外文翻譯模板

外文翻譯模板外文翻譯模板外文翻譯模板外文翻譯模板編制僅供參考審核批準(zhǔn)生效日期地址：電話：傳真:郵編:杭州電子科技大學(xué)畢業(yè)論文外文文獻翻譯要求根據(jù)《普通高等學(xué)校本科畢業(yè)設(shè)計（論文）指導(dǎo)》的內(nèi)容，特對外文文獻翻譯提出以下要求：一、翻譯的外文文獻可以是一篇，也可以是兩篇，但總字符要求不少于萬（或翻譯成中文后至少在3000字以上）。二、翻譯的外文文獻應(yīng)主要選自學(xué)術(shù)期刊、學(xué)術(shù)會議的文章、有關(guān)著作及其他相關(guān)材料，應(yīng)與畢業(yè)論文（設(shè)計）主題相關(guān)，并作為外文參考文獻列入畢業(yè)論文（設(shè)計）的參考文獻。并在每篇中文譯文標(biāo)題尾部用“腳注”形式注明原文作者及出處，中文譯文后應(yīng)附外文原文（全文，格式為word）。不能翻譯中國學(xué)者的文章，不能翻譯準(zhǔn)則等有譯文的著作。三、中文譯文的基本撰寫格式1.題目:采用小三號、黑體字、居中打??；段前二行，段后二行。2.正文:采用小四號、宋體字，行間距一般為固定值20磅，標(biāo)準(zhǔn)字符間距。頁邊距為左3cm，右2.5cm，上下各2.5cm，頁面統(tǒng)一采用A4紙。四、外文原文格式1.題目:采用小三號、TimesNewRoman、居中打印；段前二行，段后二行。2.正文:采用小四號、TimesNewRoman，行間距一般為固定值20磅，標(biāo)準(zhǔn)字符間距。頁邊距為左3cm，右2.5cm，上下各2.5cm五、封面格式由學(xué)校統(tǒng)一制作（注：封面上的“翻譯題目”指中文譯文的題目），并按“封面、封面、譯文、外文原文、考核表”的順序統(tǒng)一裝訂。

畢業(yè)論文外文文獻翻譯畢業(yè)論文題目Xxx翻譯題目指翻譯后的中文譯文的題目學(xué)院會計學(xué)院（以本模板為準(zhǔn)）專業(yè)XXXXXX（以本模板為準(zhǔn)）姓名XXXXXX（以本模板為準(zhǔn)）班級XXXXXX（以本模板為準(zhǔn)）學(xué)號XXXXXX（以本模板為準(zhǔn)）指導(dǎo)教師XXXXXX（以本模板為準(zhǔn)）譯文管理者過度樂觀與債務(wù)、股權(quán)融資之間的選擇MichaelGombola.&DaliaMarciukaityte.TheJournalofBehaviorFinance,2007Vol.8,No.4,–235本文采取了一家成長較快速的公司作為樣本，比較債務(wù)融資和股權(quán)融資后的長期股票業(yè)績。如果管理者過于樂觀的預(yù)測他們將獲得的資產(chǎn),那么他們更有可能通過債務(wù)融資來增加資本而不是股權(quán)融資。然而他們通過債務(wù)融資獲得的資本與股權(quán)融資后的長期的業(yè)績相比將會更差。但是，從另一方面來說，管理者利用“機會窗口”發(fā)行股票，我們認為會比發(fā)行債券有更差的業(yè)績。伴隨著管理者過度的樂觀假設(shè)，我們發(fā)現(xiàn)，債務(wù)融資比股權(quán)融資后的股票業(yè)績更差。管理者過度樂觀對于選擇債務(wù)或股權(quán)融資還有之后的股票業(yè)績有著顯著的影響。關(guān)鍵詞：過度樂觀、過于自信、債務(wù)融資、股權(quán)融資、長期的股票表現(xiàn)一、前言股價低和經(jīng)營業(yè)績差的表現(xiàn)導(dǎo)致了一個假說，即利用高股價和投資者的過度樂觀的時期，銷售定價過高的股票。這個“機會之窗”假說認為，管理者存在時間股權(quán)的問題時，他們公司的股票會被高估（Ritter[1991]）。然而，這一假說，不能用來解釋股票表現(xiàn)不佳的問題（Spies，Affleck-Graves[1999]和Datta,Iskandar-DattaandRaman[2000]）?？冃Р顜淼膫鶆?wù)融資問題表明必須要有一種替代假說可以解釋這些發(fā)現(xiàn)。……

外文原文ManagerialoveroptimismandtheChoicebetweenDebtAndEquityFinancingThispapercompareslong-runstockperformancefollowingdebtfinancingandequityfinancingforasampleofrapidlygrowingfirms.Ifmanagersaresubjecttooverlyoptimisticpredictionsfortheirassetacquisitions,theyaremorelikelytofinanceassetgrowthbydebtratherthanbyequity.Themanagerialoveroptimismhypothesispredictsworselong-termperformancefordebt-financedassetacquisitionsthanequity-financedassetacquisitions.If,ontheotherhand,managerstakeadvantageof“windowsofopportunity”forissuingequity,weexpectworseperformancefollowingequityissuancethanfollowingdebtissuance.Consistentwiththemanagerialoveroptimismhypothesis,wefindthatdebtfinancingisfollowedbysignificantlyworsestockperformancethanequityfinancing.Managerialoveroptimismseemstobeasignificantfactoraffectingthechoicebetweendebtandequityfinancingandpost-financingstockperformance.Keywords:Overoptimism,Overconfidence,Debtfinancing,Equityfinancing,longrunstockperformanceIntroductionEvidenceofpoorstockandoperatingperformancefollowingequityissueshasledtothehypothesisthatmanagerstakeadvantageofperiodsofhighstockpricesandinvestoroveroptimisminordertoselloverpricedequity.This“windowsofopportunity”hypothesissuggeststhatmanager’stimeequityissueswhentheirfirm’ssharesareoverpriced(Ritter[1991]).Thishypothesis,however,cannotbeusedtoexplainpoorstockperformancefollowingdebtissuesdocumentedbySpiesandAffleck-Graves[1999]andDatta,Iskandar-DattaandRaman[2000].Underperformancefollowingdebtfinancingindicatesaneedforanalternativehypothesisthatcanexplainthesefindings.Wesuggestthatmanagerialoveroptimismisafactorthatcanexplainpoorlong-termstockperformancefollowingstockand,especially,bondissuance.Recentstudiesshowthatmanagerialoveroptimismaffectscorporatedecisions.,Heaton[2002],Gervais,HeatonandOdean[2003],MalmendierandTate[2003and2005]).Asmanagersaremoreaffectedbytheper-formanceoftheir?rmthanarewell-diversi?edshareholders,moderatemanagerialoveroptimismcanhelptoensurethatmanagersbehaveinthebestinterestofshareholdersbycounteractingtheeffectofmanagerialriskaversion;however,strongmanagerialoveroptimismcanresultintheundertakingofnegativenetpresentvalueprojectsanddestructionofafirm’svalue(Gervais,HeatonandOdean[2003]).Anexcessivelyfavorableestimateoffutureoutcomesforinvestmentsisthecruxofthismanagerialoveroptimismhypothesis.Whenmanagershaveoptimisticpredictionsofinvestmentoutcomes,theyaremoreinclinedtofinancewithdebtratherthanequity.Confidenceaboutthesizeoffutureoutcomesmakesmanagersunwillingtosharefutureprofitswithnewequityinvestorsandmakethemmorewillingtoissuedebtratherthanequity.Thisstudyteststhemanagerialoveroptimismhypothesisbyexaminingpost-financingstockperformanceforbothdebtandequityfinancing.Ifmanagerialoveroptimismhasamoresignificanteffectonthechoicebetweendebtandequityfinancingandpostfinancingperformancethanmanagerattemptstotimethemarketandtakeadvantageofwindowsofopportunityforissuingequity,weexpectworsestockperformancefollowingdebtfinancingthanfollowingequityfinancing.Wefocusonasampleoffirmswithrapidgrowthinassetsandacorrespondingneedtofinancethoseassets.Byfocusingonfirmsthatrequireassetfinancing,securityissuanceforotherpurposescanbelargelyeliminated.Furthermore,sincestudyinglong-termperformancedoesnotrequireidentifyingaparticularissuancedate,ourstudyisnotlimitedtofirmswithexplicitannouncementsofsecurityissuance.Ratherthanlimitingthestudytofirmsthatannouncenewissuesofdebtorequity,weincludeallformsoffinancingandmeasurefinancingbythechangeindebtorchangeinequity.Inthismanner,implicitsecurityissuancesuchasstock-for-stockmergerscanbeincorporatedinthesample.Anotherreasonforfocusingonhighgrowthfirmsisourexpectationofstrongermanagerialoveroptimismamongthesefirms.Allelsebeingequal,overoptimisticmanagersperceivethattheyhavemoregoodprojectsavailablethanothermanagers.Asmanagersshouldtakeallprojectstheybelievetohavepositivenetpresentvalue,overoptimisticmanagerswouldundertakemoreprojectsresultinginthefastergrowthoftheirfirms.Therearetworeasonswhyitisimportanttofocusonasampleaffectedbystrongmanagerialoveroptimisminastudyexaminingwhethermanagerialoveroptimismaffectsthechoicebetweendebtandequityfinancingandpoorpost-financingperformance.First,thewindowsofopportunityhypothesisandthemanagerialoveroptimismhypothesisarenotmutuallyexclusive.Itispossiblethatwhilesomemanagerschoosebetweendebtandequityfinancingtotakeadvantageofwindowsofopportunity,othermanagersaresignificantlyaffectedbyoveroptimismwhenmakingsecuritychoicedecisions.Eventhesamemanagercanbeaffectedbybothfactorsatthesametime:anoveroptimisticmanagermayattempttotakeadvantageofsharemispricings.Becauseofmarkettimingtoselloverpricedshares,equityfinancingwillbefollowedbyworsepost-financingstockperformancethandebtfinancing.Becauseofthemanagerialoveroptimismeffectonthechoicebetweendebtandequityfinancing,debtfinancingwillbefollowedbyworsestockperformance.Asthesefactorsworkinoppositedirections,theeffectofmarkettimingcancanceltheeffectofmanagerialoveroptimisminasampleofalldebtandequityissues.Thesecondreasonforfocusingonasampleaffectedbystrongmanagerialoveroptimismisrelatedtothemarketoveroptimism.Poorpost-financingstockperformanceindicatesthatthemarketisoveroptimisticaboutthefirmobtainingexternalfinancing.Overoptimisticmanagerspreferdebtfinancingtoequityfinancingwhentheyperceivetheirsharestobeunderpriced,whichhappenswhenmanagersaremoreoveroptimisticabouttheirfirm’sfuturethanisthemarket.Asthemarketisoveroptimisticaboutfinancingfirms,overoptimisticmanagerpreferencefordebtfinancingwillbeobservedonlyforthemostoveroptimisticmanagerswhoseoveroptimismexceedstheoveroptimismofthe,ifwewouldexaminethewholepopulationoffirmsobtainingexternalfinancing,itislikelythatwewouldfindnoevidenceofworsestockperformancefollowingdebtfinancingthanequityfinancing,evenifmanagerialoveroptimismsignificantlyaffectsthechoicebetweendebtandequityfinancingandpost-financingstockperformance.ThisexpectationisconsistentwiththeJung,KimandStulz[1996]studythatcomparesstockperformanceafternewbondissuesandprimarystockofferingsand,whencontrollingforthecharacteristicsofissuingfirms,findnosignificantdifferenceinthepost-issueperformance.Weexamineasampleofhigh-growthfirmsthatincludesthetop10%offirmsintheCompustatdatabase,basedontheirone-yearpercentagetotalassetgrowth.Theresultingsamplecontainsfirmswithsignificantfinancingduringtheexaminedyear.Westudytwosubsetsofthehigh-growthsample:asampleoffirmsthatprimarilyusedebttofinanceassetgrowthandasampleoffirmsthatprimarilyuseexternalequitytofinanceassetgrowth.Ifmoreoverlyoptimisticmanagersusedebtfinancing,thenwewouldfindworseperformanceforthesamplethatprimarilyusesdebtfinancing.Worseperformanceforthesampleofequityfinancingfirmscouldprovidesupportforthewindowsofopportunityhypothesis.Wefindthatdebtfinancingisassociatedwithsignificantlyworsepost-financingone-tofive-yearstockperformance.Forexample,inthefirstpost-financingyear,ourdebt-financingsampleunderperformsourequity-financingsampleby8%to10%,dependingonthemethodologyusedtocontrolforrisk.Wecontrolforriskusingthematched-sampleapproachadvocatedbyBarberandLyon[1997]andafour-factormodel,includingthethreeFamaandFrench[1993]factorssupplementedbyamomentumfactor.Wealsoexaminetheeffectofthechoicebetweendebtandequityfinancingonpost-financingperformanceusingacontinuousvariabletomeasureafirm’srelianceondebtfinancingandcontrollingforfirmcharacteristics.Furthermore,wetesttherobustnessofourresultsusingrestrictedsamples.Regardlessofthetestdesign,wefindthatstrongerrelianceondebtfinancingisassociatedwithworsepost-financingstockperformance.Ourresultssupportthenotionthatthechoicebetweendebtandequityfinancingandpost-financingstockperformanceareaffectedbymanagerialoveroptimism.AlternateHypothesesSeveralhypotheseshavebeenpresentedtoexplainthepricereactiontotheannouncementofsecurityissuanceandtheperformancefollowingthatissuance.InthesignalingmodelpresentedbyMyersandMajluf[1984],investorslearnabouttheprivateinformationmanagershaveaboutthevalueofthefirm’sassetsfromtheirchoiceoffinancing.Managersavoidissuingsecuritiestheybelieveareunderpricedandavoidsharingthevalueaddedfromgoodinvestmentopportunitieswithoutsideinvestors.Mangersprefertofundinvestmentsinternallyandissuelower-risksecuritieswhenoutsidecapitalisneeded.Thishypothesisprovidesbackgroundforthemanagerialoveroptimismhypothesisandthewindowsofopportunityhypothesis.ManagerialOveroptimismHypothesisAcorollarytothesignalinghypothesisisthesuggestionthatmanagerswhoareoveroptimisticabouttheirfirm’sabilitytogeneratewealth-creatingprojectsandbelievetheirequitytobeundervaluedprefertoissuedebtratherthanequity.Heaton[2002]formalizesthemodelexaminingtheeffectofmanagerialoveroptimismoncorporatedecisions.Hesuggeststhatwhenmanagersareoveroptimisticaboutthefirm’sprospects,theyperceivetheirfirm’sriskysecuritiestobeundervaluedand,toavoidissuingunderpricedsecurities,preferdebtissuestoequityissues.Also,sinceoveroptimisticmanagersovervaluetheprojectsavailabletothem,theyundertakesomeprojectsthatarenegativenetpresentvalueprojectseventhoughtheirintentionsaretoactinthebestinterestsoftheirshareholders.RecentempiricalstudiessupportHeaton’s[2002]hypothesisthatoveroptimisticmanagerspreferdebtfinancingtoequityfinancing.Malmendier,TateandYan[2006]examineasampleofForbes500firmsandfindthatoverconfidentCEOsaremorelikelytoissuedebtthanequity.Furthermore,Marciukaityte[2006]findsthatfirmsobtainingsubstantialdebtfinancinghavehigherdiscretionaryaccrualsthanfirmsobtainingsubstantialexternalequityfinancing.Shesuggeststhathighdiscretionaryaccrualsatthetimeofdebtfinancingareduetomanagerialoveroptimism.Poorstockperformancefollowingequityanddebtissues.,Ritter[1991],LoughranandRitter[1995]SpiesandAffleck-Graves[1995and1999],Datta,Iskandar-DattaandRaman[2000])suggeststhatthemarketisoveroptimisticaboutthevalueoffirmsobtainingexternalfinancing.Foroveroptimisticmanagerstobelievethattheirfirmisundervalued,theyneedtobemoreoveroptimisticthanthemarketaboutthevalueoftheirfirm.Behavioralstudiessuggestthatatleastthemostoveroptimisticmanagersareevenmoreoveroptimisticaboutthevalueoftheirfirmsthanthemarket.Thesestudiesshowthatoveroptimismandoverconfidencearenotjustcharacteristicsoflaypeople;managersarealsolikelytobeoverconfident.Aftertestingoverconfidenceamonggroupsofmanagersfromdifferentindustries,RussoandSchoemaker[1992]concludethat“everygroupbelieveditknewmorethanitdidaboutitsindustryorcompany”andmorethan99%wereoverconfident.Also,Langer[1975]andWeinstein[1980]showthatpeopletendtobemoreoveroptimisticaboutoutcomeswhentheybelievetheyhavecontrolofthoseoutcomes.Ofcourse,managersdohavemorecontroloftheirfirmsthaninvestorsdo.Furthermore,desirabilityofoutcomesandcommitmenttooutcomesincreaseoveroptimism(Frank[1935],Weinstein[1980]).Asmanagers’compensationandreputationareaffectedbytheperformanceoftheirfirms,managersarelikelytobemorestronglycommittedtotheirfirmsthaninvestors.Evenhigherintelligencedoesnotseemtoprotectagainstoveroptimism;KlaczynskiandFauth[1996]showthatoveroptimismisactuallymoresevereamongpeoplewithsuperiorintellectualabilities.Furthermore,assomeofthefactorsaffectingmanagerialandmarketoveroptimismmaybethesame,.,pastperformanceofthefirmorpastperformanceofsimilarfirms,managersarelikelytobethemostoveroptimisticwhenthemarketisoveroptimistic.Thus,themostoveroptimisticmanagerswillperceivetheirfirmtobeundervaluedbythemarketevenwhenitisovervalued.Managerialoptimismforindividualprojectscanextendtooverconfidenceintheabilitytoaddvaluetoanyacquiredassets,includingacquiringanentirefirm.Withinthecontextofamerger,themanagerialoverconfidenceisreferredtoas“ManagerialHubris.”Itisanexplanationforacquiringfirmspayingsubstantialpremiumstoacquiretargets,wherethepremiumsareinexcessofmanagerialabilitytoaddvaluetothetargetassets.Themethodologyofthisstudyincorporatesmergeractivitywithinitsdefinitionoffirmgrowth,sinceassetgrowthcanbeaccomplishedeitherthroughcapitalexpenditurefornewassets,purchaseofexistingassetsfromanotherfirm,ormergers.Likewise,debtorequityissuedtofinanceamergeroracquisitionisincorporatedwithinthemethodologyofthisstudy.Suchdebtorequityissuancewillnotbeaccompaniedbyanannouncementofanewsecurityofferingeventhoughtheeffectisthesamewhethersecuritiesareissuedviaapublicofferingorinconjunctionwithamergeroracquisition.WindowsofOpportunityHypothesisIfmanagersarereluctanttoissueunderpricedsecurities,thenequityissuancewouldoccurprimarilywhenmangersperceivethesesecuritiestobeoverpriced.ThemanagerialpracticeofissuingoverpricedequityreceivesempiricalsupportinthestudybyRitter[1991]ofstockunderperformanceafterinitialpublicequityofferings(IPOs).RitterfindsthatIPOfirmsunderperformmatchingfirmsforthreeyearsafterthefirstdayofpublictrading.SuchunderperformanceisevenstrongerforfirmsgoingpublicinyearswithheavyIPOactivity.Thesefindings,Rittersuggests,“indicatethatissuersaresuccessfullytimingnewissuestotakeadvantageof‘windowsofopportunity.”’(p.4)Ifinvestorsareoveroptimisticaboutthefirmvalueincertainperiods,makingequityissuesinthoseperiodsallowsafirmtoraisethesameamountofmoneywithanissueoffewershares,takingadvantageofnewshareholders.Thishypothesissuggeststhatinvestorsareoveroptimisticaboutthevalueofafirmatthetimeoftheofferingandareslowtoreacttotheinformationcontainedintheannouncementofsecurityissue.LoughranandRitter(1995)andSpiessandAffleck-Graves(1995)showthatpost-issueunderperformanceisnotrestrictedtoIPOs;firmsmakingseasonedpublicequityofferingsalsounderperformmatchedfirmsintheone-tofive-yearpost-issueperiods.Thetypeofequityoffering,publicorprivate,alsoseemsnottomatter.Privateplacementsofequityarefollowedbysimilar-sizestockunderperformanceaspublicequityissues(Hertzel,Lemmon,LinckandRees[2002]).Furthermore,post-issueunderperformanceisnotlimitedtoequityissuesintheUnitedStates.Levis[1995]documentspoorpost-issueperformanceintheUnitedKingdom.Kang,KimandStulz[1999]showthatprivateandpublicequityissuesinJapanarefollowedbysimilarpoorpost-issueperformanceasequityissuesintheUnitedStates.Althoughempiricalevidenceofunderperformancefollowingequityissuanceisconsistentwiththewindowsofopportunityhypothesis,underperformancefollowingdebtissuanceisnotconsistentwiththishypothesis.However,severalstudiesfindstockunderperformancefollowingpublicstraightandconvertibledebtofferings(SpiessandAffleck-Graves[1999]),initialdebtofferings(Datta,Iskandar-DattaandRaman[2000]),andbankloans(Billett,FlanneryandGarfinkel[2002]).Thesefindingsbringintoquestionthewindowsofopportunityhypothesisastheonlyexplanationofthepost-financingunderperformance.Sincethecostofdebtfinancingdependsprimarilyuponmarketinterestratesandnotspecificfirmperformance,managersarenotlikelytohaveanybetterforecastofthefuturedirectionofinterestratesthandooutsideinvestors.Evenwithprivateinformationaboutthedefaultriskoftheissuingcompany,thevaluebenefitsaregreaterfromsellingoverpricedequitythanoverpriceddebtpriortoinformationaboutthetruedefaultriskbecomingpublic.SampleandMethodologySampleWecompilethehigh-growthsampleusingthefollowingsteps.First,weidentifythesetoffirm-yearsthatareincludedinbothCRSPandCompustatdatabasesduringtheperiod1981-1999.Welimitthissettofirmyearswiththedatanecessarytoidentifythehighgrowthsample,thedebt-financingsample,andtheequity-financingsample.Weexcluderegulatedutilities(SICcodes4910-4949),depositoryinstitutions(SICcodes6000-6099),andholdingorotherinvestmentoffices(SICcodes6700-6799).Weconsideronlyfiscalyearsthatare12monthslong.Thehigh-growthsampleincludesfirm-yearsinthehighestdecileofassetgrowth.Wecalculatetheassetgrowthasachangeintotalassets(CompustatitemA6)duringonefiscalyear,dividedbytotalassetsatthebeginningofthefiscalyear.Thisprocedurelimitsthesampleto7,664firms.Furthermore,toreducetheproblemofcross-sectionaldependenceofobservations,werequirethatfirm-yearsforthesamefirmareatleastfiveyearsapart.Ifwehavemorethanonefirm-yearinanyfive-yearperiod,weincludeonlytheearliestone.Thisprocedurecreatesthehigh-growthsampleincluding5,583firms.Thepercentagegrowthintotalassetsisevaluatedforaneventyear,definedasYear0.WedefinetheeventdayasthelastdayofthethirdmonthafterYear0.Weusethethree-monthlagaftertheendofthefiscalyeartoallowthemarkettohaveaccesstoeachfirm’saccountinginformationforYear0.Ourpost-eventperiodstartsthreemonthsaftertheendofYear0.Aftercompilingthesampleofhigh-growthfirmsanddeterminingeventdays,wesubdividethehighgrowthsampleintosubsamplesthatuseprimarilydebtandexternalequityfinancing.Thedebt-financingsampleincludesfirmswithdebtfinancingatleast50%