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1、美國社會保障的改革外文翻譯 原文二: the social security reform of american jobs lost during the recent recession caused a deluge of applications to the social security disability insurance program ? more than 6 million each year in 2009 and 2010 ? and threw into relief the fact that the ssdi program is structurally

2、unsound. the current applications surge will accelerate the exhaustion of ssdis trust fund and will force congress to have to choose among two unpalatable options ? increase ssdi payroll taxes or reduce benefit allowance rates. but that is not enough. if the particularly vulnerable population the ss

3、di is designed to serve is to be protected, while preserving incentives to work, the program has to be radically restructured. why get a job? even in normal economic times, those with marginally physical or mental impairments apply in the hope of acquiring disabled status under ssdi. among those alr

4、eady receiving ssdi benefits, the incentive to return to the work force is very poor. revealing ones ability to work, especially if its in a low-paid occupation, could cause permanent loss of ssdi benefits. strong work disincentives under ssdi result from its eligibility standard that guides benefit

5、 awards: an inability to engage in substantial gainful activity for 12 months or more. professors david autor of massachusetts institute of technology and mark duggan of the university of maryland recently proposed reforming ssdi to solve its twin problems of impending fiscal shortfalls and poor emp

6、loyment incentives. they propose a new front-end universal program of private disability insurance pdi paid for out of a new payroll tax to be shared by employers and employees. pdi would provide employment supports to disabled workers with a view of keeping them on the job. it would also provide ne

7、w subsidies to employers to retain disabled workers on the job. under their reform, applications to ssdi by those with disabilities but who could continue working with assistive technologies would be statutorily delayed by 22 months, during which time they would continue to receive pdis employment s

8、upports. applications for ssdi benefits by workers with serious disabilities ? who obviously cannot continue to work ? would be permitted as before. indeed, in all likelihood, the seriously disabled would begin receiving benefits quickly through ssdis compassionate allowances program. for others, cu

9、rrent ssdi would become the back end of a three-part system of disability insurance. autor and duggan estimate the annual cost of implementing pdi at $150 and $250 per year per worker. they expect pdi to reduce the number of ssdi applications. the more volatile job-market process for the disabled ?

10、because of their lower productivity, they tend to be laid-off first and hired last over the course of business cycles ? implies volatility in applications to ssdi. potentially filtering out frivolous applications under a pdi program would reduce volatility of ssdi applications during recessions and

11、reduce the programs denial rate. in addition, a smaller caseload would reduce waiting times for adjudicating legitimate claims and reduce the programs overall costs. indeed, autor and duggan suggest that a substantial amount of the cost of implementing pdi would be recovered through ssdi cost saving

12、s. costs in time and money nevertheless, workers and disability advocates are unlikely to support the autor-duggan proposal. it involves, they would argue, larger upfront costs and much longer delays in qualifying for ssdi benefits. apart from discouraging frivolous applications, mandatory delays ma

13、y also discourage deserving candidates from applying, and decisions about initial employment supports would be made by private, profit-driven insurance firms, potentially, resulting in unfair benefit denials. in addition, although the authors estimate the cost of pdi to be small relative to annual s

14、sdi payroll taxes for a lifetime median wage-earner, they do not include the taxpayer cost of employer incentives to retain disabled workers. those subsidies may work during normal economic times, but not during recessions when the compensation of disabled workers net of the subsidies considerably e

15、xceeds their productivity. flood of applicants on the other hand, pdi might attract so many new applicants ? including from among those currently employed ? that sizable cost savings to ssdi may never materialize. in that case, pdi would just become another new pay-go financed entitlement program of

16、 employment supports without any commensurate gains in employment or productivity. if, indeed, this approach could save ssdi costs by as much as the pdi proponents contend, an application delay with employment supports for appropriate candidates ? conditional on labor-force attachment and demonstrat

17、ion that employment supports are essential ? could be integrated into the current ssdi program itself ? an employment-conditioned disability front-end. this way, any cost savings would accrue immediately and directly to ssdi. the available policy options are: ? increase payroll taxes to pay for ssdi

18、s unfunded costs. ? create a new pdi entitlement with continuation of the current poorly structured ssdi program. ? or reform ssdi directly to improve work incentives and potentially make the program financially more secure. introducing a mandatory application delay with employment supports where ap

19、propriate within ssdi would avoid many of the autor-duggan proposals shortcomings and help to increase independence and self-sufficiency among many of tomorrows persons with disabilities. todays narrow ruling in virginia on the constitutionality of a provision of the affordable care act is just one

20、of many recent rulings on similar cases that have come down in recent months. since the law passed, opponents of reform have filed more than 20 different legal challenges. judges have already granted the administrations motion to dismiss 12 of these cases. and in two cases, federal judges looked at

21、the merits of the opponents arguments, determined that the affordable care act is constitutional and upheld the law. we disagree with the ruling issued today in virginia and the department of justice is considering its appeal options. we are pleased that judge hudson agrees that implementation of th

22、e law will continue uninterrupted. in the nine months since the health reform law was passed, weve made tremendous progress to strengthen our health care system, including lowering costs and implementing a new patients bill of rights to end some of the worst insurance company abuses. that work conti

23、nues. and were confident that when its all said and done, the courts will find the affordable care act constitutional. history and the facts are on our side. similar legal challenges to major new laws - including the social security act, the civil rights act, and the voting rights act - were all fil

24、ed and all failed. contrary to what opponents argue the new law falls well within congresss power to regulate economic activity under the commerce clause, the necessary and proper clause, and the general welfare clause. opponents of reform claim that the individual responsibility requirement - the r

25、equirement that all americans carry a minimum level insurance by 72014 -exceeds congress power to regulate interstate commerce because it penalizes economic inactivity. make no mistake - individuals who choose to go without health insurance are actively engaged in economic decision making - the deci

26、sion to pay for health care out-of-pocket or to seek uncompensated care. every year millions of those who have chosen to go without health insurance actively seek medical care, which is evident in the billions of dollars spent on uncompensated care every year. the affordable care act came into being

27、 precisely because of the interconnectedness of our health care costs. people who make an economic decision to forego health insurance do not opt out of the health care market, but instead shift their costs to others when they become ill or are involved in an accident and cannot pay. those costs - $

28、43 billion in 2008 alone - are borne by doctors, hospitals, insured individuals, taxpayers and small businesses throughout the nation. this cost-shift added on average $1,000 to family premiums in 2009 and roughly $410 to an individual premium. this concept is clearly seen in other areas of commerce

29、. for example, in most states, drivers are required to carry a minimum level of auto insurance. accidents happen and when they do, they need to be paid for quickly and responsibly. requiring drivers to carry auto insurance accomplishes this goal. similarly, the affordable care act, through the indiv

30、idual responsibility requirement, will require everyone to carry some form of health insurance since everyone at some point in time participates in the health care system, and incur costs that must be paid for. its no surprise then, that president reagans solicitor general charles fried recently wro

31、te, the health care laws enemies have no ally in the constitution. two federal judges that recently ruled on the challenge to the constitutionality of the reform law in michigan and virginia agreed. these lawsuits were dismissed, with the federal judge in virginia concluding how and when to pay for

32、health care are activities.in the aggregate.substantially affects the interstate health care market. two federal judges have agreed with this argument. in an earlier ruling in the western district of virginia, a federal judge wrote: i hold that there is a rational basis for congress to conclude that

33、 individuals decisions about how and when to pay for health care are activities that in the aggregate substantially affect the interstate health care market.nearly everyone will require health care services at some point in their lifetimes, and it is not always possible to predict when one will be a

34、fflicted by illness or injury and require care.far from inactivity, by choosing to forgo insurance, plaintiffs are making an economic decision to try to pay for health care services later, out of pocket, rather than now, through the purchase of insurance. as congress found, the total incidence of th

35、ese economic decisions has a substantial impact on the national market for health care by collectively shifting billions of dollars on to other market participants and driving up the prices of insurance policies. the affordable care act also bans insurance companies from discriminating against peopl

36、e with preexisting conditions. however, unless every american is required to have insurance, it would be cost prohibitive to cover people with preexisting conditions. heres why: if insurance companies can no longer deny coverage to anyone who applies for insurance - especially those who have health

37、problems and are potentially more expensive to cover - then there is nothing stopping someone from waiting until theyre sick or injured to apply for coverage since insurance companies cant say no. that would lead to double digit premiums increases - up to 20% - for everyone with insurance, and would

38、 significantly increase the cost health care spending nationwide. we dont let people wait until after theyve been in a car accident to apply for auto insurance and get reimbursed, and we dont want to do that with healthcare. if were going to outlaw discrimination based on pre-existing conditions, th

39、e only way to keep people from gaming the system and raising costs on everyone else is to ensure that everyone takes responsibility for their own health insurance. there have been many rulings on court cases regarding health reform and we know there will be many more. in the end, the affordable care

40、 act will prevail and the american people will enjoy the benefits of reform. background: the plaintiff, shawna p. dombert, brings this action pursuant to title xvi of the social security act seeking review of the decision of the commissioner of social security, denying the plaintiffs application for

41、 supplemental security income. specifically, the plaintiff alleges that the commissioners decision is not supported by substantial evidence in the record. the ssa commissioner contends that there is substantial evidence in the record to support his decision to deny the plaintiff ssi benefits. both p

42、arties have now moved for judgment. in 2008, the plaintiff filed an application for disability insurance benefits and ssi alleging disability due to back pain, arthritis, depression, anxiety, high blood pressure and a foot deformity. the administrative law judge found that the plaintiff did not have

43、 an impairment listed in the regulations and that, although she did not have past relevant work experience, plaintiff has the residual functional capacity to perform sedentary work. further, plaintiff is a 46-year-old woman with a high school education who has worked as a short order cook, an assist

44、ant to a disabled veteran, an assistant to a disabled woman, a cashier, a housekeeper and a seamstress. ruling: the court finds that there is substantial medical evidence in the record for the alj to conclude that the plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the social security act, and that

45、 the plaintiff could perform sedentary work. sedentary work is defined as work that involves sitting, with occasional standing or walking, lifting no more than 10 pounds at a time, and occasionally lifting or carrying articles like docket files, ledgers. the alj properly weighed the various medical

46、opinions. the court finds that the alj properly determined that the plaintiffs subjective complaints were not credible as they were not supported by the record. among the evidence, the march 2009 report from the plaintiffs treating physicians stated that she was able to stand and sit for an hour at

47、a time and lift 10 pounds. the plaintiff reported that she was able to take care of her eight-year-old son, do limited cleaning and shopping, drive and take public transportation. the plaintiffs complaint is therefore dismissed.譯文: 美國社會保障的改革 最近山洪暴發(fā)般的經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退造成了大量應(yīng)用與社會保障傷殘保險的程序?每年超過 6萬,在2009年至 2010 年松了一口

48、氣 ? ?事實程序結(jié)構(gòu)的合理性,ssdi是站不住腳的。當(dāng)前應(yīng)用程序潮將促進(jìn)用盡 ssdi 的信托基金,并將強制國會在兩個難吃選項中進(jìn)行選擇 ? ? ssdi 工資稅的增加或減少福利津貼。但這是不足夠的。如果要同時保留獎勵工作,ssdi 為了服務(wù),特別是弱勢群體的程序已經(jīng)被徹底調(diào)整了。為什么就業(yè)?甚至在經(jīng)濟(jì)比平時有輕微的身體或精神障礙中也適用,希望能獲得 ssdi 下的禁用的狀態(tài)。已接收 ssdi 好處的,回到工作中激勵是很差。透露工作的能力,尤其如果是在一份低報酬的工作時,才可能導(dǎo)致ssdi 好處永久丟失。根據(jù)ssdi的強有力的工作抑制,因其資格標(biāo)準(zhǔn)指南受益獎項:不能從事實質(zhì)效益可觀活動,12

49、個月或者更多。麻省理工學(xué)院的教授 david autor 和馬里蘭大學(xué)的教授duggan 最近提出改革:兩個問題,旨在解決其ssdi迫近的財政不足以及可憐的就業(yè)的獎勵。他們提出了一個新前端通用程序的私人殘疾保險 pdi ,由雇主和雇員共同支付的一種新的工資稅。pdi 將為殘疾工人服務(wù),以期保持他們對這項工作的工人提供就業(yè)支持。它還會保留對這項工作的殘疾的人士的雇主,提供新的補貼。根據(jù)他們的改革,誰能繼續(xù)與輔助技術(shù)的 ssdi 應(yīng)用程序會法定延遲22個月,在這段時間他們將繼續(xù)接收 pdi 的就業(yè)支持,。嚴(yán)重殘疾工人 ssdi 福利申請的人顯然不能繼續(xù)工作 ? ?他們將獲準(zhǔn)和以前一樣。事實上,在所

50、有的可能性中,嚴(yán)重殘疾人士會為他人開始接收快速通過 ssdi 的體恤津貼計劃的好處。當(dāng)前 ssdi 將成為殘疾保險的三個部分系統(tǒng)后端。autor 和duggan實施年度費用估算pdi每年每人在150美元到250美元之間。他們期望 pdi 減少 ssdi 應(yīng)用程序的數(shù)量。更加不穩(wěn)定的就業(yè)市場過程以幫助殘疾人士 ? ? 因為其較低的生產(chǎn)力往往是下崗的第一原因,在商業(yè)周期雇用的過程中? ?意味著經(jīng)濟(jì)周期在 ssdi 應(yīng)用程序中的波動,潛在的過濾輕薄的應(yīng)用pdi計劃將會下ssdi減少波動的應(yīng)用,在經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退期間降低程式的否定率。此外,一個較小的病人需要等待的時間就會減少合法要求和減少為審判程序的總成本。

51、事實上,autor和duggan建議將通過節(jié)省成本的ssdi 收回大量實施 pdi 的成本。成本在于時間和金錢,然而工人和殘疾的倡導(dǎo)者不支持 autor duggan 的提案。它涉及到,他們會爭辯,較大的前期成本和更長的時間延誤符合 ssdi 的好處。除了勸阻輕薄的應(yīng)用、強制性的延時可能也不值得利用、決定候選人對初聘支持都由私人利益,潛在的保險公司,導(dǎo)致不公平的利益否定。此外,雖然作者估計pdi的成本相對小的年度ssdi工資稅一輩子中值wage-earner,它不包括納稅人鼓勵雇主成本保留殘廢的工人。二可能會工作在正常的經(jīng)濟(jì)時代,但不是在經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退期間殘疾工人賠償時網(wǎng)絡(luò)的補貼大大超過他們的工作效

52、率。另一方面,pdi可能吸引這么多新聘人?包括在目前所采用的積蓄,相當(dāng)大的成本ssdi可能永遠(yuǎn)都無法物質(zhì)化。在這種情況下,pdi只會成為另一個新的pay-go就業(yè)授權(quán)活動資金支持沒有任何相稱在工作或收益生產(chǎn)力。如果,事實上,這種方法可以挽救ssdi成本高達(dá)pdi的支持者認(rèn)為,一個應(yīng)用程序的延時和適當(dāng)?shù)暮蜻x人?就業(yè)支持附件和勞動力方面有就業(yè)示威活動,支持是必要的?就會被整合到當(dāng)前的ssdi程序本身?一個employment-conditioned殘疾“前端?!边@種方式,任何代價直接向ssdi增加儲蓄資金直接向ssdi??捎玫恼哌x擇是: 1、增加工資稅來支付ssdi的無資金支持成本。 2、創(chuàng)建一

53、個新的pdi權(quán)利的進(jìn)行結(jié)構(gòu)ssdi差程序。目前 3、或者改革ssdi直接改善工作的激勵和潛在經(jīng)濟(jì)使程序更安全。 此外,介紹一個強制性的應(yīng)用和適當(dāng)?shù)膕sdi就業(yè)支持,會避免autor-duggan方案的許多缺點并幫助提高獨立眾多、自給自足的殘障者。 今天的狹窄的裁決在維吉尼亞州的合憲性上付得起的牙醫(yī)的規(guī)定行為只是其中之一,在許多最近裁決的類似病例中,由于反對該法律通過改革的反對者已正式提出 20 多個不同的法律挑戰(zhàn)。法官已經(jīng)授予了政府的運動來解雇12項的病例。在兩起事故中,聯(lián)邦法官看著是非的對手的參數(shù),確定他們付得起的牙醫(yī)行為是信奉的憲法和法律。我們不同在弗吉尼亞州今日發(fā)出的裁決,律政司正在考慮其上訴選項。我們感到高興的是得到哈德遜法官的同意,并執(zhí)行法律將繼續(xù)不間斷執(zhí)行該法律。在過去了九個月后通過了衛(wèi)生改革的法律,因為我們已經(jīng)作出加強我們包括降低成本和執(zhí)行結(jié)束一些最大的保險公司濫用的新病人的權(quán)利法案的衛(wèi)生保健系統(tǒng)的巨大進(jìn)步。繼續(xù)這項工作,我們有信心確定它在所有工作完成之后,法院一定會找到價格合理

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