ofradeolicy發(fā)展經(jīng)濟學廈門大學,陳濤

Chapter8

TheInstrumentsofTradePolicy1IntroductionBasicTariffAnalysisCostsandBenefitsofaTariffOtherInstrumentsofTradePolicyTheEffectsofTradePolicy:ASummarySummaryChapterOrganization2AppendixI:TariffAnalysisinGeneralEquilibriumAppendixII:TariffsandImportQuotasinthePresenceofMonopoly3IntroductionThischapterisfocusedonthefollowingquestions:Whataretheeffectsofvarioustradepolicyinstruments?Whowillbenefit,andwhowilllose?Whatarethecostsandbenefitsofprotection?Willthebenefitsoutweighthecosts?Whatshouldanation’stradepolicybe?4ClassificationofCommercialPolicyInstrumentsCommercialPolicyInstrumentsTradeContractionTradeExpansionTariffExporttaxImportquotaVoluntaryExportRestraint(VER)ImportsubsidyExportsubsidyVoluntaryImportExpansion(VIE)

PriceQuantity

PriceQuantity5BasicTariffAnalysisTariffscanbeclassifiedas:SpecifictariffsTaxesthatareleviedasafixedchargeforeachunitofgoodsimportedExample:Aspecifictariffof$10oneachimportedbicyclewithaninternationalpriceof$100meansthatcustomsofficialscollectthefixedsumof$10.AdvaloremtariffsTaxesthatareleviedasafractionofthevalueoftheimportedgoodsExample:A20%advaloremtariffonbicyclesgeneratesa$20paymentoneach$100importedbicycle.6Acompoundduty(tariff)isacombinationofanadvaloremandaspecifictariff.

Moderngovernmentsusuallyprefertoprotectdomesticindustriesthroughavarietyofnontariffbarriers,suchas:ImportquotasLimitthequantityofimportsExportrestraintsLimitthequantityofexportsBasicTariffAnalysis7Supply,Demand,andTradeinaSingleIndustrySupposethattherearetwocountries(HomeandForeign).Bothcountriesconsumeandproducewheat,whichcanbecostlesstransportedbetweenthecountries.Ineachcountry,wheatisacompetitiveindustry.SupposethatintheabsenceoftradethepriceofwheatatHomeexceedsthecorrespondingpriceatForeign.ThisimpliesthatshippersbegintomovewheatfromForeigntoHome.TheexportofwheatraisesitspriceinForeignandlowersitspriceinHomeuntiltheinitialdifferenceinpriceshasbeeneliminated.BasicTariffAnalysis8Todeterminetheworldprice(Pw)andthequantitytrade(Qw),twocurvesaredefined:HomeimportdemandcurveShowsthemaximumquantityofimportstheHomecountrywouldliketoconsumeateachpriceoftheimportedgood.Thatis,theexcessofwhatHomeconsumersdemandoverwhatHomeproducerssupply:MD=D(P)–S(P)ForeignexportsupplycurveShowsthemaximumquantityofexportsForeignwouldliketoprovidetherestoftheworldateachprice.Thatis,theexcessofwhatForeignproducerssupplyoverwhatforeignconsumersdemand:XS=S*(P*)–D*(P*)BasicTariffAnalysis9Quantity,QPrice,PPrice,PQuantity,QMDDSAPAP2P1S2D2D2–S22S1D1D1–S11Figure8-1:DerivingHome’sImportDemandCurveBasicTariffAnalysis10Propertiesoftheimportdemandcurve:Itintersectstheverticalaxisattheclosedeconomypriceoftheimportingcountry.Itisdownwardsloping.Itisflatterthanthedomesticdemandcurveintheimportingcountry.BasicTariffAnalysis11P2P*AD*S*P1XSPrice,PPrice,PQuantity,QQuantity,QS*2–D*2S*2D*2Figure8-2:DerivingForeign’’sExportSupplyCurveBasicTariffAnalysisD*1S*1S*1–D*112Propertiesoftheexportsupplycurve:Itintersectstheverticalaxisattheclosedeconomypriceoftheexportingcountry.Itisupwardsloping.Itisflatterthatthedomesticsupplycurveintheexportingcountry.BasicTariffAnalysis13Figure8-3:WorldEquilibriumXSPrice,PQuantity,QMDPWQW1BasicTariffAnalysis14Usefuldefinitions:Thetermsoftradeistherelativepriceoftheexportablegoodexpressedinunitsoftheimportablegood.Asmallcountryisacountrythatcannotaffectitstermsoftradenomatterhowmuchittradeswiththerestoftheworld.Theanalyticalframeworkwillbebasedoneitherofthefollowing:TwolargecountriestradingwitheachotherAsmallcountrytradingwiththerestoftheworldBasicTariffAnalysis15EffectsofaTariffAssumethattwolargecountriestradewitheachother.SupposeHomeimposesataxof$2oneverybushelofwheatimported.Thenshipperswillbeunwillingtomovethewheatunlessthepricedifferencebetweenthetwomarketsisatleast$2.Figure8-4illustratestheeffectsofaspecifictariffof$tperunitofwheat.BasicTariffAnalysis16XSPTMDD*S*DSPW2QT1QWBasicTariffAnalysisFigure8-4:EffectsofaTariffP*T3tPrice,PQuantity,QPrice,PQuantity,QPrice,PQuantity,QHomemarketWorldmarketForeignmarketHomemarketWorldmarketForeignmarket17Intheabsenceoftariff,theworldpriceofwheat(Pw)wouldbeequalizedinbothcountries.Withthetariffinplace,thepriceofwheatrisestoPTatHomeandfallstoP*T(=PT–t)atForeignuntilthepricedifferenceis$t.InHome:producerssupplymoreandconsumersdemandlessduetothehigherprice,sothatfewerimportsaredemanded.InForeign:producerssupplylessandconsumersdemandmoreduetothelowerprice,sothatfewerexportsaresupplied.Thus,thevolumeofwheattradeddeclinesduetotheimpositionofthetariff.BasicTariffAnalysis18TheincreaseinthedomesticHomepriceislessthanthetariff,becausepartofthetariffisreflectedinadeclineinForeign’sexportprice.IfHomeisasmallcountryandimposesatariff,theforeignexportpricesareunaffectedandthedomesticpriceatHome(theimportingcountry)risesbythefullamountofthetariff.BasicTariffAnalysis19Figure8-5:ATariffinaSmallCountrySPrice,PQuantity,QDPW+tPWImportsaftertariffS1D1ImportsbeforetariffD2S2BasicTariffAnalysis20MeasuringtheAmountofProtectionInanalyzingtradepolicyinpractice,itisimportanttoknowhowmuchprotectionatradepolicyactuallyprovides.Onecanexpresstheamountofprotectionasapercentageofthepricethatwouldprevailunderfreetrade.Twoproblemsarisefromthismethodofmeasurement:Inthelargecountrycase,thetariffwilllowertheforeignexportprice.Tariffsmayhavedifferenteffectsondifferentstagesofproductionofagood.BasicTariffAnalysis21EffectiverateofprotectionOnemustconsiderboththeeffectsoftariffsonthefinalpriceofagood,andtheeffectsoftariffsonthecostsofinputsusedinproduction.Theactualprotectionprovidedbyatariffwillnotequalthetariffrateifimportedintermediategoodsareusedintheproductionoftheprotectedgood.Example:AEuropeanairplanethatsellsfor$50millionhascost$60milliontoproduce.Halfofthepurchasepriceoftheaircraftrepresentsthecostofcomponentspurchasedfromothercountries.Asubsidyof$10millionfromtheEuropeangovernmentcutsthecostofthevalueaddedtopurchasersoftheairplanefrom$30to$20million.Thus,theeffectiverateofprotectionis(30-20)/20=50%.BasicTariffAnalysis22CostsandBenefitsofaTariffAtariffraisesthepriceofagoodintheimportingcountryandlowersitintheexportingcountry.Asaresultofthesepricechanges:ConsumersloseintheimportingcountryandgainintheexportingcountryProducersgainintheimportingcountryandloseintheexportingcountryGovernmentimposingthetariffgainsrevenueTomeasureandcomparethesecostsandbenefits,weneedtodefineconsumerandproducersurplus.23ConsumerandProducerSurplusConsumersurplusItmeasurestheamountaconsumergainsfromapurchasebythedifferencebetweenthepriceheactuallypaysandthepricehewouldhavebeenwillingtopay.Itcanbederivedfromthemarketdemandcurve.Graphically,itisequaltotheareaunderthedemandcurveandabovetheprice.Example:Supposeapersoniswillingtopay$20perpacketofpills,butthepriceisonly$5.Then,theconsumersurplusgainedbythepurchaseofapacketofpillsis$15.CostsandBenefitsofaTariff24Figure8-6:DerivingConsumerSurplusfromtheDemandCurveCostsandBenefitsofaTariff8$129$1010$911DPrice,PQuantity,Q25Figure8-7:GeometryofConsumerSurplusCostsandBenefitsofaTariffabP1P2DPrice,PQuantity,QQ2Q126ProducersurplusItmeasurestheamountaproducergainsfromasalebythedifferencebetweenthepriceheactuallyreceivesandthepriceatwhichhewouldhavebeenwillingtosell.Itcanbederivedfromthemarketsupplycurve.Graphically,itisequaltotheareaabovethesupplycurveandbelowtheprice.Example:Aproducerwillingtosellagoodfor$2butreceivingapriceof$5gainsaproducersurplusof$3.CostsandBenefitsofaTariff27Figure8-8:GeometryofProducerSurplusCostsandBenefitsofaTariffdcP2P1SPrice,PQuantity,QQ2Q128CostsandBenefitsofaTariffMeasuringtheCostandBenefitsIsitpossibletoaddconsumerandproducersurplus?Wecan(algebraically)addconsumerandproducersurplusbecauseanychangeinpriceaffectseachindividualintwoways:AsaconsumerAsaworkerWeassumethatatthemarginadollar’sworthofgainorlosstoeachgroupisofthesamesocialworth.29Figure8-9:CostsandBenefitsofaTarifffortheImportingCountryCostsandBenefitsofaTariffPTPWP*TbcdeDa=consumerloss(a+b+c+d)=producergain(a)=governmentrevenuegain(c+e)QTD2S2SS1D1Price,PQuantity,Q30Theareasofthetwotrianglesbanddmeasurethelosstothenationasawhole(efficiencyloss)andtheareaoftherectangleemeasuresanoffsettinggain(termsoftradegain).Theefficiencylossarisesbecauseatariffdistortsincentivestoconsumeandproduce.Producersandconsumersactasifimportsweremoreexpensivethantheyactuallyare.Trianglebistheproductiondistortionlossandtriangledistheconsumptiondistortionloss.Thetermsoftradegainarisesbecauseatarifflowersforeignexportprices.CostsandBenefitsofaTariff31Ifthetermsoftradegainisgreaterthantheefficiencyloss,thetariffincreaseswelfarefortheimportingcountry.Inthecaseofasmallcountry,thetariffreduceswelfarefortheimportingcountry.CostsandBenefitsofaTariff32Figure8-10:NetWelfareEffectsofaTariffPTPWP*TbdeD=efficiencyloss(b+d)=termsoftradegain(e)ImportsSPrice,PQuantity,QCostsandBenefitsofaTariff33ExportSubsidies:TheoryExportsubsidyApaymentbythegovernmenttoafirmorindividualthatshipsagoodabroadWhenthegovernmentoffersanexportsubsidy,shipperswillexportthegooduptothepointwherethedomesticpriceexceedstheforeignpricebytheamountofthesubsidy.Itcanbeeitherspecificoradvalorem.OtherInstrumentsofTradePolicy34baFigure8-11:EffectsofanExportSubsidyOtherInstrumentsofTradePolicyPSPWP*SPrice,PQuantity,QExportsgfeSubsidydc=producergain(a+b+c)=consumerloss(a+b)=costofgovernmentsubsidy(b+c+d+e+f+g)DS35Anexportsubsidyraisespricesintheexportingcountrywhileloweringthemintheimportingcountry.Inaddition,andincontrasttoatariff,theexportsubsidyworsensthetermsoftrade.Anexportsubsidyunambiguouslyleadstocoststhatexceeditsbenefits.OtherInstrumentsofTradePolicy36Figure8-12:Europe’sCommonAgriculturalProgramOtherInstrumentsofTradePolicyPrice,PQuantity,QSDEUpricewithoutimportsWorldprice=costofgovernmentsubsidySupportpriceExports37ImportQuotas:TheoryAnimportquotaisadirectrestrictiononthequantityofagoodthatisimported.Example:TheUnitedStateshasaquotaonimportsofforeigncheese.Therestrictionisusuallyenforcedbyissuinglicensestosomegroupofindividualsorfirms.Example:Theonlyfirmsallowedtoimportcheesearecertaintradingcompanies.Insomecases(e.g.sugarandapparel),therighttosellintheUnitedStatesisgivendirectlytothegovernmentsofexportingcountries.OtherInstrumentsofTradePolicy38Animportquotaalwaysraisesthedomesticpriceoftheimportedgood.Licenseholdersareabletobuyimportsandresellthematahigherpriceinthedomesticmarket.Theprofitsreceivedbytheholdersofimportlicensesareknownasquotarents.OtherInstrumentsofTradePolicy39WelfareanalysisofimportquotasversusofthatoftariffsThedifferencebetweenaquotaandatariffisthatwithaquotathegovernmentreceivesnorevenue.Inassessingthecostsandbenefitsofanimportquota,itiscrucialtodeterminewhogetstherents.Whentherightstosellinthedomesticmarketareassignedtogovernmentsofexportingcountries,thetransferofrentsabroadmakesthecostsofaquotasubstantiallyhigherthantheequivalenttariff.OtherInstrumentsofTradePolicy40PriceinU.S.Market466WorldPrice280bcdDemanda8.456.32Supply5.149.26Price,$/tonQuantityofsugar,milliontonsFigure8-13:EffectsoftheU.S.ImportQuotaonSugarOtherInstrumentsofTradePolicyImportquota:2.13milliontons=consumerloss(a+b+c+d)=producergain(a)=quotarents(c)41VoluntaryExportRestraintsAvoluntaryexportrestraint(VER)isanexportquotaadministeredbytheexportingcountry.Itisalsoknownasavoluntaryrestraintagreement(VRA).VERsareimposedattherequestoftheimporterandareagreedtobytheexportertoforestallothertraderestrictions.OtherInstrumentsofTradePolicy42AVERisexactlylikeanimportquotawherethelicensesareassignedtoforeigngovernmentsandisthereforeverycostlytotheimportingcountry.AVERisalwaysmorecostlytotheimportingcountrythanatariffthatlimitsimportsbythesameamount.ThetariffequivalentrevenuebecomesrentsearnedbyforeignersundertheVER.Example:About2/3ofthecosttoconsumersofthethreemajorU.S.voluntaryrestraintsintextilesandapparel,steel,andautomobilesisaccountedforbytherentsearnedbyforeigners.AVERproducesalossfortheimportingcountry.OtherInstrumentsofTradePolicy43LocalContentRequirementsAlocalcontentrequirementisaregulationthatrequiresthatsomespecifiedfractionofafinalgoodbeproduceddomestically.Thisfractioncanbespecifiedinphysicalunitsorinvalueterms.Localcontentlawshavebeenwidelyusedbydevelopingcountriestryingtoshifttheirmanufacturingbasefromassemblybackintointermediategoods.OtherInstrumentsofTradePolicy44Localcontentlawsdonotproduceeithergovernmentrevenueorquotarents.Instead,thedifferencebetweenthepricesofimportsanddomesticgoodsgetsaveragedinthefinalpriceandispassedontoconsumers.Example:Supposethatautoassemblyfirmsarerequiredtouse50%domesticparts.Thecostofimportedpartsis$6000andthecostofthesamepartsdomesticallyis$10,000.Thentheaveragecostofpartsis$8000(0.5x$6000+0.5x$10,000).Firmsareallowedtosatisfytheirlocalcontentrequirementbyexportinginsteadofusingpartsdomestically.OtherInstrumentsofTradePolicy45OtherTradePolicyInstrumentsExportcreditsubsidiesAformofasubsidizedloantothebuyerofexports.Theyhavethesameeffectasregularexportsubsidies.NationalprocurementPurchasesbythegovernment(orpublicfirms)canbedirectedtowardsdomesticgoods,eveniftheyaremoreexpensivethanimports.Red-tapebarriersSometimesgovernmentsplacesubstantialbarriersbasedonhealth,safetyandcustomsprocedures.OtherInstrumentsofTradePolicy46TheEffectsofTradePolicy:ASummaryTable8-1:EffectsofAlternativeTradePolicies47SummaryAtariffdrivesawedgebetweenforeignanddomesticprices,raisingthedomesticpricebutbylessthanthetariffrate(exceptinthe““small”countrycase).Inthesmallcountrycase,atariffisfullyreflectedindomesticprices.Thecostsandbenefitsofatarifforothertradepolicyinstrumentsmaybemeasuredusingtheconceptsofconsumerandproducersurplus.ThedomesticproducersofagoodgainThedomesticconsumersloseThegovernmentcollectstariffrevenue48SummaryThenetwelfareeffectofatariffcanbese