外文翻譯-----西方銀行公司治理對中國的影響

1、-本科畢業(yè)論文外文翻譯外文題目：The influence of western banks on corporate governance inChina出 處：University of Cambridge作 者：Jane Nolan原 文：The influence of western banks on corporate governance in ChinaAbstractThis study draws on in-depth qualitative interviews to investigate the variety ofinstitutional forces whic

2、h influence the adoption of western corporate governancemechanisms in Chinese banks. Following path dependency models of institutionalchange it was shown that cognitive and normative institutions, including a who youknow or guan*i credit culture, mean that the practical influence of western banks on

3、corporate governance reforms was perceived to be ineffectual in most cases. Given thefailure of western credit-rating systems in the sub-prime crisis, it is likely that thisperception will increase in the future. The majority of western actors believed that themain reason Chinese banks seek to co-op

4、erate with western institutions was to enhancethe legitimacy of the Chinese bank in the global financial environment, rather than toactively change e*isting governance mechanisms.Keywords: banking,corporate governance,institutional change,legitimacy seekingIntroductionThe development of Chinas econo

5、my has, to date, been driven by its considerable supplyof cheap labour and its many and varied production opportunities. Whether or not capitalwas allocated efficiently has been of little consequence and, until fairly recently, thefinancial sector has been characterized by state-owned bankslending t

6、o state-ownedenterprises on the basis of social policy principles rather than profitability andmanagerial petence. Yet as Chinas economyadvances the development of the financial sector is set to bee ever more important.Banks cannot indefinitely continue to make huge loans to inefficient enterprises

7、which willnever be repaid and many financial institutions remain promised by the corporategovernance problems associated with having the state as both official regulator andprincipal shareholder (IFC 2005, Li et al. 2021)That said, the reform of Chinas banks is now well underway and the basic method

8、semployed for restructuring have been large capital injections, the setting up of bad-banksand asset management panies, initial public offerings, partnerships with foreign banks(with the aim of improving management and IT development) and the inclusion ofoverseas board members to help improve corpor

9、ate governance.Some see these moves as part of a broader interest by Chinese officials in developing aneconomic institutional environment which is more reflective of the international businessmunity (Guthrie 1998, Wang 2007). And, at a theoretical level, these adjustmentsraise some important questio

10、ns about the nature of institutional change in Chinaseconomic transition, such as whether China will develop its own unique form of corporategovernance, or whether it will converge towards the more market-based modelsmonly found in the west.While the opening of the market to western banks has been s

11、een as a key plank of thereform programme, at the time ofwriting,many economies in thewestern world are struggling to cope with the fall-out from the sub-prime mortgage debacle,and the credibility of western banks is under severe strain (Bloomberg 2021). Some haveargued that recent events could see

12、economic power shift fromwest to east andmuch attentions now focused on the nature of Chinas position in the global economic order (Brown 2021,Time 2021). Chinas banks are now very large, with three in the worlds top 10 by marketcapitalization.1 However, such large assets should not detract from the

13、 problems whichremain in the Chinese banking system including a shallow talent pool, a shortage ofmanagerial and technical e*pertise, a local currency that is not convertible andweak corporategovernance mechanisms.This study aims to investigate the institutional forces which affect the adoption ofwe

14、stern corporate governance mechanisms in Chinese banks. The data es from a seriesof in-depth qualitative interviewswith seniormanagerswho were either employed in westernbanks with stockholdings in Chinese institutions, held non-e*ecutive directorships ofChinese banks, or had participated in other fi

15、nancial advisory roles. The following sectionswill enlarge on the corporate governance literature in relation to both western and Chinesebanks and discuss the theoretical frameworks which can help e*plain how goals, beliefs andorganizations are structured by institutions. Ne*t, the research methodol

16、ogy will be outlinedand the findings will be introduced structured around the institutional forces which influenceboth internal and e*ternal governance mechanisms as well as related technical assistanceprojects. The study concludes with a discussion of the importance of legitimacy-seeking inmotivati

17、ng Chinese banks to seek collaboration with western institutions and will underscorethe importance of local informal institutions in ensuring path dependent change. Finally,some of the key assumptions of western models of governance will be challenged,particularly the belief that market forces alone

18、 can ensure the efficient allocation of credit.TheoryIn the west it is possible to distinguish at least two forms of corporate governance: International Finance Corporations (IFC) technical assistance to Chinese banks.Bank Pre-investment At investment Post-investmentBank of Shanghai Since 1995 IFC s

19、upported, with fundingform Japan and EU, human resourcesmanagement review, credit analysis, creditpolicies and proceduresArranged for the adoption of IAS* audits Review of credit procedures, stress test tomonitor portfolio risks, SME businessdiagnostics and SME banking strategy.Bank of Beijing Credi

20、t risk management, business strategydevelopmentArranged for the adoption of IAS audits Training for board members, portfolio stresstest.China MinshengBanking Corporation$700,000 in technical assistance at time ofestablishment; advice on strategic issues andbusiness development, training of staff onc

21、redit analysisArranged for the adoption of IAS audits At the request of Minsheng identifiedindependent director, supported diagnosticreview of SME lending and SME strategydevelopment; supported energy efficiencyloan program; introduced methodology forportfolio stress test. Nanjing City mercialBankSu

22、pported risk management training throughPrice Waterhouse and CoopersArranged for the adoption of IAS audits With funding from Italy offered series oftraining programs on risk control; supportedboard members training; introduced portfoliostress test method.United Rural CooperativeBankArranged for the

23、 adoption of IAS audits Upgraded credit policy and loan recoverymanuals, introduced new credit scoringsystem; set up a Risk and plianceDepartment, and a Credit Review Centre;conducted training on credit management;started branch management and benchmarkmodels.*ian City Bank Training for bank staff o

24、n credit analysis Arranged for the adoption of IAS audits Supported credit training program in 2005;advised on acquisition of credit cooperative.China IndustrialBankArranged for the adoption of IAS audits Provided corporate governance technicalassistance in 2004; portfolio stress test in2005; techni

25、cal assistance on IT framework;SME lending diagnostics and strategy;supported energy efficiency lending.Asia Pacific Business Review self-interest and decentralized markets are capable of functioning efficiently and fairly; the continental European model based on a stakeholder theory of the firm, wh

26、erethe interests of not just shareholders, but of other groups, such as trade unions and workcouncils, are also considered (Luo 2007). In East Asia there are also a number ofdistinctive models including the Keiretsu model in Japan (sets of panies withinterlocking relationships and shareholdings) (Wi

27、tt 2006) and the model in SouthKorea (Government-supported global conglomerates such as Samsung) (Sung 2003). Liu(2006) has argued that the corporate governance system in China is one which is controlbased,rather than market orientated because Chinas unique institutional setting meansthat the regula

28、tors and authorities still make e*tensive use of administrative measures tocontrol developments in the economy.Cousin (2007) argues that corporate governance in Chinese banks poses a distinctive setof problems which are somewhat different to those encountered by other Chinese firms.First, the princi

29、pal-agent relations are even more ple* because they must take accountof a wider range of stakeholders including depositors, lenders, supervisors and regulators(Cao and Zhao 2004). Second because of the importance of thefinancial system toeconomic growth and social stability bank failures will not be

30、 allowed and in the event ofpotential collapse they are likely to be saved (Wang and Huang 2004). Of course,recent events in the global economy have shown that this behaviour is not unique to theChinese system, however the implications of a government guarantee to maintain financialsecurity means th

31、at internal controls should, in theory, be much stronger than in industrieswhere the threat of collapse is far more real (Cao and Zhao 2004, Wang and Huang 2004).Finally, information asymmetry is deeper in banks than in other panies because qualityin financial intermediation cannot be assessed immed

32、iately. For e*ample, non-performingloans tend to be discovered in the future not at the time of issuance (Wei 2005). It is clearthat, in the Chinese case, the state has allocated to itself the main role in the banking systemand, historically speaking at least, this differentiates Chinese corporate g

33、overnance modelsfrom those found in Anglo-Sa*on countries. Officials argue for the merits of this system onthe basis that, at Chinas current stage of development, markets would not fairly allocateresources and the government has a responsibility for managing the financial system so thatdevelopment o

34、ccurs rapidly, but with stability (Zhou 2004).That there are differences between the Anglo-Sa*on and the Chinese models ofcorporate governance is hardly surprising. The varieties of capitalism research traditionhas produced numerous case studies demonstrating that there has been little convergence i

35、nterms of governance structures or economic policy making over the last 20 years despitee*tensive financial globalization (Clarke 2003, Nee 2005, Streek and Thelen 2005).parative organizational scholars have also produced many studies which show thatfirms adopt various modes of economic action and o

36、rganizational forms which are largelybased on the institutional structures embedded in their nation-state base (Boisot and Child1998, Guillen 2001, Redding and Witt 2007). Moreover, Chinese thinking aboutinternational norms has been shown to vary across time, sector and issue (Wang 2007). In astudy

37、of policy documents and media mentary, Wang suggests that Chinese officialsremain open to international norms in the economic and technical realms but less so tothose governing other issues, especially political and military matters. Wang argues that itseems likely that China will abide by prevailin

38、g international economic and technicalnorms and will bee an increasingly congruent and co-operative economic partner in theglobal arena. It is probably fair to say that, at the official level, the reform of Chinasbanking system was partly influenced by the policy discourse link up with the internati

39、onaltrack (yu guoji jieguei) whereby Chinas banks were encouraged to move towards422 J. Nolaninternational standards both in terms of product innovation, accounting procedures andcorporate governance mechanisms (Cousin 2007, Calomiris 2007, Wang 2007).This publicly-stated objective, does, however, r

40、aise interesting questions as to thepracticalities of transferring corporate governance practices across culture, and, followingAguiler and Jackson (2003), this study will argue that multiple institutions will interact toinfluence the perceived legitimacy and utility of western corporate governance

41、practices inthe Chinese conte*t. Although there is some discussion over just quite what an institutionis, it is probably fair to say that most would agree that an institution enpasses both theinformal beliefs and behaviours of a given society and the formal organizations of the statethat govern thos

42、e beliefs and behaviours (Nee 2005). Within this general framework, it ispossible to differentiate further between functionalist or rational choice theories and pathdependency or varieties of capitalism approaches to institutional change (with the lattersometimes referred to as neo-institutionalism)

43、. Each approach rests on differentbehavioural assumptions (principally the degree to which rational action is limited andshaped by conte*t), and foregrounds different e*planatory mechanisms (social networksand ties, state regulations, collective action, transaction-cost economising, and so on) (Nee2

44、005, Campbell 2004).The fundamental premise of the functional approach is that, in a global arena,institutions tend to converge, or bee similar in form, because markets create incentivesfor actors to replace poor institutions with more efficient ones and actors learn fromthe behaviour of institution

45、s who survive in the face of petition (North 1990, Weingast2002). In other words, efficient institutions in some way or another promote rationalbehaviour and reduce transactions costs (Williamson 1981).There are, however, problems in accounting for the pace of institutional change withinthe function

46、al framework, which, some argue, has been somewhat slower in certaincountries than would be e*pected given efficiency and rational-choice assumptions(Furubotn and Richter 1997).譯 文：西方銀行公司治理對中國的影響摘要本研究即將深入定性探討各種影響中資銀行的西方銀行治理體制。以下的研究需要依賴模型，研究結(jié)果說明，改變認知和規(guī)機構(gòu)，主要依靠知識水平和信用文化的提升，這意味著在大多數(shù)情況下實際影響西方銀行公司治理的改革是無效

47、的。鑒于西方信用評級在次貸危機系統(tǒng)中的失靈，這種危機在未來很可能會增加。大多數(shù)西方銀行成員認為中資銀行尋求與西方機構(gòu)合作的主要原因是加強在全球金融環(huán)境中的合法性，而不是積極改變現(xiàn)有的管理機制。關(guān)鍵詞：銀行，企業(yè)治理，制度變遷，尋求合法性簡介中國經(jīng)濟的開展，迄今為止，依賴于其相當(dāng)大的廉價勞動力供給和許多不同的生產(chǎn)時機，無論資本有效分配是否有影響，以及當(dāng)前金融業(yè)的特點是在社會政策原則的根底上國有銀行貸款給國有企業(yè)，而不是在盈利能力和管理能力上。然而，隨著中國經(jīng)濟的推進，金融部門的開展將變得越來越重要。銀行不能無限期的持續(xù)作出巨大的貸款，效益差的企業(yè)將無法得到貸款，許多金融機構(gòu)仍然由于官方調(diào)節(jié)和主要

48、股東的相關(guān)治理問題受損。這就是說，中國銀行改革正在順利進展，它的方法是調(diào)整就業(yè)構(gòu)造，注入大量資金，成立“呆賬銀行和資產(chǎn)管理公司，公開發(fā)行股份，與外資銀行建立合作伙伴關(guān)系以改善管理及開展科技資訊為目標(biāo)和列入海外董事會成員，以幫助改善公司治理。一些人認為局部更廣泛的利益是中國官員在經(jīng)濟體制環(huán)境上的開展，這種經(jīng)濟體制環(huán)境更重要的是反映了國際業(yè)務(wù)交流。而且，在理論層面，這些調(diào)整提升了中國制度變遷中經(jīng)濟轉(zhuǎn)型的一些重要問題，如中國是否會開展自己獨特形勢的公司治理，還是會更靠攏常見于西方的以市場為根底的模型。雖然在西方銀行公開市場被視為一個改革方案的關(guān)鍵木板，但是，許多西方世界的經(jīng)濟體都疲于應(yīng)付次貸危機，次

49、級抵押貸款崩潰使西方銀行信譽遭受重大打擊。有些人認為，最近發(fā)生的事件可以看到全球經(jīng)濟要求下經(jīng)濟強國對中國立場的轉(zhuǎn)變，中國的銀行現(xiàn)在非常龐大，在世界前10位的資本化市場上排名第三。然而，如此龐大的資產(chǎn)不應(yīng)減損，其問題在于中國銀行系統(tǒng)存在淺的人才庫、短缺管理和技術(shù)專門知識，當(dāng)?shù)刎泿挪荒茏杂蓛稉Q和軟弱的企業(yè)管理機制。本研究旨在探討西方公司治理機制對中資銀行機構(gòu)投資的影響，這些數(shù)據(jù)來自一系列與高級管理人員深入定性的訪談，無論他們是在西部地區(qū)從業(yè)的中國銀行持股機構(gòu)，還是曾參加其他財務(wù)參謀的角色。以下各節(jié)將把有關(guān)企業(yè)管制文學(xué)放大到西方和中國銀行討論的理論框架。接下來，研究方法將概述，調(diào)查結(jié)果將推出各地機構(gòu)

50、是影響構(gòu)造部和外部管理機制以及相關(guān)援助工程的力量。該研究最后提出了推動中資銀行與西方金融機構(gòu)的合法性和重要性的討論，并強調(diào)地方非正式機構(gòu)在確保路徑依賴變化方面的重要性。最后，西方治理模式的主要假設(shè)會受到有些人的質(zhì)疑，尤其是認為市場力量本身能夠確保信貸的有效分配的那局部人。理論在西方區(qū)別兩個以上公司治理模式是有可能的：國際金融公司對中國銀行的技術(shù)援助。銀行預(yù)投資在投資后的投資，銀行自1995以來受到國際金融公司的支持，來自于日本和歐盟的人力資源管理評審，信用分析，信用政策和程序，安排國際會計準(zhǔn)則通過審查的信貸審核程序，壓力測試，投資組合的風(fēng)險監(jiān)控，中小企業(yè)業(yè)務(wù)診斷和中小企業(yè)銀行業(yè)務(wù)的策略。銀行信

51、貸風(fēng)險管理，經(jīng)營策略開展安排在國際會計準(zhǔn)則審計培訓(xùn)董事會成員之間，通過組合壓力測試。中國民生匯豐銀行在成立的時候以70萬美元的技術(shù)援助，對戰(zhàn)略問題和企業(yè)開展、員工培訓(xùn)和信用分析提出意見，安排國際會計準(zhǔn)則審計，確定在民生銀行的需求下通過獨立董事，支持診斷審查中小企業(yè)貸款和中小企業(yè)開展;支持能源效率貸款方案;介紹方法論投資組合的壓力測試。市商業(yè)銀行通過支持風(fēng)險管理培訓(xùn)，安排意大利提供資助的采用國際會計準(zhǔn)則審計的一系列關(guān)于風(fēng)險控制的培訓(xùn)方案，支持董事會成員的培訓(xùn)，引入了工程組合壓力測試方法。農(nóng)村合作銀行安排了國際會計準(zhǔn)則審計的升級信貸政策和貸款回收，通過手冊介紹了新的信用評價系統(tǒng)，建立了風(fēng)險與合規(guī)部，信貸審查中心;開展信用管理培訓(xùn);開場分行管理和