奇虎訴騰訊反壟斷案最高院判決的要點(diǎn)

奇虎訴騰訊反壟斷案最高院判決的要點(diǎn)Englishversion作者魏瑛玲合伙人；萬(wàn)興律師君合律師事務(wù)所發(fā)文日期2014-10-29作者單位2014年10月16日，最高人民法院（以下簡(jiǎn)稱(chēng)'最高院〃）對(duì)奇虎訴騰訊濫用市場(chǎng)支配地位案作出終審宣判［1］，駁回奇虎的上訴，維持原判。作為最高院審理的第一例反壟斷案件，本判決對(duì)如何界定相關(guān)市場(chǎng)、判斷濫用市場(chǎng)支配地位等一系列問(wèn)題明確了考量因素和分析方法，將成為對(duì)反壟斷訴訟，尤其是濫用支配地位案件起指導(dǎo)性作用的重要案例。本文旨在對(duì)該案例的裁判要點(diǎn)和理由進(jìn)行整理歸納和簡(jiǎn)要解讀。裁判要點(diǎn)一：并非在任何濫用市場(chǎng)支配地位的案件中均必須明確而清楚地界定相關(guān)市場(chǎng)裁判理由：界定相關(guān)市場(chǎng)有助于明確競(jìng)爭(zhēng)行為的市場(chǎng)范圍及經(jīng)營(yíng)者面對(duì)的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)約束。在濫用支配地位案件中，合理地界定相關(guān)市場(chǎng)，對(duì)于認(rèn)定經(jīng)營(yíng)者的市場(chǎng)地位、分析其行為對(duì)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的影響、判斷其行為是否違法等關(guān)鍵問(wèn)題具有重要意義。因此，在反壟斷案件中，界定相關(guān)市場(chǎng)通常是重要的分析步驟。但是，是否能夠明確界定相關(guān)市場(chǎng)取決于案件具體情況，尤其是案件證據(jù)、相關(guān)數(shù)據(jù)的可獲得性、競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的復(fù)雜性等。在濫用支配地位案件中，界定相關(guān)市場(chǎng)是評(píng)估被訴經(jīng)營(yíng)者的市場(chǎng)力量及其行為對(duì)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)影響的工具，而非目的。即使不明確界定，也可通過(guò)排除或妨礙競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的直接證據(jù)對(duì)被訴經(jīng)營(yíng)者的市場(chǎng)地位及其行為可能的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)影響進(jìn)行評(píng)估。君合解讀:根據(jù)本案例，在今后的反壟斷訴訟中，通常仍需界定相關(guān)市場(chǎng)。但是，如果由于難以獲得案件的相關(guān)證據(jù)、數(shù)據(jù)或競(jìng)爭(zhēng)情況非常復(fù)雜等原因，確實(shí)不能明確界定相關(guān)市場(chǎng)的（這種情況非常少），可轉(zhuǎn)而通過(guò)排除或妨礙競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的直接證據(jù)對(duì)有關(guān)情況進(jìn)行評(píng)估。裁判要點(diǎn)二：如果定性分析足以明確界定相關(guān)市場(chǎng)，不必要進(jìn)行復(fù)雜的定量分析裁判理由：界定相關(guān)市場(chǎng)既可以采取定性分析的方法，又可采取定量分析方法。定性分析通常是進(jìn)行界定的起點(diǎn)。在定性分析足以得出明確結(jié)論時(shí)，不必進(jìn)行復(fù)雜的定量分析。君合解讀：定性分析包括基于商品的特征、用途、價(jià)格等因素分析需求替代和供給替代的情況。定量分析包括運(yùn)用數(shù)理經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)、計(jì)量經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)等方法進(jìn)行的分析。方法只是工具，而非目的。在界定相關(guān)市場(chǎng)時(shí)，需先2014年10月23日采取定性分析。如果足以界定，則不必再進(jìn)行定量分析。只有在定性分析不能明確界定相關(guān)市場(chǎng)，同時(shí)定量分析可行的情況下（如相關(guān)數(shù)據(jù)可獲得），才需考慮定量分析。裁判要點(diǎn)三：假定壟斷者測(cè)試（HMT）可普遍適用于界定相關(guān)市場(chǎng)裁判理由：假定壟斷者測(cè)試的基本思路是，在假設(shè)其他條件不變的前提下，通過(guò)目標(biāo)商品或者服務(wù)某個(gè)變量的變化來(lái)測(cè)試目標(biāo)商品與其他商品之間的可替代程度。作為界定相關(guān)市場(chǎng)的一種分析思路，該測(cè)試具有普遍適用性［2］。既可用于界定相關(guān)商品市場(chǎng)，又可用于界定相關(guān)地域市場(chǎng)。在假定壟斷者測(cè)試的框架下，相關(guān)地域市場(chǎng)界定考慮的主要因素是：在價(jià)格、質(zhì)量等競(jìng)爭(zhēng)因素發(fā)生變化的情況下，其他地區(qū)經(jīng)營(yíng)者對(duì)目標(biāo)區(qū)域的假定壟斷者是否會(huì)構(gòu)成有效的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)約束；既可通過(guò)定性分析的方法進(jìn)行，又可在條件允許情況下通過(guò)定量分析方法進(jìn)行；既可通過(guò)數(shù)量不大但有意義且并非短暫的價(jià)格上漲(SSNIP)的方法進(jìn)行，又可通過(guò)數(shù)量不大但有意義且并非短暫的質(zhì)量下降(SSNDQ)的方法進(jìn)行。君合解讀：本案例明確了假定壟斷者測(cè)試的普遍適用性，尤其明確了該測(cè)試可以通過(guò)定性方法和數(shù)量不大但有意義且并非短暫的質(zhì)量下降(SSNDQ)的方法進(jìn)行，具有相當(dāng)?shù)男乱?。裁判要點(diǎn)四：市場(chǎng)份額只是判斷市場(chǎng)支配地位的一項(xiàng)粗糙且可能具有誤導(dǎo)性的指標(biāo)。判斷市場(chǎng)支配地位還應(yīng)考慮市場(chǎng)進(jìn)入、經(jīng)營(yíng)者的市場(chǎng)行為、對(duì)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的影響等綜合因素裁判理由：一般而言，市場(chǎng)份額越高，持續(xù)的時(shí)間越長(zhǎng)，就越可能預(yù)示市場(chǎng)支配地位的存在。反壟斷法第十九條規(guī)定經(jīng)營(yíng)者在相關(guān)市場(chǎng)的市場(chǎng)份額達(dá)到二分之一的，可推定其有支配地位，但這一推定可以被推翻。在市場(chǎng)進(jìn)入比較容易，或者高市場(chǎng)份額源于經(jīng)營(yíng)者更高的市場(chǎng)效率或者提供了更優(yōu)異的產(chǎn)品，或者市場(chǎng)外產(chǎn)品對(duì)經(jīng)營(yíng)者形成較強(qiáng)的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)約束等情況下，高的市場(chǎng)份額并不能直接推斷出市場(chǎng)支配地位的存在。根據(jù)反壟斷法第十八條的規(guī)定，認(rèn)定市場(chǎng)支配地位需要綜合評(píng)估多項(xiàng)因素。君合解讀：《反壟斷法》第19條規(guī)定：因市場(chǎng)份額被推定具有市場(chǎng)支配地位的經(jīng)營(yíng)者，有證據(jù)證明不具有支配地位的，不應(yīng)當(dāng)認(rèn)定其具有支配地位。本案例列舉了對(duì)支配地位的推定可能起推翻作用的證據(jù)，即：市場(chǎng)進(jìn)入比較容易，或者高市場(chǎng)份額源于經(jīng)營(yíng)者更高的市場(chǎng)效率或者提供了更優(yōu)異的產(chǎn)品，或者市場(chǎng)外產(chǎn)品對(duì)經(jīng)營(yíng)者形成較強(qiáng)的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)約束等情況。同時(shí)，根據(jù)本案例，如果具有相當(dāng)?shù)氖袌?chǎng)份額(如40%)，即使未達(dá)到《反壟斷法》第19條的推定標(biāo)準(zhǔn)(如二分之一），但市場(chǎng)進(jìn)入很難，或者市場(chǎng)外產(chǎn)品對(duì)經(jīng)營(yíng)者形成的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)約束很弱，亦有可能被認(rèn)定為具有支配地位。裁判要點(diǎn)五：在認(rèn)定經(jīng)營(yíng)者具有市場(chǎng)支配地位后，判斷其是否構(gòu)成濫用支配地位行為，需要綜合評(píng)估對(duì)消費(fèi)者和競(jìng)爭(zhēng)造成的消極效果和可能的積極效果裁判理由：即使被訴經(jīng)營(yíng)者具有市場(chǎng)支配地位，判斷其是否構(gòu)成濫用支配地位，也需要綜合評(píng)估其行為對(duì)消費(fèi)者和競(jìng)爭(zhēng)造成的消極效果和可能具有的積極效果，進(jìn)而對(duì)行為的合法性與否作出判斷。君合解讀：在今后的濫用市場(chǎng)支配地位案件中，法院將不會(huì)因經(jīng)營(yíng)者具有支配地位且實(shí)施了有關(guān)行為即判定其違法，需要評(píng)估行為對(duì)消費(fèi)者和競(jìng)爭(zhēng)造成的消極效果和可能具有的積極效果，即采取'合理〃原則（ruleofreason）。如果有關(guān)行為并未導(dǎo)致排除或限制競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的明顯效果（如本案例中法院對(duì)騰訊'產(chǎn)品不兼容〃行為的認(rèn)定），或?qū)οM(fèi)者和競(jìng)爭(zhēng)產(chǎn)生的積極效果遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)大于其消極效果，則可能不構(gòu)成違反反壟斷法的濫用支配地位行為。反之，則可能構(gòu)成違法。裁判要點(diǎn)六：搭售對(duì)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)既可能有積極效果，又可能有消極效果。只有對(duì)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)具有消極效果，才可能構(gòu)成反壟斷法禁止的搭售行為裁判理由：構(gòu)成反壟斷法禁止的搭售行為，應(yīng)當(dāng)符合如下條件：搭售產(chǎn)品和被搭售產(chǎn)品是各自獨(dú)立的產(chǎn)品；搭售者在搭售產(chǎn)品市場(chǎng)上具有支配地位；搭售者對(duì)購(gòu)買(mǎi)者實(shí)施了某種強(qiáng)制，使其不得不接受被搭售產(chǎn)品；搭售不具有正當(dāng)性，不符合交易慣例、消費(fèi)習(xí)慣等或者無(wú)視商品的功能；搭售對(duì)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)具有消極效果。搭售行為本身既可能產(chǎn)生積極效果，也可能造成消極效果。搭售的積極效果是在特定情況下可以提高產(chǎn)品質(zhì)量、降低成本、促進(jìn)銷(xiāo)售、確保安全，從而提高效率，其消極效果是可能使得在搭售產(chǎn)品上市場(chǎng)具有支配地位的經(jīng)營(yíng)者將其競(jìng)爭(zhēng)優(yōu)勢(shì)延伸到被搭售產(chǎn)品市場(chǎng)上。君合解讀:本案例明確了搭售可能對(duì)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)產(chǎn)生的具體的積極效果和消極效果。如果搭售未產(chǎn)生消極效果，或者消極效果非常有限、短暫但同時(shí)具有顯著的積極效果，則可能不構(gòu)成反壟斷法禁止的搭售行為。反之，則可能構(gòu)成違法。結(jié)語(yǔ)雖然本案例的被訴行為發(fā)生在互聯(lián)網(wǎng)領(lǐng)域，最高院的判決對(duì)反壟斷案件，尤其是濫用市場(chǎng)支配地位案件的若干普遍性問(wèn)題明確了考量因素和分析方法，包括并非在任何反壟斷案件中都必須明確而清楚地界定相關(guān)市場(chǎng)、判斷是否構(gòu)成濫用支配地位行為需要綜合評(píng)估對(duì)消費(fèi)者和競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的消極效果和可能具有的積極效果等。本案例對(duì)今后的反壟斷訴訟將具有重要的指導(dǎo)作用，并可能對(duì)反壟斷行政執(zhí)法產(chǎn)生重大影響。最高人民法院民事判決書(shū)(2013)民三終字第4號(hào)參見(jiàn)《國(guó)務(wù)院反壟斷委員會(huì)關(guān)于相關(guān)市場(chǎng)界定的指南》第10條第一款。KeyRulesoftheQihoov.TencentJudgmentofChina'sSupremeCourtChineseversionAuthorWei,YinglingPartner,StanleyWanAssociateJunHeLawOfficesPromulgationdate2014-10-29AuthorCompanyOnOctober16,2014,theSupremePeople'sCourt(hereafter"SPC")announcedthefinaljudgment[1]onthecaseofabuseofdominantmarketpositionfiledbyQihooagainstTencent,whichdismissedQihoo'sappealandsustainedthetrialcourtjudgment.Asthefirstantitrustcaseheardbyit,theSPCsetsforthelementsofanalysisandanalyticalapproachestoaseriesofissuessuchasmarketdefinitionanddeterminationofabuseofdominantmarketposition,amongothers.Thefinaljudgmentwillbeanimportantcasetoprovideguidanceforantitrustlitigation,especiallyforcasesofabuseofdominantmarketposition.Thisarticleaimstoidentifyandsummarizethekeyrulesandreasoningofthisfinaljudgmentandtoprovideourbriefcomments.KeyRuleI:Itisnotnecessarytoexplicitlyandclearlydefinearelevantmarketinanycaseofabuseofdominantmarketposition.Reasoning:Marketdefinitionishelpfultomakeclearthemarketscopeofcompetitivebehaviorsandthecompetitiveconstraintsfacedbybusinessoperators.Inacaseofabuseofdominant1CivilJudgment(2013)MinSanZhongZiNo.4oftheSupremePeople'sCourt.position,areasonablydefinedmarketisveryimportantforassessingthemarketpositionofabusinessoperator,analyzingthecompetitiveeffectsofitsconduct,anddeterminingthelegalityofitsconductandotherkeyissues.Therefore,marketdefinitionisusuallyanimportantanalyticalstepinantitrustcases.However,itwoulddependonspecificsituationsofacasewhetherarelevantmarketcouldbeclearlydefined,especiallyavailabilityofrelevantevidenceanddataandcomplexityofcompetition.Inacaseofabuseofdominantposition,marketdefinitionisnotthepurposebutatoolforevaluatingthemarketpowerofthebusinessoperatorbeingsuedandthecompetitiveeffectsofitsconduct.Evenifamarketisnotclearlydefined,themarketpositionofthebusinessoperatorbeingsuedandthepotentialcompetitiveeffectsofitsconductcouldalsobeevaluatedthroughthedirectevidenceofexclusionorrestrainttocompetition.JunHe'scomments:Accordingtothiscase,marketdefinitionisusuallystillnecessaryinantitrustlawsuitsinthefuture.However,ifcleardefinitionofarelevantmarketisreallynotfeasible(inveryrarecases)duetounavailabilityofrelevantevidenceordataorcomplexityofcompetition,therelatedissuesOctober23,2014couldbeevaluatedthroughthedirectevidenceofexclusionorrestrainttocompetition.KeyRuleII:Ifqualitativeanalysisissufficienttoclearlydefinearelevantmarket,complicatedquantitativeanalysisisnotnecessary.Reasoning:Marketdefinitioncouldbeconductedineitheraqualitativewayoraquantitativeway.Qualitativeanalysisisusuallythestartingpointtodefinearelevantmarket.Whenqualitativeanalysisissufficientforreachingadefiniteconclusion,itisnotnecessarytocarryoutcomplicatedquantitativeanalysis.JunHe'scomments:Qualitativeanalysisincludesanalysisofdemandsubstitutionandsupplysubstitutionbasedonfactorssuchasproductcharacteristics,useandprice.Quantitativeanalysisinvolvesapplyingthemethodsofmathematicaleconomicsoreconometrics.Methodisnotapurposebutatool.Formarketdefinition,qualitativeanalysisshouldbeadoptedfirst.Ifitissufficientfordefinition,quantitativeanalysisisnotnecessary.Onlyifarelevantmarketcouldnotbeclearlydefinedqualitativelyandquantitativeanalysisisfeasible(e.g.relevantdataisavailable),itisthennecessarytoconsiderquantitativeanalysis.KeyRuleIII:Thehypotheticalmonopolisttest("HMT")isgenerallyapplicabletodefinearelevantmarket.Reasoning:ThebasicapproachoftheHMTistotestthedegreeofsubstitutabilityamongthetargetproductandotherproductsthroughachangeofcertainvariableofthetargetproductorservice,assumingotherconditionsremainunchanged.Asananalyticalapproachtomarketdefinition,thetestcanbegenerallyapplied[2].Itcanbeusedtodefinebotharelevantproductmarketandarelevantgeographicmarket.UndertheHMTframework,themainconsiderationfordefiningarelevantgeographicmarketis:whetherthebusinessoperatorsinothergeographieswillconstituteeffectivecompetitiveconstrainttothehypotheticalmonopolistinthetargetgeographyincaseofanychangetosuchcompetitiveelementslikepriceandquality;Itcanbecarriedoutnotonlythroughqualitativeanalysis,butalsothroughquantitativeanalysisifconditionspermit;ItcanbecarriedouteitherthroughthemethodofSSNIPwhichinvolvesimposingasmallbutsignificantandnon-transitoryincreaseinprice,orthroughthemethodofSSNDQwhichinvolvesimposingasmallbutsignificantandnon-transitorydecreaseinquality.JunHe'scomments:ThiscasemakescleartheHMT'sgeneralapplicability,especiallystatingthatthetestcouldbecarriedoutqualitativelyandthroughthemethodofSSNDQthatinvolvesimposingasmallbutsignificantandnon-transitorydecreaseinquality,whichisquiteaninnovativeidea.KeyRuleIV:Marketshareisonlyaroughandpotentiallymisleadingindicatorforassessingexistenceofadominantmarketposition.Forsuchassessment,multiplefactorsshouldbeconsideredinacomprehensiveway,includingentry,abusinessoperator'smarketbehavior,andcompetitiveeffects,etc.Reasoning:Ingeneral,thehigheramarketshareisandthelongeritcontinues,themorelikelyadominantmarketpositionmayexist.Article19oftheAnti-MonopolyLaw("AML")statesthatifthemarketshareofabusinessoperatorreaches1/2intherelevantmarket,itmaybepresumedtohaveadominantposition.Butthispresumptionmaybeoverturned.Whereentryisrelativelyeasy,orthehighmarketshareisduetothatthebusinessoperatorismoreefficientorprovidesabetterproduct,ortheproductsoutsidethemarketconstituterelativelystrongcompetitiveconstrainttothebusinessoperator,adominantmarketpositioncannotbeinferreddirectlyfromahighmarketshare.AccordingtoArticle18oftheAML,multiplefactorsneedtobeevaluatedindeterminationofadominantmarketposition.JunHe'scomments:Article19oftheAMLstatesthatwhereabusinessoperatorwithapresumeddominantpositionduetoitsmarketsharecanotherwiseprovebyevidencethatithasnodominance,itshallnotbedeterminedashavingadominantposition.Thiscaseliststheevidencethatmayoverturnthepresumptionofadominantposition,includingthatentryisrelativelyeasy,thehighmarketshareisduetothatthebusinessoperatorismoreefficientorprovidesabetterproduct,ortheproductsoutsidethemarketconstituterelativelystrongcompetitiveconstrainttothebusinessoperator,etc.Meanwhile,accordingtothiscase,wherethereisaconsiderablemarketshare(e.g.,40%),evenifitfailstomeetastandardofpresumptioninArticle19oftheAML(e.g.,1/2),butentryisverydifficult,ortheproductsoutsidethemarketconstituteveryweakcompetitiveconstrainttothebusinessoperator,itmayalsobedeemedashavingadominantposition.KeyRuleV:Afterabusinessoperatorisdeterminedtohaveadominantmarketposition,acomprehensiveassessmentofitsadverseeffectsandpotentialfavorableeffectstoconsumersandcompetitionisnecessarytodeterminewhetheritconstitutesabuseofdominantposition.Reasoning:Evenifabusinessoperatorbeingsuedhasadominantmarketposition,acomprehensiveassessmentofitsconduct'sadverseeffectsandpotentialfavorableeffectstoconsumersandcompetitionisnecessarytodeterminewhetheritconstitutesabuseofadominantpositionandtofurtherdeterminetheconduct'slegitimacy.JunHe'scomments:Foracaseofabuseofdominantmarketpositioninthefuture,acourtwillnotdeclareabusinessoperatorwithadominantpositioninviolationoflawsimplyforcarryingouttherelevantconduct.Itisnecessarytoassesstheconduct'sadverseeffectsandpotentialfavorableeffectstoconsumersandcompetition,whichmeanscourtswilladopta"ruleofreason"approach.Iftherelevantbehaviordoesnotresultinanobviouseffectofexclusionorrestrictiontocompetition(forexample,thecourt'sfindingofTencent'sconductof"incompatibilityofproducts"inthiscase),orthefavorableeffectstoconsumersandcompetitionarefarbeyonditsadverseeffects,itmaynotconstituteabuseofdominantpositioninviolationoftheAML.Otherwise,itmaybedeemedinviolationoflaw.KeyRuleVI:Tyingcouldhavepro-competitiveeffectsoranticompetitiveeffects.Onlywhenithasanticompetitiveeffects,itmayconstituteatyingconductprohibitedbytheAML.Reasoning:ForaconducttobedeemedasinviolationoftheAML,thefollowingconditionsshallbemet:thetyingandtiedproductsareseparate,thesellerhasadominantpositioninthemarketofthetyingproduct,thesellerimposescertainrestrictionuponthepurchaserswhowouldhavetotakethetiedproduct,tyingisnotjustifiableanddoesnotcomplywithtradeorconsumptioncustomsordisregardstheproductfunctions,andtyinghasanticompetitiveeffects.Tyingitselfmayhavefavorableeffectsoradverseeffects.Thefavorableeffectsoftyingincludeimprovedproductquality,loweredcost,increasedsales,enhancedsecurityandimprovedefficiency,undercertaincircumstances.Itsadverseeffectisthattyingmightenableabusinessoperatortolever