瑞士的股利政策

1、外文文獻(xiàn)翻譯譯文一、外文原文原文：Dividend policy in SwitzerlandDividend policy has long been a subject of research and debate. There are many theoretical and empirical results describing the decisions companies make in this area. At the same time, however, there is no generally accepted model describing payout poli

2、cy. Moreover, empirical findings are often contradictory or difficult to interpret in light of the theory.In the ideal world of Miller and Modigliani (1961), dividends are irrelevant. The value of a firm is given by its investment opportunities. Dividends are just the residual, and investors faced w

3、ith consumption shocks can always get their own “homemade” dividends.In “real life”, however, dividend policy is one of the main concerns for managers and investors. Empirical studies have generally found that dividend increases are considered good news by investors, while dividend decreases lead to

4、 negative reactions.Several explanations for the existence and importance of dividends have been suggested over the last decades. Dividends could be used as signals for the actual position of a firm. Companies could communicate their better quality by paying higher dividends: low-quality firms will

5、not be able to imitate them since dividends involve costs in terms of foregone investment, taxes, or the need to attract external capital. Agency theory suggests that dividends may be a way to reduce the overinvestment problem or a means to keep firms in the capital markets. Dividends may also be us

6、ed to attract institutional investors, who are better monitors and prefer dividends for regulatory reasons. Behavioral aspects, such as self-control, fairness, or regret aversion, may also be important parts of the picture.Each of the main theories concerning dividend policy has found at least some

7、support in actual data. However, empirical research has also revealed weaknesses of these explanations, and a broad consensus concerning the “best” theory of corporate payout seems far away. We may know more about the “dividend puzzle”, but we are still without a definite solution.The present paper

8、examines some of the characteristics of dividend policy using Swiss data. The first part presents factors that influence variations in dividend payments across companies at a given point in time. The second part analyzes the changes in dividends over time.The cross-sectional analysis for the 2000200

9、3 periods compares the characteristics of dividend payers and non-payers. It then identifies several determinants of the differences between dividend payers in terms of payout ratios and dividend yields. The results show that companies that are less risky, larger, with lower growth opportunities, an

10、d with lower leverage tend to pay higher dividends. Institutions show a preference for dividend-paying companies, but there is little evidence that they prefer higher payout ratios or dividend yields.Quite interestingly, the factor that turns out to have the strongest influence on payout ratios and

11、dividend yields is price volatility. This may be interpreted as a sign that companies with higher earnings uncertainty are less likely to pay high dividends - or to pay dividends at all.Dividends per share are much more widespread as a headline indicator of dividend policy. The final section of the

12、paper looks at changes in (split-adjusted) dividends per share and seeks to determine whether these changes have informational content. The results show that dividend increases follow periods of high earnings and cash flow growth, whereas dividend decreases follow declines.A closer look at the data

13、reveals that there may nevertheless be some information conveyed by dividend changes. The average future level of earnings after dividend increases is significantly higher than the mean over the previous few years. The earnings of companies that decrease the dividend decline slightly and remain at a

14、 persistently low level around the dividend change.An important class of models is based on the idea that the assumption of perfect information may be unrealistic and that dividends can be used as signals of firm quality. Bhattacharya (1979) builds a two-period model with two types of firms. Investm

15、ents are made during the first period; their expected profitability is known to management, but not to outside investors. In order to signal the quality of their investment, the managers of “good” firms (managers are assumed to act in the interest of initial shareholders) will commit to paying high

16、dividends in the second period. Since attracting outside financing (during the second period) is expensive due to transaction costs, “l(fā)ow-quality” firms will be unable to imitate “high-quality” ones. The alternative models of Miller and Rock (1985) and John and Williams (1985) consider the cost of d

17、ividends in terms of foregone investments and taxes, respectively.The signaling models provide an explanation for the positive stock price reaction to the announcement of dividend increases or initiations. However, the empirical evidence on this hypothesis is mixed. In an early study, Watts (1973) f

18、ound that unexpected changes in earnings and unexpected changes in dividends were related, although he remained skeptical about the possibility to make money by exploiting this regularity. Penman (1983) finds that “both dividend announcements and managements earnings forecasts possess information ab

19、out managements expectations”. Using a sample of dividend initiations and omissions, Healy (1988) find that dividend initiations and omissions have informational content (the change in earnings is related to announcement-day returns, even when controlling for previous earnings), but this only holds

20、for year 1. Yoon and Starks (1995) and Denis et al(1994) show that dividend change announcements are linked to revisions in analysts forecasts of current income. Based on the mixed results for the signaling theory, Grullon et al (2002) suggest that, rather than an increase in profitability, dividend

21、 increases could reflect a decrease in risk the “maturity hypothesis”. They find that while profitability declines following a dividend increase, systematic risk in a three-factor Fame French model decreases. They argue that as firms become more mature (and therefore less risky, but with lower growt

22、h opportunities), they will be more likely to pay large dividends to their shareholders.Agency theory suggests that dividends can be used as a means to control a firms management. Distributing dividends reduces the free cash flow problem and increases the managements equity stake. Easterbrook (1984)

23、 also suggests that dividends can be used to keep firms in capital markets, where they are monitored by potential investors. This is useful since monitoring by existing shareholders can be hindered by coordination problems. Lang (1989) find that dividend increases are associated with higher positive

24、 share price reactions for companies with Tobins q smaller than unity, i.e., for companies with lower growth opportunities.Other evidence, however, tends to qualify the agency explanation. Capital expenditures increase following dividend increases, and decrease following dividend decreases and omiss

25、ions compared to the previous average (This is in line with the findings of Yoon and Starks 1995 and Denis et al. 1994). Moreover, companies that increase dividends have not had significantly higher increases in capital expenditure over the previous 2 years, while companies that omit dividends show

26、a significant slowdown over the same period. Thus, dividend increases do not follow an investment boom, while dividend cuts and omissions are not associated with subsequent higher investment that may indicate better growth opportunities. Cash flows and cash levels for dividend-increasing companies r

27、emain at a high level and even increase over the medium term.Dividends may thus become informative about earnings in a way not envisaged in classical signaling models. Since managers want to avoid dividend decreases, they will only increase dividends when they are reasonably sure that there has been

28、 a sustainable increase in earnings. They will also cut or omit dividends only when the firms earnings position has deteriorated considerably. As a result, a dividend increase will follow a period of significant earnings growth and confirm that the new, higher level of earnings is persistent. At the

29、 same time, dividend decreases will follow a slowdown and confirm that the firm will still be in a difficult position in the future. Indeed, although their study seriously challenges the role of dividend changes as a signal for future earnings, Benartzi et al. (1997) find that earnings are less like

30、ly to decrease following dividend increases.The paper has examined several features of dividend policy for a sample of Swiss companies. Cross-sectional comparisons show negative relationships between dividend payments and market-to-book ratios, price volatility, and leverage, as well as positive rel

31、ationships with profitability and (to a lesser extent) firm size and institutional holdings. Ownership concentration does not seem to have significant effects. Companies that used repurchases over the recent years were riskier and less profitable than companies choosing dividends. While some of thes

32、e relationships are expectable, the negative relationship between leverage and dividend payments, the weak influence of ownership structure, the strong influence of price volatility, and the contrast between dividends and repurchases are not obvious results in the light of theory and previous empiri

33、cal studies and thus are important aspects to note.Signaling models suggest that dividend changes predict future profitability. Still, the analysis of the data indicates that when dividends increase, earnings have already increased. There are no obvious signs of faster growth after positive changes

34、in dividends.Nonetheless, there is evidence that when dividends increase, future average earnings will be at a higher level compared to the past. Companies that decrease or omit dividends have been in a difficult position for several years, and they will still have inferior cash flows and earnings o

35、ver the medium term. They will also have significantly lower capital expenditures.This part of the paper examines the factors that determine variations in dividend policy across firms. The comparison is based both on averages for the 20002003 period and on data for the single year 2003.There are sev

36、eral groups of variables that are considered in the cross-sectional comparisons:- Market-to-book ratios, as a proxy for growth opportunities. Since low market-to-book companies are more likely to have free cash flow problems, it is to be expected that they pay (higher) dividends.- Total assets and t

37、otal sales, as proxies for firm size. Large companies are usually “mature” companies and therefore have more available cash relative to their positive NPV projects. Moreover, they are more likely to have widely dispersed shareholdings, and dividends could be used as a way to “keep” firms “in the cap

38、ital markets” in order to enhance monitoring. At the same time, however, large companies are usually considered less information ally opaque than small companies, and so there may be less need for dividends as costly signals. Thus, observing the actual connection between firm size and dividend polic

39、y can be interesting.- The firms betas and price volatility (computed as the band within which the share price moved around the mean price during the year), as measures of firm risk. The “maturity hypothesis” suggests that dividend increases are associated with decreases in risk rather than increase

40、s in profitability. Also, risk is an important firm characteristic in itself, and it is important to control for it.- Capital gearing, as a measure of leverage in book terms. Debt covenants often include limits concerning dividend payments as a way to mitigate the agency problem between shareholders

41、 and debt holders. On a different level, both debt and dividends can be used to reduce the free cash flow problem. Johnson (1995) suggests that debt and dividends could be alternative means to control management. Returns on assets and returns on equity, as measures of firm profitability. While it ma

42、y seem obvious that more profitable companies will pay higher dividends, it is important to control for this measure while examining the impact of the other factors.- Several indicators for the ownership structure of these companies. The ownership of large Swiss companies is quite varied from family

43、-owned companies to widely-held ones, or companies owned by investment funds. Thus, it is interesting to examine the impact of the ownership structure on dividend policy.These findings suggest that dividend changes can become informative due to the managers asymmetric perception of rewards for divid

44、end increases and negative consequences of dividend cuts. Since managers try to avoid cutting dividends until they “have to”, and only increase them when they think earnings are sufficient, dividend increases show that earnings have shifted to a higher level over the medium term, while dividend decr

45、eases are a sign that the firms problems are likely to continue in the following years.This mechanism can also explain why price volatility is such an important factor in the cross-sectional comparisons. If price volatility is taken to be a sign of uncertainty concerning future earnings, then its st

46、rong negative relationship with dividends may mean that managers try to keep dividends at a low level in order to avoid having to cut them in low earnings states. Thus, dividend changes can actually be informative, although the mechanism may be different from that considered in classical signaling m

47、odels. Exploring this hypothesis over larger samples, and perhaps for other countries with different regulatory environments, can be an interesting area for future research.Source: Bogdan stacescu, “Dividend policy in Switzerland” Fin Mkts Portfolio Mgmt(2006)20:153-183二、翻譯文章譯文：瑞士的股利政策股利政策一直是研究和辯論的話

48、題。有很多理論和實(shí)證研究結(jié)果說明公司在這一領(lǐng)域做出的決定。然而，在同一時(shí)間沒有一個(gè)普遍接受的描述股利政策的模式。此外，實(shí)證結(jié)果往往是矛盾的或難以解釋的理論根據(jù)。在米勒和莫迪里阿尼(1961)的理想世界里，股息是無關(guān)緊要的。一個(gè)企業(yè)的價(jià)值是由其投資機(jī)會(huì)決定的。股息只是一小部分因素，投資者的目的是能讓他們一直得到自己想要的消費(fèi)股的紅利。然而，在“現(xiàn)實(shí)生活”中，股利政策是投資者和管理者主要關(guān)注的問題之一。實(shí)證研究發(fā)現(xiàn)，紅利增加對(duì)投資者來說一般是好消息，而股息降低時(shí)會(huì)給投資者造成負(fù)面的影響。在過去幾十年里，幾種關(guān)于股息的存在及其重要性的解釋已被提出。紅利可以作為公司實(shí)際情況的標(biāo)志。高質(zhì)量的公司可以支付

49、較高的股息；低質(zhì)量的公司將無法與他們比擬，因?yàn)楣上⑿枰阎顿Y、稅收和吸引外部資本成本。代理理論認(rèn)為，股息可能是一個(gè)用以減少過度投資問題的方法，或是用來保持公司立足于資本市場(chǎng)上的方法。股息也可以用來吸引那些因?yàn)橐恍┍O(jiān)管原因較注重紅利的較精明的機(jī)構(gòu)投資者。關(guān)于行為的方面，例如自我控制，公正或者憎恨反感，也許也是這個(gè)部分的原因。其中每一種關(guān)于股利政策的主要理論都能在實(shí)際數(shù)據(jù)中找到一些支持。然而，實(shí)證研究也透露了這些解釋的缺陷，那就是公司支出的“最好”理論與公眾廣泛的共識(shí)似乎相差很遠(yuǎn)。我們可能對(duì)“紅利難題”有很深的了解，不過我們現(xiàn)在仍然沒有明確的解決辦法。本論文利用瑞士的數(shù)據(jù)探討了股利政策的一些特征

50、。第一部分介紹了影響股息變化的因素；第二部分分析了股利隨著時(shí)間的推移而產(chǎn)生的變化。2000-2003年期間，我們通過分析橫斷面的特點(diǎn)比較了股息納稅人和非納稅人。然后確定幾個(gè)影響股息支付率和股息收益率差異的幾個(gè)因素。結(jié)果表明，公司以較低的杠桿傾向于支付較高股息。機(jī)構(gòu)顯示了支付股息的公司的偏好，但很少有證據(jù)表明，他們寧愿支付更高的比率或股利收益率。有趣的是，原來的因素，價(jià)格波動(dòng)對(duì)支付率和股息收益率有強(qiáng)烈的影響。這種解釋可能被作為一個(gè)標(biāo)志，具有較高的收益不確定性的公司不太可能支付高股息。每股股息作為股利政策的標(biāo)題指標(biāo)是很普遍的。該文件的最后部分著眼于每股股利的變化，并尋求以確定這些變化信息的內(nèi)容。結(jié)

51、果表明，股利增加后續(xù)時(shí)期會(huì)因?yàn)楦呤找婧同F(xiàn)金流的增長(zhǎng)而使股利降低。仔細(xì)觀察數(shù)據(jù)后發(fā)現(xiàn)，有可能是一些信息轉(zhuǎn)達(dá)了分紅的變化。股利增加后，未來的平均盈利水平顯著高于前幾年的平均盈利水平。一類重要模型基于這樣一種假說，完全信息可能并不現(xiàn)實(shí)，紅利可能才是公司質(zhì)量的標(biāo)志。巴特查亞 (1979年)用兩種類型的公司建立了一個(gè)兩期模型。在前一時(shí)期進(jìn)行投資，他們的預(yù)期收益，管理者是眾所周知的，而外來投資者不知曉。為了表示他們的投資質(zhì)量，“好”公司的經(jīng)理（經(jīng)理被認(rèn)定為在股東大會(huì)上首選股東權(quán)益）將承諾在第二階段支付高股利。因?yàn)槲鈦淼娜谫Y（在第二時(shí)期）交易成本昂貴，“低質(zhì)量”的企業(yè)無法在這方面與“高品質(zhì)”的企業(yè)比擬。

52、米勒和洛克(1985年)、約翰和威廉姆斯(1985年)的替代模型分別考慮了投資和稅收損失方面的股息成本。信號(hào)模型為因紅利上漲而股票價(jià)格上漲提供了一個(gè)好的解釋。然而，實(shí)證結(jié)果對(duì)這個(gè)假設(shè)是喜憂參半的。在早期的研究中，美國(guó)瓦茨(1973)意外地發(fā)現(xiàn)收入的變化會(huì)引起股利意想不到的變化，盡管他為了繼續(xù)賺錢而對(duì)這種規(guī)律性持懷疑態(tài)度。佩因曼發(fā)現(xiàn)，“股息公告和經(jīng)營(yíng)盈利預(yù)測(cè)都具能預(yù)測(cè)信息管理”。希利(1988)通過研究股利政策和遺漏樣本發(fā)現(xiàn)股息政策和遺漏的信息內(nèi)容，但這只成立了一年。尹和斯塔克斯、丹尼斯等人(1994)表明，現(xiàn)金股利變動(dòng)宣告與分析家對(duì)目前收入預(yù)測(cè)修正有關(guān)?；诓煌Y(jié)果的信號(hào)理論，Grullon等

53、人(2002)表明，股利的上升不僅僅能表示盈利的增加，也可能反映了風(fēng)險(xiǎn)下降“成熟假說”。他們發(fā)現(xiàn)，利潤(rùn)下降時(shí)股息就會(huì)增加，在法國(guó)的系統(tǒng)模式下會(huì)減少。他們說，當(dāng)企業(yè)更成熟時(shí)（因此風(fēng)險(xiǎn)較低，但增長(zhǎng)機(jī)會(huì)較低），他們將更有可能支付巨額股利給股東。代理理論表明，股利可以用來作為一種手段去控制公司的管理。分配股息減少自由現(xiàn)金流問題，并提高了管理層的股權(quán)。伊斯特布魯克(1984)也表明，股息可使公司立足于資本市場(chǎng)，在那里他們受到潛在投資者的監(jiān)督。這是有益的，因?yàn)楸粷撛诠蓶|監(jiān)管可以避免協(xié)合問題。朗(1989)發(fā)現(xiàn)，股利增加伴隨著更高的積極的股價(jià)反應(yīng)，比如托賓的Q公司，就是因?yàn)橐?guī)模較小而缺乏增長(zhǎng)機(jī)會(huì)的公司。其他的證據(jù)往往會(huì)限定代理的解釋。股利增加使支出