The-Renminbi’s-Dollar-Peg-at-The-Crossroads畢業(yè)論文外文文獻(xiàn)翻譯及原文

1、畢業(yè)設(shè)計(jì)（論文） 外文文獻(xiàn)翻譯文獻(xiàn)、資料中文題目：人民幣匯率在十字路口文獻(xiàn)、資料英文題目：The Renminbi s Dollar Peg aTheCrossroads文獻(xiàn)、資料來源：文獻(xiàn)、資料發(fā)表（出版）日期： 院（部）:專 業(yè)： 班 級： 姓 名： 學(xué) 號： 指導(dǎo)教師： 翻譯日期： 2017.02.14附 錄 1：英文原文The Renminbi s Dlloar Peg at The CrossroadsIn the face of huge balance of payments surpluses and internal inflationary pressures, China

2、 has been in a classic conflict between internal and external balance under its dollar currency-basket peg. Over the longer term, China slarge, modernizing, and diverse economy will need exchange rate flexibility and, eventually, convertibility with open capital markets. A feasible and attractive ex

3、it strategy from the essentially fixed RMB exchange rate would be a two-stage approach, consistent with the steps already taken since July 2005, but going beyond them. First, establish a limited trading band for the RMB relative to a basket of major trading partner currencies. Set the band so that i

4、t allows some initial revaluation of the RMB against the dollar, manage the basket rate within the band if necessary, and widen the band over time as domestic foreign exchange markets develop. Second, put on hold ad hoc measuresof financial account liberalization. They will be less helpful for relie

5、ving exchange rate pressures once the RMB basket rate is allowed to move flexibly within a band, and they are best postponed until domestic foreign exchange markets develop further, the exchange rate is fully flexible, and the domestic financial system has been strengthened and placed on a market-or

6、iented basis.From 1997 until July 21, 2005, the Chinese authorities pegged the renminbi(RMB) price of the United States dollar within a narrow range. On July 21, 2005, China s authorities moved to an adjustable basket peg against the dollar, with a revaluation of the central RMB/$ rate of 2.1 percen

7、t relative to the prior central rate of RMB 8.28 per dollar.Very notably in view of the claims that China s exchange rate policy is dictated bythe imperative of maintaining an undervalued currency, the authorities resisted substantial devaluation pressures, at the cost of some deflation, during the

8、Asian crisis period starting in 1997. For some time now the situation has been reversed, withstrong revaluation pressures,speculative capital inflows, and gathering inflationary momentum in the economy. The ability to resist speculative pressures comes from the maintenance of restrictions on private

9、 capital flows, especially inflows, as well as from administrative controls useful in restraining inflation.Nonetheless, “ hotmoney” inflows have helped swell China sforeign reserves immensely in recent years. Prior to July 21, 2005, most observers, and indeed the Chinese government itself, acknowle

10、dged that China esxchange-rate arrangements were unsustainable and undesirable as a long-term foundation for responding, without disruptive episodes of inflation or deflation, to inevitable real-side shocks, as well as to secular changes in the economy such as real appreciation due to Balassa-Samuel

11、son effects. At the time of unification, the parallel rate already stood at a depreciated level relative to the official rate. Revaluation-cum-“ flexation ” is a response to the situation, including the external trade pressures it had generated, but leaves questions about how flexibility will be exp

12、loited in the future.So far, even the 0.3 percent margins of RMB/$ flexibility that exist have not been utilized fully. Furthermore, capital markets that are open to the world seem a prerequisite for a modern high-income economy such as China seeks eventually to become. The issues concern the transi

13、tion. how might China best move toward a genuinely more flexible exchange-rate regime. And how might it best dismantle capital controls. And how might it optimally sequence these two conceptually distinct liberalization initiatives.s premIn the following pages I have four goals. First, to provide a

14、brief overview of developments in China s real exchange rate, external accounts, and inflation, thereby filling in some concomitants of the nominal exchange rate trajectory in Figure. Second, to draw parallels with the experience of Germany (still the world exporter)during the Bretton Woods era. Thi

15、rd, to discuss the rather successful experiences of Chile and Israel in transiting from pegged exchange rates with capital controls to floating rates with financial opening. Fourth and finally, to sketch a blueprint for gradually flexing the RMB s exchange rate in advance of cap-iataclcount liberali

16、zation. A feature of the basket system is that intervention in support of the basket rate could still be carried out entirely in the RMB/$ market. The reason is that the basket can be implemented entirely through a variable RMB/$ exchange rate target. As a technical matter, the band could be redefin

17、ed each morning using the exchange dollar rates prevailing earlier that day in the Tokyo markets. Or it could be updated more frequently. The decision to peg to a basket is also separable in principle from the decision on the denomination of foreign-currency reserves. Diversification of official res

18、erves in line with the basket weights would serve to stabilize the value of reserves in terms of RMB, but is not otherwise a necessary adjunct of a basket peg system.Once market forces are given greater play in determining the day-to-day value of the RMB/$ rate, the RMB might well move initially to

19、the strong edge of any band that was established. For that reason, it is important that the existing capital flow controls not be dismantled until the exchange rate bands have been widened to the point where a managed float has been achieved. The move to a currency band, a band that could be widened

20、 over time, would render superfluous some of the ad hoc liberalization measures that have been deployed to ease exchange-rate pressures. Many discussions make insufficient distinction between enhanced exchange flexibility, which can be achieved (with less currency volatility) under restricted intern

21、ational financial flows, and openness of the financial account. The two are completely different, and a less risky sequencing would tackle the full gradual relaxation of financial-account controls only after the achievement of a good degree of exchange-rateflexibility. Eichengreen (2005) and Prasad,

22、 Rumbaugh, and Wang (2005) lay out the case for this sequencing in greater detail. The manifest hazards of opening to inflows in the current setting of domestic banking-system weakness furnishes one of the most compelling arguments for placing further decontrol of the financial account on the back b

23、urner. In the face of huge balance of payments surpluses and internal inflationary pressures,China has been in a classic conflict between internal and external balance under its dollar currency peg.Over the longer term, China s large, modernizing, and diverse ewcoillnnoemeydexchange rate flexibility

24、, and eventually, currency convertibility with open capital markets. A feasible and attractive exit strategy from the essentially fixed RMB exchange rate would be the following two-stage approach, consistent with the steps already taken since July 2005, but going beyond them:Establish a limited trad

25、ing band for the RMB relative to a basket of major trading partner currencies. Set the band so that it allows some initial revaluation of the RMB against the dollar. Manage the basket rate within the band if necessary, and widen the band over time as domestic foreign exchange markets develop. Possib

26、ly allow a trend crawl in the band to accommodate long-run real exchange rate changes due to structural changes along Balassa-Samuelson lines.Put on hold ad hoc measures of financial account liberalization. They will be less helpful for relieving exchange rate pressures once the RMB/basket rate is a

27、llowed to move flexibly within a band, and they are best postponed until domestic foreign exchange markets develop further, the exchange rate is fully flexible, and the domestic financial system has been strengthened and placed on a market-oriented basis. Only a resilient financial sector will be ab

28、le to withstand the occasional sharp in terest-rate cha nges that the mon etary authorities may find n ecessarwhether they are responding to incipient unwanted exchange-rate movements or to domestic inflationary pressures.附 錄 2：中文譯文人民幣匯率在十字路口面對巨大的收支盈余和內(nèi)部通貨膨脹的壓力， 中國一直處在一個經(jīng)典的其貨 幣盯住一籃子貨幣的匯率機(jī)制下的內(nèi)部和外部平衡之

29、間的沖突。長遠(yuǎn)看來， 中國 的大型現(xiàn)代化和多元化的經(jīng)濟(jì)將需要匯率靈活性，并最終開放資本市場的可兌 換。一個可行的和有吸引力的出口戰(zhàn)略， 從本質(zhì)上固定人民幣匯率將會是一個兩 階段的方法，一致與 2005年 7月以來已經(jīng)采取步驟，但超越他們。首先 ,為與人 民幣有關(guān)的一籃子主要貿(mào)易伙伴的貨幣建立一個有限的交易帶。建立傳送帶， 以 便允許一些人民幣對美元原始的估價(jià)， 如果有必要， 可以再這個地帶管理一籃子 貨幣匯率，隨著國內(nèi)外匯市場的發(fā)展，還可以拓寬這個地帶。第二 ,暫緩特設(shè)金 融市場自由化措施。他們將很難幫助緩解人民幣匯率升值壓力， 一旦人民幣匯對 一籃子匯率可以允許在一個地帶靈活移動， 最好推遲

30、直到國內(nèi)外匯市場進(jìn)一步發(fā) 展，匯率完全靈活， 國內(nèi)的金融體制加強(qiáng) ,并放在一個以市場為導(dǎo)向的基礎(chǔ)之上。從 1997 年到 2005 年 7 月 21 日，中國當(dāng)局把用美元表示的人民幣的價(jià)值限 制在一個較窄的范圍內(nèi)。 2005年7月 21日，中國當(dāng)局開始實(shí)行兌美元的可調(diào)節(jié) 的一籃子貨幣的匯率 , 相對于之前的中間價(jià) 8.28 元/美元，人民幣對美元匯率升 值 2.1%。在從 1997 年開始的亞洲金融危機(jī)期間，他們很明顯針對宣稱中國匯率政策 被稱作是維持一個被低估的貨幣 ,當(dāng)局抵抗實(shí)質(zhì)性的貶值壓力 , 以通貨緊縮為代 價(jià)。一段時間以來，形勢已經(jīng)逆轉(zhuǎn) , 人民幣具有較強(qiáng)的升值壓力 , 投機(jī)資本流入

31、 , 并在經(jīng)濟(jì)中聚集了通貨膨脹的勢頭。 能夠抵御來自維護(hù)限制私人資本流動的投機(jī) 壓力 , 以及從行政管制有效地抑制通貨膨脹，尤其是資本的流入。盡管如此 , 在最近的幾年里，“熱錢”的流入加劇了中國外匯儲備的極大的 膨脹。在 2005年7月 21日之前, 大多數(shù)觀察家，事實(shí)上，中國政府本身，承認(rèn) 中國的匯率安排作為長期的基礎(chǔ)是不能成立的， 不和需要的， 沒有破壞性的發(fā)作 的通貨膨脹或通貨緊縮 , 必然是真正幾個方面的沖擊，以及對經(jīng)濟(jì)的長期變化， 比如說由于巴拉薩薩繆爾森效應(yīng)引起的長期的增值。 在聯(lián)合的時候 , 平行匯率已 達(dá)到一個相對于貶值官方利率水平。附帶增長的貨幣增長是一種情境化的反應(yīng)， 包

32、括對外貿(mào)易已經(jīng)產(chǎn)生的壓力，但是遺留下來關(guān)于如何開發(fā)未來的靈活性的問 題。到目前為止，甚至人民幣對美元的匯率彈性 0.3%的利潤還沒有被充分利 用。此外，資本市場對世界開放似乎是一種現(xiàn)代高收入經(jīng)濟(jì)的前提， 比如中國尋 求最終的實(shí)現(xiàn)。這個問題涉及到中國如何更好地向真正的更好的更靈活的匯率機(jī) 制轉(zhuǎn)變，它將如何最好的廢除資本控制， 它將如何最佳優(yōu)化那兩個概念性的明顯 的自由化的主動權(quán)序列。在接下來的文章中我有四個目標(biāo)。 首先， 提供一個簡要概述， 關(guān)于中國實(shí)際 匯率的發(fā)展、外部賬戶和通貨膨脹 , 從而填充一些與名義匯率共存的軌跡圖。第 二 , 畫出德國的經(jīng)驗(yàn) （仍然是世界首要的出口商 ）在布雷頓森林體系時代的經(jīng)驗(yàn)。 第三 , 討論了智利和以色列人從固定匯率和資本管制到浮動利率金融開放成功 的經(jīng)驗(yàn)。第四 , 最后勾畫出逐漸彎曲的人民幣匯率轉(zhuǎn)移到了資本帳戶自由化之前 的藍(lán)圖。一籃子貨幣匯率制度的一個特征是介入以支一籃子貨幣匯率能夠繼續(xù)執(zhí) 行人民幣 /美元完全市場。究其原因是，一籃子貨幣能夠完全地實(shí)現(xiàn)，通過一個 可變的