的分析研究 資料來源 : 最優(yōu)資本結(jié)構(gòu)原理 作者 : 巴里亞 自 Modigliani 和 Miller(1958) 以來， 學術(shù)界對資本結(jié)構(gòu)進行了大量的理論和實證研究，試圖辨別影響資本結(jié)構(gòu)選擇的潛在因素。大量的文獻表明，資本結(jié)構(gòu)的選擇受資產(chǎn)結(jié)構(gòu)、公司規(guī)模、非債務(wù)稅盾、成長性、波動性、產(chǎn)品獨特性、 獲利能力等公司特征因素影響。此外，資本結(jié)構(gòu)的選擇還受行業(yè)特性、宏觀經(jīng)濟以及制度環(huán)境等因素影響。 Harris 和 Raviv(1991) 對來自美國公司的許多經(jīng)驗研究進行總結(jié) :“杠桿隨著固定資產(chǎn)比率、非債務(wù)稅盾、成長性和公司規(guī)模的增加而增加， 隨著變動性、 廣告費用、破產(chǎn)可能性、 獲利能力和產(chǎn)品獨特性的增加而減少?！?中國上市公司由于制度的特殊性，究竟什么因素決定資本結(jié)構(gòu)的選擇 ? 制度因素如何通過公司特征因素影響資本結(jié)構(gòu)的選擇 ? 等等這些問題有待于經(jīng)驗?zāi)Ｐ偷慕⒑蛯嵶C檢驗。近年來，中國研究者開始對上市公司資本結(jié)構(gòu)影響因素進行實證研究，如陸正飛和辛宇 (1998) 、李善民和蘇赟 (1999) 、肖作平和吳世農(nóng)(2002) 等，取得了一定的成果，但大多數(shù)研究都是使用簡單的回歸技術(shù)對資本結(jié)構(gòu)影響因素進行實證分析。 Titman 和 Wessels(1988)指出了這種方法的缺點 : 第一，不存 在希望測量屬性的唯一代表 ; 第二，很難找到與其他相關(guān)屬性不相關(guān)的某一特定屬性的計量 ; 第三，由于可觀察變量不能完美地代表其所應(yīng)測量的屬性，它們在回歸分析中的使用將引起變量問題中的誤差 ; 第四， 代理變量的計量誤差也許與被解釋變量的計量誤差相關(guān)將產(chǎn)生謬誤 (Spurious)相關(guān)。本文采用二階段多元程序，應(yīng)用基于因子分析模型來減緩計量誤差，以拓展中國上市公司資本結(jié)構(gòu)影響因素的實證研究。 資本結(jié)構(gòu)影響因素 : 為了構(gòu)建經(jīng)驗?zāi)Ｐ?，作者根?jù)有關(guān)的資本結(jié)構(gòu)理論和相關(guān)的經(jīng)驗研究對資本結(jié)構(gòu)影響因素進行分析，并給出捕捉這些因素 的代理變量。 一、 資產(chǎn)結(jié)構(gòu) 代理理論、權(quán)衡理論和信息不對稱理論都認為資產(chǎn)構(gòu)成影響資本結(jié)構(gòu)的選擇。根據(jù)代理理論，高杠桿公司的股東傾向于次優(yōu)投資 ( Jensen 和Meckling,1976;Myers,1977) 。 而有擔保資產(chǎn)的公司能限制這種機會行為。 因此，資產(chǎn)擔保值與杠桿正相關(guān)。另外一個代理問題來自經(jīng)理們傾向在職消費。 具有較少可擔保資產(chǎn)的公司更易遭受這種代理成本，因為這些公司對資本支出的監(jiān) 7 督較困難 (Grossman 和 Hart,1982) 。公司可以提高債務(wù)水平作為監(jiān)督工具以減緩這個 問題。因此，可擔保資產(chǎn)與杠桿負相關(guān)。從權(quán)衡理論看，帶抵押的債務(wù)減少了 債權(quán)人在債務(wù)人破產(chǎn)時的潛在損失，因而也就限制了股東侵占債務(wù)人財富的數(shù)額。同時，在公司破產(chǎn)時有形資產(chǎn)的價值比無形資產(chǎn)的價值高。 因此，資產(chǎn)擔保值與杠桿正相關(guān)。根據(jù)信息不對稱理論，有形資產(chǎn)較多的企業(yè)將面臨較少的信息不對稱問題，因此，應(yīng)該發(fā)行權(quán)益而不是債務(wù)。 且信息不對稱的存在， 給出售擔保債務(wù)帶來了不利， 因為其減少了 信息溢價。對于資產(chǎn)結(jié)構(gòu)，本文使用存貨 /總資產(chǎn) (INV)和固定資產(chǎn) /總資產(chǎn) (FIX)兩個代理變量。 二、 公司規(guī)模 許多研 究認為大公司傾向于多角化經(jīng)營，具有較穩(wěn)定的現(xiàn)金流，因此破產(chǎn)的概率較小。 Warner(1997)、 Angclua 和 Meconnel(1982)的研究發(fā)現(xiàn)財務(wù)困境的直接成本與公司規(guī)模負相關(guān)。 Fama 和 Jensen(1983)認為大公司較小公司傾向于向貸款人提供更多的信息。因此大公司的監(jiān)督成本較少，大公司比小公司具有較高的借貸能力。 因此，公司規(guī)模應(yīng)與杠桿正相關(guān)。 而 Rajan 和 Zingales (1995)認為大公司比小公司傾向于向公眾提供更多的信息，公司規(guī)?？赡芘c內(nèi)部投資人和外部投資人間信息 不對稱水平負相關(guān)。根據(jù)信息不對稱理論，大公司應(yīng)傾向于權(quán)益融資， 因此具有更低的杠桿。對于公司規(guī)模，本文使用總資產(chǎn)的自然對數(shù)(LN(TA)和主營業(yè)務(wù)收入的自然對數(shù) (LN(S)兩個代理變量。 三、稅收 基于稅收模型認為使用債務(wù)融資的主要益處在于稅收抵減。 根據(jù)基于稅收理論， 具有較高邊際稅率的公司應(yīng)使用更多的債務(wù)以獲得稅盾收益。因此，有效邊際稅率應(yīng)與杠桿正相關(guān)。 由于無法獲得相關(guān)數(shù)據(jù)來計算邊際稅率，本文采用平均稅率 (TAX) 來分析稅收對資本結(jié)構(gòu)選擇的影響。 四、非債務(wù)稅盾 DeAngelo 和 Masulis(1980)認為非債務(wù)稅盾可作為債務(wù)融資稅收利益的替代，在其他情況相同下，擁有較多非債務(wù)稅盾的公司應(yīng)更少地使用債務(wù)。 Barton et al(1989)、 Prowse(1990)、 Wald(1999)、 Kim 和 Sorensen(1986)的研究表明非債務(wù)稅盾和杠桿負相關(guān)。 本文用折舊 /總資產(chǎn)作為非債務(wù)稅盾 (DEP)的代理變量。 五、成長性 根據(jù)代理理論，權(quán)益控制型公司傾向于次優(yōu)投資而將財富從債權(quán)人手中剝奪過來。對于成長性較高的公司，由于其在選擇將來投資機會時具有更大的靈活性，這些公司的代 理問題可能更嚴重。 Myers(1977)認為高成長性公司較低成長性公司對將來投資具有更多的選擇權(quán)。如果高成長性公司需要外部權(quán)益融資來執(zhí)行將來選擇權(quán)， 那么具有大量債務(wù)的公司可能會放棄這個機會 因為這樣的投資將使財富從股東轉(zhuǎn)移到債權(quán)人身上， 即產(chǎn)生投資不足問題。因此， 成長 8 性應(yīng)與杠桿負相關(guān)。對于成長性，本文使用總資產(chǎn)增長率 (GRTA)和權(quán)益增值率 (GR