企業(yè)稅收籌劃的有效性：基于對(duì)報(bào)酬的激勵(lì)作用

PAGE我國(guó)高新技術(shù)企業(yè)納稅籌劃研究翻譯題目企業(yè)稅收籌劃的有效性：基于對(duì)報(bào)酬的激勵(lì)作用PAGE7企業(yè)稅收籌劃的有效性：基于對(duì)報(bào)酬的激勵(lì)作用1、引言有效的稅收籌劃，根據(jù)斯科爾斯等人的定義（2002），稅收籌劃，即最大限度地提高公司的預(yù)期稅后凈現(xiàn)金流量，要求管理者要考慮他們的決定所造成的稅后結(jié)果。在本文中，研究是否以稅后會(huì)計(jì)為基礎(chǔ)的績(jī)效措施，將導(dǎo)致較低的實(shí)際出口退稅稅率。實(shí)際的經(jīng)驗(yàn)替代了出口退稅的稅務(wù)規(guī)劃效力，一個(gè)基礎(chǔ)的收入結(jié)果被合適的計(jì)量，所得稅費(fèi)用總額作為稅前收入的一定比例，通常測(cè)量減稅策略將導(dǎo)致最高的稅后收入的有效性。較低的出口退稅，然而，僅能夠代理節(jié)稅以及通常并不意味稅后收入或者是現(xiàn)金流已經(jīng)達(dá)到最大值。盡管有這一局限性，出口退稅還是被用來衡量稅收功能性支出的有效性（米爾斯，1998）和企業(yè)各部門稅務(wù)績(jī)效（道格拉斯，1996）。另外，降低出口退稅是經(jīng)常被作為一種增加收入（齊格勒，1997）和使股價(jià)上升的手段（e.g.Mintz1999；Swenson1999）。會(huì)計(jì)研究處理了以會(huì)計(jì)績(jī)效為基礎(chǔ)的薪酬和經(jīng)理行為之間的關(guān)系（e.g.Larcker1983;Healy1985;Wallace1997），本文是第一個(gè)從事這方面研究的文章：是否以稅后會(huì)計(jì)為基礎(chǔ)的績(jī)效管理措施鼓勵(lì)經(jīng)理人員采取行動(dòng)來降低他們公司的出口退稅，并且首席執(zhí)行官和事業(yè)部經(jīng)理也要求做。在此之前的稅后業(yè)績(jī)計(jì)量研究只集中于首席執(zhí)行官們的報(bào)酬的決定因素為預(yù)先的稅后收益（e.g.Newman1989；CarnesandGuffey2000；Atwoodetal.1988;dhaliwaletal.2000），沒有提供任何證據(jù)說明降低一個(gè)公司的稅務(wù)負(fù)擔(dān)與稅后報(bào)酬的關(guān)系。這項(xiàng)調(diào)查擴(kuò)展到了事業(yè)部層次，這些部門的報(bào)酬激勵(lì)動(dòng)機(jī)與減少稅收的目的之間存在明顯的沖突（e.g.McLemore1997）以及觀察的經(jīng)驗(yàn)是，大多數(shù)企業(yè)沒有這么做。目前的研究提供的證據(jù)關(guān)于明確激勵(lì)首席執(zhí)行官和事業(yè)部管理人員納入其經(jīng)營(yíng)和投資決策的稅務(wù)結(jié)果的增量效益。以某個(gè)側(cè)面來研究出口退稅與企業(yè)管理層薪酬的共同課題，衡量的結(jié)果是所有樣本公司可優(yōu)化關(guān)于被調(diào)查的選擇（lttnerandLarcker2001）。如果不解決公司選擇的內(nèi)生性，很難提供一致的證據(jù)關(guān)于這選擇導(dǎo)致改善的結(jié)果。為了解決這個(gè)問題，首席執(zhí)行官和事業(yè)部經(jīng)理關(guān)于稅后績(jī)效與出口退稅的聯(lián)系依舊采用兩步方式估計(jì)，可以幫助對(duì)潛在的內(nèi)生性與相關(guān)偏見這兩個(gè)變量做出正確的選擇。作為實(shí)施這一方法的第一步，theAntleandDemski（1988）可控性原則是用來模擬一個(gè)公司的決定，通過對(duì)首席執(zhí)行官和事業(yè)作者：約翰D·作者：約翰D·菲利普斯康涅狄格大學(xué)出處：TheAccountingReview,July20032、假說發(fā)展Newman（1989），CaresandGuffey（2000），andAtwoodetal.（1998）調(diào)查作為稅后盈利企業(yè)對(duì)首席執(zhí)行官獎(jiǎng)金計(jì)劃包含變量的選擇。這些研究假設(shè)，企業(yè)有更大的稅收籌劃的機(jī)會(huì)，與AntleandDemski（1988）的可控性原則一致，更有可能使用稅后業(yè)績(jī)的措施。利用稅收籌劃的機(jī)會(huì)代理，這些研究都發(fā)現(xiàn)了跨國(guó)公司的地位，經(jīng)營(yíng)分部的數(shù)量，企業(yè)規(guī)模，首席執(zhí)行官的報(bào)酬和資本密集呈正相關(guān)，Atwoodetal。（1988）還提出證據(jù)，充分利用這一負(fù)相關(guān)的選擇。Dhaliwaletal（2000）還關(guān)注了“企業(yè)的稅收籌劃?rùn)C(jī)會(huì)和決定，是否與首席執(zhí)行官稅后收益的獎(jiǎng)金計(jì)劃之間的關(guān)系”，但有關(guān)措施只實(shí)現(xiàn)了稅收籌劃的機(jī)會(huì)使稅收抵免和企業(yè)永遠(yuǎn)不變的繳稅財(cái)產(chǎn)清單和稅率的絕對(duì)值。但不包括那些臨時(shí)繳稅財(cái)產(chǎn)清單和稅率差異造成的加速折舊，因?yàn)檫@些差異并不影響一個(gè)公司的稅后會(huì)計(jì)盈余，用于測(cè)量稅后會(huì)計(jì)績(jī)效為基礎(chǔ)的獎(jiǎng)金計(jì)劃。同樣地，在目前的研究中使用的出口退稅是利用計(jì)算器計(jì)算所得稅費(fèi)用總額，從而派出了臨時(shí)繳稅財(cái)產(chǎn)清單和稅率差異的影響。與以前的文獻(xiàn)相一致，Dhaliwaletal.(2000)發(fā)現(xiàn)有更大的稅收抵免和繳稅財(cái)產(chǎn)清單和稅率差異絕對(duì)值使公司更容易給首席執(zhí)行官搞的稅后報(bào)酬。由于永久性差異可以增加或減少應(yīng)稅收入的相對(duì)預(yù)期收入，他們沒有提供首席執(zhí)行官的稅后報(bào)酬和降低出口退稅之間的直接證據(jù)。目前研究首席執(zhí)行官的稅后報(bào)酬和出口退稅的關(guān)系。第一個(gè)假設(shè)，闡明的另一個(gè)形式是：H1：利用企業(yè)稅后業(yè)績(jī)?yōu)榛A(chǔ)來衡量首席執(zhí)行官的獎(jiǎng)金計(jì)劃將導(dǎo)致出口退稅的降低。本文還擴(kuò)展了稅前稅后報(bào)酬的分析，以作為激勵(lì)事業(yè)部經(jīng)理的薪酬計(jì)劃。對(duì)于事業(yè)部經(jīng)理參與協(xié)調(diào)稅務(wù)規(guī)劃工作的任務(wù)時(shí)，專家要求從非專業(yè)人員投入和合作保持一慣性（MilgromandRoberts1992）。該公司的稅務(wù)專業(yè)人士不僅要幫助該公司的事業(yè)部經(jīng)理在稅務(wù)規(guī)劃?rùn)C(jī)會(huì)的選擇，而且在他們制定和執(zhí)行戰(zhàn)略，以利用這些機(jī)會(huì)合作。在調(diào)低出口退稅，增加稅后會(huì)計(jì)收益方面，怎么使事業(yè)部精力更加的努力，增加稅收抵免，并導(dǎo)致應(yīng)納稅所得額永久性差異的降低？高露潔公司首席財(cái)務(wù)官說“高露潔人提供學(xué)習(xí)的機(jī)會(huì)經(jīng)常留意海外從而導(dǎo)致更高的外國(guó)稅收抵免時(shí)間匯款的方式，最大限度地提高研究和發(fā)展的稅收抵免”（Mintz1999.2）事業(yè)部經(jīng)理也可以幫助稅務(wù)專業(yè)人士制定專業(yè)價(jià)格（ErnstandYoung1999），這有助于降低出口退稅，通過國(guó)家報(bào)告反映的事業(yè)部經(jīng)理參與減少（增加）收入的其他例子，有助于降低出口退稅。包括：（1）在雇傭職工前看其工資是否具有抵免稅收的資格；（2）向該公司的稅務(wù)專業(yè)人士咨詢公司設(shè)立的地點(diǎn)，因?yàn)楣舅幍牟煌恢檬褂貌煌亩惵剩唬?）協(xié)助稅務(wù)專業(yè)人士收集申報(bào)納稅所需的數(shù)據(jù)文件。上述討論表明，事業(yè)部經(jīng)理的參與對(duì)降低出口退稅是有幫助的。在會(huì)議上傳達(dá)稅收籌劃效果對(duì)首席執(zhí)行官稅后獎(jiǎng)金的重要性，從而對(duì)他們產(chǎn)生足夠的激勵(lì)，以使事業(yè)部經(jīng)理通過加倍努力來降低企業(yè)的出口退稅。如果是這樣的話，那么明確的獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)工資就沒有必要去激勵(lì)他們付出更多的努力了。Wilson（1995.12），因此，舉一個(gè)有公司主管會(huì)談?dòng)涗?，以支持他的結(jié)論，激勵(lì)事業(yè)部經(jīng)理稅后措施應(yīng)在稅務(wù)規(guī)劃工作中有所涉及：我國(guó)建立了并不斷完善部門的稅后激勵(lì)措施。這迫使經(jīng)營(yíng)單位站在對(duì)節(jié)稅有利的立場(chǎng)上考慮問題。類似地，Mintz（1999.2）列舉了高露潔公司財(cái)務(wù)總監(jiān)關(guān)于稅后業(yè)績(jī)計(jì)量的說法：是關(guān)于稅前收入的管理激勵(lì)，公司在考慮將支付給員工多少獎(jiǎng)金時(shí)得多注意稅收優(yōu)惠的影響……但是，由于激勵(lì)的報(bào)酬取決于稅后收益回報(bào)……當(dāng)公司稅收降低會(huì)使經(jīng)理得到更多的報(bào)酬。原文：I.INTRODUCTIONEffectivetaxplanning,definedbyScholesetal.(2002)astaxplanningthatmaximizesthefirm'sexpecteddiscountedafter-taxcashflows,requiresmanagerstoconsidertheirdecisions'after-taxconsequences.Inthispaper,Iinvestigatewhetherafter-taxaccounting-basedperformancemeasuresleadtolowereffectivetaxrates(ETRs),myoutcomemeasurecalculatedastheratiooftotalincometaxexpensetopre-taxincome,generallymeasurestheeffectivenessoftaxreductionstrategiesthatleadtohigherafter-taxincome.AlowerETR,however,canonlyproxyfortaxsavingsanddoesnotalwaysimplythatafter-taxincomeand/orcashflowshavebeenmaximized.2Despitethislimitation,theETRhasbeenusedtomeasuretheeffectivenessofspendingonthetaxfunction(Millsetal.1998)andcorporatetaxdepartmentperformance(Douglasetal.1996).Also,loweringtheETRisfrequentlycitedasawaytoincreaseearnings(e.g.,Ziegler1997)andincreaseshareprice(e.g.,Mintz1999;Swenson1999).Accountingresearchhasaddressedtherelationbetweenaccounting-basedcompensationandmanagers'actions(e.g.Larcker1983;Healy1985;Wallace1997).Thispaperisthefirsttoaddresswhetherafter-taxaccounting-basedperformancemeasuresmotivateman-agerstotakeactionsthathelplowertheirfirms'ETRsanddoessoatboththechiefexecutiveofficer(CEO)andbusiness-unit(BU)managerlevels.Priorafter-taxperformancemeasureresearchhasfocusedonlyonthedeterminantsofcompensatingCEOsusingpre-versusafter-taxearnings(e.g.,Newman1989;CarnesandGuffey2000;Atwoodetal.1998;Dhaliwaletal.2000)andprovidesnoevidenceconcerningafter-taxcompensation'seffectivenessinloweringafirm'staxliability.ExtendingthisinvestigationtotheBUlevelismotivatedoutoftheapparentconflictbetweenargumentsthattaxesshouldbeallocatedtoBUsforincentivecompensationpurposes(e.g.,McLemore1997)withempiricalobservationsthatamajorityoffirmsdonotdoso(e.g.,Douglasetal.1996).4ThecurrentinvestigationprovidesevidenceconcerningtheincrementaleffectivenessofexplicitlymotivatingCEOsandBUmanagerstoincorporatetaxconsequencesintotheiroperatingandinvestmentdecisions.Acommonissueincross-sectionalstudiesthatattempttolinkaparticularmanagementaccountingchoicetoanoutcomemeasureisthatallsamplefirmsmaybeoptimizingwithrespecttothechoicebeinginvestigated(IttnerandLarcker2001).Withoutaddressingtheendogeneityofafirm'schoice,itisdifficulttoprovideevidenceconsistentwiththischoiceleadingtoanimprovedoutcome.Toaddressthisissue,therelationbetweenETRsandCEOandBU-managerafter-taxperformancemeasuresisestimatedusingatwo-stepapproachthathelpscorrectforthepotentialendogeneitybiasassociatedwiththesetwochoicevariables.Asafirststepinimplementingthisapproach,theAntleandDemski(1988)controllabilityprincipleisusedtomodelafirm'sdecisionstoadoptafter-taxCEOandBU-managerperformancemeasures.Toincludeaparticularmeasureinamanager'scompensationcontract,thisprinciplerequiresthattheexpectedbenefitsfromholdingamanagerresponsibleforameasuremustbegreaterthantheadditionalwagethatmustbepaidtocompensatethemanagerfortheresultingadditionalriskandeffort.Accordingly,anafter-taxperformancemeasureshouldbeusedasacontractingvariableinamanager'sincentivecompensationcontractonlyifthemanager'sinvolvementintax-planningeffortsleadstoadifferencebetweenpre-taxandafter-taxaccountingresults,whichisgenerallyreflectedintheETR.Consistentwithpriorresearch,thepre-versusafter-taxCEOandBU-managerselectionmodelsincludevariablesthatcontrolforafirm'stax-planningopportunitiesbecausethepresenceofsuchopportunitiesreflecttheextenttowhichamanager'sactionscanbeexpectedtolowertheETR.II.HYPOTHESISDEVELOPMENTNewman(1989),CaresandGuffey(2000),andAtwoodetal.(1998)investigatefirms'choicesofafter-taxearningsasthecontractingvariableinCEObonusplans.Thesestudieshypothesizethatfirmswithgreatertax-planningopportunities,consistentwiththeAntleandDemski(1988)controllabilityprinciple,aremorelikelytouseafter-taxperformancemeasures.Usingproxiesfortax-planningopportunities,thesestudiescollectivelyfindthatmultinationalstatus,numberofoperatingsegments,firmsize,andcapitalintensityarepositivelyassociatedwithafter-taxCEOcompensation.Atwoodetal.(1998)alsopresentsevidencethatleverageisnegativelyassociatedwiththischoice.Dhaliwaletal.(2000)alsofocusesontherelationbetweenafirm'stax-planningop-portunitiesandthedecisionwhethertouseafter-taxearningsinCEObonusplans,butmeasuresplanningopportunitiesusingonlyrealizedtaxcreditsandabsolutevaluesoffirms'permanentbook-taxdifferences.Theyexcludetemporarybook-taxdifferencessuchasthoseresultingfromacceleratedtaxdepreciationbecausethesedifferencesdonotimpactafirm'safter-taxaccountingearnings,theperformancemeasureusedinafter-taxaccounting-basedbonusplans.Similarly,theETRusedinthecurrentstudyiscomputedusingtotaltaxexpenseinthenumerator,therebyexcludingtheeffectsoftemporarybook-taxdifferences.Consistentwithpriorliterature,Dhaliwaletal.(2000)findthatfirmswithgreatertaxcreditsandabsolutevaluesofpermanentbook-taxdifferencesaremorelikelytocompensatetheirCEOsonanafter-taxbasis.Becausepermanentdifferencescaneitherincreaseordecreasetaxableincomerelativetobookincome,theyprovidenodirectevidenceofanassociationbetweenafter-taxCEOcompensationandlowerETRs.Thecurrentstudyin-vestigatesthisrelationbetweenafter-taxCEOcompensationandETRs.Thefirsthypothesis,statedinalternativeform,is:H1:Usingafter-taxperformancemeasuresinCEOaccounting-basedbonusplansleadstolowerETRs.Thispaperalsoextendsthepre-versusafter-taxcompensationanalysistoBU-managerincentivecompensationplans.TheneedforBU-managerinvolvementintax-planningef-fortsisconsistentwiththecoordinationtaskthatariseswhenspecialistsrequireinputandcooperationfromnonspecialists(MilgromandRoberts1992).Thefirm'staxprofessionalsnotonlyneedhelpfromthefirm'sBUmanagersintheidentificationoftax-planningop-portunities,butalsotheircooperationindevelopingandexecutingstrategiestocapitalizeonsuchopportunities.InthecontextofloweringtheETRandincreasingafter-taxaccountingincome,howdoBUmanagersparticipateineffortsthatincreasetaxcreditsandleadtopermanentdif-ferencesthatlowertaxableincome?Colgate-Palmolive'sCFOstatesthat"Colgateman-agersroutinelywatchforwaystotimeremittancesfromoverseas[whichleadstohigherforeigntaxcredits],maximizeresearchanddevelopmenttaxcredits"(Mintz1999,2.)BUmanagerscanalsohelptaxprofessionalsformulatetransferprices(Ernst&Young1999),whichhelpslowertheETRbydecreasing(increasing)incomereportedincountrieswithtaxratesinexcessof(lowerthan)theU.S.taxrate.5OtherexamplesofBU-managerinvolvementthathelpslowertheETRinclude(1)determiningwhetherapotentialemployeequalifiesforapayroll-basedtaxcreditbeforethehiringdecisionismade,(2)consultingwiththefirm'staxprofessionalpriortodomesticlocationdecisionstoincorporatevaryingstateandlocaltaxratesasafactorinsuchdecisions,and(3)helpingtaxprofessionalsgatherdatanecessarytodocumenttaxreturnreportingpositions.TheabovediscussionsuggeststhatBU-managerinvolvementishelpfulinloweringtheETR.Itispossiblethatthepreversusafter-taxnatureoftheCEO'saccounting-basedbonusplansignalstaxplanning'simportanceandthusprovidesimplicitincentivessufficienttomotiv