亞開行-東盟與全球價值鏈：鎖定韌性和可持續(xù)性（英）

ASEANANDGLOBALVALUECHAINSLOCKINGINRESILIENCE

ANDSUSTAINABILITY

MARCH2023

ASIANDEVELOPMENTBANK

ASEANANDGLOBALVALUECHAINSLOCKINGINRESILIENCE

ANDSUSTAINABILITY

MARCH2023

ASIANDEVELOPMENTBANK

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DOI:/10.22617/SPR230100-2

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CoverdesignbyMikeCortes.

Contents

Tables,Figures,andBoxesvi

Forewordxi

AbouttheEditorsxiii

AbouttheAuthorsxiv

Acknowledgmentsxvii

Abbreviationsxviii

1

TowardFuture-ProofingGlobalValueChains1

by

MiaMikic

ASEANIsFacinganEvolving“NewNormal”2

ASEANRemainsaValueChainHubwithGreaterReliance5

onIntraregionalLinks

GlobalValueChainsCanCreateMoreandBetterJobsinASEAN15

InnovationandTechnologyCanIncreaseParticipation20

inASEANGlobalValueChains

DecarbonizationinASEAN’sGlobalValueChain-DrivenEconomies25

DeepeningRegionalIntegrationandCooperationunderan32

Evolving“NewNormal”

Future-ProofingASEANParticipationinGlobalValueChains37

References40

2

TheStateofPlayofASEANGlobalValueChains44

by

AdrianMendozaandJamesVillafuerte

Introduction45

GlobalValueChainsPriortotheCOVID-19Pandemic:48

GlobalTrendsandASEAN’sExperience

ASEANGlobalValueChainsaftertheGlobalFinancialCrisis62

TheDevelopmentImpactofGlobalValueChainsonASEAN66

TheImpactofCOVID-19onASEANGlobalValueChains68

TheFutureofASEANGlobalValueChains90

References96

ivContents

3

JobsandGlobalValueChainsinSoutheastAsia104

by

ChristianViegelahn,PhuHuynh,andKeeBeomKim

Introduction105

HowManyJobsinSoutheastAsiaAreLinked108

toGlobalValueChains?

HowIsBackwardandForwardParticipationLinkedtoJobs118

inSoutheastAsia?

ConclusionandWayForward128

Appendixes135

References143

4

Technology,GlobalValueChains,andJobs:Continuing148

ASEAN’sRoleinTransformedGlobalValueChains

by

GloriaPasadilla

Introduction149

TechnologyandValueChains150

SkillsBiasinNewTechnologies151

TransformationoftheAutomotiveManufacturing152

GlobalValueChain

ASEANintheNewAutomotiveValueChain161

ElectronicsandElectricalIndustry170

ASEANintheElectronicsandElectricalValueChain176

WhatCanASEANExpectinaTransformedElectronics180

andElectricalValueChain?

TheHumanCapitalandInnovationChallenge184

References189

5

DecarbonizationandGlobalValueChainsinASEAN193

by

SindhuBharathi,SumathiChakravarthy,

andBadriNarayananGopalakrishnan

Introduction194

LiteratureReview199

Methodology206

ResultsandAnalysis210

Conclusion249

PolicyImplications251

Appendix253

References255

Contentsv

6

ScenariosforaGlobal“NewNormal”andASEAN258

GlobalValueChains

by

PeterPetriandMichaelPlummer

DivergingProspects259

ResearchStrategy264

SimulationResults276

ImplicationsforGlobalValueChains292

Conclusions300

Appendixes302

References310

Tables,Figures,andBoxes

Tables

2.1ImpactofCOVID-19PoliciesonGlobalValueChainParticipation82

Ratein2021,MarginalEffects

A3.1JobsinGlobalValueChains—Sectors137

A3.2JobsinGlobalValueChains—Economies138

A3.3JobsinGlobalValueChains—AggregateSectors142

utomotiveIndustryTransformation:Partnership,Acquisition,

4.1A

159

JointVentureHighlights

4.2ExamplesofPartsofTraditionalCarsNotNeededin163

ElectricVehicles

4.3PolicySupportforElectricVehicleDevelopmentinASEAN167

4.4ASEANSemiconductorComponentExportsByCategory,2018177

4.5TypesofUpgradesinASEAN182

5.1ASEAN’sRenewablePowerCapacity210

5.2EmissionsandRenewablePowerCapacity—BruneiDarussalam211

5.3ChangeinMacroeconomicVariables—BruneiDarussalam211

5.4PercentChangeinDomesticandForeignValueAdded—214

BruneiDarussalam

5.5EmissionsandRenewablePowerCapacity—Cambodia215

5.6ChangeinMacroeconomicVariables—Cambodia216

5.7PercentChangeinDomesticandForeignValueAdded—Cambodia218

5.8EmissionsandRenewablePowerCapacity—Indonesia220

5.9ChangeinMacroeconomicVariables—Indonesia220

5.10PercentChangeinDomesticandForeignValueAdded—Indonesia223

5.11EmissionsandRenewablePowerCapacity—LaoPeople’s224

DemocraticRepublic

5.12ChangeinMacroeconomicVariables—LaoPeople’s225

DemocraticRepublic

5.13PercentChangeinDomesticandForeignValueAdded—228

LaoPeople’sDemocraticRepublic228

5.14EmissionsandRenewablePowerCapacity—Malaysia229

5.15ChangeinMacroeconomicVariables—Malaysia229

5.16PercentChangeinDomesticandForeignValueAdded—Malaysia232

5.17EmissionsandRenewablePowerCapacity—Philippines233

5.18ChangeinMacroeconomicVariables—Philippines233

5.19PercentChangeinDomesticandForeignValueAdded—Philippines236

5.20EmissionsandRenewablePowerCapacity—Singapore237

5.21ChangeinMacroeconomicVariables—Singapore237

5.22PercentChangeinDomesticandForeignValueAdded—Singapore240

5.23EmissionsandRenewablePowerCapacity—Thailand241

5.24ChangeinMacroeconomicVariables—Thailand241

Tables,Figures,andBoxesvii

5.25PercentChangeinDomesticandForeignValueAdded—Thailand244

5.26EmissionsandRenewablePowerCapacity—VietNam245

5.27ChangeinMacroeconomicVariables—VietNam246

5.28PercentChangeinDomesticandForeignValueAdded—VietNam248

6.1SpecificationofAlternativeBaselines270

6.2ASpecificationofGeopoliticalInterventions272

6.2BSpecificationofTradeCooperationScenarios275

6.3WorldGrowthunderBaselineScenarios278

6.4ElementsoftheNewNormalBaseline,2035279

6.5GeopoliticalAlternatives,Income2035281

6.6GeopoliticalAlternatives,Exports2035283

6.7CooperationAlternatives,Income2035286

6.8CooperationAlternatives,Exports2035288

6.9GeopoliticalInterventions:ChangesinGlobalValueChain295

Participation,2035

6.10EnhancedTradeCooperation:ChangesinGlobalValueChain297

Participation,2035

6.11GeopoliticalInterventions:ShareofValue-AddedExports,2035298

Figures

1.1RecentShocksandtheNewNormal:IncomeChangesin203534

1.2GeopoliticalInterventions:RealIncomeChanges,203535

1.3EnhancingTradeCooperation,ChangeinRealIncomein203536

2.1HistoricalTrendsinInformationandCommunicationTechnology,50

TransportCosts,TariffRates,andOverallTradeCosts

2.2TrendsinGlobalValueChainParticipationRate,1990–201552

2.3IntraregionalTradeinASEAN,1990–201554

2.4VolumeofGlobalValueChainTradeSurgedinthe2000s55

2.5GlobalValueChainParticipationVariesGreatlyacrossASEAN56

2.6GlobalValueChainTradeinASEANisDrivenMostlyby57

BackwardParticipation

2.7OriginsofForeignValueAddedwithinASEANExports59

2.8ShareinASEANGlobalValueChainTradebyIndustry59

2.9ASEANGlobalValueChainTradeinManufacturingandServices61

EvolveinTandem,1990–2015

2.10SectoralGlobalValueChainTradeVariesSignificantlyacross62

ASEAN

2.11GrowthinGlobalGrossDomesticProductandTradeVolume,63

1980–2019

2.12BackwardGlobalValueChainParticipationRatesinthePeople’s65

RepublicofChina,2000–2017

2.13GlobalEconomicPolicyUncertaintyIndexandTradePolicy65

UncertaintyIndex,January2000–December2019

viiiTables,Figures,andBoxes

2.14GlobalValueChainParticipationinASEANhasaNonlinear67

RelationshipwithperCapitaGDP,1990–2015

2.15AverageSpilloverstoASEANofa1%LocalOutputShockto70

GlobalValueChainPartners

2.16GlobalSupplyDisruptionIndex,January2000–December202171

2.17GrowthofBackwardandForwardGlobalValueChainTrade72

in2020and2021,byASEANCountry–SectorPairs

2.18ASEANGlobalValueChainTradeSlump(2020)and73

Recovery(2021)

2.19BreakdownoftheGrowthofASEANGlobalValueChainTrade75

duringMajorCrises

2.20RecoveryofASEANGlobalValueChainTradefromCOVID-1975

Shocks

2.21ContributiontoGrowthofASEANGlobalValueChainTrade,76

bySector

2.22ContributiontoGrowthofASEANGlobalValueChainTrade,77

byPartner

2.23COVID-19StringencyIndexacrossASEAN,January2020–79

December2021

2.24DiscretionaryFiscalResponsetotheCOVID-19Crisisin80

SelectedASEANEconomies

2.25FullyVaccinatedIndividualsasofDecember202181

2.26AverageMarginalEffectsofStringencyandVaccinationRate83

onGlobalValueChainParticipationRate

3.1NumberandShareofJobsinGlobalValueChains,SoutheastAsia111

3.2ShareofJobsAssociatedwithGlobalValueChainsbyEconomy,112

SoutheastAsia

3.3ShareofJobsAssociatedwithGlobalValueChainsbySector,113

SoutheastAsia

3.4NumberandShareofJobsAssociatedwithIntraregionalValue114

Chains,SoutheastAsia

3.5ShareofWomenEmployedinGlobalValueChains,SoutheastAsia114

3.6ShareofYouthWorkersEmployedinGlobalValueChainsand116

theTotalEconomy,SoutheastAsia

3.7ShareofEmployeesEmployedinGlobalValueChainsandin117

theTotalEconomy,SoutheastAsia

3.8ShareofWorkersinHigh-SkillOccupationsEmployedinGlobal117

ValueChainsandintheTotalEconomy,SoutheastAsia

3.9WorkingPovertyRateinSoutheastAsiaandNon-SoutheastAsia122

Economies,2000–2021

3.10EstimatedChangeinWorkingPovertyAssociatedwithan123

IncreaseofOneStandardDeviationinBackwardandForward

GlobalValueChainParticipationinSoutheastAsiabyAgeandGender

Tables,Figures,andBoxesix

3.11EstimatedChangeinLaborProductivityAssociatedwith124

anIncreaseofOneStandardDeviationinBackwardandForward

GlobalValueChainParticipationinSoutheastAsia

3.12EstimatedChangeinEmploymentSharesAssociatedwith125

anIncreaseofOneStandardDeviationinGlobalValueChain

ParticipationinSoutheastAsiabyEconomicSector

3.13NumberofRegionalTradeAgreementsInvolvingAtLeastOne133

SoutheastAsianCountry

4.1InternetofThingsEcosystem151

4.2NumberofPatentAssigneesRelatedtoElectricVehicles,2011–2022158

4.3TopAssigneesofPatentsRelatedtoAutonomousVehicles158

4.4DestinationofASEANPassengerCarExports161

4.5ASEAN’sShareinGlobalCarExports162

4.6ASEAN’sShareinWorldExportsofSubassemblies162

4.7ASEAN’sShareinPartsandComponentExports163

4.8SunriseandSunsetIndustrySegmentsofPartsandComponent164

Industry

4.9ConsumerSurveyofAutoEnginePreference165

4.10ASEANExportsofBodySystemsandDriveTrainSubassemblies168

4.11ASEANExportsinAutomotivePartsandComponents169

4.12ShareofElectricVehiclesinASEANAutoExports170

4.13ElectronicsandElectricalGlobalValueChain171

4.14SemiconductorValueChain172

4.15ForeignValueAddedinASEANElectronicsandElectronicsExports

4.16ASEANElectronicComponentsExportstothePeople’sRepublic178

ofChinaandtheRestoftheWorld,2002–2021

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