資本結(jié)構(gòu)的決定因素

1、外文翻譯Determinants of Capital StructureMaterial Source: HYPERLINK http:/journal.fsv.cuni.cz http:/journal.fsv.cuni.czAuthor: Patrik BAUERThe modern theory of capital structure was established by Modigliani and Miller (1958). Thirty-seven years later, Rajan and Zingales (1995,p. 1421) stated: “Theory h

2、as clearly made some progress on the subject. We now understand the most important departures from the Modigliani and Miller assumptions that make capital structure relevant to a firms value. However, very little is known about the empirical relevance of the different theories.”Similarly, Harris and

3、 Raviv (1991, p. 299) in their survey of capital structure theories claimed: “The models surveyed have identified a large number of potential determinants of capital structure. The empirical work so far has not, however, sorted out which of these are important in various contexts. Thus, several cond

4、itional theories of capital structure exist (none is universal), but very little is known about their empirical relevance. Moreover, the existing empirical evidence is based mainly on data from developed countries (G7 countries). Findings based on data from developing countries have not appeared unt

5、il recently for example Booth et al. (2001) or Huang and Song (2002). So far, no study has been published based on data from transition countries of Central and Eastern Europe, at least to the extent of this authors knowledge. The main goal of this paper is to fill this gap, exploring the case of th

6、e Czech Republic.1. TheoreticalAccording to Myer s (2001,p.81), “there is no universal theory of the debtequity choice, and no reason to expect one. However, there are several useful conditional theories, each of which helps to understand the debt-to-equity structure that firms choose. These theorie

7、s can be divided into two groups either they predict the existence of the optimal debt-equity ratio for each firm (so-called static trade-off models) or they declare that there is no well-defined target capital structure (pecking-order hypothesis).Static trade-off models understand the optimal capit

8、al structure as an optimal solution of a trade-off, for example the trade-off between a tax shield and the costs of financial distress in the case of trade-off theory. According to this theory the optimal capital structure is achieved when the marginal present value of the tax shield on additional d

9、ebt is equal to the marginal present value of the costs of financial distress on additional debt. The trade-off between the benefits of signaling and the costs of financial distress in the case of signaling theory implies that a company chooses debt ratio as a signal about its type. Therefore in the

10、 case of a good company the debt must be large enough to act as an incentive compatible signal, i.e., it does not pay off for a bad company to mimic it. In the case of agency theory the trade-off between agency costs4 stipulates that the optimal capital structure is achieved when agency costs are mi

11、nimized. Finally, the trade-off between costs of financial distress and increase of efficiency in the case of free cash-flow theory, which is designed mainly for firms with extra-high free cash-flows, suggests that the high debt ratio disciplines managers to pay out cash instead of investing it belo

12、w the cost of capital or wasting it on organizational inefficiencies.On the other hand, the pecking-order theory suggests that there is no optimal capital structure. Firms are supposed to prefer internal financing (retained earnings) to external funds. When internal cash-flow is not sufficient to fi

13、nance capital expenditures, firms will borrow, rather than issue equity. Therefore there is no well-defined optimal leverage, because there are two kinds of equity, internal and external, one at the top of the pecking order and one at the bottom.Existing empirical evidence is based mainly on data fr

14、om developed countries.For example Bradley et al. (1984), Kim and Sorensen (1986), Friend and Lang (1988), Titman and Wessels (1988) and Chaplinsky and Niehaus(1993) focus on United States companies; Kester (1986) compares United States and Japanese manufacturing corporations; Rajan and Zingales(199

15、5) examine firms from G7 countries; and Wald (1999) uses data for G7 countries except Canada and Italy. Findings based on data from developing countries have appeared only in recent years, for example Booth et al. (2001) or Huang and Song (2002).2. Determinants of Capital StructureSizeFrom the theor

16、etical point of view, the effect of size on leverage is ambiguous.As Rajan and Zingales (1995, p. 1451) claim: “Larger firms tend to be more diversified and fail less often, so size (computed as the logarithm of net sales) may be an inverse proxy for the probability of bankruptcy. If so, size should

17、 have a positive impact on the supply debt. However, size may also be a proxy for the information outside investors have, which should increase their preference for equity relative to debt.”Also empirical studies do not provide us with clear information. Some authors find a positive relation between

18、 size and leverage, for example Huang and Song (2002), Rajan and Zingales (1995)7 and Friend and Lang (1988). On the other hand, some studies report a negative relation, for example (Kester, 1986), (Kim - Sorensen, 1986) and (Titman - Wessels, 1988). Moreover, the results are very often weak as far

19、as the level of statistical significance is concerned.ProfitabilityThere are no consistent theoretical predictions on the effects of profitability on leverage. From the point of view of the trade-off theory, more profitable companies should have higher leverage because they have more income to shiel

20、d from taxes. The free cash-flow theory would suggest that more profitable companies should use more debt in order to discipline managers, to induce them to pay out cash instead of spending money on inefficient projects. However, from the point of view of the pecking-order theory, firms prefer inter

21、nal financing to external. So more profitable companies have a lower need for external financing and therefore should have lower leverage.Most empirical studies observe a negative relationship between leverage and profitability, for example (Rajan - Zingales, 1995)8, (Huang - Song, 2002), (Booth et

22、al., 2001), (Titman - Wessels, 1988), (Friend - Lang, 1988)and (Kester, 1986).TangibilityIt is assumed, from the theoretical point of view, that tangible assets can be used as collateral. Therefore higher tangibility lowers the risk of a creditor and increases the value of the assets in the case of

23、bankruptcy. As Booth et al. (2001, p. 101) state: “The more tangible the firms assets, the greater its ability to issue secured debt and the less information revealed about future profits.” Thus a positive relation between tangibility and leverage is predicted.Several empirical studies confirm this

24、suggestion, such as (Rajan - Zingales, 1995), (Friend - Lang, 1988) and (Titman - Wessels, 1988) find. On the other hand, for example Booth et al. (2001) and Huang and Song (2002) experience a negative relation between tangibility and leverage. In this study, tangibility is defined as tangible asset

25、s divided by total assets.Growth OpportunitiesAccording to Myers (1977), firms with high future growth opportunities should use more equity financing, because a higher leveraged company is more likely to pass up profitable investment opportunities. As Huang and Song (2002, p. 9) claim: “Such an inve

26、stment effectively transfers wealth from stockholders to debt holders.” Therefore a negative relation between growth opportunities and leverage is predicted.Some empirical studies confirm the theoretical prediction, such as (Rajan-Zingales, 1995), (Kim - Sorensen, 1986) or (Titman - Wessels, 1988) r

27、eport. However, for example, Kester (1986) and Huang and Song (2002) demonstrate a positive relation between growth opportunities and leverage.TaxAccording to the trade-off theory, a company with a higher tax rate should use more debt and therefore should have higher leverage, because it has more in

28、come to shield from taxes. However, for example Fama and French (1998) declare that debt has no net tax benefits. As MacKie- Mason (1990,p. 1471) claims: “Nearly everyone believes taxes must be important to financing decision, but little support has been found in empirical analysis.” As he also poin

29、ts out (MacKie-Mason, 1990, p. 1471): “This paper provides clear evidence of substantial tax effects on the choice between issuing debt or equity; most studies fail to find significant effects. . Other papers miss the fact that most tax shields have a negligible effect on the marginal tax rate for m

30、ost firms. New predictions are strongly supported by an empirical analysis; the method is to study incremental financing decisions using discrete choice analysis. Previous researchers examined debt-equity ratios, but tests based on incremental decisions should have greater power. As he adds, debt-eq

31、uity ratios “are the cumulative result of years of separate decisions. Tests based on a single aggregate of different decisions are likely to have low power for effects at the margin. (MacKie-Mason, 1990,p. 1472).However, as data to perform similar analysis as (MacKie-Mason, 1990) is not available i

32、n the Czech Republic, the average tax rate defined as the difference between earnings before taxes and earnings after taxes, scaled by earnings before taxes, is used as a proxy variable to analyse the tax effects on leverage in this study.Non-debt Tax ShieldsOther items apart from interest expenses,

33、 which contribute to a decrease in tax payments, are labelled as non-debt tax shields (for example the tax deduction for depreciation). According to Angelo Masulis(1980, p. 21): “Ceteris paribus, decreases in allowable investment-related tax shields (e.g., depreciation deductions or investment tax c

34、redits)due to changes in the corporate tax code or due to changes in inflation which reduce the real value of tax shields will increase the amount of debt that firms employ. In cross-sectional analysis, firms with lower investment related tax shields (holding before-tax earnings constant) will emplo

35、y greater debt in their capital structures. So they argue that non-debt tax shields are substitutes for a debt-related tax shield and therefore the relation between non-debt tax shields and leverage should be negative.Some empirical studies confirm the theoretical prediction, for example Kim and Sor

36、ensen (1986, p. 140) declare: “DEPR9 has a significantly negative coefficient. . This is consistent with the notion that depreciation is an effective tax shield, and thus offsets the tax shield benefits of leverage. A negative relation between non-debt tax shields and leverage is also found by (Huan

37、g Song, 2002) and (Titman Wessels, 1988). However, for example Bradley et al. (1984) and Chaplinsky and Niehaus(1993) observe a positive relationship between non-debt tax shields and leverage. Depreciation divided by total assets is used in order to proxy for non-debt tax shields in this study.Volat

38、ilityVolatility may be understood as a proxy for risk of a firm (probability of bankruptcy). Therefore it is assumed that volatility is negatively related to leverage. However, as Huang and Song (2002, p. 9) state based on findings of Hsia (1981):“As the variance of the value of the firm s assets in

39、creases, the systematic risk of equity decreases. So the business risk is expected to be positively related to leverage. ”The positive relation between volatility and leverage is confirmed by (Kim - Sorensen, 1986) and (Huang - Song, 2002). Conversely, a negative relation is found by (Bradley et al.

40、, 1984) and (Titman - Wessels, 1988).In this study, standard deviation of return on assets is used as a proxy for volatility.Industry ClassificationSome empirical studies identify a statistically significant relationship between industry classification and leverage, such as (Bradley et al., 1984),(L

41、ong - Malitz, 1985), and (Kester, 1986). As Harris and Raviv (1991, p. 333)claim, based on a survey of empirical studies: “ Drugs, Instruments, Electronics, and Food have consistently low leverage while Paper, Textile Mill Products, Steel, Airlines, and Cement have consistently large leverage. ”譯文資本

42、結(jié)構(gòu)的決定因素資料來源：http:/journal.fsv.cuni.cz作者：Patrik BAUER現(xiàn)代資本結(jié)構(gòu)理論的建立始于Modigliani和Miller (1958)。37年以后，Rajan和Zingales提出：“資本結(jié)構(gòu)理論已經(jīng)取得了很大的進(jìn)展?，F(xiàn)在我們了解 最重要的MM理論假設(shè)使資本結(jié)構(gòu)與公司價(jià)值相關(guān)聯(lián)。然而，還有一些幾乎不為 人所知的相關(guān)理論的實(shí)證研究?！蓖瑯拥模琀arris和Raviv(1991)在他們其資本結(jié)構(gòu)理論的最新調(diào)查顯示：這 些模型調(diào)查已經(jīng)確定例了影響資本結(jié)構(gòu)的潛在因素很多。不過迄今還沒有實(shí)證 研究，然而，從這些不同的環(huán)境中分類出來很重要。因此，一些條件的資本結(jié)

43、 構(gòu)理論是普遍存在的，但是關(guān)于他們的實(shí)證性知道很少。此外，現(xiàn)在實(shí)證研究 的數(shù)據(jù)主要都來自發(fā)達(dá)國家(G7國家)。對(duì)于數(shù)據(jù)基于發(fā)展中國家的調(diào)查很少， 例如Booth等人。到目前為止，還沒有研究正在轉(zhuǎn)型期的中歐和東歐國家，本 文的主要目的是研究捷克共和國來彌補(bǔ)這一不足。1理論根據(jù)Myers（2001），“不存在債權(quán)平衡理論和股權(quán)選擇，也不用期待這種 情況?！比欢灿袔讉€(gè)有條件的理論，每一個(gè)都有助于我們了解資本結(jié)構(gòu)供公 司抉擇。這些理論分為兩個(gè)部分一要么他們預(yù)測(cè)每個(gè)公司最佳的債務(wù)產(chǎn)權(quán)比率 （所以被稱作權(quán)衡理論模型），或者他們聲明沒有明確的目標(biāo)資本結(jié)構(gòu)（啄食順 序理論）。靜態(tài)權(quán)衡模型是一種了解最優(yōu)資本

44、結(jié)構(gòu)的最優(yōu)解模型，例如稅盾和財(cái)務(wù)危 機(jī)下的費(fèi)用之間的平衡理論。根據(jù)這一理論，最優(yōu)的資本結(jié)構(gòu)是附加的負(fù)債稅 盾的邊際現(xiàn)值和附加的財(cái)務(wù)危機(jī)下費(fèi)用的邊際現(xiàn)值相等的時(shí)候。信號(hào)效益和財(cái) 務(wù)危機(jī)費(fèi)用之間的權(quán)衡，是在信號(hào)理論暗示企業(yè)選擇資產(chǎn)負(fù)債比率作為信號(hào)的 類型的情況下。因此，在一個(gè)良好的情況下，公司的債務(wù)作為一種激勵(lì)兼容的 信號(hào)必須足夠大，即：它不會(huì)為了一個(gè)好的形象而去清償債務(wù)。代理成本理論 認(rèn)為最優(yōu)資本結(jié)構(gòu)是指代理成本最小化的時(shí)候。最后，自由現(xiàn)金理論是財(cái)務(wù)危 機(jī)費(fèi)用和成本的增加之間的權(quán)衡，這主要用于公司沒有很高的閑置現(xiàn)金，這表 明高負(fù)債比率的產(chǎn)生，不是去投資比成本低或者是降低效益的項(xiàng)目。另一方面， 啄

45、食順序理論表明沒有最優(yōu)資本結(jié)構(gòu)。比起外部融資，公司更喜歡內(nèi)部融資（留 存收益）。當(dāng)公司的流動(dòng)資金不足以支付資本性支出的時(shí)候，比起發(fā)行股票，他 們更喜歡借款。因此沒有確切的最佳杠桿作用，因?yàn)橛袃?nèi)部和外部兩種股權(quán)?，F(xiàn)有的實(shí)證研究數(shù)據(jù)主要來自發(fā)達(dá)國家，例如 Bradley（ 1984）， Kim和 Sorensen （ 1986），F(xiàn)riend 和 Lang （ 1988），Titman 和 Wessels（ 1988），Chaplinsky 和Niehaus（1993）都集中在美國的公司，Kester （1986）主要比較美國和日 本的制造業(yè)，Rajan和Zingales（1995）主要研究G7七

46、國的公司，Wald（1999） 用了除了加拿大和意大利的其他五國的數(shù)據(jù)。結(jié)果數(shù)據(jù)基于發(fā)展中國家的只有 在最近幾年出現(xiàn)，例如Booth（2001）和黃宋（2002）。2資本結(jié)構(gòu)的決定因素2.1企業(yè)規(guī)模從理論上講，企業(yè)規(guī)模對(duì)財(cái)務(wù)杠桿的影響是不明確的。Rajan和Zingales （1995）表示：大公司往往趨向于多元化而且不容易破產(chǎn)，所以企業(yè)規(guī)模與破 產(chǎn)概率負(fù)相關(guān)。如果是這樣的話，企業(yè)規(guī)模大可能對(duì)融資有積極的影響，可以 加大外部融資者的偏好。另外實(shí)證研究也沒有做出一個(gè)明確的結(jié)論。一些研究者認(rèn)為企業(yè)規(guī)模和財(cái) 務(wù)杠桿正相關(guān)，例如黃宋（2002），Rajan和Zingales（ 1995）和Friend

47、和Lang （1988）。而有些學(xué)者認(rèn)為是負(fù)相關(guān)關(guān)系，例如Kester（1986），Kim -Sorensen （1986）和Titman -Wessels（1988）O而且就統(tǒng)計(jì)數(shù)據(jù)的水平而言，結(jié)果不是很 有說服力。2.2盈利能力現(xiàn)在還沒有一致的理論預(yù)測(cè)盈利能力對(duì)財(cái)務(wù)杠桿的影響。根據(jù)權(quán)衡理論的 觀點(diǎn)，盈利能力高的公司應(yīng)該有更高的杠桿作用，因?yàn)樗麄冇懈嗟亩愂帐杖?保護(hù)，自由現(xiàn)金理論建議盈利能力高的公司可以有更高的負(fù)債，以管理紀(jì)律， 促使他們多付出，引導(dǎo)他們不要把現(xiàn)金花在低效率的項(xiàng)目上。然而，從啄食順 序理論角度看，公司更喜歡內(nèi)部融資。所以盈利能力越高的公司對(duì)外部融資的 需求較低，因此有較低的杠桿作用。大多數(shù)的實(shí)證研究表明盈利能力和杠桿作用負(fù)相關(guān)，例如Rajan-Zingales （1995），黃宋（2002），Booth （ 2001），Titman-Wessels（ 1988），F(xiàn)riend-Lang