外文翻譯-企業(yè)管制及內(nèi)部監(jiān)控

PAGE民營(yíng)企業(yè)內(nèi)部審計(jì)問(wèn)題及原因分析翻譯（1）題目企業(yè)管制及內(nèi)部監(jiān)控PAGE1作者：作者：MarianneOjo國(guó)際流動(dòng)性風(fēng)險(xiǎn)框架計(jì)量，標(biāo)準(zhǔn)和監(jiān)測(cè)：企業(yè)管治及內(nèi)部監(jiān)控流動(dòng)性風(fēng)險(xiǎn)2008年2月，巴塞爾銀行監(jiān)管委員會(huì)發(fā)表題為“流動(dòng)性風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理及督導(dǎo)一紙?zhí)魬?zhàn)”的一份文件，該文件突出強(qiáng)調(diào)了這一事實(shí)：很多銀行已經(jīng)忽略的流動(dòng)資金風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理的基本原則的幾個(gè)應(yīng)用程序期間的豐富的流動(dòng)性。其2000年的一個(gè)題為“實(shí)踐為銀行機(jī)構(gòu)流動(dòng)性管理中的廣泛的審查”也進(jìn)行了巴塞爾委員會(huì)作為一種解決的事宜和問(wèn)題引起金融市場(chǎng)和金融危機(jī)的教訓(xùn)。為了對(duì)銀行監(jiān)管，對(duì)聲音流動(dòng)性風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理和2008年9月監(jiān)督原則，巴塞爾委員會(huì)鞏固這應(yīng)導(dǎo)致改進(jìn)管理和個(gè)別銀行流動(dòng)資金風(fēng)險(xiǎn)監(jiān)管。監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)將被要求開(kāi)發(fā)工具和政策報(bào)告在總體水平的流動(dòng)資金親周期性的行為。對(duì)于聲音流動(dòng)性風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理和監(jiān)督2008年9月的原則，旨在提供如“董事會(huì)和高級(jí)管理監(jiān)督的主要內(nèi)容相一致監(jiān)督的期望”，政策和風(fēng)險(xiǎn)承受能力的建設(shè)，流動(dòng)性風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理工具的使用，如綜合現(xiàn)金流量預(yù)測(cè)，限制和流動(dòng)性壓力測(cè)試方案以及一個(gè)高品質(zhì)的流動(dòng)資產(chǎn)足夠的緩沖，維修隊(duì)伍，以解決流動(dòng)資金的需求。這三個(gè)方面的親周期性，如影響評(píng)價(jià)文件強(qiáng)調(diào)及修訂資本要求指令，有可能引發(fā)連鎖反應(yīng)。與薪酬計(jì)劃開(kāi)始，這些激勵(lì)措施對(duì)管理的影響，可能產(chǎn)生正面或負(fù)面影響銀行法規(guī)，如巴塞爾協(xié)議或CRD。這些規(guī)定可以再減輕或加劇親周期性的影響。根據(jù)資本充足規(guī)則的效力，這種規(guī)則的積極影響將減少銀行傾向于削減在經(jīng)濟(jì)“蕭條”的優(yōu)惠，保留流動(dòng)資金貸款將增加，因此降低了不比配成熟發(fā)生的可能性。之間的流動(dòng)性和系統(tǒng)性風(fēng)險(xiǎn)鏈接，在歐洲央行的金融穩(wěn)定性回顧說(shuō)明，是由于具體的知識(shí)對(duì)銀行借款人與流動(dòng)性共同池的破壞。這之間的流動(dòng)性風(fēng)險(xiǎn)聯(lián)系的重要性并在銀行業(yè)系統(tǒng)性風(fēng)險(xiǎn)突出的原因是銀行不愿意保留流動(dòng)性的后果。鑒于持有流動(dòng)資金的費(fèi)用，而這相應(yīng)的作為由流動(dòng)性和資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表期限錯(cuò)配短缺，突出反映了央行承擔(dān)了銀行的資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表資金的重要作用。之間的流動(dòng)性和系統(tǒng)性風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的聯(lián)系也加劇了巴塞爾委員會(huì)根據(jù)第77聲原則流動(dòng)性風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理和監(jiān)督2008年9月。原則8規(guī)定：“銀行應(yīng)該積極管理其即日流動(dòng)資金狀況和風(fēng)險(xiǎn)以滿(mǎn)足在正常條件，并強(qiáng)調(diào)從而促進(jìn)了支付結(jié)算系統(tǒng)的順利運(yùn)轉(zhuǎn)，并及時(shí)支付基礎(chǔ)上解決問(wèn)題的義務(wù)。”第77段詳細(xì)闡述了這一突出的原因?！凹慈樟鲃?dòng)資金管理”構(gòu)成了對(duì)銀行的更廣泛的流動(dòng)性管理戰(zhàn)略的重要組成部分。正是在向國(guó)家去，一間銀行未能管理即日流動(dòng)資金有效地可能導(dǎo)致其無(wú)法滿(mǎn)足付款義務(wù)到期，因此產(chǎn)生的后果不僅對(duì)自己的流動(dòng)資金狀況而且其他各方。它說(shuō)明了如何這可能發(fā)生在兩個(gè)方面即：1．事實(shí)上，這個(gè)計(jì)數(shù)器當(dāng)事人可以看作是軟弱可欺的金融。未能解決時(shí)的預(yù)期支出，從而可能導(dǎo)致不僅向銀行付款被拖延或隱瞞，但在流動(dòng)性壓力進(jìn)一步加劇。

2.這也可能給對(duì)手意外的資金不足，削弱對(duì)手的能力，以滿(mǎn)足付款義務(wù)，并破壞了支付和結(jié)算系統(tǒng)的順利運(yùn)作。鑒于該系統(tǒng)之間的相互依存，銀行未能滿(mǎn)足某些關(guān)鍵的支出可能會(huì)導(dǎo)致流動(dòng)性差排存在的多個(gè)系統(tǒng)級(jí)聯(lián)迅速和機(jī)構(gòu)。如果風(fēng)險(xiǎn)控制是不堪重負(fù)，這些混亂可能會(huì)改變?cè)S多銀行盤(pán)中或包括中央的要求，銀行信貸資金需要過(guò)夜，并可能影響貨幣市場(chǎng)的條件。其他較重要的支付遲延還可能引起其他機(jī)構(gòu)推遲其付款，導(dǎo)致許多銀行面臨增加他們的隔夜資金的需求可能增加不確定性，任何業(yè)務(wù)中斷的影響。流動(dòng)性被認(rèn)為是“高度順周期生長(zhǎng)在良好的時(shí)間和干燥應(yīng)力時(shí)代的步伐”。建立到目前的危機(jī)，銀行和其他金融機(jī)構(gòu)的激勵(lì)，以盡量減少持有流動(dòng)資金的費(fèi)用。鑒于流動(dòng)性也可以親周期性的，因?yàn)樗淖饔迷谧罱奈C(jī)，也許是四個(gè)層面，親周期性應(yīng)該已經(jīng)在影響評(píng)價(jià)文件提出修訂資本要求指令，包括作為第四個(gè)標(biāo)題流動(dòng)資金。在越來(lái)越多的形式化的銀行監(jiān)管框架的重要性也歸因于差距。在自由裁量的銀行監(jiān)管制度中存在的基礎(chǔ)，因?yàn)槭窃诎粤馄煜碌谋罎⒅箫@現(xiàn)出來(lái)。最近的危機(jī)也突出了正式的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)評(píng)估模型。由雷曼兄弟消亡的地方審計(jì)的資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表的故障檢測(cè)違規(guī)行為（由于創(chuàng)造性的會(huì)計(jì)手法展示）揭發(fā)。正式的框架,用于測(cè)量的資本充足率在歐洲共同體水平,充分體現(xiàn)了國(guó)際趨同資本測(cè)量和資本的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)修訂,即巴塞爾協(xié)議框架是要表?yè)P(yáng)。不僅是因?yàn)樾枰粋€(gè)統(tǒng)一的框架下的報(bào)告和對(duì)比分析,對(duì)銀行資本需求的位置調(diào)節(jié)機(jī)構(gòu)為透明和公平的監(jiān)管標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的應(yīng)用,但也因?yàn)閲?guó)際趨同的過(guò)程。那些由每個(gè)國(guó)家管理者要求諧調(diào)的規(guī)則的透明和一致的實(shí)施。作為交易的一部分措施,旨在鞏固和提升在國(guó)際流動(dòng)性風(fēng)險(xiǎn)監(jiān)管一致性,并根據(jù)“準(zhǔn)確和無(wú)效管理的流動(dòng)性風(fēng)險(xiǎn)”，突出強(qiáng)調(diào)在最近金融危機(jī),巴塞爾委員會(huì)已經(jīng)開(kāi)發(fā)出一種最起碼的監(jiān)測(cè)工具,用于監(jiān)測(cè)的流動(dòng)性風(fēng)險(xiǎn)暴露的跨國(guó)界機(jī)構(gòu)的交流。流動(dòng)資金的網(wǎng)絡(luò)覆蓋率和穩(wěn)定的資金比是兩個(gè)監(jiān)管流動(dòng)性風(fēng)險(xiǎn)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，服務(wù)于實(shí)現(xiàn)促進(jìn)短期流動(dòng)性的機(jī)構(gòu)的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)狀況彈性的各項(xiàng)目標(biāo)（確保他們有足夠的高品質(zhì)液體生存的資源極度緊張時(shí)約一個(gè)月的最后期限）和促進(jìn)了長(zhǎng)期的時(shí)間彈性通過(guò)為銀行創(chuàng)造額外獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)（以基金的資金來(lái)源更加穩(wěn)定的來(lái)源上進(jìn)行的活動(dòng)）。除了上述標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，巴塞爾委員會(huì)還建議，實(shí)施監(jiān)督監(jiān)測(cè)指定一個(gè)一致的基礎(chǔ)工具。這種監(jiān)測(cè)工具，隨著標(biāo)準(zhǔn)目的是提供資料，應(yīng)幫助他們的流動(dòng)性風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的評(píng)估主管歸因于特定的銀行。這些監(jiān)測(cè)工具包括：合約到期不匹配資金，可抵押的資產(chǎn)和市場(chǎng)集中度相關(guān)的監(jiān)測(cè)工具。發(fā)展以及需要更大的流動(dòng)性風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的焦點(diǎn)，也有更大的披露要求上的依賴(lài)的必要性。這將有助于通過(guò)有效的監(jiān)管，使確定的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的過(guò)程中有效地傳達(dá)全國(guó)各級(jí)管理層。增強(qiáng)透明度，不僅有可能以“健全的發(fā)揮在結(jié)構(gòu)融資機(jī)制”的了解，但也有利于風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的識(shí)別，并確保風(fēng)險(xiǎn)得到很好的控制。高風(fēng)險(xiǎn)貸款，這是“重新包裝，出售給機(jī)構(gòu)投資者”其中有些人沒(méi)有充分理解該交易的影響，他們從事（或即將從事），以及與這些交易相關(guān)的固有風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，被認(rèn)為是在2007年9月金融危機(jī)的成因。監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)將能夠獲得更多的機(jī)會(huì)獲得重要信息是對(duì)他們的職責(zé)是在強(qiáng)加給第三方有關(guān)的資料，是必要和有效的業(yè)績(jī)披露的要求，如外部審計(jì)，有效履行職能監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)的活動(dòng)而不是一個(gè)有權(quán)檢舉。監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)之間的信貸機(jī)構(gòu)和外部審計(jì)師和審計(jì)師的職責(zé)，這些關(guān)系被確認(rèn)為是由國(guó)際商業(yè)信貸銀行案的重要一課。由于核數(shù)師進(jìn)入金融事業(yè)帳戶(hù)和其他重要文件和信息，他們認(rèn)為在整個(gè)監(jiān)管過(guò)程中的地位舉足輕重。一個(gè)國(guó)際商業(yè)信貸銀行的分析表明，措施，增加對(duì)那些已經(jīng)存在的，必須采取消除金融結(jié)構(gòu)的模糊性和加強(qiáng)各機(jī)構(gòu)之間或在這種復(fù)雜的財(cái)務(wù)結(jié)構(gòu)，監(jiān)督有關(guān)人士的合作。因此，對(duì)巴塞爾銀行監(jiān)管委員會(huì)發(fā)布了“最低標(biāo)準(zhǔn)”的制定有效的綜合監(jiān)管和監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)之間的合作規(guī)則。這不僅是為了加強(qiáng)審慎監(jiān)管的國(guó)際合作行動(dòng)，而且要提高財(cái)政透明度，特別是組結(jié)構(gòu)。對(duì)內(nèi)部控制的有效管理的重要性“為有控制問(wèn)題已在其中的職責(zé)沒(méi)有明確界定的組織結(jié)構(gòu)特點(diǎn)確定銀行：因此（1）任何高級(jí)管理人員的監(jiān)督活動(dòng)的執(zhí)行（該組織范圍內(nèi)進(jìn)行的）密切合作，以觀察不同尋常的活動(dòng)（2）任何高級(jí)管理人員的活動(dòng)進(jìn)行了全面的了解，以及如何產(chǎn)生的利潤(rùn)?！庇?995年的巴林銀行倒閉事件，不僅是由于質(zhì)量和員工欺騙缺乏，也帶來(lái)了內(nèi)部控制和管理系統(tǒng)的問(wèn)題突出。霸菱事件說(shuō)明，在銀行監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)的監(jiān)管制度的弱點(diǎn)-這包括在其內(nèi)部監(jiān)控評(píng)估缺陷銀行，瑕疵的內(nèi)部溝通固有范圍內(nèi)的銀行監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)的管理水平，在路上的銀行監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)的現(xiàn)行規(guī)則的弱點(diǎn)應(yīng)用。巴塞爾委員會(huì)分為5組，控制故障屬于經(jīng)營(yíng)不善的銀行和這些特征類(lèi)型分類(lèi)如下：

-缺乏適當(dāng)?shù)墓芾肀O(jiān)督和問(wèn)責(zé)性，以及未能發(fā)展銀行內(nèi)部控制文化強(qiáng)。

-認(rèn)識(shí)不足和對(duì)某些金融活動(dòng)的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)評(píng)估，無(wú)論是資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表或關(guān)閉。

-沒(méi)有或如職責(zé)分離的關(guān)鍵控制結(jié)構(gòu)和活動(dòng)的失敗，審批，核查，核對(duì)和經(jīng)營(yíng)業(yè)績(jī)?cè)u(píng)價(jià)。

-溝通不足之間的內(nèi)部信息管理水平的銀行，特別是信息溝通，排名較高的官員（高級(jí)管理）。

-不足或無(wú)效的審計(jì)方案和監(jiān)測(cè)活動(dòng)。本公司治理的貢獻(xiàn)有效的內(nèi)部控制制度各企業(yè)倒閉，導(dǎo)致財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告，公司治理和審計(jì)轉(zhuǎn)變。關(guān)于內(nèi)部控制和風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理中出現(xiàn)的重點(diǎn)從實(shí)現(xiàn)，由于營(yíng)商環(huán)境的變化，甚至有效的保障措施可能不足以消除所有的失敗的可能性。Keasy和賴(lài)特定義公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)為“審查公司治理和相關(guān)組織內(nèi)的生產(chǎn)，決策，控制等過(guò)程（這兩個(gè)治理方面被認(rèn)為是i，監(jiān)督和管理監(jiān)測(cè)性能（企業(yè)方面）是ii）確保管理層對(duì)股東負(fù)責(zé)及（問(wèn)責(zé)方面）其他利益相關(guān)者。”公司治理到的流動(dòng)性和系統(tǒng)性風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的機(jī)制，反饋效果是這樣說(shuō)明：“企業(yè)管理不善可能導(dǎo)致銀行倒閉，這可能構(gòu)成重大公共成本和后果，因?yàn)樗鼈儗?duì)任何適用的存款保險(xiǎn)系統(tǒng)的潛在影響，以及更廣泛的宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)問(wèn)題，如傳染風(fēng)險(xiǎn)和支付系統(tǒng)的影響的可能性。此外，企業(yè)管理不善可能會(huì)導(dǎo)致市場(chǎng)失去了一家銀行有能力妥善管理其資產(chǎn)和負(fù)債，包括存款的信心，這可能反過(guò)來(lái)，引發(fā)銀行擠兌或流動(dòng)性危機(jī)?！币约皟?nèi)部控制其中包括了內(nèi)部和外部審計(jì)職能，強(qiáng)大的系統(tǒng)，(一)執(zhí)行企業(yè)價(jià)值觀，行為守則，提供適當(dāng)?shù)男袨楹痛_保遵守這些標(biāo)準(zhǔn)所用的系統(tǒng)，（二）明確分配責(zé)任和決策機(jī)關(guān)，（三）該系統(tǒng)將有效保證之間的相互作用和董事，高級(jí)管理人員和審計(jì)委員會(huì)的合作，（四）在利益沖突可能特別是高風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的監(jiān)測(cè)，被認(rèn)為是至關(guān)重要的，以確保良好的公司治理之內(nèi)運(yùn)作的組織。此外，良好的公司治理做法被認(rèn)為是要適當(dāng)和有效的法律，法規(guī)和體制基礎(chǔ)。即使其他因素，例如法律，會(huì)計(jì)業(yè)務(wù)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)。在各自管轄范圍為準(zhǔn)因素被認(rèn)為是超出范圍經(jīng)營(yíng)制度銀行監(jiān)督，監(jiān)督的重要形式四個(gè)列入被認(rèn)為是足夠的，不僅在確保適當(dāng)?shù)闹坪饧敖Y(jié)余存在，但公司治理的一個(gè)有效的制度得以實(shí)現(xiàn)。監(jiān)督的種類(lèi)包括：“（1）由董事會(huì)或監(jiān)事會(huì)監(jiān)督董事會(huì)；（2）未在各個(gè)業(yè)務(wù)領(lǐng)域的日常工作日常運(yùn)轉(zhuǎn)有關(guān)人士的監(jiān)督；（3）不同業(yè)務(wù)領(lǐng)域的直接在線(xiàn)監(jiān)測(cè)；（4）獨(dú)立的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理，合規(guī)和審計(jì)職能。此外，關(guān)鍵是為他們的工作人員的適當(dāng)人選。董事會(huì)，審計(jì)委員會(huì)和高級(jí)管理人員承擔(dān)的角色和貢獻(xiàn)，確保內(nèi)部控制系統(tǒng)有效管理的作用，是體現(xiàn)在內(nèi)部控制系統(tǒng)評(píng)價(jià)的這些原則。監(jiān)測(cè)的重要性和缺陷整改內(nèi)部控制制度的原則是反映在10-12。原則10強(qiáng)調(diào)了在目前的基礎(chǔ)上，同時(shí)頻繁和原則11和12提請(qǐng)注意監(jiān)測(cè)，以有效的合作和訓(xùn)練有素的主管人員溝通的重要性的重要性。根據(jù)流動(dòng)性風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理的聲音和監(jiān)督2008年9月，跨業(yè)務(wù)的內(nèi)部協(xié)調(diào)的巴塞爾委員會(huì)第84原則是努力確保對(duì)資金外流的有效控制是實(shí)現(xiàn)至關(guān)重要。在有關(guān)的行動(dòng)，監(jiān)事可以采取的例子，為手段，以應(yīng)對(duì)銀行流動(dòng)性風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理方面的弱點(diǎn)或過(guò)量的流動(dòng)性風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，而需要由銀行采取行動(dòng)，通過(guò)加強(qiáng)內(nèi)部政策，控制或改善其流動(dòng)性風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理向高級(jí)管理層和董事會(huì)，被認(rèn)為是最有可能解決在銀行的流動(dòng)性風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理的過(guò)程或流動(dòng)資金不足。由于觀察到巴塞爾委員會(huì)大部分已經(jīng)經(jīng)歷了從內(nèi)部控制問(wèn)題的損失沒(méi)有有效地監(jiān)督其內(nèi)部控制系統(tǒng)的銀行。通常系統(tǒng)不具備必要的內(nèi)置不斷監(jiān)測(cè)過(guò)程和進(jìn)行的獨(dú)立評(píng)價(jià)是不是沒(méi)有足夠或沒(méi)有適當(dāng)?shù)墓芾頃r(shí)采取行動(dòng)。此外，它著重指出，此類(lèi)不充分監(jiān)測(cè)與一個(gè)不考慮和展開(kāi)反應(yīng)一天到一天的信息提供給生產(chǎn)線(xiàn)管理，并指出不尋常的活動(dòng)。如超出風(fēng)險(xiǎn)限額，在私有的商業(yè)活動(dòng)或缺乏客戶(hù)目前的財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表由借款人賬戶(hù)的其他人員。在實(shí)施監(jiān)管標(biāo)準(zhǔn)和監(jiān)管，是突出強(qiáng)調(diào)了在其咨詢(xún)文件。一個(gè)監(jiān)督的辦法不僅包括對(duì)外部審計(jì)人員的專(zhuān)業(yè)知識(shí)，巴塞爾委員會(huì)這一工具是一個(gè)站點(diǎn)系統(tǒng)，更傾向于基礎(chǔ)的辦法建議。在支持這一觀點(diǎn)，提到了從巴林銀行的地方是由財(cái)政委員會(huì)指出，這是由于主管的辦法監(jiān)督酌情權(quán)，有能力有限，偵查巴林銀行事件崩潰的經(jīng)驗(yàn)教訓(xùn)。監(jiān)管標(biāo)準(zhǔn)和監(jiān)測(cè)工具，在國(guó)際清算銀行咨詢(xún)文件內(nèi)，因此對(duì)他們的能力，以便更正式的方法來(lái)監(jiān)督這將減少對(duì)彈性范圍（創(chuàng)造性的會(huì)計(jì)慣例的范圍和“華而不實(shí)的平衡”的基礎(chǔ)支持表的數(shù)字）在一對(duì)現(xiàn)場(chǎng)監(jiān)督實(shí)施辦法。外文原文：INTERNATIONALFRAMEWORKFORLIQUIDITYRISKMEASUREMENT,STANDARDSANDMONITORING:CORPORATEGOVERNANCEANDINTERNALCONTROLSMarianneOjoA.LiquidityRisksInFebruary2008,theBaselCommitteeonBankingSupervisionpublishedapapertitled“LiquidityRiskManagementandSupervisoryChallenges”,apaperwhichhighlightedthefactthatmanybankshadignoredtheapplicationofanumberofbasicprinciplesofliquidityriskmanagementduringperiodsofabundantliquidity.Anextensivereviewofits2000“SoundPracticesforManagingLiquidityinBankingOrganisations”wasalsocarriedoutbytheBaselCommitteeasameansofaddressingmattersandissuesarisingfromthefinancialmarketsandlessonsfromtheFinancialCrises.InordertoconsolidateontheBaselCommitteeforBankingSupervision’sPrinciplesforSoundLiquidityRiskManagementandSupervisionofSeptember2008,whichshouldleadtoimprovedmanagementandsupervisionofliquidityrisksofindividualbanks,supervisorybodieswillberequired“todeveloptoolsandpoliciestoaddresstheprocyclicalbehaviourofliquidityattheaggregatelevel.ThePrinciplesforSoundLiquidityRiskManagementandSupervisionofSeptember2008areaimedatproviding“consistentsupervisoryexpectations”onprincipalelementssuchas“boardandseniormanagementoversight;theestablishmentofpoliciesandrisktolerance;theuseofliquidityriskmanagementtoolssuchascomprehensivecashflowforecasting,limitsandliquidityscenariostresstesting;andthemaintenanceofasufficientcushionofhighqualityliquidassetstoaddresscontingentliquidityneeds.”Thethreeaspectstoprocyclicality–ashighlightedintheImpactAssessmentDocumentamendingtheCapitalRequirementsDirective,havethepotentialtotriggerachainreaction.Startingwithremunerationschemes,theimpactoftheseonmanagementincentives,couldhaveapositiveornegativeeffectonbankregulations(suchasBaselIIortheCRD).Suchregulationscouldthenmitigateorexacerbateprocyclicaleffects–dependingontheeffectivenessofcapitaladequacyrules.Apositiveeffectofsuchruleswouldreducethetendencyofbankstocutbackonlendingduringeconomic“busts”whilstincentivestoretainliquiditywouldbeincreased–hencereducingthelikelihoodoftheoccurrenceofmaturitymismatches.ThelinkbetweenliquidityandsystemicrisksasillustratedintheECB’sFinancialStabilityReview,isattributedtothe“destructionofspecificknowledgewhichbankshaveabouttheirborrowersandthereductionofthecommonpoolofliquidity.”Theimportanceofthelinkbetweenliquidityrisksandsystemicriskswithinthebankingsectorishighlightedbytheconsequencesattributedtothereluctanceofbankstoretainliquidity-giventhecostofholdingliquidity.Theconsequentialshortfallsofliquidityasreflectedbyonandoffbalancesheetmaturitymismatchesaccentuatestheimportanceoftheroleassumedbycentralbanksinthefundingofbankbalancesheets.Thelinkbetweenliquidityandsystemicrisksisalsoaccentuatedunderparagraph77oftheBCBSPrinciplesforSoundLiquidityRiskManagementandSupervisionofSeptember2008.Principle8statesthat:“Abankshouldactivelymanageitsintradayliquiditypositionsandriskstomeetpaymentandsettlementobligationsonatimelybasisunderbothnormalandstressedconditionsandthuscontributetothesmoothfunctioningofpaymentandsettlementsystems.”P(pán)aragraph77elaboratesonthisbyhighlightingthereasonswhy“intradayliquiditymanagement”constitutesanimportantcomponentofabank’s“broaderliquiditymanagementstrategy.”Itgoesontostatethatabank’sfailuretomanageintradayliquidityeffectivelycouldresultinitsinabilitytomeetpaymentobligationsastheyfalldue,-hencegeneratingconsequences,notonlyforitsownliquidityposition,butalsothatofotherparties.Itillustrateshowthiscouldoccurintwoways,namely:-“Thefactthatthatcounterpartiesmayviewthefailuretosettlepaymentswhenexpected,asasignoffinancialweakness–whichinturncouldresultnotonlyinpaymentstothebankbeingdelayedorwithheld,butalsoinfurtheraggravationofliquiditypressures.-Italsocouldleavecounterpartiesunexpectedlyshortoffunds,impairthosecounterparties’abilitytomeetpaymentobligations,anddisruptthesmoothfunctioningofpaymentandsettlementsystems.Giventheinterdependenciesthatexistamongsystems,abank’sfailuretomeetcertaincriticalpaymentscouldleadtoliquiditydislocationsthatcascadequicklyacrossmanysystemsandinstitutions.Ifriskcontrolsareoverwhelmed,thesedislocationscouldaltermanybanks’intradayorovernightfundingneeds,includingtheirdemandsforcentralbankcredit,andpotentiallyaffectconditionsinmoneymarkets.Thedelayofotherlesscriticalpaymentsalsomightcauseotherinstitutionstopostponetheirownpayments,causemanybankstofaceincreaseduncertaintyabouttheirovernightfundingneedsandpotentiallyincreasetheimpactofanyoperationaloutages.”Liquidityisconsideredtobe“highlyprocyclical,growingingoodtimesanddryingupintimesofstress.”Duringthebuilduptothepresentcrisis,banksandotherfinancialinstitutionshadanincentivetominimisethecostofholdingliquidity.Giventhefactthatliquiditycouldalsobeprocyclicalandgivenitsroleintherecentcrisis,perhapsfourdimensionstoprocyclicalityshouldhavebeenintroducedintheImpactAssessmentDocumentamendingtheCapitalRequirementsDirective–incorporatingliquidityasafourthheading.Thegrowingimportanceofformalisationwithinthebankregulatoryframeworkisalsoattributedtothegapswhichexistwithinadiscretionarybasedsystemofbanksupervision–aswasrevealedintheaftermathofBaringPlc’scollapse.Therecentcrisishasalsohighlightedtheneedforformalriskassessmentmodels–asdemonstratedbythedemiseofLehmanBrotherswherethefailuresofauditorstodetectbalancesheetirregularities(owingtocreativeaccountingpractices)wasbroughttolight.TheformalframeworkforthemeasurementofcapitaladequacyatEuropeanCommunitylevel,asexemplifiedbytheInternationalConvergenceofCapitalMeasurementsandCapitalStandards(RevisedFramework),namelyBasel2,istobecommended,notonlybecauseof“theneedforaconsistentframeworkforthereportingandcomparativeanalysisofbankcapitalpositions,thedemandofregulatedinstitutionsfortransparencyandequalityintheapplicationofregulatorystandards”,butalsobecauseof“theexigenciesoftheinternationalconvergenceprocess.whichrequiresthetransparentanduniformimplementationofharmonisedrulesbytheregulatorsofeverycountry.Aspartofmeasuresaimedatconsolidatingand“promotingconsistencyininternationalliquidityrisksupervision”,andinresponsetothe“inaccurateandineffectivemanagementofliquidityrisk”–aswasprominentlyhighlightedduringtherecentfinancialcrisis,theBaselCommitteehasdevelopeda“minimumsetofmonitoringtoolstobeusedintheongoingmonitoringoftheliquidityriskexposuresofcrossborderinstitutionsandincommunicatingtheseexposuresamongsthomeandhostsupervisors.”TheLiquidityCoverageRatioandtheNetStableFundingRatioaretworegulatorystandardsforliquidityriskwhichservethepurposeofattainingtheobjectivesof“promotingshort-termresiliencyoftheliquidityriskprofileofinstitutions”(byensuringthattheyhaveadequatehighqualityliquidresourcestosurviveduringperiodsofextremestresswhichlastforaboutonemonth)and“promotingresiliencyoverlonger-termperiods”(throughthecreationofadditionalincentivesforbankstofundtheiractivitieswithmorestablesourcesoffundingonanongoingbasis).Inadditiontotheabove-mentionedstandards,theBaselCommitteerecommendsthatsupervisorsalsoimplementdesignatedmonitoringtoolsonaconsistentbasis.Suchmonitoringtools,alongwiththestandards,areintendedtoprovidesupervisorswithinformationwhichshouldaidtheirassessmentofliquidityrisksattributedtoaparticularbank.Thesemonitoringtoolsinclude:ContractualMaturityMismatch,ConcentrationofFunding,AvailableUnencumberedAssetsandmarket–relatedmonitoringtools.B.DisclosureAswellastheneedforgreaterfocusonliquidityrisk,thereisalsotheneedforgreaterrelianceondisclosurerequirements.Thiswillbefacilitatedthroughaneffectivemonitoringprocesswherebyidentifiedrisksareeffectivelycommunicatedacrossalllevelsofmanagement.Enhancedtransparencydoesnotonlyhavethepotentialto“improveanunderstandingofthemechanismatplayinstructuredfinance”,butalsofacilitatetheidentificationofrisksandensurethatrisksarewellcontrolled.35Riskyloanswhichwere“repackagedandsoldtoinstitutionalinvestors”–someofwhomdidnotfullycomprehendtheimplicationsofthetransactionstheywereengagedin(orabouttobeengagedin),andtheinherentrisksassociatedwiththosetransactions,areconsideredtobecontributoryfactorstothe2007/09FinancialCrisis.Regulatorswillbeabletogaingreateraccesstovitalinformationwhichisrequiredforeffectiveperformanceoftheirfunctionswheredutiesareimposedonthirdparties,suchasexternalauditors,inrelationtothedisclosureofinformationwhichisnecessaryandrequiredfortheefficientperformanceoftheregulators’activities–asopposedtoarighttoreport.TherelationshipbetweensupervisoryauthoritiesandtheexternalauditorsofacreditinstitutionandthedutiesoftheseauditorswasidentifiedasanimportantlessonfromtheBCCIcase.Becauseofauditors’accesstofinancialundertakings’accountsandotheressentialdocumentsandinformation,theyassumeavitalpositionintheoverallsupervisoryprocess.AnanalysisofBCCIrevealedthatmeasures,additionaltothosealreadyexisting,neededtobetakentoeliminatetheopaquenessoffinancialstructuresandstrengthencooperationbetweenallbodiesorpersonsinvolvedinthesupervisionofsuchcomplexfinancialstructures.Asaresult,theBaselCommitteeforBankingSupervisionissued“minimumstandards”whichlaydownrulesforeffectiveconsolidatedsupervisionandcooperationbetweensupervisoryauthorities.Thiswasnotonlyaimedatstrengtheninginternationalcooperationbetweenprudentialsupervisors,butalsotoimprovetransparencyoffinancial,andinparticular,groupstructures.C.TheImportanceofEffectiveManagementofInternalControls“Banksidentifiedashavingcontrolproblemshavebeencharacterisedbyorganisationalstructuresinwhichresponsibilitieswerenotclearlydefined:hence(1)Noseniormanagementmonitoredtheperformanceofactivities(carriedoutwithintheorganisation)closelytoobserveunusualactivities2)Noseniormanagementhadacomprehensiveunderstandingoftheactivitiesandhowprofitswerebeinggenerated.”ThecollapseofBaringsin1995whichwasattributednotonlytolackofqualityandemployeeeception,alsobroughttheissueofinternalcontrolsandmanagementsystemstothefore.Baringsollapseillustratedweaknessesinthebankregulator’ssupervisoryregime-whichincludedflawsithinitsevaluationofinternalcontrolsatbanks,flawsinherentintheinternalcommunicationithinlevelsofmanagementofthebankregulator,andtheweaknessesinthewaythebankegulator’sexistingruleswereapplied.TheBaselCommitteecategorisedintofivegroups,typesofcontrolbreakdownswhicharecharacteristicofailingbanksandtheseareasfollows:-Lackofadequatemanagementoversightandaccountability,andfailuretodevelopastrongcontrolculturewithinthebank-Inadequaterecognitionandassessmentoftheriskofcertainbankingactivities,whetheronoroffbalancesheet-Theabsenceorfailureofkeycontrolstructuresandactivitiessuchassegregationofduties,approvals,verifications,reconciliationsandreviewsofoperatingperformance-Inadequatecommunicationofinformationbetweenlevelsofmanagementwithinthebank–particularlythecommunicationofinformationtohigherrankedofficials(seniormanagement)InadequateorineffectiveauditprogrammesandmonitoringactivitiesD.TheContributionofCorporateGovernancetoanEffectiveSystemofInternalControlsVariouscorporatecollapseshaveresultedinchangestofinancialreporting,corporategovernanceandaudit.44Theemphasisoninternalcontrolsandriskmanagementemergedfromrealisationthatduetochangeinthebusinessenvironment,eveneffectivesafeguardsmaybeinsufficienttoeliminateallpossibilitiesoffailure.KeasyandWrightdefinecorporategovernanceasthe“examinationofthestructuresandprocessesassociatedwithproduction,decisionmaking,controlandsoonwithinanorganisation.”Thetwoaspectsofgovernanceareconsideredtobei)Supervisionandmonitoringofmanagementperformance(theenterpriseaspect)andii)ensuringaccountabilityofmanagementtoshareholdersandotherstakeholders(theaccountabilityaspect).Thefeedbackeffectsofcorporategovernanceintotheliquidityandsystemicriskmechanismsareillustratedthus:“Poorcorporategovernancemaycontributetobankfailures,whichcouldposesignificantpubliccostsandconsequencesduetotheirpotentialimpactonanyapplicabledepositinsurancesystemsandthepossibilityofbroadermacroeconomicimplications,suchascontagionriskandimpactonpaymentssystems.Furthermore,poorcorporategovernancecouldresultinmarketslosingconfidenceintheabilityofabanktoproperlymanageitsassetsandliabilities,includingdeposits,whichcouldinturn,triggerabankrunorliquiditycrisis.”Aswellasarobustsystemofinternalcontrols(whichincorporatesinternalandexternalauditfunctions),theimplementationofi)corporatevalues,codesofconduct,standardsofappropriatebehaviourandthesystemusedinensuringcompliancewiththese,ii)aclearallocationofresponsibilitiesanddecisionmakingauthorities,iii)theestablishmentofasystemwhichwouldguaranteeefficientinteractionandcollaborationbetweentheboardofdirectors,seniormanagementandauditors,andiv)specialmonitoringofriskexposureswhereconflictsofinterestarelikelytobehigh,areconsideredtobecrucialtoensuringthatsoundcorporategovernanceoperateswithinanorganization.Furthermore,soundcorporategovernancepracticesareconsideredtorequire“appropriateandeffectivelegal,regulatoryandinstitutionalfoundations.”Eventhoughfactorssuchasthesystemofbusinesslawsandaccountingstandardswhichprevailinrespectivejurisdictionsareconsideredtobefactorswhichoperatebeyondthescopeofbankingsupervision,theinclusionoffourimportantformsofoversightareconsideredsufficientnotonlyinensuringthatappropriatechecksandbalancesexist,butthataneffectivesystemofcorporategovernancecanbeachieved.Thetypesofoversightinclude:“(1)oversightbytheboardofdirectorsorsupervisoryboard;(2)oversightbyindividualsnotinvolvedintheday-to-dayrunningofthevariousbusinessareas;(3)directlinesupervisionofdifferentbusinessareas;and(4)independentriskmanagement,complianceandauditfunctions.Inaddition,itisimportantthatkeypersonnelarefitandproperfortheirjobs.”Thecontributionandtheroleassumedbyseniormanagementinensuringthatinternalcontrolsystemsareeffectivelymanaged,isreflectedthroughthePrinciplesfortheAssessmentofInternalControlSystems.Theimportanceofmonitoringandtherectificationofdeficiencieswithininternalcontrolsystemsisreflectedunderprinciples10-12.Principle10highlightstheimportanceofmonitoringonafrequentandongoingbasiswhilstprinciples11and12drawattentiontotheimportanceofeffectivecollaborationandcommunicationbetweenhighlytrainedcompetentstaff,theboardofdirectors,auditcommitteesandseniormanagement.Accordingtoparagraph84oftheBCBSPrinciplesforSoundLiquidityRiskManagementandSupervisionofSeptember2008,internalcoordinationacrossbusinesslinesisvitaltowardsensuringthateffectivecontrolsoverliquidityoutflowsareachieved.Inrelationtoexamplesofactionswhichsupervisorscouldadopt,asmeansofrespondingtobankswithliquidityriskmanagementweaknessesore